MIGRANT RIGHTS, VOTING, AND RESOCIALIZATION:
Suffrage in Chile and Ecuador, 1925–2020

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Resumen

Los emigrantes pueden votar desde el extranjero en unos 120 territorios y los inmigrantes pueden votar en unos 50 países. Muchos migrantes internacionales pueden votar o abstenerse tanto en el país de origen como en el de residencia, lo que hace que haya cuatro tipos distintos de comportamiento electoral de los emigrantes: el voto de los inmigrantes, el de los emigrantes, el doble voto transnacional y la abstención. La participación política de los migrantes afecta a la toma de decisiones democráticas y a los resultados electorales en *dos* comunidades políticas. Mi objetivo es desentrañar por qué los migrantes deciden votar o abstenerse en el país de origen o de residencia, en ambos o en ninguno. Realicé encuestas en Chile y entrevistas en Ecuador, casos probables en los que encontrar individuos con derecho a voto a nivel nacional en dos países. Sostengo que la resocialización política ayuda a explicar la participación electoral de los migrantes a nivel individual. Postulo que los recursos combinados con los vínculos con personas o lugares en uno o ambos países constituyen una condición necesaria y los recursos con un motivo para votar sirven como condición suficiente para el voto de los migrantes. Los estudios de caso arrojan luz sobre los orígenes legales y normativos del derecho de voto durante el último siglo, las diferencias entre las variantes de voto de los migrantes y cómo los procesos de (re)socialización política ayudan a explicar por qué los migrantes votan y por qué cambian su comportamiento electoral a lo largo del tiempo.

Abstract

Emigrants can vote from abroad for about 120 territories and immigrants can vote in about 50 countries. Many international migrants can vote or abstain in both the origin and residence countries, making four distinct types of migrant electoral behavior: immigrant, emigrant, and dual transnational voting, as well as abstention. Migrant political participation affects democratic decision-making and electoral outcomes in two polities, reasons for which both migrant enfranchisement and voting merit scholarly research. My goal is to unpack why migrants decide to vote or abstain in either the origin or residence country, in both, or in neither. I conducted surveys in Chile and interviews in Ecuador, likely cases to find individuals with national-level voting rights in two countries. I argue that political resocialization helps to explain individual-level migrant voter turnout. I posit resources combined with ties to people or places in one or both countries constitute a necessary condition, and resources with a motive to vote serves as a sufficient condition for migrant voting. Rather than a trade-off of replacement, over time migrants change their positioning and motives to vote in one country or both. The case studies shed light on the legal and normative origins of migrant enfranchisement over the last century, differences among migrant voting variants, and how political (re)socialization processes help explain why migrants vote and change voting behavior over time.

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Introduction

Why do migrants vote? In what ways do migrants' ties to the origin country keep them voting? When becoming more rooted in the residence country, what happens to their voting behavior over time? Combining these multifaceted research questions exposes critical interlinkages that shed light on the phenomenon of migrant voting. Human behavior lies at the center of this discussion: individuals are active agents in societies and polities participating in more than one place. Migrants' dual lives unfold in and between origin and residence countries, given their experiences in social surroundings and interactions with state and non-state institutions under different political regimes. A growing number of migrant voters across world regions merit research into when, where, and why migrants vote or abstain. The aim of this kind of research is to give meaning to, and make sense of, migrants' unique positioning as both emigrants and immigrants and how that affects their participation in two countries' national-level elections.

'Migrants' in this dissertation refer to adults who relocated across international borders, comprising foreign residents (immigrants and denizens) in their new residence, or destination, country and nonresident nationals for the origin country (emigrants abroad or overseas and the diaspora), including dual nationals. While more inclusive democracies incorporate migrants into the demos, or political community, *participation* serves as a main pillar of democracy. Once states enfranchise migrants, mainstream studies have largely overlooked how and to what extent suffrage rights affect migrant voting decisions (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017). To fill this gap, I chose individual-level migrant voting as the dependent variable; using original survey and interview data, I explore what voting means to migrants and unpack how multiterritorial ties can influence migrant voting behavior.

Migrant voters exercise suffrage in four ways: immigrant voting (foreign residents vote only in the residence country), emigrant voting (nonresident nationals vote only for the origin country from abroad), dual transnational voting (in both countries), and abstention (not voting in either, despite holding suffrage rights) (Finn 2020a). I capture and summarize these four migrant voting options in a typology (see Figure 1) that provides a framework for 1) classifying migrant voting and questioning the reasons migrant voters lie in one quadrant and not another.; and 2) analyzing voters' electoral behavior by following their political resocialization paths, showing changes in migrant electoral behavior over time. The typology serves as the dissertation's key framework for exploring migrant voting and individual migrants' decisions to participate or abstain in two countries' elections throughout their voting lives.

When deciding whether to vote, all voters are influenced by factors such as education and life-cycle stages. However, international migrants who have the right to vote in two countries are influenced by additional factors unique to their life circumstances (see Section 1.2 in Chapter 1). Moreover, while all voters experience varying degrees of political socialization from interacting with agents in and beyond institutions like the media, education, family members, and acquaintances (e.g., Froman 1961, Rolfe and Chan 2017), migrants politically socialized in one country, then moved and live outside their origin country, further distinguishing them as voters (see e.g., Paul 2013, Waldinger 2015, Chaudhary 2018). International relocation, which involves an uprooting of connections to the origin country, then re-rooting to the residence country, is a shock that affects any migrant's life. Yet new connections or ties do not simply replace the old ties. Individuals change their original, national citizen-state relation to an emigrant-origin state relation and gain a new, immigrant-residence state relation. I hypothesize that, over time, migrants maintain, adjust, or shrink their connections or "roots" to both the origin and residence countries and the people living in these countries. I further suggest that the three possible outcomes in two countries result in nine possible resocialization pathways, which I call the Roots Routes, based on the idea that changing ties to people and places changes individual-level migrant voter turnout.

I select Chile and Ecuador as case studies, in which I consider each individual as simultaneously an immigrant and emigrant. Both countries offer immigrants the right to vote in national-level elections after a five-year residence (without naturalizing, i.e., adopting the country's nationality), which is rarer than offering emigrant suffrage rights to nationals abroad. Ecuador allows foreign residents to register after five years whereas Chile automatically registers foreign residents as voters. Most of their foreign-born populations also hold emigrant voting rights, which facilitates finding individuals who can potentially vote in national-level elections in two countries—that of residence and origin. For each country case study, I analyze the history of full migrant enfranchisement to set the context for migrant voting, contributing my own original research. The legal process can contain lags or rights reversal, highlighting enfranchising migrants is not necessarily linear or permanent. In Chile, I demonstrate the typology's first use to more quantitatively outline which migrants vote and the second more qualitative use in Ecuador to start to unpack the reasons migrants give to explain why they vote.

My historic analysis of Chile's long road to migrant enfranchisement in 1925, 1980, and 2014 is sourced from national censuses, newspaper archives, transcriptions from commissions reviewing the constitution, and constitutional articles. For migrant voting in Chile, I combine official statistics,

electoral registries, and an original online survey of 1,482 migrants during Chile's 2017 presidential election, to highlight differences between the typology's four migrant voting types. For Ecuador's comparatively short road to enfranchisement, I examine electoral laws, academic studies, and the 1998 and 2008 Constitution. My analysis of migrant voting is based on 71 interviews conducted in Ecuador in 2019 with migrants from Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, and Venezuela who had lived under various (non)democratic political regimes. My study of migrant voting in Ecuador is a vehicle to explore the reasons migrants vote, abstain, or are prevented from voting.

Through this dissertation, I raise questions and discussions on larger concepts regarding contemporary citizenship practices and migrant political participation in more than one country. I attempt to reconceptualize migrant voting by categorizing it into four distinct types. Migrant voters not only differ from other voters but also among themselves. The most unique group comprise those who vote in both origin- and residence-country elections, which I call 'dual transnational voting.' Dual transnational voters remain underrepresented in existing literature, despite their potential impact on electoral outcomes in two countries and despite the importance of their democratic participation as a novel suffrage practice in the globalized world. Finally, I offer a framework for evaluating migrants' political resocialization processes, which I do by showing various trajectories of migrants becoming embedded within a place through their ties to people and the country. While this dissertation focuses on migrant voting behavior, scholars can apply the same framework to other social phenomena, particularly migrant participation in societies of residence and origin.

After elaborating on the dissertation's main concepts and the migrant voting typology in Chapter 1, I analyze evidence from Chile in Chapter 2 and from Ecuador in Chapter 3. After gaining suffrage rights and enough resources to vote, migrants also need *reasons* to turn out. For some, reasons are straightforward but for others, they involve a complex time-sensitive mix of ties, duties, trust, loyalty, and perceptions toward a certain country (or nation-state), political parties, and people. I find that, alongside being invested in a country's future, multiterritorial ties to people and places tend to ebb and flow, in turn affecting migrants' choices to vote or abstain in two countries. The findings establish the foundation for my claim in Chapter 4 that international migration is a shock that starts the political resocialization process, during which an individual maintains or adjusts political attitudes, values, and behavior over time. Interactions with agents in both countries, and in the social spaces between them (see Figure 1.3), migrants can grow, maintain, or shrink their roots in both countries, as I capture in the Roots Routes (see Figure 4.1). Each route influences migrants' decisions to vote in one or neither

country or in both countries—meaning each migrant's route is linked to their current quadrant in the migrant voting typology.

In the rest of the Introduction, I expand on the main concepts of migrant political rights, voting, and resocialization and how this study will contribute to the gaps in relevant literature. Then I present my migrant voting typology, used as a framework throughout the analysis, followed by my hypotheses built from theories from pertinent literature. I justify the two country case selections and explain the methods used for my analysis, before elaborating on the aims and contributions to be drawn from my findings. I conclude by outlining the four chapters, showing how the dissertation fits together to shed light on the phenomenon of migrant voting.

Introducing Migrant Rights, Voting, and Political Resocialization

Over 120 autonomous territories grant some migrants a form of suffrage rights in local or national elections, or both (Earnest 2008, 2015a, Arrighi and Bauböck 2017, GLOBALCIT 2019, IDEA 2019). Suffrage rights define political membership in the demos, so when states include foreign residents, they eliminate the nationality requirement for voting and when they include nationals abroad, they eliminate the residence requirement (Caramani and Grotz 2015). In this sense, 'morphing the demos' (Bauböck 2015) has reshaped traditional nationality and territorial requirements for membership in the political community, extending the concept and practices of citizenship 'beyond nationality' (Pedroza 2019). While legal distinctions between nationals and non-nationals remain, more countries offer more individuals formal voice in the decision-making process than any time in the past.

My study builds and expands on relevant literature on granting migrant rights, which has been emerging since the 2000s. Numerous studies examine the theoretical and normative reasons why states grant suffrage rights to migrants (e.g., López-Guerra 2005, Bauböck 2007, 2015, Beckman 2007, Owen 2012), why states should enfranchise refugees (Bender 2021), and why states should re-enfranchise migrants after reversing such rights (on the United States [US], see Hayduk 2006). Various macro enfranchisement analyses focus on the drivers, patterns, and timing (e.g., Earnest 2008, 2015a, Lafleur 2015, Turcu and Urbatsch 2015, Koopmans and Michalowski 2016). Other studies have assessed immigrant enfranchisement discussions and reforms at subnational levels, especially in the EU, with their successes and failures (Pedroza 2013, 2019, Piccoli 2021); and Michel and Blatter (2021) examine to what extent public opinion supports enfranchising emigrants and immigrants in Europe.

While research on migrant enfranchisement has progressed over the last decades, many aspects have yet to be analyzed at different levels within and across the globe. Past studies tend to limit their scope to advanced democracies, leaving out hybrid and competitive authoritarian regimes that also hold elections. However, exceptions exist since some studies have indeed addressed different regimes and emigrant enfranchisement in various African states (e.g., Brand 2010, Wellman 2015, 2021, Wellman and Whitaker 2021). Studies on Latin America and the Caribbean also include different regimes and colonial legacies, such as Erlingsson and Tuman (2017) analyzing 24 countries and Belton (2019) comparing Caribbean countries.

Additionally, country case studies tend to focus on either emigrant or immigrant enfranchisement, such as on Mexico (Calderón Chelius 2003), New Zealand (Barker and McMillan 2014, McMillan 2015), Portugal (Pedroza 2019), South Korea (Mosler and Pedroza 2016, Chang and Pedroza 2020), and Uruguay (Stuhldreher 2012). Prominent research on external voting in Latin America also comes from Jean-Michel Lafleur (Lafleur and Calderón Chelius 2011, Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015, Bermudez *et al.* 2017). Taking a historic view, Allen, Nyblade, and Wellman (2020) are compiling a dataset on worldwide emigrant enfranchisement rights' modes and durability; however, they still exclude immigrant rights in the dataset.

To fill in some of these gaps in migrant enfranchisement studies, I focus on both immigrant and emigrant enfranchisement processes in two countries. I build especially from analyses conducted by Escobar (2007, 2015, 2017) since they focus on Latin America and include processes of both immigrant and emigrant voting rights. For both Chile and Ecuador, I examine their enfranchisement processes, drawing on Palop-García and Pedroza's (2019) three steps that states enact, regulate, then apply migrant voting rights. I choose Chile as a pioneer of granting immigrant suffrage and Ecuador as a later example of enacting both immigrant and emigrant rights simultaneously (Escobar 2015). Chile was a top-down early adopter of immigrant suffrage in 1925 in local-level elections, extending these to the national level in the 1980 Constitution, curiously enacted under a military dictatorship (Finn 2020b). In contrast, Ecuador was a relative latecomer in 2008, seemingly adhering to the global-norms hypothesis (i.e., the expansion of human rights encourages enfranchisement) and bottom-up demand from civil society. However, regarding emigrant suffrage, Ecuador began emigrant enactment in the 1990s and implemented it in 2006 onwards whereas Chile was a regional latecomer, enacting it much later in 2014 and implementing it in 2017. Besides the legal steps, I also explore the reasons why and how Chile and Ecuador granted migrant suffrage. For example, Chile challenges existent reasons to expand the demos and highlights the importance of migrants knowing about their voting rights.

Data collected in Ecuador reveal how immigrants and emigrants can have rights on paper yet face challenges exercising them in practice. As such, it contributes to larger debates in migration studies about the boundaries of the demos, as well as recent work by Allen and colleagues (2020) on the modes of migrant suffrage enactment and the durability of application over time.

After states grant voting rights, my focus shifts to migrants exercising these rights, another aspect not fully explained by relevant literature. Migrants mirror other voters in some ways yet hold additional characteristics that influence their electoral decisions for turnout and vote choice. Drawing on Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), individuals overall politically participate because they can, they want to, and because they are invited to. Individuals can participate because they have enough resources; they want to because they are interested in participating; and finally, they are invited to participate by various nodes and agents encouraging them to vote. To examine individuals' electoral decisions, I look at learning processes that occur during political socialization and resocialization that ultimately influence individuals' voting behavior.

Early Political Psychology, Sociology, and Political Science studies on children's political socialization shows that they acquire civic norms and values from surrounding influences and actors (e.g., Hyman 1959, Bender 1967, Niemi 1973, Eliasoph 1998, Morawska 2013). Interactions within a network early on establishes social psychological micro-foundations (Rolfe 2012). Political experiences in pre-adulthood also directly shape political decisions, including future electoral behavior (Hyman 1959). However, although influential, political socialization experiences in the formative years growing up do not fully determine electoral behavior in adult life (Searing *et al.* 1973, Niemi and Sobieszek 1977, Jennings and Niemi 1981, Niemi and Hepburn 1995). Instead, political learning continues over time: the lifelong openness perspective explains that people keep learning through new experiences with individual and institutional agents (see Sigel 1989, Sears and Funk 1999, Sears and Brown 2013, Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017). Additionally, adults who migrate also undergo political *re*socialization, post-migration (Sigel 1989, Paul 2013).

As I have defined in other works, "political resocialization is a cognitive learning process during which individuals maintain or adjust political attitudes, values, and behavior based on individual and institutional agents within a new context" (Finn 2020a, p. 733). For adult migrants, I suggest that their initial political socialization—which began while growing up in the origin country—ends when they move to a different country, which instigates their political resocialization process. Simplifying some of the drivers of migration and the 'capability' to move (see Carling 2002, de Haas 2021), the more forced the migration was, and the larger the difference between the two countries' political systems,

the larger the shock. I attempt to explain why and how migrants decide to participate, or not, in national elections in origin and residence countries by asking them about their political learning before, during, and after migration.

Migrants, unlike other voters, undergo what Paul (2013, p. 195) calls "layered learning experiences," which accumulate over time and across spaces. Layered experiences in turn affect migrant political behavior, including the electoral decision to vote or abstain. One remanent, or layered prior experience, is what Bilodeau (2014, p. 362) calls authoritarian imprints, defining them as migrants having "an imprint of their political socialization under an authoritarian regime [that] marks their general outlook on politics." Authoritarian imprints from the origin country can affect political behavior in the residence country, as evidenced in Australia and Canada (Bilodeau and Nevitte 2003, Bilodeau 2004, 2014, Bilodeau, McAllister, *et al.* 2010). I add to the discussion of authoritarian imprints by analyzing migrant voting in Chile and Ecuador, countries that host migrants with low or no language barriers and who experienced political socialization under nondemocracy. The case studies offer an opportunity to unpack migrants' hybrid and authoritarian imprints in a South American context (also see Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero 2021).

Migrants, as both emigrants and immigrants, have ties, or roots, to both countries and the people who live there and are politically influenced by both throughout their lives. Over time, migrants grow, maintain, or shrink their roots; three possible scenarios in two countries result in nine possible resocialization pathways ($3^2=9$), what I call the Roots Routes. The paths map migrants' trajectories of forming and adjusting ties to a country (duty, patriotism, wanting to contribute) and people within the country (family and close friends), both as an immigrant voter in a residence country and as an emigrant voter for the origin country. On explaining political participation, I follow Rolfe's position that studies should consider not only individuals but also take their social interactions seriously since they affect social outcomes; people are "embedded in particular social contexts" and expectations shape their role within the political world (Rolfe 2012, pp. 2, 16; also see Ryan and Mulholland 2015; Ryan 2018).

The Roots Routes are a step towards improving existent resocialization theories of resistance, exposure, and transferability (White *et al.* 2008) to reveal meaning and motivations behind migrant voting and voting behavior changes over time, which I expand on later in this Introduction. The Roots Routes show the process of migrants becoming embedded within the 'soil' of society and through different social interactions and relations, with and within a country, nurturing the roots so they grow deeper (see Chapter 4). However, they can be uprooted or wither away when the soil lacks water and

nutrients—relations may be insufficient to solidify migrants' roots in a hostile society toward emigrants (e.g., perceiving them as "traitors") or immigrants (e.g., as "outsiders"). While I examine migrant voting in specific contexts and the experiences that continue to shape voting behavior, the framework can be applied beyond this dissertation's focus, for instance, to studies of belonging, participation, and integration at the individual or group level.

Framework: A Migrant Voting Typology of Voting Here, There, in Both Countries, or Nowhere

To analyze why migrants vote or abstain, I propose a typology that categorizes four types of migrant voting (see Figure 1) based on how an individual votes from abroad as an emigrant for origin-country elections and as an immigrant voting in the residence country. The typology can explain the voting behavior of migrants who have, or potentially will have, voting rights in both the origin and residence countries. It is not meant to gauge political integration but rather to capture if a migrant either votes or abstains, in the origin and residence countries. This creates four types of migrant voting: 1) immigrant voting, meaning foreign residents participate only in the residence country; 2) emigrant voting, indicating nonresident nationals participate from abroad only in the origin country; 3) dual transnational voting, or participating in both countries; and 4) abstention, or choosing not to vote despite having suffrage rights in both countries (Finn 2020a). Migrants are not only different from other voters but, as the typology implies, vary among each other. The typology displays individuals' voting options in a world of expanding enfranchisement by literally drawing lines between the various electoral behavior choices available to migrant voters.

The typology nuances the binary of migrant voting that literature characterizes as 'here' and 'there' (e.g., in Chaudhary 2018)—implying the residence and origin country, respectively. Migration scholars have long recognized that transnational spaces emerge between the two places (Glick Schiller *et al.* 1992, 1995, Faist 1998), that the migratory system cuts through them (Paul 2013), and that activities occur and communities form 'between' the 'here' and 'there' (Portes 1996, Portes *et al.* 2002, Waldinger 2008, e.g., Erdal and Oeppen 2013). Some studies examine how places besides the two localities can influence migrants' integration, identity, and everyday lives—what Shams (2020) conceptualizes as 'elsewhere' places with spillover effects from global politics or events.[1] States are also involved; policies

[1] Shams (2020) gives examples of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) recruitment and terrorist attacks impacting ethnic or religious identity of migrants living in a variety of other countries; the events occur far

from the origin country can foster emigrants' integration as immigrants in residence countries, as evidenced with Mexican policies aimed at Mexicans living in the United States (Smith and Bakker 2008, Délano 2018), suggesting policies have the power to link both places. The distinction between 'here' and 'there' further blurs as borders 'shift' far into other territories (Shachar 2020, Finn and Jakobson 2021), for example through implementing 'border' control procedures and requiring pre-migration bureaucratic documents while potential immigrants still live in the origin country (Finn 2019, Brumat and Finn 2021). Post-migration, casting votes can occur for two geographic places. Following Tsuda (2012), participation in the two places happens simultaneously, within the same time span (also see Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). However, some factors that influence migrant voters' behavior stem from within, between, and beyond the 'here' and 'there.'

The typology frames my analysis of migrant electoral behavior (i.e., individual-level turnout) and its four categories make my dependent variable of migrant voting multicategorical. While top-down enfranchisement is established at the national or supranational level, voters ultimately decide whether to cast a ballot;[2] thus the typology shifts the focus from states to individuals. It highlights that immigrants are simultaneously emigrants (Pedroza and Palop-García 2017a, Sayad 2018 [1999]), aligning with scholars who have recently nuanced migrant voting (e.g., Caramani and Grotz 2015, Waldinger 2015, Chaudhary 2018, Finn 2020a). I add to the discussion by focusing on one type of political participation (national-level voting) in states offering extensive migrant suffrage rights, putting origin and residence countries on par with each other. The typology can be used to systematically categorize migrant voting for local or multilevel elections and its purpose is multifold: to differentiate between migrant voters, to describe migrant voters and what it means when they engage in origin- and residence-country politics, and to track changes in individuals' electoral behavior over time in the two countries.

from migrants' physical location but are nonetheless powerful enough to redefine migrants' identities and how the residence-country society views them. Similar scenarios can unfold related to voting and partisanship.

[2] I assume that each individual has free choice to vote or abstain, whereas in reality migrant voters may face high barriers to participation (Finn 2019), such as rigid eligibility requirements or cumbersome registration processes. Such rules and barriers disincentivize voters from casting ballots (see, e.g., Franklin 1996, Norris 2004). Contrarily, easier registration encourages turnout (Jackman 1987, Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019). While scholars must include regulations and ease of registration in their analyses (as I do), it is unfitting to include it in the typology because of variation among countries.

After international migration, individuals with multiterritorial political rights face two choices, to vote or abstain, in two countries—creating *four* distinct types of migrant electoral behavior (see Figure 1 below). The typology demonstrates that political participation can be (a)symmetrical between the origin and residence countries, since a voter can participate in some elections, but not others, or in one country but not the other. While it does not capture the in-betweenness of places (as it only considers voting in either the origin country or residence country), recognizing that such places exist facilitates discovering the factors stemming from living in and between the countries that influence voting behavior (see Figure 1.1 and Section 1.3 in Chapter 1). This helps to understand why migrants lie in one quadrant and not another, and potentially why they change behavior.

Figure 1 A Migrant Voting Typology[3]

		Votes in Origin Country	
		Yes	No
Votes in Residence Country	Yes	Dual transnational voting	Immigrant (foreign resident) voting
	No	Emigrant (nonresident national) voting	Abstention

Source: Modified from Finn (2020a).

All migrant voters fit into one, and only one, quadrant at any given time, making the typology's categories collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive (Collier *et al.* 2012). There is no 'ideal' quadrant since the typology has no normatively superior quadrant. The immigrant voting quadrant comprises foreign residents (non-naturalized individuals living in the residence country) and here I also include naturalized individuals, meaning those who adopted the residence country's nationality (who may be dual nationals or hold multiple nationalities). Emigrants who renounce nationality would lose origin-country voting rights so lie beyond this classification. Migrants can make various

[3] Note that nonresident nationals comprise a larger group than 'emigrants' since it comprises both emigrants and their descendants (and others who gain the nationality from abroad); however, I focus only on emigrants (first-generation adults who move abroad).

movements between categories and are free to return to the same quadrant numerous times. Movements are not necessarily linear towards one voting type, indicating that there is no straight-line pattern of voting behavior over time nor an end point to migrants' voting trajectories. Nonetheless, in some contexts, I expect certain patterns are more likely to emerge (see Chapter 3 and 4).

Linking Migrant Voting to Transnationalism and (Non)Citizenship

The migrant voting typology incorporates aspects of transnationalism in migration studies and raises conceptual questions about (non)citizenship. It is recognized that migrants do not wholly live in one country or in two countries (Waldinger 2008)—instead, migrant voters 'balance' two political communities, from which they select how, and in which ways, to be politically engaged in each location (Erdal and Oeppen 2013). Given the aforementioned spread of migrant voting rights around the globe, migrant voters can establish multifaceted and context-specific political identities, for instance feeling belonging and loyalty to more than one country (see Glick Schiller *et al.* 1992, Yuval-Davis 2006, Faist and Gerdes 2008, Bilodeau, McAllister, *et al.* 2010). Political practices "that transcend the borders of independent states are *transnational* if they involve simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons to geographically separate polities" (Bauböck 2003, p. 705, emphasis in original). Given this definition, migrant voting as I study it entails a transnational political practice since the migrant has crossed borders and holds suffrage rights in two polities.

Transnational citizenship can be parsimoniously conceptualized as status, identity, and participation, which Jakobson and Kalev (2013) offer by condensing literature on these dimensions (e.g., Soysal 1994, Sassen 2002, Guarnizo *et al.* 2003, Bloemraad 2004). They add Fox's (2005) idea of vertical versus horizontal transnational citizenship, to offer a six-fold model of individuals practicing citizenship as status, identity, and participation both vertically and horizontally (Jakobson and Kalev 2013).[4] The vertical relation is between the individual and state whereas the horizontal one entails "power relations within society" (Fox 2005, p. 175). Together they form a transnational perspective, as migrants' bureaucratic relations with two states and with people in both societies. I capture this in migrants' motives for voting and in the Roots Routes as migrants' ties to both a country and the people, mostly family, living in that country.

[4] An example of vertical citizenship as identity would be loyalty to the state whereas a horizontal example could be solidarity with social peers; citizenship as participation vertically would be voting out of duty whereas horizontally would be through civic activism (Jakobson and Kalev 2013, p. 203).

Migrants' liminal relation with the two places (the origin and residence countries) is what forms the concepts of transmigrants and transnationalism; immigrants, emigrants, and transmigrants can live in and between places. Building from literature spanning Political Science, Political Theory, and Sociology (e.g., Glick Schiller *et al.* 1992, 1995, Portes 1996, Faist 1998, Kivisto 2001, Bauböck 2003, Guarnizo *et al.* 2003, Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003, Fox 2005, Escobar 2007, Faist and Fauser 2011, Erdal and Oeppen 2013, Faist *et al.* 2013, Jakobson and Kalev 2013, Paul 2013; Erdal 2020), I suggest four learning places and spaces in which international migrants participate and (re)socialize (see Section 1.3 and Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1). These comprise the two countries, the transnational space between them, and the intersecting and independent migratory system (the last from Paul 2013).

As a transnational practice, migrant voting raises conceptual issues with formal membership (political rights in a demos) and the practices of citizenship (exercising rights connected to membership). Citizenship in sovereign territories is "a legal status and relation between an individual and a state or other territorial polity that entails specific legal rights and duties", as defined by the Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT 2020, p. 8). While in some places (e.g., the EU and US) citizenship is synonymous with nationality, these two terms legally differ in some Latin American constitutional law (Pedroza and Palop-García 2017b). In other words, states can legally define a foreign resident as a 'citizen', without naturalizing to become a national citizen. When literature refers to citizenship as synonymous to nationality, I specify 'citizenship as nationality'; otherwise, I refer to citizenship as a person's bundle of rights, including voting rights.

Conceptualizing citizenship (as nationality), Bauböck (2006) establishes legal status, rights, and political participation as its three dimensions. Both access to, and loss of, this legal status and its related rights differ greatly between countries (Vink and Bauböck 2013), in turn creating variations among citizenship regimes, which are "institutionalized systems of formal and informal norms that define access to membership, as well as rights and duties associated with membership, within a polity" (Vink 2017, p. 222). I recognize that citizenship can be a political construction to mean *membership* at levels besides the territorial nation state (Maas 2013)—which I see as contributing to migrants' ties to people and places that in turn affect their citizenship practices, including voting behavior. I attempt to nuance (non)national migrant voters with respect to gaining and exercising political rights through membership in two political communities.

As casting a vote from abroad and active immigrant voting have emerged as alternative ways to be members, migrant voting has changed the concept of citizenship as nationality. Offering political rights to non-nationals demonstrates a "decoupling of rights and benefits from the status of

citizenship [as nationality]" (Vink 2017, p. 223)—in turn, nationality is no longer a necessary condition to gain membership in the demos (Beckman 2006, Maas 2013, Pedroza 2013, Caramani and Grotz 2015). Nationality nonetheless remains a sufficient condition when individuals also reach voting requirements such as sanity, non-criminality, and a certain age (Beckman 2006). Holding rights in two countries has been facilitated by the spread of states accepting dual nationality and less worry over divided loyalties (Spiro 1997, 2016, Faist 2001, Faist and Gerdes 2008). Tolerance for dual nationality stretched from one-third in 1960 to three-quarters of countries worldwide in 2018, diffusing between neighbor states and reinforced by diaspora politics (Vink *et al.* 2019). Diaspora engagement has transformed migrant-country relations since, as Délano and Gamlen (2014) highlight, "such origin-state efforts to engage diasporas redefine the parameters of citizenship." Diaspora governance and the expansion of migrant organizations and political parties abroad (see Gamlen 2014, Adamson 2016, Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020) also affect citizenship practices, as both emigrants and immigrants engage in politics in two countries.

When immigrants, emigrants, or both groups have rights and participate, these two dimensions are no longer exclusively only for national citizens, weakening the concept of citizenship as nationality (Finn 2020a). Foreign residents electorally participating in a growing number of countries creates (or expands) the notion of non-national citizens. I pay special conceptual attention to the voter subgroup allowed to cast ballots in national-level elections as immigrants in one country and simultaneously as emigrants of another. As shown in Figure 1, people exercising voting rights in two countries participate in what I refer to as *dual transnational voting*. While emigrant voting requires nationality, immigrant voting does not. Since nationality alone does not define membership in the demos (Beckman 2006), citizenship as nationality cannot comprise the core of analyses of membership or rights, or of exercising those rights. Digging further into membership and transnationalism, I look to political (re)socialization theories to make sense of migrant voting in two countries.

Existing Theories and Hypotheses:

Making Sense of Political Learning and Migrant Voting in Two Countries

Existent theories of political resocialization fall short to illustrate electoral outcomes of migrant voting. White and colleagues (2008) suggest three theories: resistance, exposure, and transferability theory. *Resistance theory* reflects the primacy or structuring principle, meaning impressions from the initial political socialization process endure; in short, occurrences and influences during one's earlier years

resist change later in life. *Exposure theory* indicates that although one may already hold political beliefs, norms, and practices, it is possible that these change over time, especially when living in a new political system in a different territory. *Transferability theory* suggests that immigrants draw on past experiences (e.g., with political regimes, prior interest in politics, and past voting) and apply lessons from their old environment in the origin country to life in the residence country.

The theories are not mutually exclusive and fail to recognize that migrants' individual-state relations change over time. Specifically, while relocation ends the initial political socialization process, the migrant converts their national citizen-country relation to an emigrant-origin country relation, and also gain an immigrant-residence country relation. These are the three individual-state relations captured by the Roots Routes. The political resocialization process continues throughout migrants' voting lives, as their experiences affect how much their connections to people and places are strengthened, diminished, or stabilized over time. Digging into the roots with a framework of migrant political resocialization helps make sense of political learning and migrant voting outcomes.

Making sense of migrant voting at the individual level requires exploring not just personal characteristics but also the institutional and social context in which they live, in both physical places and transnational spaces. It involves asking migrants about their experiences navigating the migratory system and interacting with state institutions; where their families live and if they used to or currently discuss politics together; and their interest in, and knowledge of, politics, candidates' campaigns, and voting registration. Additionally, migrants who have lived in nondemocracy might be influenced by their trust (or lack thereof) in democracy, governments, and voting procedures. Taking an agency-based focus on individual migrants, and considering their past and present contexts, I propose five hypotheses to investigate these topics and answer questions about the motives and influences behind why migrants vote.

Hypothesis 1: Potential migrant voters who self-report being able to communicate well in the language of the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting. While non-fluency in a language is an obvious barrier to voting, migrant voters can face more nuanced language difficulties.[5] I stress linguistic communication, which focuses more on

[5] Linguistic distance (i.e., the closeness between the immigrants' and the new country's language) influences initial residence country choice and then language acquisition and proficiency increase earnings in the residence country (Chiswick and Miller 2015) and political participation (Luthra *et al.* 2018). Beyond economic integration, "earnings payoff tends to be high, yet this underestimates the *total returns* as it does not include the social, cultural, and political benefits of destination proficiency" (Chiswick and Miller 2015,

understanding and being involved in the political world through active participation. Given South America has high intraregional migration, and the primary language is Spanish in most countries, I take advantage of the survey data of native speakers who change countries to show that language proficiency falls short when analyzing political participation in the residence country. Linguistic communication differentiates migrants (even if native speakers of the same language) from the native-born population.[6] As (re)socialization is a learning process through experience, the *cognitive* aspect helps unveil some informal linguistic barriers to interacting with formal political channels, such as migrant voting. I expect that immigrants with greater ability to communicate will become more involved in the residence country's elections, whether they continue voting in origin-country elections or not.

Hypothesis 2: Potential migrant voters who have a higher interest in politics are more likely to participate in dual transnational voting. Interest in politics is a well-established independent variable that influences individual-level voter turnout among native-born voters in a country. I add duality by exploiting the multiterritorial aspect of migrant voting as a chance to uncover new knowledge about electoral behavior. Does an overall interest in politics motivate migrant voting in both countries, or is the interest country-specific? Does being interested in politics in the residence country motivate migrants to also vote in the origin country, and vice versa? Migrants more often being able to vote or abstain in one or both countries adds complexity to interest in politics as a 'traditional' factor, particularly for dual transnational voters who participate in two countries.

Hypothesis 3: Potential migrant voters who have a longer tenure in the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting. Previous studies on migrant political engagement outcomes over time have produced inconclusive findings (e.g., Portes 1996, Guarnizo *et al.* 2003, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Waldinger 2008, 2015, Chaudhary 2018, McCann *et al.* 2019). While Waldinger (2015) finds that new political loyalties negatively affect political engagement in the origin country, immigrants do not necessarily choose between competing loyalties: Chaudhary (2018) reveals that migrants can be actively engaged in two locations, although in practice this is time-consuming and may not translate to participation (Jakobson and Kalev 2013). I expect in-country tenure and

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p. 211 emphasis added). Putting these economics studies into broader terms, the linguistic distance between variations of Spanish is small, i.e., presents a low barrier to effectively communicate shortly after arrival. Besides facilitating everyday life, part of the 'payoff' is political integration via electoral engagement.

[6] Ramakrishnan (2013) highlights that immigrants are distinct from native-born minority groups in terms of legal status since the former hold visas instead of nationality. For this reason, language skills and communication of migrant voters versus native-born non-native speakers of the dominant language are not comparable and should be evaluated separately.

intention to stay to increase *im*migrant voting (since it was presumably zero prior to migration[7]) but could either increase or decrease *em*igrant voting. Dual transnational voting, by virtue of being a combination of the other two migrant voting types, is affected by default. For instance, emigrants who did not vote in the origin country will continue to abstain there but may vote in the residence country (thereby entering the immigrant voting quadrant); emigrants who voted in the origin country could start or continue to vote from abroad and start to vote in the residence country (thereby entering the dual transnational voting quadrant).

Hypothesis 4: Potential migrant voters who have a longer intention to stay in the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting. Both the intention to stay and the previous factor of in-country tenure are unique to migrants and irrelevant for other voters. Relevant literature proposes that the stakeholder principle, having a common interest in a country's future with the native-born population, or a 'stake' in a country, as an argument that states use to offer or withhold migrant suffrage rights (Bauböck 2007). One signal that migrants envision having a stake in the residence country is when they report that they plan to live there 'forever'. This again does not necessarily reduce the (horizontal and vertical) identities and participation migrants have with origin countries. The migrant may be part of the 'imagined community' (Anderson 2016 [1983]), is still attached to, or is involved with, life in the origin country. Examples of this include investing in business and property or staying in contact with family and friends who remain there, even if they do not plan to return. Considering the possibility of entrenched and iterated roots, I expect political membership in the demos and intention to stay to increase voting in the residence country, or in both countries.

Hypothesis 5: Potential migrant voters with greater connections with a country are more likely to vote in that country. This directly addresses migrants' ties, or connections, to a country, visualized as different sets of roots (in Figure 4.1). Living everyday life, working, paying taxes, and other activities create roots, identities, and ties in a destination country (e.g., Glick Schiller *et al.* 1992, Boccagni and Ramírez 2013, Erdal and Oeppen 2013) (see Chapter 3 and 4). One kind of tie is developing political belonging to that country, in the sense of having a shared interdependent future with other members (Yuval-Davis 2006). I expect that migrants with more ties are more likely to turn out to vote.

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[7] In unique instances, migrants could have already voted in the residence country before moving there: for example, a Chilean could have inherited an Italian nationality by *ius sanguinis* and have participated in external voting for Italy without ever having lived there (i.e., as a nonresident national but not as an emigrant). They could then move to Italy and continue voting as a resident dual national in Italian elections while also voting from abroad as an emigrant for Chilean elections.

All my hypotheses advance the broader argument that when immigrant voting increases and external voting stays constant, dual transnational voting increases by default. The hypotheses do not consider children migrants and those without rights to vote in both countries. Turnout decisions for migrants in my case studies, as discussed in the next section, reveal greater complexity when their origin country has or had hybrid or nondemocratic regimes—given the 'authoritarian imprint' migrants carry with them (Bilodeau 2014). For emigrant voting, I expect individuals from nondemocracies (that are still undemocratic, as of 2020) to abstain in origin-country elections, at minimum because such elections fail to meet democratic standards of being free and fair. Contrarily, these migrants may be more inclined to participate in immigrant voting, despite the authoritarian imprint. One reason is because of what Bilodeau and Nevitte (2003) explain as the migrant honeymoon phase of boosted trust in the residence country's democratic system and political institutions—meaning at first, immigrants judge the country not for what it does, but for what it *represents*, such as the hope for a better life. This optimistic period in the new environment entails a positive experience for migrants during political resocialization. While migrants adjust their voting behavior in the two countries, it may occur slowly when political learning under nondemocracy is deep-rooted. Overall, I expect potential migrant voters with weaker perceptions of a country's democracy vote less in that country, as compared to those with stronger perceptions.

Chile and Ecuador: Case Selection and Justification

This dissertation's population of interest are individuals who have undergone political socialization processes in at least two countries and have the potential to gain national-level voting rights in two countries. To find migrants who have all four voting options available to them, I looked to countries that offer universal suffrage rights to foreign residents at the national level, which is rarer than offering emigrant suffrage rights. As of 2020, there are five countries in the world which fulfill this criterion: Chile, Ecuador, Malawi, New Zealand, and Uruguay. I discarded New Zealand because it has been thoroughly analyzed by other scholars (e.g., Barker and McMillan 2014, 2017, McMillan 2015) and Malawi because it has a very low, decreasing in-country immigrant stock, totaling just 1.3 percent of total population (UN DESA 2017, p. 25). The three remaining country candidates are in South

America, a region that grants migrants extensive voting rights (Escobar 2015, 2017).[8] I eliminated Uruguay from the analysis because its rigid eligibility requirements makes it difficult to access denizen voting rights; according to Article 78 of the National Constitution, immigrants must provide proof of good behavior (no criminal record), property or capital in Uruguay, an occupation or profession, have formed a family in Uruguay, and maintained residence in the country for the last 15 years (Margheritis 2015, Stuhldreher 2016).

This leaves Chile and Ecuador as the remaining two countries to serve as country cases. Both offer universal foreign resident suffrage rights in national-level elections, meaning that they offer immigrants without the residence country's nationality the right to vote after a five-year period. Ecuador allows foreign residents to register after these five years whereas Chile automatically registers foreign residents as voters (Law 20.568, Article 6, 2012). The foreign-born immigrant stock in both Chile and Ecuador primarily comprises those born in another South American country (INE 2019, INE-DEM 2019, INEC 2020), almost all of which extend emigrant voting rights (GLOBALCIT 2019). Chile and Ecuador are thus likely cases in which to find individuals who potentially have dual transnational voting rights in national-level elections. Despite drawing parallels between Chile and Ecuador in the Conclusion, due to differences detailed in Chapter 2 and 3, I examine the countries as separate (i.e., not comparative) case studies. While the dependent variable in each analysis is individual-level migrant voting, the two case studies shed light on migrant enfranchisement legal processes, Chile as a pioneer and Ecuador with a human-rights based approach. I detail the various steps of granting migrant suffrage rights to set each country context, before analyzing migrant voting.

In terms of the two waves of Latin American migrant enfranchisement defined by Escobar (2015), Chile counts as an early adopter and Ecuador as a latecomer to granting migrant voting rights. However, Chile was an early adopter only of restricted *im*migrant suffrage in local-level elections in the 1925 Constitution (Article 104), then the 1980 Constitution (Article 14) expanded foreign resident suffrage to the national level, under General Augusto Pinochet's military dictatorship (Finn 2020b). This scenario is an extreme case demonstrating that democracy is not a necessary condition for expanding migrant enfranchisement. Foreign residents voted at the local level for the first time in 1935—along with women voting for the first time (Valenzuela E. M. 1995)—and at the national level in the 1988 plebiscite (Finn 2020b). Yet regarding *em*igrant rights, Chile was a latecomer compared to

[8] Suriname represents the exception since it has never had migration laws and is usually excluded in South American migration analyses (see Finn *et al.* 2019). Additionally, Guyana and Uruguay do not grant external voting rights to nationals abroad (Stuhldreher 2012, IDEA 2019).

the rest of Latin America, only granting them in 2014 and nationals abroad voting for the first time in the 2017 presidential election (see Chapter 2 and Table 2.1).

Ecuador enfranchised migrants relatively recently, first to nationals abroad in the 1998 Constitution (*Ley Orgánica para el Ejercicio del Derecho al Voto de los Ecuatorianos/as Domiciliados en el Exterior*), regulating them in the 2000 Electoral Law (Article 4 and 99) and in a 2002 electoral reform, then applying them for the first time in 2006 (Ramírez 2018, Palop-García and Pedroza 2019, Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2020). Ecuador then enshrined multilevel voting rights for foreign residents in the 2008 Constitution and applied them in 2009 (see Chapter 3 and Table 3.1). The two country case studies reveal nuances in the role of democracy and democratic principles in migrant enfranchisement processes and the importance of how political elites frame migrants before and after extending voting rights.

Methods: A Survey in Chile and Interviews in Ecuador

As established throughout the Introduction, I am interested in evaluating factors that affect migrant voting, as proposed by the hypotheses in the previous section, and in unpacking the political resocialization process to explore why such factors, contexts, and individuals' motives affect migrant voting. To achieve these two different aims, I used two different methods to conduct fieldwork. In Chile, I administered a survey in 2017 to gauge the factors that affect migrant voting and highlight the four migrant voting types. In Ecuador, I drew from in-depth interviews from 2019 to unpack the reasons migrants give for voting and their political (re)socialization processes in both the origin and residence countries. Chapter 4 establishes the political resocialization process as a framework to link how certain factors and political experiences affect individuals' electoral turnout in national-level elections as present (voting) or absent (abstention).

Focused on Chile, Chapter 2 identifies real-world examples of enfranchisement in dictatorship and democracy and exemplifies the four migrant voting types through quantitative analysis. I obtained a non-representative sample by conducting an online survey, designed in Qualtrics and promoted via Facebook, during the weeks leading up to the 2017 Chilean presidential election. The online survey offered quick data collection and obtained responses from 1,482 migrants. 2017 was an ideal year for such a survey since it was the first time that Chilean emigrants voted from abroad in the presidential primaries, drawing overall attention to migrant voting, even though non-naturalized immigrants had had national-level suffrage rights since 1980 and had exercised them since 1988 (Finn 2020b). The

Research Ethics Committee within the Faculty of Social Sciences and History at the Universidad Diego Portales in Santiago, Chile, approved the survey before it was launched. It was available for five days before the election on November 19, 2017, and for another five days before the second round on December 17, 2017. It closed before the election polls opened to avoid mixing the intention to vote with prior voting. Respondents qualified if they lived in Chile but were born in another country and were of voting age. The final database contains 1,482 migrant respondents.

The survey comprised three sections: demographics, socioeconomic status, and political engagement (see Appendix 2.8). After accepting the informed consent agreement to participate in the online survey, the first section captured age, year of migration, sex, origin country, and intention to stay in the residence country (the possible answers were: less than a year, 1–4 years, 5–10 years, forever, "I don't know"). The second asked about discrimination and its frequency over the past 12 months, subjective household socioeconomic status (from 1, "we do not meet our needs," to 4, "it allows us to live comfortably"), ability of linguistic communication in the residence country (from 1, "always," to 5, "never"), inter- and intra-group contact in various social and work groups (majority Chileans, majority from the origin country, majority from other countries for colleagues, neighbors, friends, and other groups), education (from 1, "no schooling," to 9, "doctoral degree"), and employment (temporary job, stable job, no job but searching, no job but not searching, study and work, study, not studying or working, retired).

The third section asked about political engagement with questions regarding political news consumption (newspapers, television, radio, and social media) in both countries, interest in politics (from 1, "very interested," to 4, "completely uninterested"), and knowledge of voting rights in the residence country ("yes", "no", or "I don't know"). Since voter registration for foreign residents is automatic in Chile after a five-year residence, immigrants may be unaware of suffrage rights. This is important because while non-voting appears as abstention, not knowing one has suffrage rights translates to involuntary non-voting, which is different from voluntary abstention. This section also included a short series of questions on past experiences and future intention to vote in both countries. Those answering "no" to voting were asked, "why?" as an open-ended field prompting a reply. Those answering "yes" to voting in the upcoming 2017 election were asked who they would vote for from the provided list of candidates. Qualtrics randomized the order of the candidates in the online surveys to avoid respondents selecting only the first choices. The first round contained eight candidates whereas the second round had two.

To analyze the survey sample, I use the typology's first intended purpose of classifying migrant voting, showing a snapshot in time of when individuals lie in one quadrant. Classifying migrants in only one quadrant for any election demonstrates *which* migrants vote or abstain and where they vote (in one country, in both, or in neither). This use allowed me to ask descriptive questions such as: which types of migrants are in which quadrant and what are the differences between migrant voters in the various quadrants? Using multinomial regressions, I used the survey response data to compare individuals in the various quadrants to better understand the differences among migrant voting types.

Focused on Ecuador, Chapter 3 uses qualitative analysis to understand why a given individual votes in one, both, or neither country. The evidence came from transcribed semi-structured interviews conducted between June and October 2019 with 71 foreign-born residents in Ecuador. I designed the interview questions between April and June 2019 within a project investigating democracy and migrant voting through a transnational perspective.[9] The Research Ethics Committee at the Universidad Casa Grande in Ecuador approved these interviews as part of the research project. Interviewees qualified if they were currently living in Ecuador, were of voting age, and their origin country was either Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, or Venezuela. Each nationality group was part of a traditional immigration wave to Ecuador between 1979 and 2007 or a recent wave between 2008 and 2018. Time of migration is important, as I am interested in experiences when the migrants grew up under certain political regimes (democracy, hybrid regime, or authoritarianism) in the origin country.

The interviews comprised four sections with closed- and open-ended questions (see Appendix 3.6). They started with basic questions in Section A and Section B asking about electoral participation. Section A captured age, sex, origin country, education, year of migration, previous migration, and intention to stay (less than a year, 1–4 years, 5–10 years, forever, "I don't know"). Section B captured interest in politics in both the origin and residence countries (from 1, "very interested," to 4, "completely uninterested"), then simple "yes" or "no" responses to questions about voting registration in the destination country and prior and future intention to vote in both countries. For those answering "yes" to having voted in Ecuador in the past, Interviewees identified which elections they voted in from a list of the seven opportunities to vote since 2009. Many of the demographics,

[9] Funded by the Universidad Casa Grande, Ecuador, the project was entitled, *Democracia, ideología y partidismo en perspectiva transnacional: Evidencia del voto migrante en y desde Ecuador, 1979–2018* (Democracy, Ideology, and Partisanship from a Transnational Perspective: Evidence of Migrant Voting in and from Ecuador, 1979–2018). Gabriela Baquerizo, Sebastián Umpierrez de Reguero, and I were the Principal Researchers, with research assistance from Vivian Cartagena, Paula Lanata, María José Medina, and Claudia Navarrete.

socioeconomic status, and political engagement variables and questions in the interviews purposefully reflected those from the Chilean survey. In addition, questions asked Interviewees to self-report their political orientation (0 being most left-leaning and 10 being most right-leaning) and to what extent they agreed with the statement, "Democracy is the best type of government" (ranking 1 as "totally agree," to 5, "totally disagree").

Section C, the main descriptive part of the interviews, comprised open-ended questions on: a) electoral participation, b) political culture and political socialization, c) democracy and political resocialization, and d) political identity.[10] Each of these four subsections included two to four questions about past electoral experiences and the main obstacles to, and impact of, migrant voting in both the origin and residence countries that Interviewees were encouraged to elaborate on. More in-depth questions were asked about discussing politics with family while growing up, their first voting experiences, and if and how prior voting influences their projected future electoral decisions. The interviews also inquired into changed perceptions of democracy in both countries, pre- and post-migration, to capture expectations and effects from exposure to the residence country's political system, as well as if Interviewees have followed politics in the origin country since emigration. Lastly, Interviewees were asked about similarities and differences in their self-reported political orientations in the two countries, including how they relate to political parties and movements.

The interviews closed with Section D, which contained quick-to-answer, but slightly more sensitive questions, to obtain a more complete migrant profile. The section captured legal status in the residence country (no visa, in process, temporary, permanent, dual national, asylum seeker, or refugee), future intention to naturalize, any discrimination experienced within the past 12 months, perceived motives behind the discrimination, employment (temporary job, stable job, unemployed but searching, no job but not searching, study and work, study, not studying or working, retired), subjective household socioeconomic status (from 1, "we do not cover our needs," to 4, "it allows us to live comfortably"), frequency of travel to the origin country, frequency and amount of remittances sent to the origin country, active membership (in political parties, migrant associations, non-governmental organizations [NGOs], none) in both countries, and trust in political institutions (political parties, police, courts, electoral system, the executive branch, armed forces, legislative branch, and the embassy and consulates) in both countries (see Appendix 3.6 for all interview questions, in original language and translated to English).

[10] The open-ended questions were transcribed and are available (in Spanish) upon request.

To analyze the interview data, I used the typology's second intended purpose of tracking movements between quadrants throughout a migrant's voting life to analyze changed electoral behavior through their political resocialization paths. My analysis attempts to address explanatory research questions in Chapter 3 such as: what are the reasons why migrants change their electoral behavior in more than one political community over time? How does an individual migrant voter decide when to vote in the origin country and the residence country? In addition, I recorded nuances the Interviewees described about their political socialization and resocialization processes. I noted common occurrences during the migrants' personalized trajectories related to connections, trust, and political participation the origin and residence countries, to name a few. I use the interview data to offer a first attempt in Chapter 4 of theory building and explaining why migrants vote and why they change behavior over time in two countries.

The research faces limitations since the data collection techniques in both case studies resulted in non-representative groups that prevent me from generalizing about all migrant voters within or beyond Chile and Ecuador. Given the country contexts, obtaining representative samples of migrant voters would have been difficult and costly; representativeness remains a challenge in many countries. Leading scholars have questioned even influential studies with generalized findings. For example, Guarnizo et al. (2003, p. 1223) state their survey "can be considered representative of each immigrant nationality in its principal areas of concentration", but Waldinger (2008, pp. 6–7) doubts this, mainly due to its "significant referral element" (meaning that one interviewee had referred another, who referred another, and so on). Waldinger questions representativeness for any generalization, including to the three nationalities under study. Despite non-representativeness in the present analyses, the evidence presented in each case study in this dissertation seeks to preserve internal validity and offers valuable insights into migrant enfranchisement and types of migrant voting.

I apply the typology to analyze survey and interview data, adding to my earlier work (Finn 2020a) that initially presented the typology. Migrants adapt some political attitudes, beliefs, and values over time; how they adapt depends on agencies in both the origin and residence countries and experiences in between and beyond the two places (see Section 1.3). Political socialization in the origin country previously instilled in the individual affects voting; however, migrants change through political resocialization, which can unilaterally affect voting behavior in one country, or reciprocally affect it in two countries.

Aims and Contributions of Analyzing Migrant Voting

In the rest of this dissertation, I aim to, 1) reconceptualize migrant voting by classifying the various types of migrant voting, 2) explore the differences among the four types of migrant voters and their motives to vote or abstain, drawing special attention to dual transnational voters participating in national elections in two countries, and 3) offer a framework for evaluating migrants' political resocialization processes and linking them to migrant voting outcomes. Using the interview data, I suggest that the Roots Routes show migrants' trajectories of becoming embedded within a place through their ties to people and the country. The framework does not assume inevitable or organic bottom-up or top-down political incorporation, but it does assume individuals' capability for agency and getting involved politically. Given this, I discuss barriers to participation, as well as legal and institutional blockades to migrant voting, as apparent abstention may in fact be prevention from voting (see Section 4.4).

By focusing on migrant voting, I make the following contributions: a) introduce a comprehensive migrant electoral behavior typology (Figure 1); b) identify factors and reasons that foster and deter migrant voting; c) highlight the importance of including migrant voters in mainstream electoral literature on turnout and vote choice; d) deconstruct the concept of citizenship as nationality (by focusing on citizenship practices and migrants exercising electoral rights as nationals and non-nationals); e) use the migrant voting typology as a framework to track changes in migrant voting over time in two countries; and f) attempt to reconstruct political resocialization theories.

The implications from this analysis shed light on larger debates in the literature, as touched on throughout this Introduction, such as the process and effects of changing the boundaries of the demos, individual-level transnational (non)citizenship practices, and political integration in contemporary societies holding elections. Since enfranchisement legally converts migrants from outsiders beyond the political community into potential insiders within the demos, I examine who grants migrant suffrage rights, when, and to whom. Before understanding migrant voting as a phenomenon, it is important to know who can vote and who cannot. Rights can remain symbolic on paper but not in practice (for all or some voters) until migrants *exercise* suffrage rights, freely choosing to vote or abstain.

Outline of the Chapters

Throughout all four chapters, individuals lie at the core—this is a people-centered study, specifically their political learning in democracy and nondemocracy, electoral motivations, and connections to other people and places that influence migrants' decision-making to vote, or not, in national elections in two countries. Hereafter, the dissertation contains four chapters and a conclusion, as follows.

Chapter 1, *Migrant Voting: Types, Turnout, and Multi-Sited Political Learning*, contains the migrant voting typology as an analytical framework, the main concepts, and the places and spaces in which political learning occurs that ultimately affect individual-level migrant voter turnout. Given the spread of migrant enfranchisement, more international migrants have become potential voters in two countries—an in-person voter in the residence country and a voter from abroad for origin-country elections. There are a total of four combinations of voting or abstaining in two countries: immigrant voting, emigrant voting, dual transnational voting, and abstention. I put particular emphasis on dual transnational voting, representing the inherent duality in international migrants' lives, including their interest and participation in more than one polity. In this chapter, I also clarify transnationalism in migration as well as citizenship versus nationality. Before introducing the dependent variable of individual-level migrant voting, prior to being able to vote, migrants must have suffrage rights; I explain that resources and ties to a country or the people within it can lead to migrant voting. Thereafter, I elaborate on each of the independent variables within the five hypotheses offered in this Introduction. Whereas some factors (e.g., age and education) affect all voters, some are specific to migrant voters (e.g., intention to stay and linguistic communication) and others develop or change over time (e.g., civic duty and multiterritorial ties to both countries). Such factors also arise through political learning in transnational spaces between countries and in the migratory system. The chapter overall sets the stage for using the four migrant voting types in the following chapters that explore individual-level migrant turnout.

Chapter 2, *Granting then Exercising Migrant Voting Rights: Insights from Chile*, begins with an explanation of how and why states set the boundaries of the demos, the political community with voting rights, then outlines the long 92-year road to enfranchising immigrants and emigrants in Chile. Through historical content analysis, I explain the major actors involved in the process of enfranchising some foreign residents in local-level elections in 1925 in relative democracy, extending them to national-level elections in the 1980 Constitution during a military dictatorship, then granting emigrant voting rights between 2014 and 2017 in democracy. Data for this analysis comes from national

censuses from 1875 onwards, newspapers, academic literature, constitutional laws, and transcribed debates while reviewing constitutional amendments. In the second empirical part of the chapter, I use the migrant voting typology to show which migrants vote, based on responses to an original survey of 1,482 migrant voters in Chile. Emigrants voting from abroad in national-level elections for the first time in 2017 brought attention also to denizen voting, making the run-up to the 2017 presidential election an ideal time to collect data on migrant voters and potential voters. I review the instrument, measurements, and a brief validation before employing a multinomial regression model. It includes the 680 survey respondents who held national-level suffrage rights in both the origin and residence countries, with the aim of empirically exploring four hypotheses to better understand which explanatory variables affect migrant voting.

Chapter 3, *Unpacking Migrants' Electoral Decisions: Insights from Ecuador*, is three-fold: it outlines migrant enfranchisement in Ecuador, reports reasons for voting based on interviewing migrants, and discusses how migrants have formed and transplanted authoritarian imprints. First, I present Ecuador's short road to enfranchising immigrants and emigrants via its 1998 and 2008 Constitutions. Second, I review the empirical method, interview design, and selection process. The data for this analysis comes from 71 interviews—completed between June and October 2019—with migrants living in Ecuador. Interviewees had undergone political socialization in their origin countries of Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, or Venezuela, prior to residing in Ecuador. Open-ended questions explored how migrants' (non)democratic experiences had resulted in comparative views on democracy, institutional trust, political culture, and electoral participation. The goal was to move past factors that influence voting and instead find reasons migrants vote or do not vote—migrants have *motives* for voting in two countries. The main reported reasons for voting were multiterritorial ties to people and places and being invested in a country's flourishing future, for both a stronger democracy and economy. Both relate to the origin and residence countries, but often in different ways. A secondary reason for voting was formal recognition as a voter—which instigated feelings of belonging and civicness. I also identified bureaucratic reasons, for instance, obtaining documents such as a voting certificate to facilitate non-electoral tasks, making the act of voting a means, rather than an end. Third, I explore how political learning in nondemocracy formed authoritarian imprints, formed by violence, corruption, economic crashes, and elections that were unfree, unfair, or both. Such imprints prove enduring over the course of migrants' lives but are not determinative of voting behavior in the residence country or, surprisingly, of projected voting for the origin country.

Chapter 4, *Migrant (Non-)Voting, Resocialization, and the Roots Routes*, builds from the prior chapters' analyses to take a step toward theory building and to offer a systematic framework for applying it. I underline how the new findings relate to overarching ideas on citizenship practices, (non)nationality, and political participation. State-led control creates barriers for some immigrants to participate in society and politics, yet after gaining suffrage rights, migrants may or may not exercise these rights. While migrant voting indicates political integration, migrants who abstain are not necessarily unintegrated. Using evidence from previous chapters, I compare abstention versus prevention of voting: migrants who abstain can still be political insiders whereas other voters have rights on paper but are prevented from voting in practice, forced to be political outsiders. I then address why migrants vote or abstain in two countries. I consider international migration as an individual-level shock that ends migrants' political socialization and starts the ongoing political resocialization process. The key components are multiterritorial ties with countries (e.g., civic duty) and the people living there (e.g., family and friends), which affect political attitudes and values, in turn affecting political behavior.

Whereas political socialization (or growing roots) affects individuals' electoral decisions in only one country, migrants' resocialization (growing new roots) can remarkably affect electoral decisions as both an emigrant for the origin country and as an immigrant in the residence country. Based on interactions with agents in the two countries and in the social spaces between them, over time migrants can grow, maintain, or shrink their roots with both the origin and residence countries. Three possibilities in two countries result in nine possible resocialization pathways, what I call the *Roots Routes*. The main goal is to take a step toward theory building to replace resocialization theories, in order to better explain why migrants vote and why they may change voting behavior. I use the four migrant voting categories to track migrants' personalized trajectories by examining prior turnout to migrants' future intention to vote in the two countries to show changes in migrant voting over time.

To conclude the dissertation, I highlight the contributions stemming from analyzing migrant rights, voting, and resocialization, drawing on evidence from the two case studies of Chile and Ecuador. Moreover, I elaborate on the conceptual and theoretical implications of the migrant voting typology's uses and the Roots Routes. I reiterate political resocialization as an explanation, and the Roots Routes as a framework, are not the only ways to understand why migrants vote. Nonetheless, the (re)socialization processes leading up to migrant (non)voting—that forms and sustains migrant-state relations at the core of claims-making and exercising formal voice in contemporary democracies—represent critical pieces in answering why migrants vote. As such, I suggest political resocialization and the Roots Routes can help explain individual migrants' electoral turnout in two

countries and claim that these prove more useful than existent resocialization theories. I finalize by drawing on my findings to suggest how other scholars can conceptually build from and empirically apply the migrant voting typology and the Roots Routes in future research on migrant political resocialization and participation.

Chapter 1

Migrant Voting: Types, Turnout, and Multi-Sited Political Learning

Migrant political participation is a growing phenomenon in the twenty-first century thanks to high human mobility, the spread of democracy, and the expansion of granting political rights to both emigrants and immigrants. Migrant voters exercise political voice and suffrage rights—traditionally reserved only for resident citizens—which expands democratic representation throughout the demos (political community). As migrant voters grow in number, they also potentially affect electoral outcomes. Migrant voters are distinct from other voters, yet studies still fail to understand why individual migrants choose to participate in politics in more than one country. Throughout the dissertation, I aim to make conceptual, theoretical, and empirical contributions to this knowledge gap.

The most straightforward way to understand differences in electoral decision-making between migrant voters and other voters is asking why they vote. Emigrant voters abroad show concern for the wellbeing of their family and friends and want to see improvements in the origin country, whereas immigrant voters show concern for the wellbeing of themselves and their family and friends in the residence country. They build relations with community members in the residence country such as colleagues, neighbors, and their children's teachers. Migrants may own a house or property in one or both countries so are interested in protecting their assets. Migrant voter behavior seems to be greatly defined by temporal and spatial aspects that arise from having such multiterritorial ties.

Migrants' voting behavior changes over time as they reinforce or change their connections to places and people by living in and between two countries. Over time (the temporal aspect) migrants form distinct relations with two countries (the spatial aspect). Initially, an individual undergoes political socialization and grows 'roots' in the origin country they are born and raised in (see Figure 4.1). Later, if individuals migrate internationally as adults, the shock ends political socialization and starts political resocialization. Whereas political socialization affects voting behavior in one country, political resocialization affects migrants' voting behavior in two countries. Political resocialization is a cognitive learning process during which individuals maintain or adjust political attitudes, values, and behavior based on individual and institutional agents encountered in a new context (Finn 2020a). The dynamic learning process persists throughout each migrant's voting life. During political resocialization, migrants have two sets of roots, or ties, with two countries: one set comprises connections based on the emigrant-origin country relation and another set of roots based on the immigrant-residence

country relation. While migrants can bring prior political learning and experience with them across borders, they maintain or adjust political attitudes, values, and behavior over time towards both the origin and residence countries.

Socialization and resocialization processes comprise complex, temporal, and accumulated learning experiences. Migrants' interactions with individuals and institutional agents in and between the origin and destination countries often create and change the ties one has with a country and the people living there. However, I show that at any given moment, individuals are on only one of nine possible trajectories towards being classified into only one of the four migrant voting types. The trajectories are what I refer to as the Roots Routes, which I detail in Chapter 4 (see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1). The collectively exhaustive migrant voting categories (Figure 1 in the Introduction) are: 1) immigrant voting, or foreign residents or naturalized persons participating only in the residence country; 2) emigrant voting, or nonresident citizens participating only in the origin country from abroad; 3) dual transnational voting, or migrant voters participating in both countries; and 4) abstention, or migrants choosing not to vote in either country despite having suffrage rights. The Roots Routes and typology fit together because establishing, maintaining, or cutting ties in a country explains why certain factors—such as prior voting, tenure abroad, and civic duty—affect migrants' individual-level electoral behavior. Therefore, better unraveling the (re)socialization processes sheds light on understanding which migrants vote as well as where and why migrants vote.

This chapter contains the theoretical and conceptual framework I use to analyze migrant voting. Section 1 details the migrant voting typology, which allows scholars to more adequately categorize the four existent migrant voting types. In Section 2, which covers migrant individual-level turnout, I outline the relevant factors that drive turnout among all voters and then propose the necessary and sufficient conditions for migrant voting. In Section 3, I frame political socialization as 'growing roots' within a country and with the people there, then offer a new definition of political resocialization that begins at international migration. Finally, in Section 4, I explain how political learning—especially aspects such as when, with whom, and where—affects migrant voting.

1.1 The Typology: Four Migrant Voting Types

Before exploring why migrants vote or abstain, I first suggest a migrant voting typology, presented in Figure 1 in the Introduction. The typology shows individuals' options in a world of expanding migrant enfranchisement. Previously, the options were to vote or abstain only as a resident citizen; now the options for many international migrants are to vote or abstain in the origin country as an emigrant

abroad, and to vote or abstain in the residence country, either as a dual national or a foreign resident. Not two, but *four* distinct types of migrant electoral behavior exist. The typology reflects the four migrant voting types from Finn (2020a): 1) immigrant voting, or foreign residents or naturalized persons participate only in the residence country; 2) emigrant voting, or nonresident nationals participate from abroad only in the origin country; 3) dual transnational voting, or migrant voters participating in both countries; and 4) abstention, or migrants choosing not to vote in either country despite having suffrage rights.

The typology shows the possibility of simultaneous political practices between two political communities. It gives equal weight to both origin and destination countries granting suffrage rights. Building from existent research that already explains who has voting rights or why states grant or withhold rights (e.g., Earnest 2015a, Escobar 2015, Arrighi and Bauböck 2017, Goenaga 2019, Palop-García and Pedroza 2019, Pedroza 2019; Wellman 2021), I contribute to understanding the individual-level decision to vote or abstain in the country or countries of choice. The typology's categories are collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive (Collier *et al.* 2012) since migrants fit into one, and only one, quadrant at a given time. No quadrant is normatively superior. The purpose is not to gauge political integration but to classify migrant voting.

Migrants move between categories and return to the same quadrant many times; this reveals migrant voting trajectories, with some being more typical than others. While there is no convergent endpoint over time, it is possible that once a migrant enters a quadrant, he or she is more likely to remain there, regardless of where he or she lives. For example, when an individual who has never voted relocates to another country, past abstention may affect the migrant in the new political community, resulting in an inactive voter for both the origin and residence countries. Here, abstention exemplifies Tsuda's (2012, p. 635) mutually *negative reinforcement* of transnational engagement because abstention in one country influences the voter to also abstain in another country. Conversely, a similar reciprocal mechanism may work to keep a migrant in the dual transnational voting space: simultaneous participation in two countries can be *positively reinforcing* (Tsuda 2012, p. 644). In the simpler non-transnational (domestic) space, once individuals vote, they are more likely to vote again because of this 'habit' (e.g., Franklin 2004). While migrant voters' political participation in the origin country may reinforce continued participation in the residence country, and vice versa, politically active migrants do not always stay in the dual transnational voting quadrant. These migrants may change into an immigrant or emigrant voter or later abstain, depending on how they change their ties to people and places over time.

Furthermore, long-term migrant voting patterns are not exclusively reinforced from a habit of participation. Migrants can maintain roots and relations over many decades in both the origin and residence countries—what I refer to as *multiterritorial ties*.[11] Since migrants often care about the future of both countries and the people living there, I propose that dual transnational voters continue voting because of multiterritorial ties. For emigrants abroad, the principal motives to participate in origin-country politics are civic duty and connections with family and friends still residing there (the left-behind). Meanwhile, immigrants establish ties with and become invested in the newer country and the people there, forming fresh roots and increasing the probability of voting in the residence country.

1.1.1 Not just 'here' and 'there': To vote or abstain in two countries makes four options

Many scholars have studied migrants' political engagement at "home and abroad" or "here and there," alluding to studying individuals as both immigrants and emigrants (e.g., Waldinger 2008, Faist *et al.* 2013, Escobar *et al.* 2015, Chaudhary 2018, Peltoniemi 2018a, McCann *et al.* 2019). Yet a categorical binary is not enough to classify migrant voters. During the last decade, scholars have more often focused on how emigrant voter participation changes and how it affects the origin country (Burean 2011, Lafleur and Calderón Chelius 2011, Tintori 2011, Collyer 2014a, Gamlen 2015, Waldinger 2015, Domenech and Pereira 2017, Guarnizo *et al.* 2019, Ramírez and Umpierrez de Reguero 2019, Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020). Overall, as Finn (2020a) points out, there are three outcomes of changed voter participation: post-migration, an emigrant's political participation toward the origin country may increase, decrease, or remain the same.

Existing literature on political participation outcomes over time focuses primarily on explaining the first two outcomes. For example, Chaudhary's (2018) study of 12 immigrant groups in seven European cities finds that their emigrant voting for the origin country either increases or decreases over time. Chaudhary (2018) explains his empirical results using two contrasting perspectives derived from other scholars. The first perspective—stemming from Waldinger—maintains that as migrants establish new connections in the destination country during the political resocialization process, ties

[11] Waldinger (2008) repeatedly refers to "homeland" versus "homestate" ties to respectively refer to the origin and destination countries, while examines the possibility of transmigrants maintaining "here-there" ties, activities, and connections (although he finds very few transmigrants). To capture the dual nature of connections, I employ the term 'multiterritorial ties' that I argue influence activities, specifically, migrant voting.

and political engagement will *decrease* in the origin country.[12] Waldinger (2008, p. 11) supports this idea by measuring three types of cross-border exchanges: first, regularly conducted activities of sending remittances to, travel to, and voting in the origin country (inversely related to geographical distance between countries). Second, attachments and loyalties, measured as plans to settle in the destination country, self-identifying one's 'real homeland', and self-described identity as an origin-country national (biased toward single country political identity and civic duty). Third, Waldinger also measures naturalized citizens' participation and past voting behavior in residence-country politics for registered migrant voters (which excludes foreign resident voting).

The first perspective adopts an assimilationist view that individuals forfeit origin-country ties to "make room for" new connections in the destination country (Guarnizo *et al.* 2019). Others argue that political ties with the 'home state' organically fizzle out as migrants' attention and interest shift from the origin to residence country (Waldinger and Soehl 2013). Assimilation means identity and loyalty link solely to one country, making for a "zero-sum relationship" between political engagement in the two countries (Tsuda 2012, p. 635). Tit-for-tat of forfeiting or replacing ties is an assumption, one that falls short when using empirical evidence to explain long-term voting behavior. The assumption fails to consider a) emigrants' sense of civic duty toward the origin country, b) migrants' multiple options for political participation, even without naturalizing, and c) migrants' relations expand beyond geographical borders and a single 'homeland' because of multiterritorial ties.

In contrast, the second perspective posits that ties and political engagement simultaneously increase in the origin and residence countries and are thus complementary to each other (found in, for example, Guarnizo *et al.* 2003). Guarnizo and colleagues (2003, p. 1223) measure transnational electoral participation in the origin country as having political party membership, giving monetary contributions to a party, and active involvement in political campaigns. Transnational nonelectoral participation in the origin country is measured by hometown civic association membership, monetary contributions to civic projects, and regular membership in charity organizations sponsoring projects.

[12] Although Chaudhary (2018) classifies the first outcome as the 'resocialization' perspective, I ignore his label since it is not synonymous to how it appears in the political socialization literature. There is still much debate over questions such as: to what extent migrant transfer attitudes and behaviors from the origin country to the residence country? How long do these attitudes and behaviors endure over time in both territories and to what extent does exposure to the residence country's political system influence immigrants' adaptation? (see White *et al.* 2008). However, these questions do not inherently imply an assimilationist view that migrants always *replace* ties formed in the origin country with ties from the residence country. Replacement is only one of many possible outcomes of resocialization.

To test this perspective, Chaudhary (2018) uses a sample of immigrants in Europe, but still uses citizenship (as nationality) acquisition and associational membership to measure political and civic engagement. However, such aspects are often absent or irrelevant outside the United States or Europe, limiting the reach of explaining migrant voting outcomes elsewhere.

The individual continues emigrant political engagement from abroad while participating in the residence country, which is explained by either "positive reinforcement" or "co-existence" (Tsuda 2012, pp. 635, 638). Positive reinforcement indicates a causal relationship between the voter's decisions in two territories. Co-existence indicates a relationship between the voter's decisions in two territories where neither territory affects a voter's decision to politically engage in the other.

Both perspectives agree that *im*migrants' political participation in the residence country will increase over time—unsurprising, given engagement there was zero before migration. Guarnizo and colleagues (2003, pp. 1212–1213, 1238–1239) insist that migrants who *regularly* conduct cross-border political activities that affect the origin country comprise only a small minority, which includes better educated individuals with longer tenure in the residence country. Waldinger (2008, p. 14, 2015, p. 8) reiterates that migrants regularly conducting such activities comprise a small elite group. Individuals who have had more time to establish resources in the destination country are more likely to engage in frequent cross-border activities. However, if you extend the definition of participation from exclusively "regular" to include "occasional," a third of the same sample is politically engaged in both countries, which is more significant than a small minority (Guarnizo *et al.* 2003, pp. 1227, 1238). In a more recent large-N study, McCann, Escobar, and Arana (2019) survey migrants from Mexico and Colombia who live in the US and find that tenure abroad does *not* reduce attention to politics during presidential elections in their origin country. While their study measures the level and frequency of emigrants' political engagement in two countries, the focus remains on the emigrant-origin country relation, implicitly forfeiting the immigrant-residence country relation.

Using the terminology of the migrant electoral behavior typology (as outlined in the Introduction), both perspectives expect an increase in tenure in the residence country to increase immigrant voting over time but have varying effects on emigrant voting. Waldinger's logic predicts that as in-country tenure increases, immigrant voting would increase, and emigrant (as well as dual transnational) voting would decrease. As immigrants become more rooted and involved in the destination country, he posits, they reduce their ties and involvement in the origin country, assimilating to 'natives' in the destination country and forgoing previous links and behavior from the origin country. Contrarily, Guarnizo and colleagues' research foresees more migrants entering the dual

transnational voting quadrant over time as they participate in both countries. This scenario implies that migrants maintain ties and involvement in both countries simultaneously.

Moving on from Waldinger and Guarnizo and colleagues' research and following Chaudhary, who led on combining these two contrasting research outcomes, I evaluate both immigrant and emigrant electoral decisions and discuss the relation between migrant voting outcomes between countries. So far, a rough idea exists of who participates and when, with some answers on where. Both Waldinger and Guarnizo and colleagues examine the extent to which a change in migrants' tenure in the residence country (the independent variable X) affects the level of political engagement in the origin country (the dependent variable Y_O) since a change in X causes a change in Y_O. When attempting to determine if tenure abroad affects Y_O, the studies emphasize 'there' (in the origin country) and overall overlook engagement 'here' (in the residence country).[13]

Analyzing political engagement in this way poses two problems: first, it prioritizes either political engagement in the origin country or in the residence country, while in fact both are relevant dependent variables. Moreover, engagement in the residence country may affect that in the origin country, or vice versa, so both must be included. The critical difference between the aforementioned studies and the present analysis is that I am interested if national-level voting is complementary between two countries, not if other types of integration, citizenship, nationality, or memberships in one country affect voting in the other. Second, tenure in the residence country fails to explain migrant abstention in the residence country. Tenure also falls short to explain continued participation in the origin country, unless one follows the complementary perspective, which means also accepting the assumption that the migrant is 'integrating' in the destination country. For this reason, I suggest that it is not tenure per se that is critical in the outcome, but rather the processes that occur over time—such as forming, maintaining, or cutting ties—that explain voting.

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[13] Waldinger and Guarnizo avoid residence-country immigrant participation in the main analysis because they use data from the United States, where foreign residents cannot vote in national elections until they naturalize. Some states allow immigrants to vote in local elections, while most states previously granted suffrage rights, then experienced rights reversal (see Hayduk 2006). Furthermore, although Chaudhary (2018, p. 437) will "examine voting patterns in origin and receiving country national elections among immigrants in Europe," he nonetheless focuses on the origin country, as voting in the most recent national-level election in the origin country is his main dependent variable. Chaudhary (2018, p. 437) uses voting in the last destination country election as an independent variable and moreover does not overcome the naturalization issue since he uses citizenship acquisition and associational membership as proxies for immigrant political and civic engagement.

From these problems, three questions arise: 1) why have scholars found contrary results on migrant political participation in two countries as time passes? 2) In what ways do the same factors (e.g., interest in politics or civic duty) affect migrants' decisions to vote in one or both countries? 3) How does voting in one country affect voting in the other? Answering the first question, I suggest that previous works have over-emphasized naturalization in the destination country and focused primarily on changes in emigrant voting, resulting in perceived trade-offs between voting in the two countries. Instead, I put the origin and residence countries on par and categorize migrant voting into a typology that shows migrants' four unique voting options. It moves beyond 'here' and 'there,' adding complexity to multiterritorial suffrage. I evaluate electoral factors for all four migrant voting types (see Chapter 2) and migrants' reasons for changing voting behavior (in Chapter 3), which supports a more well-rounded attempt at unpacking why migrants vote.

Examining migrant voting in both the origin and residence countries, I suggest that the dynamic political resocialization process serves as a mechanism. It sheds light on why migrants decide to vote—precisely the dissertation's main research question—by exploring how factors, such as years spent abroad, change one's voting behavior in two countries. Migrants pivot between being more politically involved in one country or the other (Tsuda 2012) or participate in both countries (Smith and Bakker 2008, Chaudhary 2018, McCann *et al.* 2019, Erdal 2020). Fluctuations reflect migrant voters adjusting political attitudes, values, and behavior (i.e., through political resocialization) in both countries over time, visualized as changing quadrants within the four migrant voting types.

The last question goes a step further to understand if electoral decisions in one country affect decisions in another country. In other words: does immigrant and emigrant voting show a causal relationship? Migrant voters balance two political communities, from which they select how, and in which ways, to be politically engaged in each (Erdal and Oeppen 2013). The relationship between voting in one country versus the other may be non-causal (non-exclusive or co-existent) when electoral decision-making in the origin or destination country does not affect the electoral choices in the other country (see Chapter 4).

In attempting to answer these questions, I take the viewpoint that political resocialization is not a type of assimilation (see Kivisto 2001) and that transmigrants, as will be further discussed in the next section, can have several identities linking them to more than one country (Glick Schiller *et al.* 1992). Before diving into how multiterritorial ties form during resocialization, I explain what connects migrants between the origin and residence countries in the first place: transnationalism.

1.1.2 Fitting dual transnational voting into transnationalism and citizenship

"Transnationalism," alongside "globalization," is a common term used across disciplines and it continues to hold a plethora of meanings (see Vertovec 2009). Kivisto (2001, pp. 551–570) outlines how transnationalism relates to migration, delineating three versions in three disciplines. First, Glick Schiller, Basch, and Szanton Blanc (e.g., 1992, 1995) presented transmigration as a new concept in Cultural Anthropology, emerging from the possibility of making social fields linking origin and residence countries. Second, Portes (e.g., Portes and Zhou 1993, Portes 1995, 1996, 2005, Portes *et al.* 1999) refined transnationalism in Sociology by analyzing ethnic enclaves and segmented assimilation among first- and second-generation immigrants and how the modern world makes it easier for migrants to forge and maintain cross-border connections.[14] Third, Faist (e.g., 1998, 2000) contributed a theoretical articulation to Political Science through the transnational social space paradigm, which emerges more easily through modern telecommunication and travel. Following Faist, I also view transnationalism as one possible post-migration outcome, alongside assimilation and ethnic pluralism.

I apply Glick Schiller, Basch, and Szanton Blanc's (1995), Faist's (1998, 2000) and Bauböck's many studies of transnationalism to my own definition of migrants' roles in politics. First, migrants can develop multidimensional political identities based on learning in both the origin and residence countries. Political learning also occurs between the two countries in social spaces (also see Faist *et al.* 2013). Second, some, but not all migrants are transmigrants and have multiple identities, which sometimes leads to dual transnational voting as one possible electoral behavior outcome.

Dual transnational voting—first coined by Finn (2020a)—accounts for political behavior practices in origin and residence countries as well as in the social spaces between both countries. Dual transnational voters participate in elections in the origin *and* residence countries, whereas both emigrant and immigrant voting occur in the origin *or* residence country, respectively (see Figure 1.1). Dual transnational voters are distinct from other migrant voters because they hold suffrage rights and multiterritorial ties (e.g., transnational political belonging, civic duty, political interest, and attachment to family and friends) in two countries. As Tsuda (2012, p. 633) highlights, the *simultaneity* of dual engagement in at least two countries is what distinguishes transnationalism from nationalism.

[14] Portes' studies also identify three distinct types of transnationalism: economic, political, and sociocultural. I do not engage with the second perspective because, as Kivisto (2001) points out, Portes considers transnationalism as a type of assimilation.

Figure 1.1 Relations Between the Four Types of Migrant Voting



Source: Finn (2020a).

Note: Having suffrage rights is a scope condition for migrant voting.

I use Bauböck's (2003) definition of transnational political practices as a framework for my definition of dual transnational voting. According to Bauböck (2003), for any political practice to be considered transnational, it must fulfill two necessary conditions: a) transcend the borders of independent states, and b) involve simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons to geographically separate polities. Given the emphasis on *practices*, I focus on migrant voting. The term 'transnational voting' comes up in existing literature; however, most of these studies focus solely on what Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) calls homeland politics, explicitly examining political engagement in only the *origin* country over time.[15] As a result, homeland politics and external voting do not meet Bauböck's second condition to be

[15] Regarding active migrant transnationalism, Østergaard-Nielsen (2003, pp. 762–763) distinguishes *immigrant politics* (foreign residents participate in migration politics in the residence country, e.g., to gain rights, during which the origin country becomes involved) from *homeland politics* (emigrants participate in political activities from abroad that affect the origin country). Homeland politics includes three subtypes: emigrant politics (residents abroad working toward institutionalizing a transnational status); diaspora politics (emerging from origin countries prohibiting groups from participating from abroad); and translocal politics (migrant communities' activities with other migrants within the destination country). The various types and subtypes overlap, so are not mutually exclusive (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p. 763).

considered as transnational political practices. In contrast to existing literature, I acknowledge the possibility of migrants' simultaneous, and possibly overlapping, electoral behavior in two independent states by adding "dual" to the term "transnational voting." Therefore, dual transnational voting can be considered a transnational political practice, according to Bauböck's (2003) definition.

Dual transnational migrant voting is an increasingly relevant phenomenon to study. As voting rights and human mobility increase, migrant voters will eventually comprise a percentage in the electorate large enough to play a role in election outcomes in more than one country (White *et al.* 2008, Tsuda 2012, Paul 2013, Gamlen 2015, McMillan 2015, Chaudhary 2018). Furthermore, migrant voting extends beyond *indirect* participation in the residence country, which is how Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) more narrowly characterizes migrants' transnational involvement; migrants increasingly participate in politics through *direct* and formal means. While migrants' direct political participation has varying degrees of effects, it does not take away from state power; rather it changes the migrant-state relation, as Escobar (2007, p. 48) explains:

> The transnational approach to citizenship does not see the end of the national state, which continues to be the main grantor of membership status and rights, but it does not ignore either the imminent transformation of the state/citizen relations as simple aberrations of the traditional conception of the national state. It acknowledges the implications migration has for the status of membership and which do not fit within the legal and conceptual models of the traditional national state.

The "transnational approach to citizenship" intertwines with various other approaches to citizenship and nationality studies. Jakobson (2014, p. 17) details four approaches—citizenship as a regulatory regime, citizenship as practice, issue-specific arenas of citizenship, and normative theories of citizenship—then groups them together under a broader umbrella of "citizenship as a multidimensional analytical concept." Jakobson's (2014) broad concept of citizenship includes the variables of legal institutional aspects, value-based ideological aspects, and human agency. Migrants, who can adjust ideology throughout life and in different countries, are similarly influenced by these aspects in a transnational setting.[16] A broadened political and social environment can significantly

[16] Based on an extensive review of works defining and conceptualizing ideology, Gerring (1997, pp. 966, 980) lists "all definitional attributes" and offers a minimal definition: "Ideology, at the very least, refers to a set of idea-elements that are bound together, that belong to one another in a non-random fashion." For Gerring (1997, p. 981), non-random means having some "internal coherence." I select the applicable attributes from

change people's political ideology, especially among migrants (Feldman 2013, p. 602). Within this environment, the regulatory regimes of both the origin and residence countries define political rights and can foster or constrain participation (formal political practice for nationals and foreign residents). Agency flourishes when migrants participate in more than one political community; again, one of the key transnational aspects comes from simultaneity (Bauböck 2003, Tsuda 2012, Jakobson 2014, p. 23, Erdal 2020), in this case, simultaneous political participation in two countries.

Dual transnational voting reflects a "vertical" practice of transnational citizenship: the political practice of voting parallels an individual's (vertical) relation to multiple states (Fox 2005, p. 175, see Jakobson 2014, pp. 26, 30, 58). According to traditional notions of national citizenship, the vertical relation was between a state and a citizen with full political rights. However, my typology of four types of migrant voting challenges the traditional concept of citizenship as nationality since, while emigrant voting requires nationality, immigrant and dual transnational voting do not.

In the past, having political rights was the key defining characteristic of full citizenship (Marshall 1964), hence naturalization was the traditional way to become enfranchised. While many residence countries have "liberalized" access to nationality (Joppke 2007), other paths also exist to gain suffrage rights, as I will detail for Chile and Ecuador (in Chapter 2 and 3). One non-traditional way is through foreign resident suffrage rights, either as an alternative or complementary to naturalization and integration policies (Pedroza 2013, 2019, Huddleston and Vink 2015). In between the two opposing conceptual poles of the national citizen and the foreigner, there are many other legal categories of persons in South America with varying political rights attached to a country, some based on colonial or cultural ties or *ius sanguinis* (Acosta 2018, Finn 2018). Foreign residents with political rights such as voting in local or multilevel elections comprise a category referred to as "denizens" (Hammar 1990, Brubaker 1992, Joppke 2010). International migrants today enjoy more voting options as a national abroad and increased inclusion in the demos as a foreign resident, regardless of naturalization decisions. Coupling these rights with emigrant voting, dual transnational voting is an example of exercising rights-based political membership.

Gerring's definition of "ideology" to define migrant voters' ideology as individual-level thoughts based on their own knowledge of political subject matters, which can help to explain their political behavior. The scholar warns that "it is not reasonable to try to construct a single, all-purpose definition of ideology, usable for all times, places, and purposes… It may be that ideology is *more* context-dependent than most other social science terms" (Gerring 1997, p. 983, emphasis in original). As will become apparent throughout this analysis, the stability of migrants' ideology is challenged when they relocate to a new context, since new political learning can influence their 'set of idea-elements' and partly explain changes in political behavior.

National citizens who meet basic requirements continue to be members of the demos and still possess the greatest number of political rights, following "the idea that political power is for members only, and the most fundamental indication of membership is citizenship" (Beckman 2006, p. 155). Yet, citizenship and nationality are not interchangeable terms; for instance, nationality is not always required for formal membership into the demos (Beckman 2006, Hayduk 2006, Joppke 2007, p. 37, Pedroza 2019). In Latin America, they constitutionally differ: nationality is a legal membership whereas citizenship relates to the rights one holds in a given country (Escobar 2015, p. 928, Pedroza and Palop-García 2017b, Acosta 2018). They also differ elsewhere, such as in China, where Liu (2020) shows that the state uses the *hukou* system to 'unmake' and 'remake' citizenship for emigrants while abroad and upon return. Changing the rights individuals hold affects their citizenship, without changing their nationality. In terms of rights and membership, Pedroza (2019) uses immigrant enfranchisement processes in Portugal and Germany to make a thorough case of how citizenship goes far beyond nationality.

Migrant voting studies have evolved beyond 'here' and 'there' and the existence of immigrant and dual transnational voting reveals an opportunity for migrants to challenge the intersection of traditional citizenship and nationality notions. How immigrants "define and negotiate their own citizenship" as well as how they respond to citizenship laws affect "the meanings and practices of citizenship" in destination countries (Bloemraad *et al.* 2008, p. 170). After states have unbundled some rights such as voting from nationality, some scholars conceptualize noncitizenship independently from citizenship as nationality (e.g., Tonkiss and Bloom 2015, Bloom 2018). Mixing the "domains" of rights-based with membership-based transnationalism (Fox 2005, p. 192), foreign residents voting without nationality demonstrates another way to be an active member of a political community.

In sum, emigrant, immigrant, and dual transnational voters fulfill Bauböck's (2003) first condition of political practices transcending the borders of independent states and his second condition of simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons to geographically separate polities. Migrant voters conduct post-migration cross-border political practices and active voters show overlaps toward the origin country in which their political socialization occurred, in the residence country in which they undergo political resocialization, or in both via dual transnational voting. To unpack multiterritorial suffrage decisions, in the next section I compare relevant factors for all voters versus migrant-specific variables, focusing especially on migrants' multiterritorial ties.

1.2 Migrant Voter Turnout: Language, Interest, Time, and Ties

Individual voters politically participate because they can, want to, and have been invited to (Verba *et al.* 1995). They can vote because of the resources and knowledge they have; they want to participate because perhaps they are interested in politics; and they have been "invited" or encouraged to vote through various agents. As Spies and colleagues (2020) highlight, while electoral turnout theories based on 'native' nationals also apply to immigrants, 'additional explanatory power' can be gained by using immigrant-specific approaches. Traditional explanatory variables for voting affect both immigrants and emigrants, but in different ways as compared to other voters (Ruedin 2018)—especially over time and given the multiterritorial aspects inherent in international migrants' political engagement in two territories (Erdal 2020, Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2020). In turn, they also face additional factors that affect their turnout decisions. I elaborate on such variables in the five hypotheses (presented in the dissertation's Introduction), which narrow in on migrants and their unique possibility for participating in dual transnational voting.

Extensive literature highlights typical factors that influence individual-level voter turnout, such as age, education, resources, interest in politics, previous voting, and a sense of civic duty (see e.g., Campbell *et al.* 1960, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974, Niemi 1976, Verba *et al.* 1995). Additionally, as reviewed and elaborated on in Rolfe (2012), external and group-level factors such as networks and mobilization affect voter turnout, as do institutional contexts such as registration processes and voting systems (e.g., Powell Jr. 1986, Jackman 1987, Rosenstone and Hansen 2002, Franklin 2004, Avery and Peffley 2005, Blais 2006, 2008, 2008, Rolfe and Chan 2017). Within transnational studies in migration, evidence exists that men are more likely to partake in political activism (Portes 2005, Guarnizo *et al.* 2019) whereas women by voting (e.g., Boccagni and Ramírez 2013).

Resources, such as money spent on transportation to a voting location and time spent becoming and staying politically informed, are necessary for voting (see Figure 1.2). Education and income can measure socioeconomic status and can affect electoral behavior (Verba and Nie 1972, Avery and Peffley 2005). In Latin America, age and education are the best predictors of voting behavior (Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014).[17] When individuals have more resources, they can allocate some for voting, which increases their likelihood to vote (Powell Jr. 1986, Verba *et al.* 1995).

[17] The required minimum age for voting is typically 18 throughout the region, with some exceptions: the minimum age is 16 years old in Brazil and Ecuador (Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2017).

While time and money boost the ability to vote, having resources entails a necessary, but insufficient, condition for migrant voting. One also needs some knowledge to be able to vote; for instance, knowing they have suffrage rights, the procedures of how to register, where and when to vote, and for whom to vote. Voting entails trade-offs, forgoing resources to register, stay informed, and vote that could have been used on other activities. Because political engagement can be costly, migrants who are more established in the residence country have more time and resources "to remain connected" and participate from abroad in origin-country politics (Escobar *et al.* 2015, McCann *et al.* 2019). Consequently, those with greater resources more often participate in emigrant voting from abroad (e.g., Lafleur 2015, Chaudhary 2018). Using the same logic, those with greater resources would more often participate as an immigrant in the residence country. Voters, particularly immigrants, must also know enough of the language to be able to follow politics, gain voting information, and read the ballot; Hypothesis 1 captures self-reported ability to communicate in the residence country language.

Voters also participate in national elections because they want to, for example, spurred by civic duty or interest in politics (e.g., Campbell *et al.* 1960, Rolfe 2012, Smets and Van Ham 2013) (also see Section 1.2.1). Interest in politics positively relates with electoral behavior because people interested in politics stay informed about politics and then are more likely to vote (Powell Jr. 1986, Verba *et al.* 1995, Rosenstone and Hansen 2002, Prior 2010). Yet most people are only moderately interested in politics, as a higher interest requires more resources to develop and maintain (Dalton 2008, Almond and Verba 2015 [1963], McCann *et al.* 2019). For emigrants, along with civic duty and the ease of voting, an interest in politics also influences voting from abroad (Peltoniemi 2018b). For immigrants, Black (1987) discovers that their interest in, and accumulative experience with, politics play a large role in political participation, regardless of where it occurs. White et al. (2008) similarly find that in Canada, immigrants from a variety of political system types who have an interest in elections and voting show very similar post-migration adaptation to Canadian politics.

What remains unclear is if a migrant's general interest in politics (e.g., 'following the news') would be enough to become a dual transnational voter, or if the interest must be country-specific to turn out to vote in that country. I explore this idea by focusing on interest in politics in Hypothesis 2. While the presence or absence of interest in politics affects migrant voting, a lack of variation over time fails to explain a *different* outcome (i.e., voting in one election then abstaining in the next). As Prior (2010, p. 763) highlights, "political interest behaves like a central element of political identity, not like a frequently updated attitude." Since I aim to focus precisely on migrants' adjusted attitudes and

behavior, I suggest that migrants' interest in politics often relates to a country or the people there, meriting more focus on ties rather than interest in politics per se.

Time plays a large role in many voting-related decisions since the longer migrants live in a country, the more likely they are to gain resources, knowledge, and networks in the residence country and the more incentives they have to improve language skills, stay informed about residence-country politics, and spend resources to register and vote. In other words, tenure (the amount of time one has resided in the destination country) and intention to stay both correlate with migrants' resources and choices on investing time and money. Hypothesis 3 focuses on longer tenure, not only its influence on immigrant or emigrant voting, but on dual transnational turnout in both countries. For immigrants, tenure increases exposure to the newer political system and allows time for obtaining local knowledge on issues and candidates, whereas emigrants may engage in new or different ways with origin-country politics (White *et al.* 2008, Bilodeau 2014, Peltoniemi 2018a, Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019). Similarly, Hypothesis 4 involves intention to stay in the residence country (versus returning to the origin country or relocating elsewhere) since I expect longer plans to stay give migrants greater incentives to make connections and establish themselves in the residence country, benefits that pay off in the long term.

Verba and colleagues (1995) also explain individuals vote because they are "invited to" participate by a variety of agents and groups, suggesting that mobilization can increase turnout among voters (Smets and Van Ham 2013), including for immigrant voters (e.g., Bloemraad 2006, Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019) and emigrant voters (Burgess 2014, Gamlen 2015, Paarlberg 2020). At the institutional level, a country's government or party system affects political participation, e.g., a country's legal framework can encourage or discourage participation, while mandatory (as compared to facultative) voting systems can boost turnout (Powell Jr. 1986, Jackman 1987, Franklin 1999, Fornos *et al.* 2004, Blais 2006). Some scholars argue that electoral institutions will not function in the same way for emigrants abroad: "International migration systematically weakens connections between emigrants and sending states: sending states lack organizational capacity in the place where migrants reside; migration limits the political communications required for mobilizing and informing an electorate" (Waldinger and Soehl 2013, p. 1247). However, evidence consistently shows that origin countries, political parties, and migrant organizations engage with emigrants abroad (e.g., Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Smith and Bakker 2008, Délano and Gamlen 2014, Burgess 2018, Délano 2018, Koinova and Tsourapas 2018, Paarlberg 2019, Tsourapas 2020, Yener-Roderburg 2020, Fliess 2021), expanding the political arena beyond national territories (Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020).

State-led processes affect migrant voting since automatic or easy registration processes increase enrollment whereas expansive voting rights increase turnout (Lafleur 2013, Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020). Conversely, cumbersome or multi-step registration processes decrease turnout, at least for emigrants (e.g., Lafleur and Calderón Chelius 2011, Hutcheson and Arrighi 2015, Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020). Over a dozen countries grant emigrants special representation in the origin country (Collyer 2014a, Hartmann 2015, Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019). For instance, Ecuador reserves legislative seats in the National Assembly to represent emigrants in their own overseas district (Palop-García 2017, 2018, Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2017, Fliess 2021); campaigns directly target emigrants who elect candidates to these designated seats (Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2020).

Party-led outreach via mobilization instigates higher emigrant turnout (Burgess 2018, Burgess and Tyburski 2020). Worldwide, political parties have started to conduct electoral campaigns abroad for external voters (Burgess 2018, Paarlberg 2019, Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020) sometimes mixing with active migrant organizations and hometown associations (see Fauser 2013). "A vibrant party is an active organization that operates beyond electoral cycles, has clear symbols, and maintains a significant presence in the territory" (Rosenblatt 2018). As the diaspora politics literature explores parties expanding their activities beyond the territory—a natural development of a new modus operandi (Rashkova 2020)—some are targeting certain emigrants in particular areas, perhaps striving to be vibrant parties abroad.

Countries such as Italy have many emigrants abroad concentrated in certain locations (e.g., Italian descendants in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) and strategically target their connections with the group, as do leaders of "local ethnic associations" in residence countries (Tintori 2011, p. 178). Some Turkish political parties similarly try to mobilize its high emigrant population in Germany (Yener-Roderburg 2020; also see Mügge *et al.* 2019 for Turks in the Netherlands). Such efforts are less fruitful in areas with large emigrant populations scattered across a country since it is difficult to target them with finite campaign resources (van Haute and Kernalegenn 2020, p. 244). Similarly, political party campaigning abroad is also not worth it for countries such as Mauritius and Namibia with small emigrant populations, thus they refrain from engaging in overseas mobilization (Hartmann 2015).

Additional groups, organizations, candidates, states, and interest groups are also able to mobilize voters (Schildkraut 2005), including migrant voters. A wide range of organizations and outlets such as ethnic media, for-profit businesses (e.g., travel agencies, insurance brokers, notaries, and immigrant consultants), NGOs and community groups, and government-backed initiatives target immigrants by providing information and building political know-how skills in an attempt to increase immigrants'

political participation (Bloemraad 2006, pp. 83–98). People tend to surround themselves with like-minded people. Spouses, family, friends, colleagues, neighbors, and acquaintances form networks and play a role in individual-level choices to participate (Rolfe and Chan 2017, Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, García-Castañon 2018; Ryan 2018). Rooij (2012, p.470) finds that informal social networks in Western Europe had more influence on individuals' electoral choices and played a larger role in getting migrants to participate in politics than formal institutions. As Putnam (1993, 2000) highlights, social capital such as networks, norms, and trust enable individuals to cooperate and foster civic engagement.

Figure 1.2 Select Necessary Conditions for Migrant Voting



Source: The description "can/able to" is based on Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995).

Migrants' networks, connections, and activities in two countries foster multiterritorial ties, thus represent critical pieces in unpacking migrant voting. Existing networks and connections can maintain political engagement in the origin country (Lafleur and Calderón Chelius 2011, Collyer 2014a, Escobar *et al.* 2014, Waldinger 2015, Chaudhary 2018, McCann *et al.* 2019); similarly, gaining new social networks and local information can lead to immigrant participation in the destination country (Hochschild *et al.* 2013, Morawska 2013, Chaudhary 2018, McCann and Jones-Correa 2020, Pujols 2020). I explore ties in both countries, and their relation to the four types of migrant voting, in Hypothesis 5. In Chapter 3, I find more migrants report being interested in politics because of personal or civic ties or because they are invested creating a better democratic and economic future for a country. As I will show in Chapter 4, establishing a connection with a country and caring about people within it can motivate migrants to stoke their interest in politics and encourage them to stay informed in either the origin or residence country, or both. Outlined in Figure 1.2, I propose that migrant voters who have the resources to exercise suffrage rights will decide to vote or abstain based on their ties or duties (the attachment and loyalties) with individuals and nations. International migrants' ties and concern for the future are *multiterritorial*, making them different from other voters. Multiterritorial ties add complexity to voting decisions since they signify electoral choices in one country may influence electoral choices in the other country.

The dotted lines at the top of Figure 1.2 indicate suffrage rights comprise a scope condition, because without them, one has no voting rights to exercise.[18] Once suffrage rights are obtained, migrant voting is then determined by both resources and ties. The variable of ties is inapplicable in compulsory voting systems. Reaching a bottom tier of "origin country" results in emigrant voting whereas "destination country" results in immigrant voting; combining emigrant and immigrant voting indicates dual transnational voting; absence of adequate resources or failure to reach a bottom-tier results in abstention. Political learning, positioned vertically along Figure 1.2, occurs throughout life—first as socialization and then for migrants as resocialization, which shapes voting behavior. When migrants have resources and ties, the combination creates a necessary condition for individual-level voter turnout.

[18] "Scope conditions are closely tied to necessary conditions. *By definition* all cases included have a value of 1 on the scope condition" (Goertz 2017, p. 110, emphasis in original). Migrants having suffrage rights is thus a requisite for migrant voting.

1.2.1 Inherent duality: Multiterritorial ties and civic duty in two countries

"Ties" refer to information flows and connectedness to family or assets, or to the nation-state or nationality (Boccagni and Ramírez 2013). It is a shorthand term for an individual's connections, or attachment, to a territory/nation-state or the people who live there. Like other voters, migrants' connections potentially affect how they think and feel about a given setting. Individuals care about the education system in which their children are enrolled; people care about the quality of healthcare they and their loved ones receive; voters care if their politicians are caught in corruption scandals versus spending time bettering communities; investors care about tax policy in a country in which they invested. What differs for migrants is that ties are multiterritorial.

Ties include a sense of belonging, which breeds a sense of duty or obligation, implying that an individual has a rights-responsibility relationship with a state. A sense of duty and how a voter defines the act of voting affects migrant voters' decisions to vote or abstain (Wass and Blais 2017, Peltoniemi 2018a, pp. 61–62). When the sufficient condition of having resources and strong ties is met, it seems more likely that individuals vote (see Figure 1.2). Ties to the origin country result in emigrant voting whereas ties to the residence country result in immigrant voting. Hypothesis 5 proposes that the existence of multiterritorial ties (to both countries or people within the countries) increases dual transnational voting.

Emigrants maintain relations with the origin country and with people there. As Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez (2015, p. 8) point out, states and political parties know emigrants continue to care about the origin country but may lack information. As a result, institutional agents strive to fill the information gap for migrants and entice them to participate; for example, the Mexican electoral authority has used a campaign *hazlo por los tuyos* ('do it for yours,' meaning your loved ones) urging emigrants to register and vote, attempting to take advantage of emigrants' connections with family and friends in Mexico (Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015).

Political parties worldwide conduct electoral campaigns abroad, even from countries that legally prohibit campaigning abroad, such as Mexico (Smith and Bakker 2008), since politicians can rally and make speeches abroad before announcing official candidacy in elections (Paarlberg 2017, McCann *et al.* 2019). Politicians also attempt to strategically affect voting in the origin country by nurturing emigrant-origin country relations in the hopes that emigrants will influence their family and friends 'back home,' as Paarlberg (2017) found in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Mexico. Part of this strategy lies in politicians believing in an influential connection between emigrants and their

friends and family left behind, evidenced by remittances (Burgess 2012, Adamson 2016, Paarlberg 2017, 2019).

Sending money demonstrates emigrants are still committed to, and care about, their family and friends' wellbeing in the origin country. While countries 'tap into' emigrant resources and may 'embrace' the emigrant-origin state national identity, they form diaspora institutions to *govern* the emigrant population (Gamlen 2014, pp. 183, 192). But diasporas are not only governed by state policies; for centuries there have been actors who affect politics in both the origin and residence countries and in the larger geopolitical context (see Adamson 2016, 2019, 2020; Koinova and Tsourapas 2018). In the current globalized world, one way of active political participation is voting (e.g., through postal or electronic methods) on different sides of international borders. Larger studies of aggregated emigrant voter turnout (e.g., Burgess and Tyburski 2020, Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020) show that sending remittances correlates with increased emigrant participation in origin-country politics. Similarly, Erlingsson and Tuman (2017) find that in Latin America and the Caribbean, sending remittances can increase the chances of governments granting emigrant suffrage rights. Countries formally recognize continued ties between emigrants and origin countries—these connections can endure even decades after emigration and shape the emigrants' ties with the country and the people there (see Chapter 3).

Post-migration, immigrants interact with individuals and institutional agents in a new context. Political resocialization unites previous learning with new experiences, which can change attitudes, opinions, and political party preferences that migrants apply to both the origin and residence countries (White *et al.* 2008, Paul 2013, p. 202, Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015, Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, Chaudhary 2018) (see Chapter 3 and 4). A modified attitude can affect immigrant and emigrant voting, as individuals compare political systems and adapt their role as political actors in one or both territories.

Multiterritorial ties reflect the duality in migrants' lives that affect political decisions in both countries. Migrants build political attitudes and beliefs from early learning (Niemi and Hepburn 1995), creating "layered learning experiences that accumulate over space and time" (Paul 2013, p. 195). Mixing "pre-departure" attitudes and stances (such as ideology) with new ones in the residence country result in changes in attitudes, attachments, and behavior that are more dynamic than for other voters (Paul 2013, p. 195, Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015).

One prominent aspect of duality in migrant voters' lives involves civic duty within the rights-responsibility nexus. Migrants may feel a (civic, national, patriotic) responsibility, or obligation, to a

certain community, country, nation, or nation-state. The various levels of connection and duty exemplify what Maas (2013) explains as multilevel citizenship—i.e., citizenship is not only a legal status given by a state but can be established and practiced at other substate and suprastate levels. A sense of civic duty can emerge from political learning via family, school, religious groups, media, and peer associations (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, pp. 4, 17). Individuals can also base their sense of duty on the rights-responsibilities toward a country; as I explore in Chapter 3 and 4, migrant voters can display distinct rights-responsibility relations with the origin and residence countries. Migrants can translate their sense of civic duty connected to a country into the act of voting.

A variety of factors and life events can influence one's sense of civic responsibility, starting with birthright nationality (see Shachar 2009) and political socialization in a country. What happens afterwards is subject to debate: following the persistence perspective, preadult learning persists throughout life; following the impressionable years perspective, certain age ranges (over late adolescence and early adulthood) are most susceptible to change then stabilize, or "crystalize". Early learning is particularly important for partisanship, prejudice, and racial and ethnic identity (Sears 1975, Sears and Brown 2013, pp. 71, 75, 85). By early adolescence, some individuals will have already established certain political orientations, political interest, and national loyalty or duty (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, p. 4).

International migrants are again unique from other voters because of dual transnational voting: does an established sense of civic responsibility stir migrant voting in both countries? Or is duty expressed by voting in only one country? For emigrant voters, scholars have already identified civic duty as an independent variable that drives external voting, which Peltoniemi (2018b) finds among Finnish emigrants. Migrants who take suffrage rights abroad for the origin country understandably can maintain voting habits and civic duty, which keeps them voting while living abroad. As immigrant voters, moving internationally is a shock that begins the political resocialization process in a new country context with a different political system, institutions, and agents around them (see Chapter 4). The environment brings opportunity for fresh learning that can influence adults as voters.

Strong civic ties or duty can waver or further consolidate when a large exogenous shock occurs during political socialization, such as economic crisis, political crisis, war (at home or abroad), or outbreaks of violence; individuals reevaluate their political orientations during such shocks, which will

be hard to change again (White *et al.* 2008, p. 269).[19] Sears and Brown (2013, pp. 59, 77) refer to such catalysts as what occurs in "the times" or *zeitgeist* that form people's "life histories." Countries can opportunely draw on people's "deep-rooted attachment to the political system established in childhood" to connect with individuals for political purposes (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, p. 5). Citizen-state connections shed light on why individuals comply with laws and play by the rules, like paying taxes and completing military duty (Easton and Dennis 1969, Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017). Military service in times of war exemplifies this relationship since countries call on people (as part of their duty) and people obey (willing to die for the country as part of their duty). Ties and civic duty endure but also change shape over one's experiences in "the times."

Upon relocating to another country, individual migrants—but again, not necessarily refugees—bring their sense of civic duty with them: the citizen-state reciprocal relation changes into the emigrant-origin country relation. Emigrants can "maintain close ties with families and friends" in the origin country (Paul 2013, p. 198). As I explain in Chapter 3, feelings of obligation can form long stable roots within an individual's political trajectory; if formed, a sense of duty to a certain place or community is highly unlikely to become uprooted, even after emigrating.

Since the emigrant is now also an immigrant, what about civic duty in the residence country? One needs time to settle in and create ties before deciding on values within the new context, which may or may not include a sense of duty toward the country or the idea of the nation-state. More commonly, ties in the residence country are to family and friends. When an immigrant says, however, that civic duty motivates them to vote (see Chapter 3), the rights-responsibilities balance also applies between countries and foreign residents. Immigrants building ties in the destination country and emigrants continuing ties with the origin country demonstrates the possibility of maintaining multiterritorial ties.

Recapitulating Figure 1.2, the combination of resources and ties can shed light on which of the four migrant voting types a migrant belongs, at any given moment. Holding enough ties in the origin country results in emigrant voting, whereas enough ties in the residence country results in immigrant

[19] Emigrants and refugees have different motives for relocating to another country, yet the overlapping general objective is to seek a more prosperous life. War within the origin country affects refugees personally, putting their own safety at risk. Contrarily, when the origin country engages in war abroad, it affects citizens in the country and abroad differently. For instance, adults in the US changed political stances and behavior during the time of the Vietnam War, prompting scholars to question the continued relevance of the persistence perspective (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, pp. 6, 33–36).

voting. Absence of either resources or ties results in abstention. Combining emigrant and immigrant voting signals dual transnational voting.

1.3 Migrants' Political Learning: Temporality, Agents, Places, and Spaces

During (re)socialization, three critical aspects are temporality, agents, and context—meaning political learning depends on when, with whom, and where it occurs. First, temporality of political learning is more than just the pre- and post-migration divide since the duration and sequence of learning matters. Specific to migrants, Paul (2013, p. 190) highlights that "migration results in superimposed sets of learning experiences that occurred in particular spaces (contexts) and sequences (chronological orders)." The political socialization process affects political engagement only in the origin country; the outcome of voting is binomial (vote: yes or no). Duration matters because migrants must have grown up in the environment before relocating—i.e., children or young adolescents who are too young to have voted in the origin country may not have had time to completely form their political attitudes and values, which will affect the political resocialization process.

Post-migration, the political resocialization process can affect engagement in two countries; the outcome of migrant voting is multinomial (vote in the origin country: yes or no; vote in the residence country: yes or no). As Paul (2013) points out, new learning does not lead to an exclusive outcome (e.g., all migrants will vote after a certain length of time or after exposure to a certain type of political system). In short, temporality is important because voting outcomes depend on the attitudes, values, and behaviors individuals had learned during socialization, and then also the ways individuals maintain or change them post-migration during resocialization.

The second critical aspect of political learning is agents in and beyond institutions. Agents influence migrants in the socialization process either indirectly (e.g., exposure to media) or directly through interpersonal interactions. According to Froman (1961), an individual's learning environment is influenced by the media, education, peers, and family. Close contacts such as family and friends are not the only influential figures; daily interactions with neighbors and acquaintances also play a role (Rolfe and Chan 2017).

Differential treatment towards immigrants can affect whether the individual views the political scene in the residence country as a friendly place or a hostile environment for foreigners. Impressions and lived experiences influence decisions to politically participate. When faced with conflicting views, people tend to "accept the political norms of the preferred socializing agent" (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, p. 13). Post-migration, various agents reinforce or countervail migrants' political

orientations; during resocialization, migrants maintain or adjust political attitudes, values, and behavior in the new context.

Which agents are the most influential? It partly depends on age. Wasburn and Adkins Covert (2017, p. 17) organize a life-course model of political socialization recognizing social identities, historical contexts, and maturation of individuals who are aging in a changing society.[20] The major transitions of leaving school, starting work, starting a family, retiring, and maintaining health all relate to which agents are active at which stage, and their relative importance. Family members always play important roles, even despite changing family structures (Jennings *et al.* 2009). Who is considered 'family' depends on the life stage: it first comprises the family one is born into, in young adulthood it becomes the family one establishes, which later in life serves as the dominant family socializing agent. Parents represent top-down direct socializing agents whereas spouses are lateral socializing agents used to discuss politics and electoral decisions (García-Castañon 2018). Families can affect partisanship, stances on political issues, trust of the federal government, as well as interest and knowledge of politics (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, p. 62). For adults, partisanship fluctuates dependent on "the times," meaning specific experiences through life (Sears and Brown 2013, p. 81). Later in life, agents in the workplace replace agents in school.

Agents from religious affiliations, voluntary associations, and the media endure through all life stages. The media as a source of political information traditionally came from television, newspapers, and radio but now also includes social media and websites.[21] Voluntary associations include formal organizations such as trade unions as well as informal and nonpolitical organizations (e.g., social clubs, sport teams, student councils, community service) (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, pp. 77–78). By participating in associations, people develop skills such as leadership and voice that they then use to engage with politics. Similarly, as mentioned, completing bureaucratic government paperwork allows

[20] Wasburn and Adkins Covert (2017, pp. 14–15, 17, 27, 47) refer to social identities as gender, race/ethnicity, and social class; historical contexts include period or cohort effects and varying reactions to political events; and maturation refers to cognitive development and increasing political sophistication. The last helps shed light on how individuals' sociopsychological characteristics "have influenced their learning political beliefs, values, attitudes, and patterns of participation" (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, p. 47).

[21] Media acts as socialization agents through agenda setting, priming, and framing (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, p. 80): *agenda setting* means that the media covers certain issues and their importance; *priming* is an extension of agenda setting since it makes some issues more salient than others, in effect influencing people's political judgements on the topic; and *framing* means media has the power to impose "cognitive frameworks for understanding political actors, conditions, and events" (also see Valentino and Nardis 2013).

immigrants to develop destination country-specific skills that they can then use for migrant political engagement. The third critical aspect of political learning is the context, integral to migrant voting. Migrants interact with agents beyond the residence country, as Paul (2013, p. 188) details:

> …one cannot discuss how migration changes ideas, behaviours, identities, priorities and lifestyles without analysing the learning mechanisms underlying these transformations. Learning occurs through interactions between migrants and receiving societies; between migrants and diasporic organisations; between migrants and their non-migrant friends and family back home; between more or less experienced migrants in the receiving country etc. Politicians and government authorities enter the picture when they adapt to appeal to migrants… Learning does not happen in a vacuum: one needs to analyse what attitudes and behaviours acquired in primary socialisation are unlearned and partially replaced with values and action repertoires from the host country.

Figure 1.3 Four Political Learning Places and Spaces for International Migrants



Sources: Built from ideas in select literature (Glick Schiller *et al.* 1992, Faist 1998, 2000, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Faist *et al.* 2013, Jakobson and Kalev 2013, Paul 2013, Finn 2019).

The context of learning is multiterritorial and beyond. Waldinger (2015, p. 20) notes, "As opposed to the globalists who see immigrants living in two worlds and the nationalists insisting that these same home country connections be cut, I will show that the immigrants are instead between here and there." The betweenness of the two places is what forms the concepts of transmigrants and transnationalism. Living in and between places applies to immigrants, emigrants, and transmigrants. In between the places are two additional spaces (see Figure 1.3) where migrants interact with various agents.

Regarding each part of Figure 1.3, the two physical territories of the origin and destination countries are where people live before and after migration. Migrants can embed themselves in social and political structures in the newer residence country while they simultaneously keep connections to the origin country (Faist *et al.* 2013, Fauser 2013). Each country has a distinct political system, regime, political culture, governmental institutions, and offers a certain bundle of political rights. Here, individuals interact with agents within the family, school system, religious groups, workplace, and voluntary associations, and through media exposure (see Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017). In between the two countries, Glick Schiller and colleagues (1992, p. 1) propose migrants build "social fields" linking the places, which they call "transnationalism."

Based on Faist (1998, 2000), the "social space" that has organically emerged through migrants' actions and involvement in political culture and practices between the origin and destination countries is what I label as the transnational space. Through migrants' involvement in political culture and practices linking the origin and destination countries, a social space organically emerges, called the transnational space. As Jakobson and Kalev (2013, p. 202) point out, the space is not only one of "social interaction, but economic stock-taking, political motivations and governance regimes, that also shape the context for transnational migration."

Lastly, Paul (2013, pp. 192–193) includes the "transnational migratory system" as one of the "relevant learning spaces" containing migrant-related security, control, politics, policies, cross-border political parties, and institutions. I partially separate the transnational space from the migratory system; although they overlap, the migratory system encompasses the transnational space entirely. The migratory system exists in both the origin and residence countries, as well as independent from them, for example the role of non-governmental organizations and via supranational or international law.

Furthermore, only some of the migratory system is transnational. Countries maintain policies and laws defining migrants' rights as well as (non-)state organizations and institutions working with migrants and migration. For example, certain departments or ministries (e.g., the Ministry of the Interior or Foreign Affairs) often manage migration topics within a country and human mobility across

borders. Decision-making on migration governance strategies can be at the national level (see Geddes *et al.* 2019). Moreover, border control and security form critical parts of a country's sovereignty because states need them to maintain (at least an appearance of) control over the territory (De Genova 2002, Hollifield and Wong 2015). The migratory system requires individuals to complete pre- and post-migration bureaucracy, which are the steps and documents countries require before allowing individuals to legally reside and formally participate in society and politics (Finn 2019).

Migrants can construct multiple identities by living in and being connected to two territories (Basch *et al.* 1994, Glick Schiller *et al.* 1995). Experiences with new governments and political activities prompt migrants to compare their new environment to the origin country (Paul 2013; see Chapter 2 and 3). While adult attitudes can change substantially, the boundary between analyzing socialization versus behavioral changes is always hazy (Niemi and Sobieszek 1977, p. 211). Nonetheless, I argue migrants can have multiple political identities and simultaneous multiterritorial ties. Political learning forms ties, which affect how, why, and to what extent migrants politically participate. Table 1.1 summarizes the relation of the temporal migration trajectory with political learning and outcomes.

Table 1.1 Longitudinal Migrant Voting Processes

Time	Electoral Options	Main Political Learning Process	Roots and Relation	Learning Places and Spaces	Relevant Independent/ (Control) Variables
t_0 pre-migration	1. Vote 2. Abstain	Socialization: establishing political attitudes, values, and behavior	Growing roots: 1. national citizen-state relation	Origin country	• resources • interest in politics • ideology • civic duty • (age) • (education)
t_1 post-migration short term	1. Vote only in origin country 2. Vote only in residence country 3. Vote in both countries 4. Abstain in both countries	Resocialization: maintaining or adjusting political attitudes, values, and behavior	Two sets of roots: 1. emigrant-origin country relation 2. immigrant-residence country relation	1. Origin country 2. Destination country 3. Transnational space 4. Migratory system	• resources • communication • interest in politics • intention to stay • in-country tenure • multiterritorial ties to people/country • (nondemocratic origin country)
t_2 post-migration long term	Continuation in a migrant voting quadrant Movement between migrant voting quadrants	Resocialization: growing, maintaining, or shrinking roots in origin and residence countries	Migrants can change between the nine Roots Routes, which can result in moving between migrant voting quadrants		

Notes: The term "learning spaces" in the socialization context comes from Paul (2013, p. 192), as does the migratory system as one of the spaces. The four electoral options come from Finn's (2020a) migrant voting types.

1.4 Conclusion

Increased international migration and the expansion of migrant enfranchisement around the globe have increased the number of migrant voters—many of whom have formal political voice in two countries, the origin and residence countries. What drives migrants to vote or abstain? Why do migrants turn out to vote in one country or in both? I argue that combining resources and ties to a country or the people within it can lead to migrant voting (see Figure 1.2). To examine migrant voting as a dependent variable, I offer a migrant voting typology (Figure 1 in the Introduction) as an analytical framework. As suggested in Finn (2020a), moving past just 'here' and 'there', the choice to vote or abstain in two countries makes four options: immigrant voting, emigrant voting, dual transnational voting, and abstention. While emigrant voting requires nationality, immigrant and dual transnational voting do not. As such, migrant voting affects the notion of citizenship as nationality, as further detailed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3).

Throughout the dissertation, I put particular emphasis on dual transnational voting, representing the inherent duality in international migrants' lives, including their interest and political participation in two countries. Migrant voters are unique from other voters because, as nonresident nationals and as foreign residents (or with multiple nationalities), they hold additional suffrage rights and face additional explanatory variables affecting electoral decisions (see Table 1.1). Moreover, other factors (e.g., civic duty and multiterritorial ties to both countries) can develop and change over time.

Migrants also differ because they experienced political socialization in one country then political resocialization in another country. Although the political socialization process is already complex—and adding migrant resocialization in a second country further increases complexity—it is a step worth taking because it guides electoral behavior and socialization literature toward a growing group of political actors: migrant voters. Migrants' political socialization and resocialization processes not only occur in the origin and residence countries but also in transnational spaces between them and in the migratory system (see Figure 1.3). International migrants interact with different sets of agents, both people and institutions, that influence migrants to establish, maintain, and adapt their political attitudes, values, and behavior. Whereas political socialization affects individuals' electoral decisions in only one country, migrants' resocialization can affect electoral decisions as both an emigrant for the origin country and as an immigrant in the residence country.

Chapter 2

Granting then Exercising Migrant Voting Rights: Insights from Chile

Since migrants must have suffrage rights before they can vote, the first half of this chapter focuses on enfranchisement whereas the second narrows in on migrant voting. While dozens of countries grant select immigrant groups the right to vote, Chile remains one of only five countries in the world—along with Ecuador, Malawi, New Zealand, and Uruguay—to grant all adult immigrants the right to vote in multilevel elections after a residence period (Pedroza 2013, Arrighi and Bauböck 2017).[22] Chile automatically registers foreign residents into the electorate for multilevel elections after five years of permanent residence. Most of these foreigners also have external voting rights, making it is possible to find people who can vote in national-level elections in two countries: the new country of residence (Chile, without needing to naturalize) and the origin country through external voting from abroad.

As a global pioneer in migrant suffrage rights, Chile enfranchised some foreign residents first in local elections in democracy in the 1925 Constitution under President Arturo Alessandri Palma, then expanded the rights to include national-level elections in the 1980 Constitution under the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet. In this chapter, I suggest that both enfranchisement processes were political elite-led projects during crisis periods, with the main actors being members of the constitutional review committees. After being a pioneer of immigrant suffrage, Chile was a latecomer in granting emigrant suffrage, who only received the right to vote in 2014, and voted from abroad for the first time in 2017. Analyzing Chile's long road to enfranchising both immigrants and emigrants challenges misleading beliefs about the primary role of democratic ideals and international norms in extending migrant voting rights, which, as Escobar (2015) notes, only started being used as reasons to grant suffrage in Latin America in the 1990s onwards. For the historical analyses, I use evidence from newspaper archives from the 1920s, scholarly literature, constitutional laws and reforms, and transcribed debates from constitutional commission sessions (reforming the 1833 Constitution then the 1925 Constitution). I further support my analysis with data from Chile's national

[22] Allowing "all adults" to vote means the constitutional right to vote is universal (i.e., non-discriminatory), open to all nationalities, backgrounds, both men and women, etc. However, just as other voters, migrant voters must meet requirements, such as age. While these five countries are the most legally inclusive, thus are extreme cases, dozens of countries allow some foreign residents voting rights at some level, including across the European Union (see Introduction).

censuses dating back to 1875, the National Institute for Statistics (INE), and the Electoral Service (Servel).

Post-enfranchisement, I shift my analysis from the state granting rights to individuals exercising them. Emigrants voting from abroad in national-level elections for the first time generated attention to migrant voting, including for foreign residents, making the run-up to the 2017 presidential election an ideal time to collect data on potential migrant voters through an online survey. In this Chapter, I use the survey results and my typology to provide an empirical illustration exploring the four types of migrant voting. I evaluate some factors that influence individual-level migrant voting in national elections, as outlined in Chapter 1, to further investigate migrant electoral behavior in two countries.

In the following Section 1, I broadly outline the steps to, and motives for, enfranchising migrants. Section 2 details Chile's long 92-year road to enfranchising both immigrants and emigrants, focusing on foreign residents because Chile was a global pioneer in immigrant voting rights and because of the unusual circumstances of extending these rights during dictatorship. I explain the methodology used for surveying potential migrant voters in Chile in 2017 in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 contains the survey's main findings, as related to select hypotheses from the dissertation's Introduction.

2.1 Migrant Enfranchisement: How and Why States Set the Boundaries of the Demos

Migrant enfranchisement means adding migrants to the political community through granting voting rights. Full migrant enfranchisement occurs when a country has granted suffrage rights to both nationals abroad and foreign-born residents, including non-naturalized immigrants (Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* under review; see Appendix 1.1)[23]. Palop-García and Pedroza (2019) outline three steps to enfranchise emigrants: passing, regulating, then applying legislation. To achieve emigrant enfranchisement, a country must enshrine suffrage rights in (electoral or constitutional) law, create regulatory steps for migrants to access the right to vote (e.g., electoral laws), then implement said laws. Enfranchisement is achieved when a new group of migrant voters cast a ballot in an election for the first time; for all migrants, these steps must be completed for both emigrant and immigrant voters.

[23] Nonresident nationals comprise a larger group than emigrants, since some people hold the nationality of a country in which they have never lived and can still exercise voting rights (e.g., descendants of emigrants obtain nationality through *ius sanguinis*). In this dissertation, I focus only on migrants, thus limit my analysis to enfranchisement processes for emigrants abroad and in-country immigrants, including those who have and have not naturalized in the residence country.

A plethora of studies have pinpointed many reasons why countries enfranchise migrants, under which types of government, and how quickly or slowly they have adopted then implemented such rights. Normative reasons outlining who countries 'should' enfranchise include those who are subject to a government and its laws, affected by a government's decisions, or who are stakeholders (e.g., Whelan 1983, Shapiro 2003, Bauböck 2005, 2007, 2015, López-Guerra 2005, Owen 2010, 2012, Bender 2021). Additionally, Beckman (2007, p. 31) identifies groups that are typically excluded from 'universal' suffrage such as minors, felons, the intellectually disabled, and migrants.

Contrary to the idea that democracy is the primary driving force for migrant enfranchisement, other regimes, such as hybrid and authoritarian types, have also granted migrant voting rights (Jacobs 1999, Collyer 2014b, Caramani and Grotz 2015). Both emigrant and immigrant enfranchisement have been achieved by established democracies (e.g., Austria, Italy, Japan), when countries were relatively newer democracies (Mexico, Poland, Thailand), and electoral autocracies (Belarus, Gabon, Kazakhstan). In South America from the 1920s through the 1980s, countries generally granted migrant voting rights under what Escobar (2015) calls nondemocratic regimes led by "strongmen" and in democracy in the 1990s onward; the exceptions are Chile in 1925 in the first wave (since it was democracy) and Peru in 1997 in the second wave (since it occurred under 'strongman' Fujimori). Before the 1990s, regimes that enfranchised migrants tended to be rightwing and offered rights only for symbolic support, to gain legitimacy, or to increase turnout, meaning most explanations for why enfranchisement occurred were domestic and not international (Escobar 2015). Such 'strongmen' are not unusual in the region, even in democracies such as Chile (Alemán and Navia 2009). Chile's hyperpresidentialist constitution favors a stronger executive power over the legislative branch, including for legal decisions on migrants and migration (Siavelis 2002, Stefoni 2011, Gargarella 2013, Acosta 2018, Thayer 2019, Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero 2020, Freier and Jara Castillo 2020).

From the 1990s onwards, Escobar (2015) finds that typically left-leaning governments in South America have granted migrant voting rights and that domestic factors are more important than international factors for achieving migrant enfranchisement. International factors include but are not limited to: globalization, international agreements on human rights, the notion of "universal citizenship," regional market integration, and hope for reciprocity. Reciprocity of migrant enfranchisement has arisen particularly among countries with a mutual language or 'culture' and those sharing an imperial past, the same political authority, or colonial ties (Bauböck 2005, Hartmann 2015, Turcu and Urbatsch 2015, Arrighi and Bauböck 2017, Chaudhary 2018, Pedroza 2019).

Scholarly studies offer three relevant insights for this chapter: first, the incumbent government's political ideology fails to fully explain migrant enfranchisement. Earnest (2008) analyzes four decades (1975–2005) in 25 mostly European countries and finds left-leaning governments were less likely to grant immigrant suffrage rights. However, when he extends the study five years up until 2010, he finds the opposite: that left-leaning governments were more likely to give foreign residents the right to vote (Earnest 2015a). Thus, the reasons for granting migrant enfranchisement are more complex and go beyond ideology. Second, Wellman (2015, 2021) finds that emigrant enfranchisement, reversal, and reimplementation in South Africa reflected shifting political party power. The present analysis nuances incumbent party decision-making because while the main political leaders played a role in immigrant enfranchisement in the 1920s and 1970s, the core influential decision-making power laid in the hands of constitutional review committee members.

Third, democracy played a larger role in the region in granting migrant suffrage starting in the 1990s because of the worldwide diffusion and adoption of liberal norms, reinforced by a spread of institutions and non-governmental organizations (Turcu and Urbatsch 2015). At the individual level, migrants have more opportunities to claim voting rights both in-country and abroad, access to consular services (i.e., legal protection) have increased, and courts more often consider human rights international agreements (Earnest 2015b, Acosta 2018). Such reasons for migrant enfranchisement were largely absent in the first period of immigrant enfranchisement in Chile in 1925 when the country had few immigrants within its total population. Analyzing the immigrant enfranchisement process during this period sheds light on pre-globalization reasons for enfranchisement unrelated to international factors, colonial ties, or immigrants' claims making.

South American countries used democratization or a return to democracy to reconnect with emigrants who left during nondemocratic periods and allowed residents who already possessed voting rights to finally use them in democratic elections. It is not uncommon for migrant enfranchisement to occur during democratization (Lafleur 2015, Erlingsson and Tuman 2017, Palop-García and Pedroza 2019), especially within the 'window of opportunity' following a democratic transition (Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010, Earnest 2015a), not just in South America but also elsewhere, such as in some Baltic countries (Cianetti 2014). Ramírez and colleagues (1997) identify such a window opens an opportunity also for granting women's suffrage rights.

Besides the immigrant-emigrant specification within enfranchisement laws, countries may further distinguish between suffrage at different levels (e.g., local versus national) or reserve voting rights only for some migrants (e.g., based on emigrants' military or diplomatic status or on immigrants' residency

or origin country) (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017). Between the steps of adopting, regulating, and applying rights, lags or stagnation can occur, or a country can recede to a previous step by repealing legislation (Palop-García and Pedroza 2019), meaning not all democracies offer or have offered immigrant voting rights, emigrant voting rights, or both. Countries such as Nicaragua have adopted rights but never implemented them (Umpierrez de Reguero under review). Other countries have reversed rights (implementing then later eliminating them) for nationals abroad, such as Morocco (Brand 2006, 2010) as well as Armenia, Cook Islands, Guyana, and Liberia (Wellman 2015). South Africa experienced a double reversal since political parties expanded, repealed, and then reinstated diaspora voting after transitioning to democracy (Wellman 2015, 2021). Reversal has also occurred for immigrant voting, which was widespread a century ago in the United States, but for the most part have been repealed (Hayduk 2006, 2015).

2.2 A Long Road to Enfranchising Immigrants and Emigrants in Chile

Despite these studies of migrant enfranchisement and rights reversals, other reasons exist, which come to light by detailing country cases. I do so for Chile and Ecuador to give deeper meaning to the context in which enfranchisement processes unfold and rights' survival over the long term. In Chile, the six steps to enfranchising both immigrants and emigrants took 92 years. The milestones were adoption of restrictive immigrant voting in local elections (1925), expansion of immigrant voting (1980), first application of universal immigrant voting in national elections (1988), adoption of emigrant voting (2014), and emigrants voting from abroad for the first time in national elections (2017) (also see Appendix 2.5). Focusing on immigrants, over this span of almost a century, Chile has experienced changes in the stock (number) of foreign residents and their percentage within total population (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 Chile's Immigrant Stock and Percentage within Total Population, Select Years 1875–2019



Source: Based on data from INE-DEM (2019), UN DESA (2019), and Population and Housing Censuses (*Censos de población y vivienda*), select years between 1875 and 2017, from Chile's National Institute of Statistics (INE).

The immigration trends show that during both migrant enactment steps, the percentage of immigrants in total population was low: Chile extended voting rights to select foreign residents in 1925, all immigrants represented between 2.5% and 3.2% of total population; then Chile expanded enfranchisement to foreign residents in multilevel (local and national) elections in 1980, when immigration was at its lowest percentage recorded, at 0.7%. As Pedroza (2013, p. 31) reports, this puts Chile among at least two dozen other countries that also enfranchised denizens while having "either very low or even negative migration rates."

It is tempting to limit the analysis of Chile's immigrant stock and percentage to 1990 since it has steadily grown since then, about a seven-fold increase in three decades. However, extending the temporal analysis to before 1990 reveals additional relevant information. Going as far back as possible with available census data on foreign-born residents, the largest increase in stock occurred between 1875 and 1885; the percentage of foreign residents in Chile peaked at 4.2% in 1885, which remained lower for over 130 years, until the same percentage emerged again in 2017 (see Figure 2.1).

The initial peaks in 1885 and 1907 occurred after many South American countries had implemented policies aimed to attract skilled white European men (Acosta 2018). Shortly after the peak, over the course of World War I and II and into the Cold War era, immigration slowly declined. This trend likely reflects the very few new arrivals in Chile and a normal death rate for the original immigrants during this period. By 1970 when Salvador Allende was president, foreign-born residents comprised 1% of the total population, then dropped to its lowest at 0.7% in 1982 during Pinochet's regime. This is unsurprising, given the dictatorship perceived foreigners as threats to national security (Stefoni 2011, Lara Escalona 2014, p. 81). Chile's return to democracy (1989–1990) brought many positive changes, such as economic growth and stability, significant progress on poverty reduction, and improving its ranking on the human development index (Castiglioni and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016). Combined with the broader effects of globalization, Chile became an attractive country of residence, drawing migrants in from new origin countries (see Table 2.3).

The most recent increase from 4.2% in 2017 to 7.8% in 2019 is somewhat misleading since it mainly reflects a change in methodology of how Chile tracks its in-country immigrant stock. Chile was previously an emigrant-sending country; many sought better economic opportunities or absconded from the 1970 and 1980s political crises under Allende then Pinochet (Cano and Soffia 2009). However, increasing immigration in 2017—even if the peak was only around 4%, much lower than 'immigration nations'—Chile decided not to only rely on the national census to track foreign residents. Instead, Chile's National Institute of Statistics (INE) began crossing census data with administrative

records (e.g., visa holders and border entries and exits) from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Migration (DEM) to obtain a more precise measure of the immigrant stock. The data for 2019 in Figure 2.1 are estimates; thus, while immigration is climbing, the 'spike' between 2017 and 2019 reflects more the changed methodology.

Table 2.1 Milestones in Chile's 92-year Road to Enfranchising Immigrants and Emigrants[24]

Year	Action	Enfranchisement Step Description
1925	Review	Subcommission reviews 1833 Constitution
1925	Enact	Article 104 of the 1925 Constitution enacts immigrant suffrage (restrictive, municipal elections) with 5-year residence
1931	Regulate	Electoral law regulates foreign resident voting
1934	Regulate	Electoral law reformed
1935	Apply	First time select foreign residents vote in municipal elections
1974	Review	Commission reviews 1925 Constitution; drafts Article 12 and Article 14
1980	Enact	Article 14 of the 1980 Constitution enacts immigrant suffrage (universal, multilevel elections) with 5-year residence
1988	Apply	First time foreign residents vote in national elections, in plebiscite
2014	Enact	Law 20.748 enacts external voting
2016	Regulate	Law 20.960 regulates external voting
2017	Apply	First application, Chilean nationals vote from abroad in national elections, in presidential primaries (July), first round of the presidential election (November), and second round (December)

[24] The steps of enact, regulate, and apply are from Palop-García and Pedroza (2019). Five-year residence is the only constitutional requirement specific to foreign residents, but they must also meet the standard voting requirements (e.g., age of 18 years old and a clean criminal record; previously restricted to literate men 21 years and older). The 1935 municipal elections also marked the first time women voted in Chile.

As a world pioneer of immigrant enfranchisement, but a latecomer for granting nationals the right to vote from abroad, Table 2.1 summarizes critical dates to chronologically visualize how the process unfolded. Allen, Nyblade, and Wellman (2020) highlight that the *mode* of enfranchisement (i.e., change in legislation, by referendum, etc.) and the institutional actors involved not only shed light on why migrants have rights but also their durability over time. As a country study, Chile's road to enfranchising both immigrants and emigrants is worthwhile to analyze how and why rights emerged and may shed light on why they have not been reversed. Considering these trends, and prior to focusing on migrant voting, I ask why the incumbents in both periods decided to grant and enhance immigrant voting rights, first during relative democracy in 1925 and then during dictatorship in 1980.

2.2.1 The 1925 Constitution: Immigrant voting rights in relative democracy

Granting foreign residents' voting rights in Chile was a lengthy multistep process (see Table 2.1). Relating Palop-García and Pedroza's (2019) three enfranchisement steps to immigrants in Chile, the right was approved for municipal elections in 1925 in constitutional law, regularized in 1931 then reformed in 1934, and applied in 1935 when select foreign residents voted for the first time. The 1935 local elections also marked the first time women could vote. As discussed in the next section, the right to vote was expanded to national-level elections in the 1980 Constitution during dictatorship (i.e., with no elections to vote in), then applied in 1988 in a plebiscite. In the 1925 Constitution (Article 104), the vote was restricted to literate men over 21 years old who had lived in Chile at least five years. The electoral law regularizing it occurred in 1931 but specified land ownership as a requirement;[25] the 1934 law regularized suffrage for all women, including female foreign residents, without the land ownership requisite (Valenzuela E. M. 1995, p. 174).

Focusing on immigrant suffrage, the important changes in 1925 and 1934 occurred while Arturo Alessandri Palma was President, making him a key political figure in Chile's immigrant enfranchisement history who lies at the center of the present analysis. Primary evidence for this section comes from analyzing the constitutional commission formed to reform the 1833 Constitution, articles

[25] In between Alessandri's two presidential terms, a chain of events led to his successor President Emiliano Figueroa Larraín's (from December 1925 to April 1927) resignation, then Carlos Ibáñez del Campo becoming Vice President for three months before being 'elected' president in a one-candidate election, leading Chile from July 1927 to July 1931 under an authoritarian regime (BCN 2020a). While the 1931 law regularized suffrage (with a land ownership requirement), no municipal elections occurred under Ibáñez (Valenzuela E. M. 1995). Alessandri's second presidential administration began in December 1932 (BCN 2020b).

in the 1925 Constitution, data from Chile's Electoral Service (Servel), and data from Chile's national censuses. Secondary evidence comes from the existent literature, which is scarce, as suffrage rights are largely ignored even in historical legal accounts, such as in Durán Migliardi and Thayer's (2017) study of Chile's migratory legislation between 1824 and 1975. An exception includes Courtis's (2016, 2017) analyses recounting the legal evolution of defining certain foreigners as Chileans as early as the 1822 Constitution. A plethora of works focus on Alessandri, ranging from his campaign and the 1920 election (Serrano 1979, Millar 1981) through his second administration starting in 1932 (Correa Sutil 1979), including analyzing his political discourses and personal character (Orrego Vicuña 1979, Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017), to the political and social environment during the period (e.g., Alwyn Oyarzún and Alamos Varas 1979, Krzeminski 1979, Vial Correa 1981). Moreover, Alessandri wrote memoirs of his presidential terms, broken into three volumes: his first presidential administration, self-exile, and second presidential administration (Alessandri Palma 1967a, 1967b, 1967c).

Many scholars continue to consider Alessandri a key political actor in Chile's twentieth century history, which is exemplified by the extensive literature focused on him (e.g., Millar 1981, Vial Correa 1981, San Francisco 2020). Despite being well-known by monikers such as the 'Lion of Tarapacá' (his hometown), Alessandri is not well-known for immigrant enfranchisement; the topic was also largely invisible from the press and political discourses at the time and has been largely absent from academic legal and historical accounts. Put simply by an established historian on the era, Dr. René Millar Carvacho (2020), "suffrage was not a priority" in Alessandri's campaigns or administrations; instead, his main aim during his first presidential administration was to replace the parliamentary system in Chile with a full presidential system, which was achieved in the 1925 Constitution.[26] The 'so-called' parliamentary system at the time was not fully parliamentary, nor a working presidential system, and was debated before the 1920 election (Millar 1981, Vial Correa 1981).

I use 'democracy' in quotation marks since Alessandri's presidential administration, especially the first one, differed from modern liberal democracy. According to various democracy indexes, there was a drop—but not a collapse—of democracy between 1925 and 1932, followed by steady growth that

[26] Citations marked 'Millar 2020' stem from an informal conversation on August 26, 2020, with Dr. Prof. René Millar Carvacho, a well-known historian and Professor at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (*Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile*) and a scholar of Alessandri's political career. Millar is particularly known for his 1981 book, *La elección presidencial de 1920* (The 1920 Presidential Election). After obtaining verbal permission, the conversation was recorded and transcribed (in Spanish). All translations are my own.

collapsed from 1970 to 1990 (see Appendix 2.1). Scully (1992) describes a critical juncture in Chile's party system, starting with Alessandri's victory in 1920 and through a transition period 1924 until 1932. As a charismatic populist candidate and leader unlike any proceeding him, in his first presidency Alessandri took advantage of the class cleavage and (anti)clerical divide in Chile, managing to bring the working class (especially "unorganized urban workers") into party politics, as well as other "previously passive political actors" such as students and artisans (Scully 1992, pp. 77–80). Before analyzing the enfranchisement process, I elaborate on the following incongruencies: on one hand, the 1920 election set the stage for continued middle-class involvement in politics, a milestone in the 20th century; on the other hand, the 1920 election encompassed widespread fraud, irregularities, and low participation—thus lacking important dimensions of democracy.

While several historians of this Chilean period have agreed that the 1920 election was a milestone in Chile's 20th century political history and was competitive (Lennon Zaninovic 2020, Millar 2020), the close presidential election was also marked by irregularities such as vote buying, bribery, and altering of ballots and election records (Millar 1981). Both candidates, Alessandri and Luis Barros Borgoño, took measures to tilt victory in their favor, making the 1920 election fall short of the contemporary requirement of democracy to have free and fair elections.[27] However, vote buying was not treated as bribery or an illegal act at the time but rather seen as *gratificaciones* ('gratuities,' as in a reward or bonus) for fulfilling political favors like turning out to vote (Millar 1981, p. 169). Fraudulent practices went beyond election day, as the tight race between the two candidates ended in an official tribunal being formed to verify the actual number of votes for each candidate (i.e., by discounting fraudulent votes) to determine who won.

As Retamal and Retamal (2020) explain, even a century later, the 1920 election was the closest presidential election in Chile's history; Alessandri's victory was "razor thin" (Scully 1992, p. 81), winning by having just one constituent group's support more than Barros Borgoño (177 versus 176 *electores*) (Millar 1981, p. 161). Referring to Alessandri, some tribunal "members did not dare give an unfavorable result to the candidate who a considerable and boisterous part of the [public] opinion had already been chosen as the winner" whereas other members already considered "that Alessandri had won" so even in the face of alleged fraud, they still determined his victory legitimate enough to adapt

[27] The 1920 presidential election involved a third candidate, Luís Emilio Recabarren, nominated by Socialist Workers party leaders (Millar 1981). However, Recabarren was barely involved in the competition; Scully (1992, p. 82) reports that, "none of the competing political parties even made public allusion to his candidacy."

the ruling and declare he won by one additional constituent group (Millar 1981, p. 162, own translation). The group had been called for by none other than Alessandri himself and was named—as it turned out, ironically—the Tribunal of Honor.

Despite such irregularities, the novelties that arose at the time set the stage for democratic growth. According to Millar (1981, p. 213, own translation), "the 1920 election clearly reflects a moment of transition in the country's historical evolution. Values, ideas, economic and social structures are in a full transformation process." A hundred years after the 1920 election, historians recognize that it "marked the eruption of mass-politics, and with it, modern democracy" (Lennon Zaninovic 2020, quoting Gabriel Cid, historian at the Universidad San Sebastián, own translation). The 'masses' included the new urban population of working and middle classes; with rural to urban migration on the rise, literacy rates climbed, which in turn increased the number of eligible voters since literacy was a voting requirement (Millar 1981; see Appendix 2.5). Despite extensive undemocratic practices, Alessandri gained support from "social sectors that had, until then, been on the margins of political decisions" (Lennon Zaninovic 2020, own translation).

Alessandri oversaw significant parts of Chile's journey to enfranchising immigrants: during his first administration (1920–1925), the new constitution granted some migrants suffrage rights in local-level elections and during his second term, 1932–1938, an electoral law recognized women as voters for the first time while also regularized and implemented (local-level) foreign residents' suffrage rights. Escobar (2015, pp. 930, 933) describes Alessandri as "an authoritarian leader who resorted to immigrant enfranchisement in search of new support" and positions him as a "strong supporter of universal suffrage."[28] But granting suffrage to two new voter groups does not necessarily signify that Alessandri was a supporter or progressive leader of voting rights. It was possible that he was trying to secure future electoral support, or suffrage emerged for other reasons. To investigate questions surrounding whether Alessandri was a pro-universal suffrage leader, or not, I further examine Chile's process of immigrant enfranchisement.

Alessandri appears to be front and center of the Commission and Subcommission. The constitutional discussion sessions leading up to the resulting Article 104 in the 1925 Constitution were recorded, transcribed, and are made digitally available in Chile's Library of the National Congress (Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior] 1925). The document is called 'The Official Acts of

[28] The original quote from Escobar (2015, p. 930) refers to authoritarian leaders, in plural, referring to both 1925 enfranchisement in Chile as well as in 1983 in Venezuela.

the Commission and Subcommissions' Sessions in Charge of Analyzing the Project of the New Political Constitution of the Republic.' The original Consultative Commission—which Alessandri called for through Decree 1.422—comprised 122 people, then resulted in two subcommissions (*forma* and *reforma*): the first met only three times to oversee relevant tasks and logistics, such as obtaining voters' approval for the process; the second (*reforma*) was the Subcommission of Constitutional Reforms. It comprised 15 men chosen by Alessandri and met 30 times to discuss amendments and draft 110 Articles (Bernaschina 1956, BCN 2020c).[29]

Tsebelis (2018, pp. 15–17) reports that the Subcommission was made up of "politicians and other political operatives" but since the group lacked popular legitimacy, "Alessandri resorted to an extra-constitutional means of 'legitimizing' his Subcommission's constitutional proposal" by holding a plebiscite. Since Alessandri hand-picked the members, and actively participated while presiding over the sessions, I posit that the results aligned with Alessandri's political objectives. Alessandri's insistence to obtain his goals and resistance to negotiation (Millar 2020) reflects Tsebelis's (2018, p. 15) account that "Alessandri reportedly stormed out of a Subcommission meeting and was ready to halt reform talks altogether" after remarks from a conservative party representative.

My analysis of discussions about foreign residents' voting rights and their right to be elected starts with reviewing the official record in a 757-page document, in which the term "foreigners" (*extranjeros*) appears 39 times.[30] J. Guillermo Guerra proposes making, "a clear distinction between what political citizenship and municipal citizenship is," in other words, distinguishing those voting in national and local elections. Guerra also suggests that women and foreign residents who are "contributors" (assumedly meaning those who paid taxes) should be granted voting rights at the municipal level (Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior] 1925, p. 328). Other conversations about foreigners involve *ius soli* and naturalization; the Subcommission upholds the 1833 Constitution determining that

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[29] Fifteen men participated in the Subcommission: Domingo Amunátegui Solar, Luis Barros Borgoño, Ramón Briones Luco, Nolasco Cárdenas, Guillermo Edwards Matte, J. Guillermo Guerra, Manuel Hidalgo, Roberto Meza Fuentes, Pedro N. Montenegro, Enrique Oyarzún, Romualdo Silva Cortés, Francisco Vidal Garcés, Carlos Vicuña Fuentes, Eliodoro Yáñez, and Héctor Zañartu. Additionally, the Minister of Justice at the time, José Maza, was also active in the sessions and the Subsecretary of the Interior, Edecio Torreblanca, served as the Subcommission's Secretary.

[30] For scholars interested in further details, discussion regarding foreign residents revolves around voting rights (pp.152, 158, 270, 389–390, 599), their right to be elected (pp.282, 283, 287, 295, 523), and *ius soli*, naturalization, and nationality (p.332, 472, 534, 570) (Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior] 1925, Stuhldreher 2012, 2016, also see Margheritis 2015, p. 327). All translations are my own.

those born in the Chilean territory are Chilean and that foreigners may adopt the Chilean nationality and naturalize after one year of residence (Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior] 1925, p. 327). Considering that citizenship regimes involve both access to acquiring nationality and the rights related to it (Vink 2017), such high access made Chile more inclusive to immigrants, but not to emigrants in this instance (Vink and Bauböck 2013). However, the Subcommission did not offer blanketed rights to all foreigners, as they explicitly excluded children born in Chile to transient foreigners (in contemporary lingo, referring to temporary immigrants) and to foreign diplomats working in Chile from the privilege of naturalizing after a year. The Subcommission also determined that foreigners must renounce their original nationality when they adopt Chilean nationality (Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior] 1925, pp. 534, 570).[31]

José Maza, the Minister of Justice at the time, states that, "having the right to vote in municipal elections is something unrelated to nationality" (Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior] 1925, p. 328). Maza's comment sets the tone for further mentions of immigrant suffrage rights, which resulted in the drafting of Article 104, which establishes a five-year residence as a pre-condition to be an immigrant voter in Chile (still in effect as of 2020). While there were other general voting requirements at the time such as being 21 years or older, male, and literate, the residence condition applied specifically to foreigners.

While Alessandri had played a major role in suggesting and organizing the Subcommission, such anticlimactic discussions behind the resultant constitutional article did not shed light on his role in immigrant enfranchisement in Chile. Alessandri knew how to use "all the available tools" to gain popular support from the "masses" and incite them when he thought it would help his political ends (Millar 2020). Rather than being a suffrage advocate, Alessandri seeking votes, electoral support, legitimacy, or symbolic popularity as a leader could better explain the emergence of new voting rights.

2.2.1.1 Explaining early enfranchisement

I challenge three seemingly plausible explanations for enfranchising foreign residents in Chile in 1925: policy diffusion (of neighboring countries' enfranchisement policies), the leader being a suffrage advocate, and a small foreign population (making it relatively easier to pass enfranchisement legislation).

[31] Similarly, the 1833 Constitution (Article 6) also required Chileans to renounce their Chilean nationality, if they nationalized in another country.

Historically, in 1925 Chile was a pioneer in immigrant enfranchisement, regionally and globally, which credits Alessandri with not following a trend but rather starting one. Nonetheless, neighboring countries had already taken preliminary steps to enfranchising immigrants. Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil were main immigrant-receiving nations at the time (Acosta 2018). Despite having higher populations of foreigners, the city of Buenos Aires passed Law 1.240 on foreign resident voting in 1917 (Escobar 2017, p. 10). Uruguay had also made progress redefining eligibility of the electorate: Article 1 of its 1830 Constitution granted political association to "all citizens" in all sections of the territory, Article 1 of its 1918 Constitution Article 1 changed it to "all inhabitants" in the territory, then Article 78 of its 1934 Constitution granted foreign resident voting rights in both local and national elections (Stuhldreher 2016, pp. 248–249).[32] While Chile remains an innovator in granting immigrant voting rights, it was not a radical move at the time, even compared to nearby countries with higher immigrant populations.

Second, I find little evidence that Alessandri was "a fervent supporter of universal suffrage," as Echeverría (2015, p. 3) claims. Escobar (2015) mentions that Alessandri was a strong supporter of voting rights but does not explore this stance further. As president, Alessandri was a political elite and through his administration, tried to increase his role as the Executive. Despite his own obtained power, Alessandri was also known for standing against hierarchies, including being anti-party (Silva 2006) and using his speeches to appeal to the "masses" of the day (Millar 1981). Since most of the "masses" had just started to be politically included at this time, I did not expect a public discussion around immigrant enfranchisement. This was confirmed when a keyword search through newspaper articles from 1924 and 1925 in Chile's National Digital Library proved fruitless (see Appendix 2.2), showing no public discussion or contestation.

The only concrete evidence that I find supporting Alessandri's position as an advocate of voting rights is that universal suffrage was one of three main topics in his project to reform the 1833 Constitution (BCN 2020b). However, as quoted above, Millar disagrees with this, which also became evident to me given the sparse attention Alessandri and the Subcommission members dedicated to discussing suffrage rights (Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior] 1925). Alessandri prioritized automatic registration in the electorate to reduce manipulation and protect his own political

[32] While Uruguay remains one of the most liberal countries worldwide for immigrant voting rights, eligibility rules to access suffrage rights were, and continue to be, rigid. To vote, immigrants must have a clean criminal record, maintain residence in Uruguay for 15 years, have a job, and have formed a family in the country (Stuhldreher 2012, 2016, Margheritis 2015).

aims (Millar 2020), which underlaid his reputation for his connection with the "masses" through his political discourse rhetoric (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). For example, he closed the National Congress in 1924 during his first administration, took power into his own hands instead of calling for a constituent assembly, and manipulated the press during his second administration (Millar 2020, San Francisco 2020). Alessandri did not hesitate to limit rights when 'necessary' instead of negotiating or allowing other voices to be heard.

Third, as compared to total population, there were very few immigrants during this period (see Figure 2.1); moreover, few people had voting rights since the country still excluded women, illiterate men, and those under 21 years old. Upon return from his self-exile during his first presidency, Alessandri's return stirred optimistic public opinion about positive change to overcome political and social crisis (Donoso 1934, Alwyn Oyarzún and Alamos Varas 1979). In the 1920s, "general dissatisfaction with the existing order" had dissipated throughout society, including discontentment with the parliamentary system (Silva 1994). The scenario illuminates why Alessandri gained popular support and why the population was unconcerned with selective immigrant enfranchisement.

However, none of these three reasons shed light on *why* Alessandri extended voting rights to some foreign residents in local elections. It seems possible that Alessandri could have been trying to gain votes or continue his popularity.[33] At first glance, these motivations seem implausible because a) immigrants were enfranchised at the local (not national) level, so they would not have been able to directly reelect Alessandri; and b) with only a small population of foreigners in the total population, further reduced through rigid eligibility requirements for voting, the number of migrant voters would have been too low to significantly affect electoral outcomes. However, taking a closer look into the context and enfranchisement process, I cannot discard either of these scenarios. While they cannot fully answer the question of why the administration granted immigrant voting rights, both carry validity and reveal a glimpse into the whole picture.

On the surface, both the number and percentage of immigrants in the population seem too insignificant to play a role; in 1925, immigrants made up between 2.5% and 3% of total population (see Figure 2.1). However, the voting requirements (only literate men 21 years old and older) meant the entire electorate in 1925 was much smaller than modern electorates. In the 1920 presidential election, 383,331 men were on the electoral registry and 166,115 voted—representing just 9% of the

[33] While Alessandri's grandfather had emigrated from Italy to Chile and Alessandri had a familial link to Italian communities, this fact alone is insufficient to assume that he supported foreign residents' political rights.

entire male population at the time (Millar 1981). Thus, immigrants who gained voting rights in 1925 became part of a small special electorate.

Of the approximate 105,500 immigrant residents in 1930, around 65% were European and many of the 68,163 men would have had voting rights (Dirección General de Estadística de Chile [General Directorate of Statistics of Chile] 1931, Gutiérrez Roldán 1975; see Appendix 2.3, 2.4, 2.5). As Fernández Domingo (2006) reports, before 1860, Europeans arriving to Chile mostly worked in trade and self-employed professions with technical skills; French, Germans, and Italians formed part of the middle and upper classes. Escobar (2015, p. 933) adds that some "immigrants achieved significance as skilled labourers, merchants and entrepreneurs." Based on this citation, Echeverría (2015, p. 3) then posits that the administration recognized immigrants' importance "by the granting of limited voting rights to those foreigners who met certain requirements." However, based on public records, the press, and academic sources, I find no evidence of Alessandri or the Subcommission deciding to grant voting rights as a 'reward' or in recognition of such occupations or contributions. Under greater scrutiny, it seems that these skilled European men would have met voting requirements and as such, carried much more political weight than as first appeared. Even with conservative estimates of the adult foreign-born male population, the number is significant since the electorate numbered only 383,331 in 1920.

Given that the immigrant electorate only gained local-level voting rights, perhaps Alessandri sought to gain indirect electoral support or increase his chances of future election or appointment to other public local-level positions. Alessandri had been a "political insider" before running for president, given his career as Senator and Deputy (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, p. 523, BCN 2020b). His desire to continue his political trajectory and gain and maintain political power through holding public office is thus a reasonable ambition. More specifically, Samuels (2003, p. 2) narrows the theory of political ambition to a particular form of "progressive" ambition (in his case study of Brazil) with politicians seeking first a short-term post as Deputy followed by serving in state or local politics over the long term. After being president twice, Alessandri continued as a Senator until his death in 1950 (BCN 2020b). Alessandri's political trajectory aligns well with Samuels' definition of progressive political ambition; it seems feasible that Alessandri could have sought to gain electoral support in any additional way he could. Despite a small population of foreign residents, granting them local-level suffrage meant that they could then electorally support Alessandri in municipal elections after his presidency.

The 1925 Constitution gave the President of Chile the right to name mayors of the main cities in Chile, but Decree 1.642 of 1934, approved in 1935, changed it so mayors were elected (Senado de Chile [Senate of Chile] 2016). Fewer municipalities meant fewer representatives to be elected. The literate foreign resident professionals resided primarily in six areas (Atacama, Santiago, Valparaíso, Valdivia, Concepción, and Magallanes), and these men were the ones who gained voting rights. Therefore, it is possible that foreign residents could have aided in electing mayors in municipal elections who supported Alessandri since this link would indirectly boost his chances of presidential reelection.

In addition to electoral support at the ballot, Alessandri may have been trying to use foreign residents to increase (real or imagined) legitimacy as the incumbent. Was it possible that Alessandri was looking to win favor from wealthy migrant families, for example, to boost popularity in elite circles? Based on the evidence I have gathered, it does not appear to be the case, mostly because the Executive had the power to grant key players nationality, which would have been a more direct way to grant immigrants multilevel voting rights, allowing them to elect Alessandri. Instead, it seems that political elites other than Alessandri lie at the core of why the 1925 Constitution granted local-level migrant voting rights: a project by elites, for elites, to gain indirect electoral support to maintain political power, as well as win votes in the future.

Political elite-led projects are nothing new in South America. Elite projects to populate, whiten, and build a nation are core themes throughout Acosta's (2018) detailed account of two centuries of migration and citizenship law in South American countries. Attracting fair-skinned skilled Europeans had previously been part of Chile's legal nation-building project to increase and whiten the population, strongly influencing its nineteenth-century migration legislation (Lara Escalona 2014, Durán Migliardi and Thayer 2017, p. 442, Acosta 2018). Spilling over into the twentieth century, the notion of 'ideal' or 'desirable' migrants were still white European literate men. Other immigrants in Chile, such as Arabs and Asians, faced discrimination as 'non-ideal' immigrants (which continues today; see Chan and Montt Strabucchi 2020); those with undocumented status made them ineligible to vote—which frames why Escobar (2015, p. 943) explains that immigrant enfranchisement under Alessandri occurred against a backdrop of imagining the desirable European immigrant uninterested in naturalizing and few in number. Through the normative perspective of the day, the decisionmakers saw this select group of foreigners as those that 'should' have voting rights. Rather than seeing foreigners as outsiders, literate men were valued for their skill and sex, regardless of their birthplace. Such a perspective is reinforced by the Subcommission's outcome separating naturalization decisions

from voting rights (Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior] 1925, pp. 328, 599). The normative lens suggests that few within the elite group of voters would have opposed welcoming working-aged, skilled, white, literate men as new members in the exclusive electorate 'club.'

The possibility remains that Alessandri believed in greater suffrage rights and wanted to include new voters, but I would not portray him as a strong or fervent supporter of voting rights for foreign residents. Granting a group of migrant voters the right to participate in local-level elections could have boosted his popularity—and indirectly his chances of reelection—in a more significant way than has been recognized in the literature. Another simpler explanation is that new migrant voters mirrored the current voter profile so much so, that extending suffrage rights to them was a 'natural' step, unworthy of press or debate. While this may appear to be an anticlimactic ending to the question of why some migrants gained voting rights in the 1925 Constitution, it is crucial to explaining the extension of suffrage rights universally to adult migrant residents in multilevel elections in the 1980 Constitution. The major difference is that while the first step occurred during 'democracy,' the second occurred during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet.

2.2.2 The 1980 Constitution: Expanding immigrant voting rights under authoritarian rule

The coup d'état that overthrew Allende's administration resulted in a declared state of emergency and Pinochet's 17-year military dictatorship (1973–1990). Political parties had polarized to two extremes,[34] dissolving the ideological center, which eliminated the possibility of forming coalitions necessary for reaching agreement (Bermeo 2003, Valenzuela 2003). Pinochet knew that maintaining polarization would allow him to take advantage of the dire situation. According to Huneeus (2000), implementing economic and constitutional changes was part of a multidimensional plan to legitimize the regime (gaining admiration from some in the process), extend his rule, delay transition (i.e., continue the declared state of emergency), and centralize political power. Martínez and Díaz (1996) point out that changing the foundations of the political and socioeconomic systems may have been a standalone objective (also see Barros 2002). Being unable to single-handedly control all political players, Pinochet founded the secret police DINA (*Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional*, or the National Intelligence

[34] In Chile, political parties began to form 1828–1891, with the emergent Conservative, Radical, and Liberal parties (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1976, Valenzuela J. S. 1995). A tripolar division of left, center, and right had dominated the Chilean partisan system since the late 1820s and this deep-rooted system reemerged post-Pinochet (Valenzuela J. S. 1995, Scully 1996).

Directorate) to control the opposition, as well as spy on government employees in their private and professional lives (Huneeus 2000, pp. 104, 160).[35]

Part of the political overhaul to create change required wiping the slate clean: Pinochet eliminated other political parties and began a constitutional revision. The objective of reviewing the 1925 Constitution and implementing ('Chicago boys' technocrat style) free market economic change was to reestablish normalcy in politics and the economy, after it had been in dire straits prior to the coup (Huneeus 2000, pp. 215–217). According to Bermeo (2003), society comprised "ordinary people" who believed the coup saved Chile from communism, that the country was in a war against Marxism, and as such, underestimated or ignored abundant violence and human rights abuses. Pinochet aimed to settle the chaos but used the 'war' against Marxism and a state of emergency to maintain fear so he could make significant institutional changes during this critical juncture in Chile.

Almost immediately following the 1973 coup, the Ortúzar Commission began its lengthy process of reviewing the 1925 Constitution, which contributed to the final product of Chile's 1980 Constitution. The process unfolded within the context of crisis. The final wording agreed upon in 1974 for Article 12 (defining suffrage and who national citizens are) and Article 14 (foreign resident voting) were both approved in 1978 during the writing of what would become the 1980 Constitution.

2.2.2.1 A foreign resident's right versus a national's duty

I examine transcribed dialog from the Ortúzar Commission in 1974 (Historia de la Ley, Art.14 2005).[36] The Commission was a selected group assigned to review the nationality and citizenship articles within the 1925 Constitution, in preparation for the eventual 1980 Constitution. These discussions are included in the History of the Law of Article 14 of the Republic of Chile's Political Constitution of 1980. The National Congressional Library, the Supreme Court, and the General Accounting Office collaborated to prepare this document. It contains sections of the conversations that occurred during the political sessions while the Commission members reviewed the previous constitution. I also use

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[35] The DINA was the secret police in Pinochet's first years, which was then changed to the CNI (*Central Nacional de Informaciones*, or the National Information Center) in 1977. These organizations, and Pinochet, were later tried in court for violating human rights, such as inflicting torture (Huneeus 2000, pp. 113, 163).

[36] The official name was the Commission of Studies for the New Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile (*La Comisión de Estudios de la Nueva Constitución Política de la República de Chile*), but is more commonly known as the Ortúzar Commission, given the last name of the group's leader.

Articles 12 and 14 from Chile's 1980 Constitution, as well as academic references regarding context, enfranchisement, and migration law.

At the time, the Migration Law of 1975 (still active as of December 2020) regulated immigrant flows, which had been implemented earlier in Pinochet's regime from a national security perspective (Stefoni 2011). Nonetheless, immigrant suffrage rights had not changed since the 1925 Constitution. The expansion of immigrant voting rights from local to national elections in the 1980 Constitution was not a drastic change; rather I view the change as an "institutional innovation" since it expanded the status quo (Thelen 2003, p. 209). Since 1925, select foreign-resident voters could choose if they wanted to participate or abstain in municipality elections; I found the Commission expanded this understanding to mean immigrant voters should be able to choose whether they want to participate, or not, in *all* elections, both municipal and national.

A critical political actor in forming this perspective regarding the right, not duty, to vote was Jaime Guzmán. Guzmán had led the Gremial movement and was close with Pinochet, writing numerous speeches for him and stating that this government could restore social peace (Huneeus 2000, p. 146).[37] Guzmán was a vocal member of the Ortúzar Commission, taking suffrage stances opposing other Commission members—particularly contrasting Jorge Ovalle Quiroz and the Commission's President, Enrique Ortúzar Escobar. The Commission members discuss foreign resident voting as a right, not an obligation, and their dialogues express strong views regarding the appropriateness of mandatory voting.

Guzmán was the only one on the Commission who supported an optional voting system for all voters, whereas the other members argued it should be optional only for immigrant voters. Reviewing the Commission's debate in Historia de la Ley, Article 14 (2005, pp. 35–38, 43–44, own translation), Ortúzar in particular expresses that facultative (voluntary) voting would have grave consequences for social order, and it would be a mistake to interpret "the contemporary conception of what a free, open, and democratic society is" while being lax about the "weak sustaining bases" of such a society if the government allowed voters to choose to be interested, or not, in the electoral process (Finn

[37] The Gremial movement was a Chilean political group located within higher education, based out of the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (*Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile*), led by Jaime Guzmán, who maintained a "close relationship" with Pinochet, a relationship that served as political backing for the movement (Huneeus 2000, p. 146). As a young political elite, Guzmán started a conservative political party, the Independent Democratic Union (*Unión Demócrata Independiente*, UDI) (Luna *et al.* 2013), which remains active, as of 2020.

2020b). Ortúzar argues that the government must force people to vote, because if they have a choice, many will abstain—preferring instead a day of rest rather than making the "minimal sacrifice" of expressing their opinion at the ballot. He believed that activists and those with strong interests would always vote, which would worsen the political divide since moderate voters would abstain. He continued to argue that, as national citizens lose interest in public matters, it would allow those "desiring the destruction of the institutional system" to succeed. However, Ortúzar's belief that 'all' members must participate is *not* synonymous with universal suffrage goals, but it did encompass a large electorate group. The Commission considered eligible national voters to be Chileans free of convicted sentences and crimes who were at least 18 years old; meeting these requirements, Chilean nationals gained suffrage rights.[38]

In contrast to Ortúzar and other supporters' position on mandatory voting for Chileans, most of the Commission views foreign resident voting as a right, not an obligation. They aimed to constitutionally ensure that immigrants who meet requirements would then have the possibility to vote in the future, but only if legislators decided to grant this right via electoral law—as Silva Bascuñán summarizes (Historia de la Ley, Art.14 2005, p. 30)—highlighting the critical difference between the legal enfranchisement steps of enactment versus regulation. However, the Commission determined that foreign residents would not be able to run for elected office. Despite the Commission's stance that optional voting would make sense in a "purely aristocratic or elite society, but in no way in a democracy in which all its members are called to participate," they nonetheless decided that foreign residents should be allowed to opt in or out of being members of the electorate and choose to vote or abstain in each election.

The Commission's stance endured and was converted into Article 14 of the 1980 Constitution: "Foreigners residing in Chile… may exercise suffrage rights in the cases and manner determined by law." Although the Commission wanted to avoid the possibility of legislators or political parties using immigrant enfranchisement as partisan leverage, their focus remained on ensuring immigrant voting, if enacted, could never be constitutionally considered mandatory. The debate focused on future constitutional interpretation of who could meet requirements to be an immigrant voter. The Commission states that voting is not an inherent right, although they also express that individuals will

[38] After debate if national voters should be 18 or 21 years old, the final decision (in Session 57 on December 5, 1987) favored 18 as the minimum voting age.

have the option (after 10 years, later reduced to 5) to choose, as the immigrants see fit, to participate or not in the political community.

The voting as a right-versus-duty discussion had two repercussions on the voting system and personal freedoms today (Finn 2020b). First, in 2010, Chile was already experiencing declining turnout in the mandatory voting system with optional electoral registration and switched to an optional voting system with automatic registration, but lower turnout continued (Navia 2004, Herrera and Navia unpublished)—which did not destroy the institutional system. As compared to when voting was compulsory, turnout rates have indeed been lower (Carlin 2006); in Chile's 2017 presidential election, participation was 46.8% of the electorate (Joignant 2018), which Ortúzar's thinking had predicted: fewer people vote when it is voluntary. However, based on the Commission sessions, the debate was never about voting being optional or mandatory, but rather about how to control Chilean nationals to ensure they fulfil this obligation (their "moral duty"), i.e., how to establish the grounds for effective punishment for Chileans who do not vote (Historia de la Ley, Art.14 2005, pp. 35, 39–40, 42).

Second, the resulting 1980 Constitution (counterintuitively) increased foreign residents' personal freedoms while restricting that of nationals. Commission member Enrique Evans de la Cuadra saw no reason why the Constitution would not also grant suffrage rights to foreigners under certain conditions, given Chile offers immigrants the chance to naturalize after a residence period (Historia de la Ley, Art.14 2005, p. 10). As Pedroza (2015) outlines, a country can include migrants in the demos either through a traditional route of naturalization (see, e.g., Brubaker 1992) or through enfranchising them. The Commission seems to echo this view, as members expressed that optional voting after a residence period is *just as logical* as offering optional naturalization after a residence period (Finn 2020b). This created two ways of joining the political community in Chile: naturalization would mean gaining the Chilean nationality and thereafter voting would be mandatory;[39] alternatively, the Commission allowed non-naturalized immigrants to join the political community and participate in elections only when they wanted to, as shown in Table 2.2.

[39] Various reasons exist as to why people would prefer not to naturalize in a country, e.g., it may change legal (economic, social, or political) rights in the origin country; they may feel the costs outweigh the additional benefits; they may already have more than one nationality or are not allowed to have another; others may lack the resources to apply or not meet requirements.

Table 2.2 Two Paths for Immigrants to Vote, Chile

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Immigration</td><td rowspan="2">→</td><td rowspan="2">Naturalization</td><td>Mandatory voting for nationals (until 2009/2012)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Facultative voting for nationals (enacted in 2009, applied in 2012)</td></tr>
<tr><td>→</td><td>Enfranchisement</td><td>Facultative voting for foreign residents (since 1980, applied in 1988)</td></tr>
</table>

Source: Extended from Finn (2020b).

Chileans and immigrants both have automatic registration and optional voting, enacted in 2009 (Law 20.337), regulated in 2012 (Law 20.568), and applied in 2012 (in local elections). Both categories must be free of felony convictions and at least 18 years old, whereas foreigners must have also reached a five-year residence in Chile. In other words, after five years in Chile, the state has the electoral service automatically add foreign residents to the electorate (for both municipal and national elections) whereas individual immigrants choose to participate in elections, or not. Foreign residents also choose whether or not to naturalize.

Therefore, contrary to outliers in Europe that stress either national citizenship or political rights for denizens (without easy access to naturalization) (see the discussion in Huddleston and Vink 2015), Chile has long offered both. Comparing countries within and beyond the EU that have extended versus withheld local-level suffrage rights, some countries have easy whereas others have difficult naturalization rules—meaning that while naturalization rules may be part of the story, the naturalization regime alone does not spur or block discussion (or approval) of denizen enfranchisement (Pedroza 2013).

Granting voting rights to foreign residents makes their enfranchisement "an option vis-à-vis naturalization, either an *alternative* or a *pathway*" (Pedroza 2013, p. 27, emphasis in original). In the case of Chile in 1980, the two both led to holding multilevel voting rights (although these were not implemented until 1988). The two routes of including migrants in the demos apply only to first-generation immigrants since Chile has *ius soli* laws: children are born into the nationality, making it a non-voluntary (but renounceable) membership. Enfranchisement through residence increases immigrants' agency and offers extensive liberty to choose the extent to which they participate

politically in the destination country—initially giving immigrants more freedom than Chilean voters, who previously had mandatory voting.

However, the constitutional change offering more rights to foreigners than nationals strangely occurred during a restrictive period in Chile's migratory legislative history. The regime deported many foreigners and discouraged others from entering the country, framing them as threats to society, the regime, and state security (Lara Escalona 2014, pp. 62, 81, 90).[40] In this sense, the complementary view did not emerge because of territorial inclusiveness arguments (see Bauböck 2005) but nonetheless the outcome in Chile was inclusiveness.

2.2.3 Granting emigrant voting rights, 2014–2017

The last stage to reach migrant enfranchisement in Chile was granting suffrage rights to nationals abroad, which took three years to complete the three steps for emigrant enfranchisement. Chile was an extreme latecomer in granting Chileans the right to vote from abroad, in stark contrast to having been a pioneer in foreign resident voting rights (Escobar 2015, 2017). External voting was enacted into law in 2014 (Law 20.748), which outlined voting from abroad in presidential primaries, presidential elections, and national-level plebiscites. External voting was then regulated in 2016 (Law 20.960), requiring Chileans to change their address to abroad and to prove a past residence of at least one year in Chile, presumably any time within the individual's life. Finally, enfranchisement for emigrants was applied in 2017—first in July for the primaries, followed by the first round of the presidential election in November, then the second round in December 2017. In total, Chile's long road to migrant enfranchisement thus ran a whopping 92 years, from 1925 to 2017.

Chile's emigrant enfranchisement process had various failed attempts before approval (Toro and Walker 2007). According to the official record of constitutional reform detailing the chronology of external voting, the first mention of Chileans being allowed to vote from abroad dates to 1971 during Allende's administration (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 2015). Interestingly, this occurred before Pinochet's regime—the regime that exiled many Chileans, as well as pushed others to emigrate. The topic of external voting quickly resurfaced post-Pinochet: in 1991,

[40] The military dictatorship had strict control over mobility (the right of entry and exit) of all persons, Chileans and foreigners alike (DL 2460 of 1979) and could expel individuals after a 24-hour notification (Lara Escalona 2014, pp. 87–88). 'Restrictive' here in dictatorship differs from studies on Chile's contemporary restrictive migration governance (Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero 2020, Vásquez *et al.* 2021), which occurred in democracy.

a proposal tried to modify it (Law 18.700) to include Chileans abroad in presidential elections. Two years later, the proposal, along with details on electoral registration, was presented, but nothing came of it. The discussion lay dormant until 2005, when another proposed modification to Law 18.700 was rejected. Despite the setback, it marked a turning point in external voting as a regular issue, appearing every one to three years. In 2009, Bachelet proposed automatic registration and facultative voting for Chileans abroad, but again, nothing came of it. In 2010, Piñera proposed a similar motion to modify Law 18.700 but his proposal required voters to have some form of link (*vínculo*) to Chile in order to vote from abroad—the Senate considered such a link as restrictive and rejected the proposal (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 2015).

A group of Senators followed up in 2013 by re-opening discussion on external voting for presidential elections and plebiscites and suggested that external voter registration be required before every Chilean election. It was approved with 29 votes from the Senate (with 6 votes against and 1 abstention), thus moved to the Chamber of Deputies (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 2015). In 2014, Bachelet prioritized the discussion and added the right to also vote in presidential primary elections and eliminated the voter registration requirement before every election. The National Congress approved the constitutional reform project in April 2014, with Bachelet's last amendments, which proved successful through the following legal steps in the Chamber of Deputies, finishing in 2016 (as Law 20.960). Bachelet commented,

> We believe that with this law, we are honoring democracy, by allowing each of our compatriots to effectively have the possibility of marking his or her preference in our national elections. And that is what we are doing—we are cutting a tie that was limiting [the breadth of] our democracy and also [we are] strengthening the bond between the sons and daughters of this land, by enacting the law that will regulate the right to vote of Chilean men and women abroad. (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 2016, own translation)

Thus, the presidential primaries and election of 2017 marked the first applications of Chileans voting from abroad. The highest number of voters registered and who voted in 2017 came from Chileans living in Argentina and the United States (Joignant 2018)—which are among top destination countries for Chileans (Luna *et al.* 2016, p. 53).[41] The requirement in Law 20.960 of living at least one

[41] Reported in 2016, the largest stock of Chileans residing abroad was in Argentina (429,708 people), the US (113,394), Sweden (42,396), Canada (37,577), and Australia (33,626) (Luna *et al.* 2016). The highest numbers

year in Chile is important because it excludes some from the larger group of Chileans abroad (anyone holding the nationality) to include voters only from the smaller group of emigrants—meaning the Chilean nationality is not a sufficient condition to vote for the second or later generations who have never lived in Chile. A Chilean abroad must register their address with Chile, fill out a form to register to vote, show Chilean identification, and prove that they have lived in Chile at least a year (*el certificado de avecindamiento de Extranjería*) (Servel 2020). Voter registration becomes automatic when Chile's Electoral Service has access to the residence certificate (Law 18.566).

To achieve enfranchisement, again, a country must enshrine migrant voting rights (making it law), regulate them via the legal framework (making it possible to exercise the right), as well as implement them (the first time migrants vote in elections) (Palop-García and Pedroza 2019). For foreign resident (immigrant) voting in Chile, this occurred between 1925 and 1934 for local elections and then between 1980 and 1988 for national elections. For nonresident nationals (emigrant) voting from abroad, the enfranchisement process took place between 2014 and 2017. In total, Chile took 92 years to enfranchise both immigrants and emigrants, spanning 1925 to 2017 (also see Courtis 2016, 2017, Finn 2020b).

Despite the long history of immigrant voting in Chile, emigrants voting from abroad for the first time in 2017 drew overall attention to migrant voting. The 2017 presidential election presented an ideal moment to collect data that would allow me to further explore the phenomenon of migrant voting and which migrants vote. The rest of this chapter expands upon the four migrant voting categories (emigrant, immigrant, and dual transnational voting, as well as abstention). I conducted a survey in Chile in 2017 focused on electoral participation in the origin and residence countries. Using the results, I investigate four hypotheses focused on how linguistic communication, interest in politics, intention to stay, and in-country tenure might affect individual-level migrant voter turnout.

2.3 Surveying the Four Migrant Voting Types in Chile

The survey was available for five days in both November and December 2017, aligned with Chile's two rounds of the presidential election. I selected the year 2017 because immigrants comprised about 5% of the total population (see Table 2.3 and 2.4) and foreign residents automatically obtain voting

of registered Chilean voters abroad in 2017 were in Argentina (7,507), the US (5,308), Spain (3,099), and Canada (2,581), whereas accordingly the most votes came from Argentina (3,876) and the US (3,391) (Joignant 2018).

rights after a five-year residence (Echeverría 2015; Law 20.568 Art. 6, 2012). Consequently, almost 2% of the electorate for the 2017 election comprised registered immigrant voters (i.e., 267,116 foreign residents in the electorate of 14,308,151 people) (Servel 2017, Joignant 2018). These percentages suggest that the special electorate group of registered immigrant voters have the potential to significantly impact a close election in Chile. In the 2017 election, 39,137 Chileans abroad were also registered to vote (Joignant 2018).

To contextualize the election, on November 19, 2017, eight candidates appeared on the ballot in the first round.[42] Piñera from the right-center party coalition Let's Go Chile (*Chile Vamos*) won about 37% of the votes and Guillier from The Strength of the Majority (*La Fuerza de la Mayoría*), part of the center-left coalition of the New Majority (*Nueva Mayoría*) won about 23% (Servel 2017). In the run-off on December 17, 2017, Piñera won about 55% and Guillier 45% of the votes (Servel 2017). Sebastián Piñera had served his first term as President of Chile in 2010–2014 and began his second term in March 2018.

In the first round, about 19% of eligible immigrants in the electorate (51,213 individuals) voted, versus about 21% (56,163) in the second round in December (Servel 2017). A majority (over 33,000) of these immigrant voters participated from the Metropolitan Region, in which Santiago is located (Servel 2017).[43] Comparatively, overall turnout in the general election was about 47% in the first round and 49% in the second round; of the emigrant electorate (Chileans residing abroad), 60% of those registered turned out to vote in the first round and 54% in the second (Joignant 2018). Based on Servel data, Bravo and Bravo (2018) show that compared to Chileans, foreign resident voters were 3 percentage points less likely to turn out to vote, *ceteris paribus*. Therefore, immigrant voters were less likely to vote than Chileans living both inside and outside the territory.

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[42] The eight candidates were Eduardo Artés Brichetti, Marco Enríquez-Ominami Gumucio, Carolina Goic Boroevic, Alejandro Guillier Álvarez, José Antonio Kast Rist, Alejandro Navarro Brain, Sebastián Piñera Echenique, and Beatriz Sánchez Muñoz.

[43] Chile comprises 16 regions. In the first round of the 2017 presidential election, 33,479 of the 51,213 immigrant voters who participated live in the Santiago Metropolitan Region; 3,520 voted in Tarapacá, 3,156 in Antofagasta; 2,870 in Valparaíso; 2,060 in Arica and Parinacota; and about 1,000 or fewer in the remaining regions (Servel 2017).

2.3.1 An original electoral online survey

After designing the survey between March and July 2017, I ran a small pilot in October 2017.[44] I designed the survey in Qualtrics and promoted it through FacebookAds (an advertisement component of the social media website, Facebook). It was available and open to responses between November 14–19 and December 12–17, 2017, five days until the polls opened on election day for each round.

Respondents qualified by being of voting age, being foreign-born, and residing in Chile. To find survey respondents, I applied a Facebook filter for foreign-born persons who entered the site while in Chile (based on logging in through a Chilean IP address). People from this group saw an advertisement on their newsfeed; the photo displayed international flags and stated, in Spanish, "Immigrant in Chile? Your voice counts! A brief survey" (photo in Appendix 2.6). Clicking on this Facebook advertisement redirected the individual to the Qualtrics survey.

The survey was advertised and conducted only in Spanish since most immigrants are intraregional and must live five years in Chile before gaining voting rights.[45] After reading information about the survey and participant anonymity, each Respondent answered the question, "Do you accept participating in this study under the previously listed conditions?" (see Appendix 2.7). Only those clicking "yes" indicating their informed consent could proceed to the survey. The survey closed for those failing to meet the age or location requirements asked in the first questions.

Of the survey Respondents during the total 10 days over which the survey was available online, I eliminated: a) those who had answered less than 70% of the survey (excluding 932 responses from November and 707 from December); b) those who completed the survey in less than three minutes (90 the first round and 46 the second) since this is an inadequate amount of time to have properly comprehended the questions; and c) the very few 'repeat' surveys that shared an IP and had copy and pasted responses to the open-ended questions. That left 1,482 remaining usable responses.

The 1,482 Respondents include both potential voters and migrant voters. Chile only grants foreign residents suffrage rights after a five-year residence, so many Respondents (N=805) had not

[44] The Research Ethics Committee within the Faculty of Social Sciences and History at the Universidad Diego Portales in Chile approved the survey.

[45] Although there are immigrants from outside South America residing in Chile (for example, one of the recent emergent immigrant groups originates from Haiti, with Creole as their native language), I nonetheless conducted the survey only in Spanish. The intention was not to cater to native speakers (the majority language of foreign residents in Chile; see Table 2.3) but rather, based on the requirement to be eligible to vote, I assumed Respondents would have enough language acquisition over the five years of residence to answer the survey.

yet met the threshold, meaning the survey attracted many newly arrived immigrants. Given such a high number of individuals without suffrage rights responded to a call geared toward the upcoming election ("Immigrant in Chile? Your voice counts!") hints that Respondents are interested in both politics and political participation in the residence country. Nonetheless, I focus only on migrants who, at the time of the survey, had voting rights in national-level elections in two countries (N=680). After eliminating missing data, I was left with a final count of 658 Respondents for the present analysis.

The large number of responses reflect an advantage of online surveys: they offer quick data collection, are inexpensive, and eliminate interviewer bias (Berrens *et al.* 2003). However, as a Facebook opt-in survey, the self-selected respondents do not comprise a random or representative sample, thus the results hold internal validity only for this group. I do not extrapolate to all migrant voters nor try to attempt to predict future patterns of electoral behavior in Chile.

The survey had several limitations: one potential bias is that Respondents needed a Facebook account and had to be logged in during the open period to complete the survey. Although a non-political photo advertised the survey, selection bias may exist since I conducted the survey before a presidential election. Stating "your voice counts" implied political voice, appealing to respondents interested in politics, which could have affected the decision to vote as well as the decision to answer the survey. Furthermore, while the survey captured migrants' electoral behavior in the past and present in two countries, a design flaw creates a limitation to the study: the question about past voting in the origin country failed to specify whether this was before or after migration. Although this disrupts proper categorization for emigrant and dual transnational voting, it is not detrimental to achieving my research objectives, as I elaborate on in the next two subsections.

2.3.2 Measuring demographics, socioeconomic standing, and political engagement

The dependent variable is previous migrant voting, based on the migrant voting typology categorizing four types: immigrant, emigrant, and dual transnational voting, and abstention (see Figure 1 in the Introduction). I defined "previous voting" as having voted in the past whereas abstention means never having voted before. I conducted a multinomial logistic regression on this multicategorical dependent variable. As Starkweather and Moske (2011, p. 1) describe it, "Multinomial logistic regression is a simple extension of binary logistic regression that allows for more than two categories of the dependent or outcome variable. Like binary logistic regression, multinomial logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation to evaluate the probability of categorical membership." This type of regression is fitting because my dependent variable comprises four categories, which are nominal since

they are not in any order or scale. Being non-linear, interpreting multinomial logistic regression follows a different logic, so I present the odds ratio to report the results. My objective was to explore the phenomenon of migrant voting; specifically, I am interested in showing that migrants voters' electoral behavior and turnout are influenced by additional independent variables at the individual level. To estimate the level of influence each independent variable has on the dependent variable, I examine their effect on this group of survey respondents.

The survey contained three sections: demographics, socioeconomic standing, and political engagement (see Appendix 2.8 to see all questions).[46] Regarding political engagement, I expected some misreporting because memory is imperfect and because of the social desirability response bias (voter turnout is often overreported because people who abstain, or will abstain, feel reluctant or embarrassed to say this, so they lie). Those who misreport voting because of imperfect memory "unintentionally misremember" voting while those who misreport voting because of the social desirability response bias "intentionally misreport" voting (Holbrook and Krosnick 2010, p. 41). While the online survey opted for brief questions and answers to avoid tiring out respondents and to encourage them to complete the questionnaire, the fact that it was anonymous and online may have helped overcome the bias. Holbrook and Krosnick (2010, p. 44) find that the social desirability bias may decrease in online surveys since they are self-administered, the logic being that "if the respondent could report an embarrassing fact anonymously and confidentially, then he or she would have no motivation to lie and would tell the truth" hence, it eliminates the "social pressure" for a certain response. In short, an impersonal and anonymous online survey takes out the 'social' aspect, so respondents feel less pressure to lie.

From the survey, I take *knowledge of voting rights in the residence country* as an independent variable because foreign resident voter registration occurs automatically in Chile after a five-year residence. Hence, many immigrants are unaware of suffrage rights. While having suffrage rights is a scope condition (because without them, one has no voting rights to exercise; see Figure 1.2 in the previous Chapter), migrants need to *know* they have voting rights as an immigrant in the residence country in order to vote. Thus, knowledge of voting rights is an independent variable that can affect turnout. Knowledge of voting rights was captured in the survey question: "Do you have the right to vote in the upcoming presidential elections in Chile?" The available answers were "yes," "no," or "I don't

[46] As covered in the dissertation's Introduction where I analyze migrants' political engagement, I am interested in the conventional form of formal political participation: voting in national-level elections, both as a foreign resident in the residence country and as a national abroad for the origin country.

know." The second two answers gauged how many migrant Respondents—who have immigrant voting rights due to a five-year residence—were unaware of this right. I asked this because while most nonresident nationals in South America can vote from abroad in national-level origin country elections, foreign resident voting at the national level in the residence country is a rarer phenomenon (GLOBALCIT 2019), so some immigrants may be unaware of such suffrage rights or if they have them. Since most South American countries have used compulsory voting systems (for resident nationals), I assume that individuals have knowledge of emigrant but not necessarily immigrant voting.

The survey addresses four main hypotheses from the dissertation's Introduction, that correspond with the following four independent variables: interest in politics, in-country tenure, intention to stay, and linguistic communication.[47] Hypothesis 1 states: Potential migrant voters who self-report being able to communicate well in the language of the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting. Language is important since it is necessary to obtain political information on candidates and logistically for casting a ballot. While most South American states' dominant language is Spanish, and intraregional migration is prevalent (see Table 2.3), there are large variations in countries' vocabulary, phrasing, and accents. To capture this for my analysis, the survey contains a variable of self-reported ability to communicate in Spanish in Chile, what I label as *linguistic communication*. The survey item asked, "When you speak Spanish in Chile, how often are you able to communicate clearly and coherently?" Respondents could select "always," "frequently," "sometimes," "rarely," "never," or "I don't know." No one answered the last two (unsurprising, given the survey was in Spanish). Thereafter, I combined "always" and "frequently" to mark linguistic communication as "high" versus combining "sometimes" and "rarely" as "low" linguistic communication.

Hypothesis 2 posits: Potential migrant voters who have a higher interest in politics are more likely to participate in dual transnational voting. The variable *interest in politics* is derived from the item, "How interested are you in politics?" Respondents could choose the options of "very interested," "somewhat interested," "uninterested," or "very uninterested." I included four possible responses to avoid people defaulting to the middle option, similar to cross-national surveys, such as the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and the World Values Survey, which both also offer four response options. I then grouped "uninterested" and "very uninterested" into one indicator.

[47] See Chapter 3 and 4 for the remaining Hypothesis 5 on ties to a country, and on how political socialization in a nondemocratic origin country affects migrant voting in two countries.

Hypothesis 3 suggests: Potential migrant voters who have a longer intention to stay in the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting. *Intention to stay* conveys immigrants' future plans of how long they think they will continue living in the country of residence. The survey asked, "For how many more years do you plan on living in Chile?" The six possible answers were: less than a year, 1–4 years, 5–10 years, forever, I don't know, or I don't live in Chile. I used the last answer as another check to be sure I captured only the target group (foreign-born residents); if "I don't live in Chile" was selected, the survey automatically closed. No one answered "less than a year" so this category does not appear in the analysis. Thus, the remaining four categories are listed in the descriptive table (Appendix 2.8). *Intention to stay* disregards how long migrants have already lived in Chile, focusing only on future plans of how much *longer* they plan to stay. Those planning to stay long term will have larger accumulated benefits from voting since the elected government's adopted policies would affect migrants who still live in the residence country.

Hypothesis 4 proposes: Potential migrant voters who have a longer tenure in the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting. *In-country tenure* comprises the number of years lived in the country of residence. I calculated in-country tenure by subtracting the open-ended response arrival year from 2017 (when the survey was conducted) and then grouped them into 6–10, 11–20, or more than 20 years. Tenure of five years and below is inapplicable because in the present analysis, I only included eligible migrant voters; the requirement to obtain voting rights is a five-year residence. After excluding those who did not yet have suffrage rights as a foreign resident in Chile, the sample size was 680—then eliminating missing data, 658.

For control variables, I used age, education, sex, election round, and top nationalities. Age is grouped into categories of 16–24, 25–33, 34–42, 43–50, or over 50 years of age. While 18 is a typical minimum age for voting, some countries such as Brazil and Ecuador offer the right to those 16 years old and older (Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2018). Education is the highest level of schooling completed, from elementary school to holding a postgraduate degree—reflecting the six major categories in a national survey in Chile.[48] I condensed the completed education categories and labeled them as high school or lower, professional training, and university (both under- and post-graduate). The categories for sex are woman or man. Election rounds in November then December 2017 comprise the subsamples. Again, the analysis focuses on voter turnout rather than vote choice,

[48] The national survey (*la Encuesta Nacional UDP*) was conducted yearly from 2005 through 2015, designed by a multidisciplinary team based at the Universidad Diego Portales in Santiago, Chile (more information available, in Spanish, at http://encuesta.udp.cl/).

meaning I examine if migrants vote or abstain, not for whom they vote in each election round. Lastly, I used the question on origin country to separate the top nationalities of Respondents from Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela.[49]

2.3.3 A brief validation of Chile's migrant population and turnout

While the survey produced a convenience sample, and while I do not post-stratify the responses, in this subsection I provide an overview of the documented immigrant population in Chile in 2017 near the presidential election. I first outline the how the general immigrant population has grown, then focus on the migrant voter population and turnout in 2017. As of the end of 2019, immigration is at the highest it has ever been in Chile yet, at around 8% of total population, it pales in comparison to other immigrant residence countries or superdiverse cities. There has been a steady uptick in numbers since 2000, especially since 2015 (see Figure 2.1), and Chile has received more residents from different origin countries. From 1970 to 2002, immigrants originated mainly from Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Spain—the first three of which are Chile's border countries. But over the last decade, and according to the 2017 national census as depicted in Table 2.3, Colombia and Venezuela displaced Ecuador and Spain in terms of top origin countries.

Haitians are an emerging immigrant group in Chile: through 2014, Chile did not provide this individual nationality its own category, placing it in 'other countries', presumably due to such a low stock (Acosta *et al.* 2018, Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero 2020). Yet in 2017, Haitians represented 8.5% then 14.3% in 2018 of all foreign-born persons living in Chile, surpassing more traditional nationalities of Argentines, Bolivians, and Colombians in 2018 and 2019 (as seen in Table 2.3). Colombians and Venezuelans have replaced Argentines and Peruvians as top origin countries of immigrants living in Chile. Based on the 2019 estimate, Venezuelans represent almost 1 in 3 immigrants in Chile, while combining Colombians, Haitians, and Peruvians account for another 39%, meaning almost three quarters originate from four countries, only one of which (Peru) is a border country.

[49] In previous models, I included border countries (Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru) as well as other Latin American and Caribbean countries but found that including the top nationalities of the Respondents (from Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela) showed a more fruitful relation with migrant voting.

Table 2.3 Chile's Foreign-Born Population, Select Years 2005–2019

Total Number of Foreign-Born in Chile by Year					
2005	2010	2014	2017	2018	2019
212,935	305,212	410,988	779,863	1,251,225	1,492,522

Origin-Country Composition of Foreign-Born Population by Year						
	2005	2010	2014	2017	2018	2019*
Argentina	25.2%	19.9%	16.3%	**9.0%**	6.0%	5.3%
Bolivia	5.9%	6.4%	8.8%	**10.0%**	8.6%	8.0%
Brazil	3.8%	3.2%	3.0%	1.8%	1.5%	1.3%
China	1.1%	1.6%	1.9%	1.2%	1.1%	1.1%
Colombia	2.4%	3.6%	6.1%	**14.3%**	11.7%	10.8%
Cuba	--	--	--	0.9%	1.3%	1.1%
Dominican Republic	--	--	--	1.5%	1.4%	1.3%
Ecuador	5.1%	5.0%	4.7%	3.7%	3.0%	2.8%
Haiti	--	--	--	8.5%	14.3%	12.5%
Peru	20.6%	30.4%	31.7%	**25.5%**	17.9%	15.8%
Spain	4.7%	3.7%	3.5%	2.1%	1.7%	1.5%
United States	4.5%	3.6%	3.1%	1.6%	1.3%	1.2%
Venezuela	2.2%	1.9%	1.9%	**11.3%**	23.0%	30.5%
No declared country	--	--	--	0.4%	0.3%	0.2%
Other countries	24.5%	20.7%	19.1%	8.3%	7.0%	6.4%

Sources: Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero (2020), INE-DEM (2019), INE (2017a, 2020).

Notes: *2019 is an estimate from INE (2020). Nationalities comprising less than 1% of total foreigners are included in the 'Other countries' category. In bold are the top five nationalities present in 2017, relevant to frame migrant voter turnout.

In 2017, immigrants in Chile overwhelmingly were adults: 85% between 15 and 64 years old, versus 10.6% under 15 and 3.6% 65 and older (INE, 2018; see Appendix 2.9). The gender balance between men and women immigrants was steady throughout all 16 regions, between 44–55%; in the Santiago Metropolitan, where the greatest number of immigrants in Chile reside, the balance was 50-50 in 2017 (Appendix 2.9). Survey Respondents showed a female-favorable gender balance since 59% of Respondents were women and 41% were men; in the smaller sample of 650, women comprise about 63% versus 37% men (see Appendix 2.10).

Since the group of Respondents is highly educated, it is important to highlight that immigrants have consistently had at least two years or more of education, on average, as compared to 'native' Chileans. According to data from CASEN (*Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional*, or National Socioeconomic Characterization), Chileans over 24 years old averaged 9.74 years of education in 2006, which slowly increased over time to 10.85 years of education in 2017; comparatively, immigrants over 24 years old averaged 12.93 years of education in 2006, which stayed steady until increasing to 13.30 years of education in 2017 (Fuentes and Hernando 2019, p. 394).

During the 2017 presidential election, there were two rounds of voting, resulting in the election of President Sebastián Piñera. Bear in mind that in 2017, the foreign-born population was about half of what it was in 2019; with 779,863 foreigners, in the election year immigrants represented 4.2% of the total population (see Figure 2.1). Of those immigrants, more than a third were eligible to vote, or 267,116 foreign residents, comprising 145,052 women and 122,064 men (Servel 2017). By nationality of origin country, in both rounds of the 2017 presidential election, more than a third of immigrant voters who participated were Peruvian, following by 10.9% Argentine, then 8.9% Bolivian, and 8.6% Colombian (Servel 2017, Joignant 2018; see Table 2.3).

The four nationalities in Table 2.4 comprise four of the five top origin countries represented in Chile in 2017 (for all nationalities, see Appendix 2.9).[50] While the four groups comprised almost 60% of all foreign-born residents in Chile in 2017, foreigners numbered only 4.2% of total population, which helps to understand why immigrant voters only comprised 0.75% of all voters in 2017.

[50] Regarding the rest of the top ten nationalities of immigrant voter turnout versus stock in the total population, five other groups are overrepresented. Ecuadorians comprised 3.7% of foreigners in 2017 yet represented 6% of immigrant voters in the first round; Spaniards comprised 2.1% in the foreign population but represented 3.8% of immigrant turnout; and similarly, Germans, Uruguayans, and Brazilians each represented about 2% of immigrant voters (Servel 2017; see Table 2.2).

Table 2.4 Foreign-Born Population and Voters, 2017, Chile[51]

Top Origin Countries	Percentage of Foreign-Born in Chile		
	Within foreign-born population	Voter turnout 2017	Voter turnout in survey
Argentina	9.0%	10.9%	9.8%
Bolivia	10.0%	8.9%	6.6%
Colombia	14.3%	8.6%	22.0%
Peru	25.5%	36.0%	28.4%
Total of all foreigners	58.8%	64.4%	N/A
Total within all voters	N/A	0.75%	N/A

Sources: The foreign-born population comes from official data (INE 2017b, INE-DEM 2019); voter turnout calculated for the first election round based on Joignant (2018) reporting Servel data; survey turnout based on the 658 responses.

Venezuela, the fifth origin country in 2017 (before becoming the largest immigrant group in 2019), comprised a newer migrant inflow, so naturally many had not yet met the five-year residence mark before the 2017 election. Venezuelan residents in Chile, however, already hold political views toward other immigrants and toward immigration-related policy (Doña-Reveco and Gouveia 2021). Haitians, despite being an emergent group in Chile—who represented 8.5% of foreigners in 2017—barely voted and were absent from the top 20 nationalities who participated in the 2017 election (Joignant 2018). Like Venezuelans, Haitians comprised an even more recent immigrant flow in Chile, so very few would have already gained voting rights. Nonetheless, both Haitians and Venezuelans will represent important foreign resident voters in future Chilean elections.

2.4 Findings from Surveying Migrants in 2017

The descriptive statistics show that the 658 responses split almost evenly between the two presidential election rounds in November and December 2017 (see Appendix 2.10 for descriptive characteristics)—similar to the almost even turnout rates in both rounds. This group of survey

[51] The top four origin countries reflect turnout in Chile's 2017 presidential election. The turnout percentage of each nationality is the number of foreign residents from the origin country who voted, over the total number of foreign residents who voted (i.e., I do not consider how many are registered to vote per nationality).

Respondents reported being interested in politics, educated, and slightly more female (63% women). The most common age range was between 34 and 42 years old, comprising a third of Respondents, whereas about 20% were between 43 and 50 and 24% over 50.

Almost all had moved from a Latin American or Caribbean country, with the most Respondents being Colombian (22%) or Peruvian (28%), representing the top two origin countries in the sample. These nationalities align with the two primary foreign-born population by origin country in Chile in 2017 (see Table 2.3). Approximately a third had finished high school, a third professional training, and a third completed university. Regarding knowledge of voting rights in Chile, 57% reported that they know they have the right to vote, whereas 43% reported either that they do not have voting rights or that they were unsure if they have voting rights or not—these numbers are worrisome and reflect high misinformation about suffrage rights as foreigners in Chile, as discussed in the next subsection.

Regarding the four main independent variables of interest (communication, interest in politics, intention to stay, and tenure), linguistic communication clashes with the fact that almost all Respondents were native speakers of Spanish; while coming from a regional origin country increased fluency, it did not translate to high linguistic communication. While 409 self-reported being able to communicate clearly and coherently in Spanish in Chile, 249 people responded that they did not, underlining why I measured communication rather than fluency. However, speaking Spanish as a mother tongue allowed Respondents to stay informed about politics and elections, whether they engage in political discussions or not. In fact, the next variable, interest in politics, revealed that only 70 of the 658 Respondents said they were uninterested in politics, whereas 254 were somewhat interested and 334 were highly interested. Such high interest in politics goes hand-in-hand with the high number of active voters, as discussed in the next subsection.

Respondents intended to stay long term in Chile since more than half reported plans to continue living in Chile six years or more—of these, 322 reported intending to stay more than 10 years or "forever." Respondents also had lengthy tenures in Chile; while all Respondents in the group of 658 had lived in Chile at least five years at the time of the survey, and thus had gained voting rights, 301 had already resided in Chile between 6 and 10 years, whereas 357 reported their arrival year was 11 to more than 20 years ago. Long tenure and intention to stay reflect the shorter geographic distance to border or regional countries. Perhaps intention to stay is supported by being able to visit the origin country more easily and frequently, as well as hear more news on the residence country's national media coverage.

2.4.1 Answering four hypotheses on migrant voting

Using the migrant voting typology, Respondents fit into each of the four quadrants: about half are classified as emigrant voters and almost a third are dual transnational voters (see Figure 2.2). Since only 93 of the 658 Respondents abstained in national-level elections in both countries, I consider the Respondents very politically active. Figure 2.2 is not intended to summarize or forecast migrant voting in Chile; rather, it shows a snapshot in time for this group of Respondents, demonstrating the typology's utility.

Figure 2.2 Prior Migrant Voting: 658 Survey Respondents in Chile

		Votes in Origin Country	
		Yes	No
Votes in Residence Country	Yes	Dual transnational voting 201 Respondents	Immigrant voting 32 Respondents
	No	Emigrant voting 332 Respondents	Abstention 93 Respondents

Source: Application of Finn's (2020a) typology.

Dual transnational migrant voters comprising 201, almost a third of Respondents, was higher than expected; however, the survey limitation of a lack of distinction between voting in the origin country pre- versus post-migration could overestimate voters in this category. Another possibility is that these individuals' origin countries had had compulsory voting systems and they continued voting because they had internalized the habit.[52] Ignoring the nonvoters, the Respondent group comprises 565 active voters. The immigrant voting quadrant is the least filled, meaning that most individuals who voted in the residence country have also voted in their origin country. Even if the survey question

[52] Within the survey group, emigrant voting was compulsory only for Peruvian nationals abroad. Nonetheless, some Peruvians reported voting while others abstained (in my interviews, some believed they will not receive a fine abroad if they do not vote; see Chapter 3). Given the variation in voting behavior, I include Peruvians in the analysis.

miscategorized some of these voters as dual transnational, having voted in the origin country before migration and in the residence country after migration would have placed these individuals in the immigrant voting category. These two categories would still comprise the same number of active migrant voters in the group.

The immigrant voting quadrant houses only 32 migrants, showing that within 658, very few people opted to vote *only* in the destination country. Based on this group's voting behavior, as well as interviews (see Chapter 3), most migrants do not simply 'replace' previous political attitudes, values, and behavior from the origin country with those from the residence country, even after a long tenure.[53] For someone to politically assimilate, it would mean that post-migration, an individual would forfeit origin-country ties or characteristics in order to replace them with those from the residence country (Guarnizo *et al.* 2019). Full political assimilation implies that identity and loyalty link to solely one country, making a 'zero-sum' relationship between political engagement in two countries (Tsuda 2012, p. 635). Such a zero-sum outcome could manifest itself as migrants vote only in the origin country from abroad, but this is not the case for the third of the group who are dual transnational voters.

The multinomial logistic regression shows abstention, immigrant voting, and dual transnational voting from the multicategorical dependent variable (for results, see Appendix 2.11). Since emigrant voting is the most common type of migrant voting among this group of Respondents, it serves as the reference category. The goodness-of-fit indicators suggest that the model is adequate for explaining the dependent variable on which migrant Respondents vote and in which location.

Since the interpretation of multinomial logistic regression is complex—given the migrant voting types comprise a multicategorical dependent variable—the following odds ratio graphs in Figure 2.3 accompany the multinomial logistic regression results in Appendix 2.11. Since emigrant voting serves as the reference category, the independent and control variables are shown for abstention, immigrant voting, and dual transnational voting in three separate graphs, with each showing the variables of interest. If the variable's margin range intercepts with 0 (marked with a vertical line through the graph), it is not statistically significant. If the margin range is on the positive side, the variable has a positive relation with the type of migrant voting, as compared to emigrant voting. Similarly, ranges located below 0 indicate an inverse relation with the migrant voting type.

[53] Such replacement would parallel the concept of social assimilation, understood as "the decline, and at its endpoint the disappearance, of an ethnic/racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that express it" (Alba and Nee 1997, p. 863), also reflecting Gordon's (1964) definition of structural assimilation.

Figure 2.3 Odds Ratio Graphs from the Multinomial Logistic Regression, N=658







I review the results in order of the variables listed in the odds ratios. The first variable listed in the three graphs, knowledge of voting rights as a foreign resident in the residence country, is highly significant and positively related to both immigrant and dual transnational voting. Previous exploratory work in Santiago, Chile, showed that many immigrants lack information or have misinformation regarding their right to vote (Doña-Reveco and Sotomayor 2017, Pujols 2020). In contrast to the 377 migrants who knew they had suffrage rights in Chile, 281 Respondents were misinformed about such rights. Within this group, all 658 Respondents had voting rights, yet 176 reported not having them at the time of the survey and 105 were unsure if they had the right or not in the upcoming presidential election.[54] It seems that automatic voter registration leaves many individuals ill-informed or uninformed.

The other four variables in the above graphs each relates to a hypothesis. Hypothesis 1 (Migrant voters who self-report being able to communicate well in the language of the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting) is partially supported by the

[54] An exception would be if migrants had spent more than one year outside of Chile and had lost continuous residence—but they would have also had to misreport their original arrival year as when they moved to Chile. Another exception is if they were undocumented migrants, which is possible, but unlikely given the high tenure and socioeconomic standing reported by most survey Respondents.

results. The results show that low communication (distinct from language fluency) is significant for increasing the chances of abstention (i.e., non-voting in both the origin and residence countries). This means that, within this group of Respondents, lower communication in the residence country relates to abstaining altogether.

Hypothesis 2 (Migrants who have a higher interest in politics are more likely to participate in dual transnational voting) is strongly supported by the results. While interest in politics affects all voters, the duality of migrant voters means they carry political attitudes, beliefs, and values with them across borders. Their past learning, prior voting, and interest in politics 'travel' with migrants across borders. Although uninterest in politics is highly significant and has an inverse relation with dual transnational voting, being somewhat interested in politics is significant and has an inverse relation with dual transnational voting. Hence, only Respondents who are *very* interested in politics have a high and significant probability of being a dual transnational voter. This makes sense, as a very high interest in politics may be enough to motivate migrants to spend time staying informed in two countries. The abstention category was also significant and positively related to those who are somewhat interested in politics—meaning that Respondents who are only partially interested are more likely to sit out of elections in both countries.

Hypothesis 3 (Migrant voters who have a longer intention to stay in the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting) is neither supported nor contradicted by the results. Intriguingly, intention to stay is not statistically significant for any of the migrant voting categories for this group. The immigrant voting category reports all negative coefficients for short- and long-term intentions to stay as well as for those who are unsure of their future residence plans. This means that the Respondents are less likely to be an immigrant voter, as compared to being an emigrant voter—however, these relations are not statistically significant. Instead, the results suggest that future plans to stay longer in Chile does not affect people in this group when deciding to turn out to vote or not.

Hypothesis 4 (Migrant voters who have a longer tenure in the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting) is strongly supported by the results. In-country tenure (medium is 6–10 years and long is 11 to more than 20 years of having already lived in Chile) has a significant relation with migrant voting: the longer migrants live abroad, the more likely they are to vote as emigrants. The results contradict Waldinger's (2008) findings that an emigrant's political engagement with the origin country decreases post-migration, and aligns more with Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller (2003) that emigrant engagement with the origin country increases over time living

abroad. However, an increase in engagement with the origin country does not necessarily parallel an increase in engagement with the residence country, at least for conventional participation such as voting. If they were complementary, more migrants would land in the dual transnational voting quadrant, rather than the emigrant quadrant.

The significant control variables in the model for some migrant voting types include age, top origin countries, and election round. The other control variables (education, sex, and having emigrant rights) are not statistically significant. The multinomial logistic regression table (in Appendix 2.11) shows that the youngest cohort of migrant voters under 25 years old is highly significant and positively related to abstention (as compared to emigrant voting)—this corresponds with the trend of younger people in general being less involved in voting, rather than a migrant phenomenon. From 16 to 33, age is negatively correlated with dual transnational voting, but insignificantly so. Regarding the top origin countries, being from Peru is negatively related to and statistically significant for abstention and immigrant voting. The correlation reveals a slight bias since, as mentioned, Peru has compulsory voting for nationals abroad. While Peruvians abroad are more likely to vote from this institutional rule that compels them to, not all of them vote (Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2020). Lastly, the first round of the election is highly significant, with an inverse relation (as compared to emigrant voting) with dual transnational voting. The result means more Respondents reported higher prior voting in both countries in December 2017, which makes sense, since they had recently had the chance to cast a vote in November 2017.

Despite not representing all immigrants in Chile, the exploratory exercise of evaluating select variables' influence on migrant voting offers insights behind migrants' electoral behavior in two countries. The fact that 249 of 658 Respondents reported low linguistic communication is worrisome, given their at least five years of residence in the destination country. But surprisingly this variable was not statistically significant for the group. Although lower linguistic communication in Chile created a barrier from socially discussing or engaging in political discussion, it did not blockade electoral participation. In other words, immigrants are interested in politics and informed about politics in both countries but may avoid talking politics with Chileans in Chile.

Lastly, an overall takeaway is that dual transnational voting (migrants voting in both the origin and residence countries) may represent a more common phenomenon than previously thought. While it is well-established that more years of education and an interest in politics increases individual-level turnout, I have found that these characteristics also naturally increase turnout among this group of 658. The new insight is which type of migrant voting they choose: Figure 2.2 shows that 332 were

emigrant voters, 201 dual transnational voters, 32 immigrant voters, and 93 fell in the abstention quadrant. As reviewed in Chapter 1, Chaudhary's (2018) "complementarity perspective" (based on, e.g., Guarnizo *et al.* 2003) and Tsuda (2012, p. 644) posit that simultaneous political participation in two countries can be positively reinforcing. But migrant voting in one or both countries does not necessarily influence voting in the other; instead, some migrants vote for other reasons, including voting to battle corrupt leaders, improve the road to democracy, and lean toward open-market economic policy, as I explore in Chapter 3. The turnout decisions in two places do not necessarily have to 'reinforce' each other or have a causal relation to each other. However, as I will explore in Chapter 4, they are indeed related, at the very least because migrants move internationally with inherent political attitudes, values, and previous behavior learned throughout life.

2.5 Conclusion

Historic immigrant flows to Chile peaked in 1885 at 4.2% foreign-born residents within the total population, which was not reached again until 2017 (see Figure 2.1). Given the low numbers of foreigners, the fact that Chile enfranchised migrants at all provokes questions about the reasoning behind enfranchisement. To achieve migrant enfranchisement, a country must enact, regulate, then implement emigrant suffrage rights (Palop-García and Pedroza 2019) as well as immigrant suffrage rights. Chile's legal process lasted 92 years, from 1925 until 2017. The milestones were adopting restrictive immigrant voting in local elections (in 1925), expanding immigrant voting (1980), first application of universal immigrant voting in national elections (the 1988 plebiscite), adopting emigrant voting (2014), and emigrants voting from abroad for the first time in national elections (2017) (see Table 2.1). Despite lags between each step, the migrant enfranchisement path in Chile has had no rights reversals. Immigrant voting rights as established in the 1980 Constitution, however, will likely be discussed the next time a constitutional committee meets; as of December 2020, this may occur in 2021 or 2022.

I find that both the 1925 and 1980 immigrant enfranchisement processes seem to have been political elite-led projects, the elites mostly being the commission members. While the sessions occurred first under President Arturo Alessandri Palma then General Augusto Pinochet, their roles differed, as Alessandri was very present throughout the process versus Pinochet being absent. The first process, despite low numbers of foreign residents at the time, foreign voters could have created strategic legitimacy for the incumbent government, given the tight restrictions to vote (i.e., literate males over 21 years old). Importantly, they also offered Alessandri future electoral support in

municipal elections. Using primary and secondary sources, I debunked the conjecture that Alessandri was a strong supporter of universal suffrage; expanding the electorate was not a priority in his first administration, which was based on other reforms. More plausibly, foreign residents who 'naturally' (normatively) fit with the current voter profile were included in the electorate by convenience. The profile changed with the times, since just a decade later Chile regulated voting rights in local-level elections for women in 1934 (Law 5.357), who did not receive full political rights until 1949 (Law 9.292) (Valenzuela E. M. 1995; see Appendix 2.5). Thus, I view the constitutional changes as more organic and normative—reflecting the elite views of the period—that created indirect support for Alessandri's reelection and possibly boosted his plans for municipal-level public office.

The second process where foreign residents gained more extensive suffrage rights under a nondemocratic government provides new evidence strengthening Brubaker's (1992) insight that historical conceptions of the demos will have long-lasting effects. Analyzing the Ortúzar Commission members' sessions on nationality, citizenship, and suffrage, their extensive debates revolved around *which* foreigners will have the right to vote under which rules, rather than *if* foreigners will vote. After a designated residence period, they positioned naturalization and foreign resident enfranchisement as equally logical routes to joining the demos, leaving the choice up to immigrants. Immigrant suffrage was explicitly determined to be a right, never an obligation, as it was for Chilean nationals. However, an important feature for continued durability of this constitutional right is that this path dependence grew from *elites'* normative perspective; in contemporary democracies, including Chile, what matters most are perspective of most voters. When a new commission is formed to review the 1980 Constitution, immigrant voting rights may again be on the negotiation table—but its outcome will reflect the normative views of voters, rather than only elites.

Expanding immigrant voting in 1980 in Chile during dictatorship reinforces the idea that migrant enfranchisement is not a democratic phenomenon. The process counterintuitively resulted in expanding rights and freedom for foreign residents to take an interest in politics or become integrated as they wish within the political community, except running for public office. According to Committee members (except Guzmán), the Constitution should not allow Chileans the choice to vote or abstain since Chileans could be "indifferent" to the country's society and future; Ortúzar called voting a "moral duty" and it was required to take interest in public matters, in order to support order, security, and institutions (Historia de la Ley, Art.14 2005, pp. 40–41). As such, Chilean voters faced compulsory voting and punishment if they failed in their "moral duty" to vote. Contrarily, foreign voters faced facultative voting as well as optional naturalization after a five-year residence. The choice meant that

nationals and foreigners had fundamentally different relationships with Chile since the state had different expectations for the two groups.

Offering foreign residents two paths to multilevel suffrage rights (see Table 2.2), one with full membership via naturalization and one with residence-based extensive rights, could relate to a 'complementary' view between naturalization and integration policies toward immigrants (Huddleston and Vink 2015). Chile not only decoupled suffrage rights with nationality, but these policies convey that rights are not an 'alternative' to naturalization. As Pedroza (2013, pp. 40–41) frames the topic, "denizen franchise gives immigrants the decision of how to integrate and when to participate." As such, in this case, it is unnecessary to evaluate naturalization's relation to integration, i.e., if it is a "catalyst or crown" (Hainmueller *et al.* 2017). Rather, Chile takes the focus off the integration discussion—and away from positioning nationality acquisition as an end goal—by showing another approach for immigrants' membership and participation, an early decision taken that had nothing to do with concerns about integration.

After a state decides the extent to which to enfranchise which migrants, its effect on migrant voting remains a gap in mainstream literature on electoral behavior (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017). Once migrants obtain voting rights, participation in democratic elections represents the substantive last step of a democracy approaching a modern version of universal adult suffrage. Voting allows individuals to express formal political voice and affect election outcomes, which may also increase migrant political integration. Thus, I conducted a survey in 2017 on migrant electoral behavior, then analyzed 658 responses to explore which migrants vote and where.

Taking the four migrant voting categories as a multinomial dependent variable, I explored four hypotheses on how the independent variables of linguistic communication, interest in politics, intention to stay, and in-country tenure might affect migrant voting behavior and turnout—while controlling for age, education, sex, election round, and top nationalities. While all 658 Respondents had voting rights in Chile in 2017, within the group, 176 reported not having suffrage rights and 105 were unsure if they could vote in the upcoming presidential election, which was only days away. Knowledge of voting rights in the destination country proved highly significant and positively related to both immigrant and dual transnational voting. These findings indicate that in countries using automatic voter registration to add foreign residents to the electorate, as Chile does, greater efforts should be made to inform individuals that they have the right to vote.

Among the 658 Respondents, 249 reported low linguistic communication, despite having lived in the residence country at least the past five years. But lower communication was not statistically

significant and did not form a barrier to migrant voting for this group; they can stay informed about politics in both countries but perhaps avoid talking politics with Chileans in the residence country. Regarding interest in politics, only Respondents who reported being "very interested" in politics had a high and significant probability of being a dual transnational voter. Being highly interested can motivate migrants to spend time staying politically informed in two countries. For those reporting being "somewhat interested" in politics also showed a significant and positive relation to abstention, indicating that Respondents who are only partially interested are more likely to sit out of elections in both countries.

Whereas intention to stay proved insignificant in affecting migrant voting decisions, the findings on tenure partially aligned with Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller (2003; see Chapter 1) since emigrant engagement increased over time abroad. However, an increase in engagement with the origin country does not necessarily come along with an increase in engagement with the residence country, at least for conventional participation such as voting. If they were complementary, more migrants would land in the dual transnational voting quadrant, rather than the emigrant quadrant. What is new here is that I have four types of migrant voting (rather than just two, voting in the origin country versus the residence country), nuancing the previous findings. While emigrant voting goes up over time, faster than dual transnational voting, it means that emigrant engagement is not increasing *because of* engagement in the residence country. In other words, it seems as though voting 'here' is not as related to voting 'there' as has the literature previously suggested.

Such results should pique the interest of scholars interested in integration and diaspora politics, since over a third of the group had voted in the country of residence as immigrants and half had participated in external voting as emigrants. As I propose throughout this dissertation, the four types of migrant voting must be analyzed together to form a more complete picture of migrants' electoral options and individual-level turnout decisions. Based on my theoretical argument and this survey of 658 migrants, I suggest that very few individuals opt to vote *only* in the residence country (i.e., fall into the immigrant voting quadrant) because people do not simply 'replace' previous political attitudes, values, and behavior from the origin country to 'match' those with from the residence country—in other words, full political assimilation in that sense is an antiquated notion.

Future studies should not assume 'integration' or political participation will organically arise over time simply by living in a country. Likewise, scholars cannot assume the converse scenario of disengagement from origin-country participation. In an extreme scenario, if all immigrants completely assimilated, they would fall in only the immigrant voting and abstention categories; if all emigrants

kept ties only to the origin country, they would fall only in the emigrant voting and abstention categories. In Figure 2.2, a mix exists throughout the four quadrants, which I would also expect in other contexts.

Chapter 3

Unpacking Migrants' Electoral Decisions: Insights from Ecuador

The purpose of this Chapter is to further explore the phenomenon of migrant voting by unpacking the meaning behind migrants' electoral decisions: to vote or not to vote? That is the question for many international migrants, as a national abroad for origin-country elections and as a foreign resident voter in the residence country. In Chapter 1, I outlined the main conceptual contribution of this dissertation and offered the migrant voting typology to classify the phenomenon. Thereafter in Chapter 2, I used an empirical illustration in a novel context to show that the four types of migrant voting exist, as well as explored independent variables that affect migrants' individual-level electoral turnout. To continue, in this Chapter I analyze the reasons migrants vote in national elections. Semi-structured interviews are a fruitful way to understand such reasons because it allows migrants explain in their own words their electoral decisions in both the origin and residence countries—revealing personalized peeks into underlying (re)socialization processes behind migrant voting decisions.

I chose Ecuador to conduct interviews with immigrants in 2019 since the country grants foreign residents multilevel voting rights after five years of permanent residence. Additionally, most immigrants in Ecuador also have emigrant voting rights, making it is possible to find migrant voters who can participate in national-level elections in two countries: the new country of residence without needing to naturalize (in Ecuador) and the origin country through voting from abroad. The selection process targeted migrants who had politically socialized under more than one regime type, thus including people from the origin countries of Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, or Venezuela who now reside in Ecuador. This set of countries has experienced shifting political regimes over the last half century, ranging from closed autocracy to liberal democracy, which I relate in my analysis. Thereafter, the aim of the selection was to find varied sociodemographic characteristics and include those who moved to Ecuador between 1979, when Ecuador returned to democracy, and 2014 since this allows immigrants to have met the five-year requirement to vote in Ecuador. All questions posed to the Interviewees specified temporal (sequenced pre- and post-migration) and spatial (origin or residence country) aspects through a transnational lens to explore how voting in one country could affect voting in the other.

Findings from 71 semi-structured interviews provided rich information about how migrants' personalized trajectories influence why and where they decide to vote or abstain. While this small

group does not represent the entire migrant population, Interviewees from the five origin countries offered shortened versions of their political trajectories. Narrative patterns emerged, ranging between situations of scarcity, violence, and corruption to prosperity, freedom, and trust in democracy. Open-ended questions covered the topics of prior voting and future intention to vote, political socialization and resocialization, individual-state relations in two countries, as well as political identity and partisanship. Such targeted questions on political experiences allowed me to begin unpacking (re)socialization processes.

Migrant trajectories soaked in politics revealed dynamic (re)socialization processes that affect the outcome of migrant voting in two countries. Taken together, Interviewees' responses reveal that while varying (non)democratic political experiences leave a mark on migrants, neither positive nor negative experiences are determinative of migrant voting behavior in the short or long term. Many Interviewees who socialized in nondemocracy then resocialized in democracy display a critical eye for spotting false promises and a lack of transparency in politicians and governments, as well as realistic views of democracy's benefits and fragility. Almost half of the Interviewees are dual transnational voters—having voted at least once in both the origin country from abroad as well as in the country of residence—and almost three-quarters of Interviewees intend to vote in the two countries in the future (see Chapter 4).

In the next section, I chronicle Ecuador's eleven-year road to enfranchising both immigrants and emigrants (1998–2009) by explaining when migrants gained voting rights as well as existent registration and voting laws. Section 2 contains the method of analysis, the Respondent characteristics, and limitations to the analysis. In Section 3, I present the main results and outline the reasons migrants say they turn out to vote, as well as introduce a new variable: investment in a flourishing future, or the idea that some migrants participate because they are committed to improving a country's democracy and the economy. Section 4 expands on how Interviewees' past experiences in nondemocracy influence current political attitudes and electoral behavior.

3.1 A Short Road to Enfranchising Immigrants and Emigrants in Ecuador

The legal process of granting voting rights to both nonresident nationals and foreign residents is prevalent throughout Latin America, including in Ecuador (Escobar 2015). According to Palop-García and Pedroza (2019), legislation for emigrant enfranchisement must be 1) passed, 2) regulated, and 3) applied before nationals abroad can participate in elections, which can take years to achieve. It can take even longer to grant voting rights to long-term foreign residents, or 'denizens.' Migrant

enfranchisement is also not a guarantee—discussion at various governmental levels may never reach the first step of passing legislation. In states with federalist governments, legislation may pass at the local or regional level but get rejected at the national level, which occurred in Germany.[55] Alternatively, migrant suffrage legislation is passed and then lags between regulation, or thereafter between regulation and application. Emigrant voting rights in Ecuador encountered minor lags, whereas immigrant voting rights were granted quickly without setback.

Table 3.1 Milestones in Ecuador's 11-year Road to Enfranchising Immigrants and Emigrants[56]

Year	Action	Enfranchisement Step Description
1998	Enact	Article 27 of the 1998 Constitution enacts emigrant voting suffrage
2000	Regulate	Article 4 and 99 in the 2000 Electoral Law regulates emigrant voting
2002	Regulate	2002 reform regulates emigrant voting
2006	Apply	First time emigrants vote in national elections, in a presidential election
2008	Enact	Article 63 of the 2008 Constitution enacts immigrant voting suffrage with 5-year residence (universal, multilevel elections)
2008	Enact	Article 63 of the 2008 Constitution enacts special representation for emigrants
2009	Regulate	Organic Electoral Law of Elections and Political Organizations (i.e., the Democracy Code) regulates immigrant voting
2009	Regulate	Article 4 and 150 in Electoral Law 2009 regulate special representation for emigrants
2009	Apply	First time immigrants vote in Ecuadorian elections

3.1.1 Granting migrant voting rights in the 1998 and 2008 Constitutions

In Ecuador, Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy (2020) report that a migrant organization (*Federación de Ecuatorianos en el Exterior* [Federation of Ecuadorians Abroad]) originally instigated the external voting rights discussion in the mid-1990s. Their demands were met when emigrant voting was

[55] However, Pedroza (2019) suggests that decades-long discussions and political parties' changing framing of the topic in parliamentary debates make Germany not so much an example of failure, but a long-debated, ongoing case of denizen enfranchisement.

[56] The steps of enact, regulate, and apply are from Palop-García and Pedroza (2019). While the five-year residence is specific for foreign residents, they must also meet the standard requirements (e.g., age) to vote.

enshrined in the 1998 Constitution (Article 27), which also allowed nationals abroad to hold dual nationality (i.e., retain original nationality even if they naturalized in the country of residence) (Article 11). However, considering the three steps to legislation, enfranchisement is incomplete until a country regulates and implements it.

Emigrant voting rights in Ecuador stemming from the 1998 Constitution were introduced in the 2000 Electoral Law (Article 4 and 99) and regulated in the 2002 reform (Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2020). But the National Electoral Council halted implementation of emigrant voting rights in Ecuador; as Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy (2020, pp. 116–117) explain, there was public debate about how the electoral process would unfold abroad and the Council, intending on "setting the rules of the game," "did not allow nonresident Ecuadorians to participate in the 2002 presidential elections." Implementation was achieved in 2006; that year's presidential election marked the first time Ecuadorians abroad voted in-person, for example in Consulates (Ramírez 2018, Palop-García and Pedroza 2019). Although there were more registered Ecuadorians abroad during the most recent election of 2017 than initially in 2006, the 2006 presidential election attracted the highest percentage of registered voters (61% of voters of total registered Ecuadorians abroad) as compared to the 2017 election (39%) (Ramírez and Umpierrez de Reguero 2019). Despite taking eight years from beginning to end, Ecuador's process of granting emigrant voting rights was linear, with no rights reversals.

After the election of Rafael Correa as president of Ecuador in 2006, the perceived role of emigrants as voters changed in tandem with legislative changes introduced by Correa's administration in 2007 when he was sworn into his first term. Correa set a new kind of political discourse by coining the term "Fifth Region," meaning Ecuadorians abroad form a distinct "region" in addition to the four existent parts of the country (Boccagni and Ramírez 2013, Boccagni 2014, Pugh 2017, Ramírez 2018). While the group of people who make up the region are real, the region itself is an idea, not an actual territory. The Fifth Region exemplifies how states can 'shift' their national borders, at will, far into other territories (Shachar 2020), for reasons such as implementing migration control strategies or reestablishing territorial connections with emigrants.

A decade after emigrants first gained suffrage rights, Ecuador enshrined immigrant voting rights via Article 63 of the 2008 Constitution, granting foreign resident voting rights, regardless of nationality, in all local and national elections and plebiscites after a five-year residence. The 2008 Constitution emphasizes migrant rights because it "advocates the principles of universal citizenship and recognizes the right to human mobility" (Escobar 2015, p. 941). The Constitution also designated special representation for Ecuadorians abroad, meaning voting for legislative seats to elect direct

representation in the origin country—which the National Electoral Council regulated in 2009 (Collyer 2014a, Palop-García 2017, Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2020; Electoral Law 2009, Article 4 and 150). As van Haute and Kernalegenn (2020) point out, giving emigrants special representation incentivizes political parties, new or existent, to establish themselves abroad since their presence and campaigning can incentivize more emigrants to vote. The Organic Electoral Law of Elections and Political Organizations—more commonly known as the Democracy Code (*Código de la Democracia*)—regulated immigrant voting in 2009. Thereafter, and likely because of a brief lag period between the 2008 Constitution and immigrants casting votes for the first time in Ecuador, the first turnout of foreign voters in 2009 was low (Escobar 2015, p. 941).

In sum, emigrant enfranchisement in Ecuador took eight years (1998–2006), immigrant enfranchisement took one (2008–2009), and the entire process took eleven (1998–2009). Compared to other countries—such as Chile where it took 92 years to achieve (1925–2017; see Chapter 2), or the United States where multilevel immigrant voting was widespread from independence until being repealed in the 1920s (Hayduk 2006, 2015)—Ecuador experienced a relatively short journey to extensive migrant enfranchisement. Ecuador has since expanded enfranchisement by designating special representation, and as of 2020, there is no indication that migrant voting will be reversed.

3.2 Findings from Interviewing Migrants in 2019

Between August and October 2019, a research team conducted 71 interviews with foreign residents in Ecuador from five origin countries: Chile (14 Interviewees), Colombia (20), Cuba (9), Peru (14), and Venezuela (14).[57] Colombian and Peruvian immigrants rank in the top three origin countries with the most migrants present in Ecuador (along with immigrants from the United States); the five selected origin countries accounted for around 35% of all foreign residents living in Ecuador (see Appendix 3.1). However, instead of trying to represent the entire immigrant population in Ecuador, the primary

[57] The data (in-person semi-structured interviews and verbatim transcriptions of the open-ended questions, both in Spanish) stem from a larger project completed between March 2019 and March 2020 entitled, "Democracy, Ideology, and Partisanship in Transnational Perspective: Evidence of Migrant Voting in and from Ecuador, 1979–2018," funded by the Universidad Casa Grande in Guayaquil, Ecuador. Gabriela Baquerizo, Sebastián Umpierrez de Reguero, and I applied for the project through the University's *Semilleros* program, then collaborated with four Research Assistants: Paula Lanata, María José Medina, Claudia Navarrete, and Vivian Cartagena. Based on techniques in Mosely (2013), the project totaled 83 interviews, from which I exclude those from Spain to focus on Latin America. I also exclude two (non-Venezuelan) Interviewees who arrived in the most emergent wave and thus did not yet have voting rights in Ecuador.

decision for choosing Interviewees from the five origin countries was to find variance in political learning experiences in democracies, hybrid regimes, authoritarianism, or a combination of these political regime types (see Table 3.4). All countries except Cuba offer external voting rights to emigrants abroad.[58]

Interviewees belong to either in a traditional wave (1979–2009) or an emergent wave (2010–2019) of immigration to Ecuador. The traditional wave starts from 1979 when Ecuador returned to democracy and ends in 2009 after the 2008 Constitution that emphasized migrant rights (Escobar 2015) and was implemented. The emergent wave picks up in 2010, one year after implementation of the 2008 Constitution and ends in 2019 when the interviews were conducted. Over the period of analysis, immigrant stock (the number of foreign residents within total population) in Ecuador tripled, from approximately 0.8% to 2.4% of the total population (see Appendix 3.2). Table 3.2 summarizes the Respondents' characteristics and shows that they are about evenly split between the two waves.

Table 3.2 Description of 71 Respondents by Origin Country, Select Variables[59]

Origin Country	Women	Men	Age Range	University Degree	Stable Employ.	Temporary Employ.	Arrived 1979–2009	Arrived 2010–2019
Chile	5	9	34–66	12	12	2	11	3
Colombia	8	12	24–76	12	17	1	11	9
Cuba	3	6	21–54	7	6	1	1	8
Peru	7	7	22–66	5	7	5	8	6
Venezuela	6	8	21–63	12	13	0	5	9
Subtotal	*29*	*42*	--	--	--	--	--	--
Total	*71*		*21–76*	*48*	*55*	*9*	*36*	*35*

[58] Chile enacted external voting rights through the Constitutional Reform Law 20.748 in 2014–2015, which was implemented in 2017 (see Chapter 2); Colombia enacted them for presidential elections in 1961 (Law 39), which were extended to legislative elections in the 1991 Constitution (Bermudez *et al.* 2017); Peru enacted them in the 1979 Constitution and has applied them since 1980 (Umpierrez de Reguero, Erdilmen, and Finn 2021); Venezuela extended them in 2009 via the Organic Law of Electoral Processes, Article 124.

[59] Except for age range, all descriptions are given in numbers of Respondents in the category. Regarding employment, Interviewees were asked about their main economic activity, with eight choices (see Appendix 3.6); temporary employment includes seasonal and sporadic jobs. Appendix 3.3 shows a further breakdown of the arrival waves.

Overall, the group of 71 migrant Interviewees are highly educated: 16 Respondents indicated that their highest level of completed education was high school, 7 completed technical training, and the remaining 48 hold an undergraduate (33 people) or postgraduate degree (15 people). Capturing highly educated Respondents is not unusual: Boccagni and Ramírez's (2013) non-representative sample of non-resident Ecuadorian voters abroad captured about a quarter with a university degree. When Escobar and colleagues (2015) surveyed Colombian voters in various cities in Europe and the United States, around 55% of their survey's respondents had an under- or postgraduate degree. The average age among the group is 45 years old, and approximately 40% of the Interviewees are women. Three-quarters of the Respondents were currently working a stable job whereas nine people said they worked, but only in temporary or sporadic positions. Only three Respondents did not have jobs and four were students (two only study and the other two work and study).

In addition to their origin country, 14 Respondents had previously lived in one or more countries before Ecuador. More frequent migration patterns beyond 'temporary' or 'permanent' are emerging worldwide (Constant 2020), and in this group most repeat migrants were from Chile and Venezuela. After leaving the origin country, 12 Respondents had previously lived in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, England, Mexico, Spain, Switzerland, the United States, or Venezuela, for an average of about 4 years (ranging from half a year to 13 years). The other two had also lived in an additional second country (2 years in Peru and 3 years in the Unites States) before moving to Ecuador. Four of these countries are in South America, and six in Latin America, underlining the prevalence of not only intraregional migration but also repeat intraregional migration. Geographical proximity and a common language facilitate movement and knowledge acquisition post-migration. Variation in residence history among Interviewees enriched cross-country and cross-time comparisons in the analysis, particularly regarding democratic freedoms, views on corruption, and institutional trust.

Most (53 people) reported holding permanent residency in Ecuador. Another 15 Interviewees held dual nationality, which seemed uncorrelated to previous migration elsewhere since 11 had naturalized in the destination country, making their second nationality Ecuadorian. Three individuals held their second passport from Costa Rica, Italy, or Russia. As a unique case, one Chilean Respondent had German and Ecuadorian passports; this 62-year-old woman left Chile in the early 1980s and for

political reasons had to renounce Chilean nationality.[60] The few remaining reported holding a temporary visa, refugee status, were undocumented, or they preferred not to answer this question.

Approximately one in every five Respondents reported that they or someone in their household had experienced some form of discrimination within the last year in Ecuador. This high rate was initially surprising to learn, given the group's educational credentials and shared native language, as well as most having a documented legal status. However, the discrimination had little to do with their jobs or status—the most selected reason for discrimination was "being a foreigner," reported by 12 Respondents. Six others reported other types of discrimination, three of which said was based on their way of speaking. Although all Respondents speak Spanish as their native language, differences in accent, intonation, and word usage are used a basis for discrimination against the Interviewees by 'native' Ecuadorians.

About half (37 Respondents) send remittances and visit their origin country, with varying frequencies. While 9 people send remittances only in the case of emergencies, 10 send them one to six times a year, and 18 (a quarter of the group) transfer money seven times or more a year to family or friends in the origin country. Of those who send remittances, most preferred not to report how much they send, but 12 normally send less than $100 USD each time and another 12 people send more than $100 but less than $250 each time. Trips to the origin country are common, but not for all Interviewees: 10 people report never visiting (choosing the answer: "not even once in the last five years") and 21 rarely ("once or twice in the last five years"), whereas 28 visit occasionally ("once every year or year and a half") and 12 frequently ("up to three times a year"). Remittances and visits to the origin country are evidence that at least half of the Interviewees continue financial and personal contact with the left-behind and maintain some connection to the origin country.

3.2.1 Selection process and method limitations

My selection procedure for interview respondents had four obligatory requirements (for specifications, see Appendix 3.4). Rather than trying to represent the immigrant population in Ecuador, the main aim was to explore political experiences in a variety of settings in both democracy and nondemocracy, which is why I selected the five origin countries. As such, the selected group captures typical migrant

[60] Dual nationals included: Chile-Costa Rica (CL2), Germany-Ecuador (CL9), Colombia-Ecuador (CO2 and CO4), Colombia-Italy (CO13), Cuba-Russia (CU1), Cuba-Ecuador (CU2 and CU9), Peru-Ecuador (PE10), Venezuela-Italy (VE3), Venezuela-Ecuador (VE4, VE5, VE7, VE10, and VE12).

voting trajectories, specific to regimes shifting between left- and right-leaning governments and between democracy and nondemocracy.

From there, the selection process aimed to vary the Respondent group by sex, age, and year of arrival between 1979 and 2014. I started in 1979, the year Ecuador returned to democracy and stop at 2014, since those who moved after 2014 fail to meet the five-year requirement to vote in Ecuador, except the four Venezuelans who arrived in the most emergent wave. Even though they do not yet have immigrant voting rights to participate in Ecuadorian elections, I nonetheless include them to explore events in, and ties to, the current authoritarian origin country.

Following these guidelines, possible Respondents were asked if they would be willing to interview. Starting with a small pool of Respondents who agreed to be interviewed, a snowball technique allowed expanding the pool of Interviewees to include other foreign residents. The trust-based referral system based on closer friends, colleagues, and acquaintances gained more interviews, which occurred primarily in Guayaquil. Furthermore, the referrals had to be someone outside the nuclear family and who was not a first cousin, to maximize variation in the political socialization familial experiences.

Selected Interviewees first read the Consent Information, signed the Consent Form (see Appendix 3.5), then participated in a questionnaire with close-ended (survey) questions and open-ended questions in a semi-structured interview (see Appendix 3.6).[61] I designed the questions between April and June 2019. The literal transcriptions, in Spanish, contain only responses to the open-ended questions in Section C, which averaged approximately 45 minutes. This questionnaire section covered four topics, each with two to four questions, that provide the main empirics for the present Chapter: (1) electoral participation, (2) political socialization, (3) democracy and political resocialization, and (4) political identity.

To measure electoral participation, I distinguish instances of pre-migration voting (participating as a resident national) from post-migration voting. To categorize the latter, I use Finn's (2020) four types of migrant voting: immigrant (foreign resident and dual national) voting in the residence country,[62] emigrant voting from abroad for the origin country, dual transnational voting (participating in both countries), and abstention (voting nowhere, despite having suffrage rights).

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[61] The Research Ethics Committee at the Universidad Casa Grande in Ecuador approved the questionnaire.

[62] Respondents include foreign residents, dual nationals, undocumented residents, and a refugee. While Executive Decree 1182, Article 3, from 2012 prohibits refugees from political involvement in Ecuador, it is not always enforced, thus I include the refugee in the analysis.

I exclude Cubans from my analysis of prior voting since Cubans lack emigrant voting rights and cannot enter the emigrant or dual transnational voting quadrants. However, I include Cubans when analyzing the intention to vote since it is hypothetical for all Respondents. In contrast to Cubans, Peruvians are mandated to vote while abroad (Belgium similarly has a compulsory voting system for emigrants) and thus cannot enter the immigrant voting quadrant. This is because if Peruvians vote in Ecuador, they are also legally required to vote in Peru, so would enter the dual transnational quadrant. Nonetheless, I include Peruvians in both prior and future voting analyses since the Respondents show electoral variation—i.e., some vote and some abstain in origin-country elections, despite being legally compulsory.

I consider any pre-migration political experiences and learning as political socialization and post-migration experiences as political resocialization. Within the group of Interviewees, some pre-migration experiences occurred in a third or fourth country because of repeat migration (i.e., the Interviewees did not emigrate directly from their origin country to Ecuador). Nonetheless I focus only on resocialization in Ecuador and its effects on a migrant's perception toward Ecuador and the origin country because that is where the migrants can cast ballots.

The last part of the interview covered political ideology, party affiliation, and involvement in political movements—from which I focus on political identity. The Interviewees explained their views on democracy, perceptions toward political regimes and trust in institutions for the origin and residence countries, both before and after migrating. After placing themselves on a left-right scale of ideology in the questionnaire, Interviewees further detailed their political identity in both countries, which I categorized using a color-coding system for systematic reference. I then took notes on each nationality based on the various categories, remarking on differences and similarities in their responses.

The research faces two main limitations. First, I expect some misreporting on political engagement not only because memory is imperfect but also due to the social desirability response bias; some overreporting of voting could come from people feeling reluctant or embarrassed to say that they abstained, planned to abstain, or express their views on democracy, so they lie. Second, since the data collection technique formed a non-representative sample, I cannot generalize about all migrant voters of these nationalities in or beyond Ecuador. Nonetheless, the achieved purpose of semi-structured interviews was to explore a) the reasons for migrant voting, abstention, and obstacles to voting and b) why individual-level turnout decisions change over time in two countries. I captured nuances of political socialization and resocialization processes within the group of Interviewees, noting common occurrences during personalized trajectories (also see Chapter 4), as related to

institutional trust, ideology, and adaptation of political attitudes, values, and behavior in the origin and residence countries over time.

3.3 Reasons Migrants Vote: Ties and Being Invested in a Flourishing Future

Individual-level turnout is influenced by age, education, and intention to stay in the residence country (see Chapter 1). However, they fail to shed light on where and when migrants decide to vote or abstain. To gain such insight, I analyze responses explaining why migrants say they vote.

Table 3.3 Reasons for Migrant Voting

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Main reasons</td><td>Family ties (connections with people)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Territorial ties (connections with place)
Emigrants: civic duty, citizenship/nationality, belonging as a nonresident national
Immigrants: residence, belonging as a foreign resident, trust in the voting process</td></tr>
<tr><td>Invested in a flourishing future
for a positive change in politics and less corruption</td></tr>
<tr><td>Secondary reason</td><td>Formal recognition
Emigrants: inclusion as nonresident nationals
Immigrants: inclusion as foreign residents</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">(Case-specific) bureaucratic reasons</td><td>Avoid fines*</td></tr>
<tr><td>Obtain voting certificate</td></tr>
</table>

Source: Based on 71 interviews with migrants in Ecuador in 2019.

Notes: *Except for Peruvian emigrants, avoiding fines as a reason for voting is often based on misinformation or a misunderstanding by immigrants, emigrants, or other people who believe that voting is compulsory, when in fact it is facultative.

As Table 3.3 outlines, three reasons stand out as the strongest: (1) migrants have ties to people, mostly family, living in the country; (2) migrants have deeply rooted ties to a territory through ideas of citizenship/nationality, duty, and belonging; and (3) migrants are invested in creating a flourishing future for the country—both a stronger democracy and stable economy. These three reasons were so often cited during the 71 interviews, and oftentimes interwoven with other reasons for voting, that in

Table 3.3 I label them as 'main reasons' for migrant voting. A less cited motive is labeled as the 'secondary reason'. Having resources and a motive to vote creates a sufficient condition for the emergence of migrant voting.

3.3.1 Multiterritorial ties to people and places

When migrants explain why they vote, they almost always incorporate ties and geographical aspects into their answers. For example, when interviewing migrants after elections, Boccagni and Ramírez (2013, p. 722) report that "interviewees didn't talk much about politics… they talked much more of their families, of their affections." Similarly, none of the 71 Interviewees directly reported voting because they are interested in politics; rather, they are interested in politics because they care about family and friends and they care about what happens in the future since it affects their loved ones' wellbeing. One Interviewee participated in emigrant voting because, "it is the country where I was born, where obviously my family lives, or I mean, the majority of my family lives there" (PE3).[63] For this Interviewee, familial ties are on par with territorial ties.

Territorial ties, such as feelings of duty to the origin country, have formed stable roots in most people's political trajectories. Once formed, a sense of duty from the individual-state relation to a place or community is unlikely to become uprooted, even long after emigration (see Chapter 4).[64] Migrants' identity with a country and the nationality stick with them, even after decades abroad. One Interviewee asserted: "I'm very Colombian, very nationalist… I'm Colombian, my family is Colombian, I have family in Colombia, my friends are Colombian, and we participate, let's say, I actively participate in Colombian society online…. every day I know what's happening in my town" (CO3). Taking it a step further, some commented that being abroad changes their perspective toward the origin country's political scene: "I'm much more aware of the country now, looking at it from afar… we can see our country like from a bird's eye view, for the good of the country" (CL6). As I further explore in Chapter 4, such a shift in perspective suggests that although the individual is the

[63] The interviews were conducted and transcribed in Spanish; all translations are my own. Referencing the interviews, I use the ISO Alpha-2 codes to abbreviate the countries, and number each interview (i.e., CL1 is Chilean Interviewee 1, CO for Colombia, CU Cuba, PE Peru, and VE Venezuela).

[64] Those forced to emigrate will not necessarily have civic duty or a sense of obligation to the origin country, although they may hold other long-lasting connections to people, communities, culture, customs, and so forth (see Chapter 4). Other catastrophic events (crisis, recession, war) related to the individual-state relation can also uproot a sense of civic duty.

same person, and the origin country is the same country, the new 'bird's eye view' reflects the change from a national citizen-state relation to an emigrant-origin country relation when abroad.

Over time, immigrants residing abroad grow roots in the residence country, their "new home," often with Ecuadorian spouses and children in the household. One Interviewee explains she is motivated to vote "because I love this country, the truth is I have a son here—my son is Ecuadorian" (P2). Politics inevitably intertwine with all other aspects of life; one Interviewee from Venezuela explained that she "[has] to participate in the country's political life, in social life, in economic life because I live here, I produce here, I live off of the fruits of my labor, I work here, my family lives here" (VE3). She went on to say: "I can't tell you that I feel Ecuadorian, [because] I'm Venezuelan, that I can't deny, but my life is here." Although she participates politically in Ecuador because she has planted roots in the country, she also maintains her role and connections as an emigrant to her origin country in terms of belonging, nationality, and citizenship.

Some find it only natural that residency and connections result in wanting to participate in politics, strengthening ties to the residence country. One Interviewee, who has lived in Ecuador for 15 years, considered it "obvious" that she cared about Ecuador since it was like her "second homeland" and believed that voting was a right that "we should exercise" and that "I want to exercise." (CO6). Another Interviewee elucidated, "I feel a little Ecuadorian [after] so many years living here, it seems to me that I have *the right and the responsibility to participate*" (CL2, emphasis added). Territorial ties to the destination country over time of residence create bonds to the people and place, making migrants feel less like outsiders and more like insiders with a sense of belonging (see Chapter 4). Since the residence country grants suffrage rights to foreign residents, migrants can exercise the right to formally participate and become active political insiders as members of the demos.

When mentioning ties, Interviewees were usually referring to connections to family and friends. Through these networks, they grow attached to the country, which may or may not include a sense of duty (or the idea of belonging to the nation-state). In Eliasoph's (1998, p. 82) words, voting is a civic act that is "close to home" and "do-able." For migrant respondents, "close" reaches far beyond a geographical territory and "home" often refers to both the origin and residence countries, suggesting voting is a meaningful political act for individual migrants. As one Interviewee put it: "Everyone who lives in a country—regardless of being a resident, native, or foreigner—in my opinion, has the right and the responsibility to vote" (VE2).

Yet, feelings of duty as a foreign resident are again commonly based on established ties and residence: "I live here, I work here, I pay taxes here, I have the obligation to vote because it's part of

my responsibility" (CO11). Even without previous electoral participation in any country, one Respondent's ties grew so strong in Ecuador that it stirred a newfound sense of civic duty that motivated her to vote for the first time in 2017 because "as a resident of so many years, I feel the right and *the obligation to contribute* to this civic matter" and describes it as quite "an experience that in my almost 50 years I had never had, and it felt important to me. I felt that this was very patriotic, very civic" (CL13, emphasis added).

In such cases, feelings of duty expand beyond the emigrant-origin country relation since people can also develop a similar sense of duty to the residence country as an immigrant—whether as a foreign resident or those holding multiple nationalities (further explored in Chapter 4). Based on this group of Interviewees, migrants' multiterritorial ties to place and to people within it are mutually reinforcing and connections to people can cause ties to the idea of the nation-state.

3.3.2 Investment in a country's flourishing future

Another motive that affects migrant voting emerged from analyzing the in-depth interviews: investment in a flourishing future. Ideas of investment in a "collective interest" and contributing to a "flourishing" future originate from Bauböck (2015).[65] This is a distinct reason that migrants often acknowledged as *the principal motive* to vote. Respondents specifically referred to this reason as the betterment for themselves, their children, and all residents in terms of economic opportunities and wellbeing. They also referred to a well-functioning democracy, democratic institutions, and urban development as components of a flourishing future; people "always want things to work in the best way [they can], because it's your home" (PE14).

I was not expecting to discover this as a reason that affects migrant voting at the individual level and, as such, it is absent from my previous outline (Figure 1.2) of necessary conditions for voting in a given country. In Chapter 1, and building from Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), I proposed that while time and money (resources) allow people the luxury of voting, people vote because they feel they *belong* to a country (ties and civic duty), because they *care* about people living there (ties to family

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[65] Bauböck bases his stakeholder principle on two assumptions: 1) individuals are interested in being a member of the demos for instrumental and intrinsic reasons, and 2) those in the self-governing polity *share a "collective interest in* preserving its autonomy and *contributing to its flourishing*" (Bauböck 2015, p. 825, emphasis added). While this principle is used to demarcate the demos, I find the wording also captures many Respondents' motives for exercising voting rights: migrant voters have aligned their individual-level interests to collective ones and vote to achieve a brighter future for the country.

and friends), or a combination of these two. I suggest that family ties and territorial ties are two strong reasons that motive individual-level migrant turnout. Compared to other voters, migrants are first influenced by more combinations of resources and ties across the countries in which they have lived. Second, migrant voters more commonly position themselves in terms of people (especially family) and place ('here' and 'there'). Through my interviews, I also discovered a third main motive for migrant voter turnout: investment in a flourishing future. Migrant voters who want a flourishing future means they vote because they want to see a positive political change, less corruption, new economic opportunities, and to bolster democratic freedoms.[66]

Wanting a brighter future reveals that rather than forgetting—or, using Paul's (2013) phrasing, "unlearning"—past political experiences, migrant voters prefer to *apply* learned lessons. "When I vote in Ecuador, I think that it's for you all to not fall into the same [mess] that we fell into. To help [ensure] that you don't experience what we lived through" (VE1), referring to the devasting consequences stemming from Venezuela's current political regime.

Others want a flourishing future given their roots in the destination country: "I love Ecuador because I've been here, I think, like 30 years… I'm one of those people who truly values Ecuador… so *we want something good for Ecuador* (CO9, emphasis added). One Respondent expressed that "we're all part of the decisions" implying that migrants have a stake in their residence country of Ecuador because "the results of the measures that the elected leaders apply" will affect everyone, including migrants (PE12). He stressed the consequences of policies and that having a stake in a country or community drives him and many others to want to "improve things." A third Respondent explained: "I'm a resident in Ecuador, and as an inhabitant of Ecuador living in this country, *I also want changes*—because I live here, I want things to go well" (CO20).

Despite migrant enfranchisement expansion, contemporary numbers of overseas voters are rarely high enough to affect aggregate electoral outcomes, as revealed by analyses of elections in New Zealand (Gamlen 2015), Romania (Burean 2011, Vintila and Soare 2018), Italy (Laguerre 2013, Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019), and Turkey (Yener-Roderburg 2020). However, regardless of

[66] By reporting that migrant voters in my group of Interviewees are invested in a flourishing future, I do not exclude that other (non-migrant) voters may also want the same, or that they may turn out vote for the same reason. The difference here is that Respondents reported feeling invested in the future directly from residence and their newer 'roots' in the destination country and as well from nationality and family ties (their initial 'roots') in the origin country. These roots and desires seem to be more explicit for migrant voters (see Chapter 4). Again, it is the duality and explicit reference to spatial and familial relations that make migrant voters' responses stand out as distinct.

the election results, many Respondents who claim they are invested in a flourishing future assume (or believe) that electing a candidate who proposed to design and implement policies will achieve just that. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p. 19) put it, people want "more income to less, and in addition, they may like peace, security, fairness, and lots of other things." Respondents echoed this position and prioritized the benefits of a stable political system and a strong economy.

Some Respondents believed that a flourishing future meant a stronger democracy in terms of free participation, representation, and 'good' policy. Reflecting back to her first time voting, one Interviewee "felt happy because for the first time you do something like exercising democracy, to participate, since now I can vote, I can form an opinion, contribute," and she still believed that "with my vote, I can contribute to maybe [help] that person continue, I mean, I offer a little help or a little contribution, that I am supporting democracy, [supporting] the country" (CO12). Many Interviewees repeatedly link election outcomes with policy—in other words, it was a common understanding among Interviewees that voters elect a candidate, the elected leader makes public policy (the output) that, when applied, either helps or hurts the country and the people within (the policy outcome). For this group of migrant voters, voting is how they directly contribute to strengthening democracy.

For other Respondents, a flourishing future meant a stronger economic outlook for a country, such as a stable currency, increased international trade, and quality public services. When describing why they vote in Ecuador, one Respondent answered that "my choices can also help better my life here… the quality of life for everyone in this country" (PE1), while another reports emigrant voting because he wants "a big change, to see my country improve its economy" (PE5). Specific economic-related reasons for voting included more opportunities for people within the country in terms of jobs, wages, and access to goods and services.

Several Respondents who prioritized a strong economy as a reason for investment in the future seemed to have been influenced by their pre-migration experiences. For example, tight political control goes along with tight economic control, such as the most recent occurrences in Venezuela: government interference is affecting millions of people because of food and medicine shortages (Freier 2018, Freier and Parent 2018, 2019). Concerns about government interference and its effect on the economy were also reflected in responses by Chileans who had lived with state intervention, recession, and rationing during Salvador Allende's presidency, 1970–1973.

Wanting to "make a change" towards a flourishing future indicates that voters are unsatisfied with the country's current state. Radcliff (1992) has proposed that voters in 'developing countries' turn out to vote when the economy is doing badly. However, Fornos and colleagues (2004), after an extensive

study and various models testing "the institutional, socioeconomic, and political process approaches to turnout"[67] in Latin America from 1980 to 2000, find no significant empirical evidence that Latin Americans are motivated to vote because of a country's poor economic performance. Rather than disqualifying Radcliff's findings, they call for further research examining factors that drive turnout reasons. Comments from the Interviewees seem to support Radcliff's hypothesis. While the interview questions did not specifically ask whether Respondents turned out to vote because of macroeconomic reasons, the topic nonetheless appeared various times throughout open-ended responses, particularly from Colombians and Venezuelans.

Finally, Respondents repeatedly mentioned democracy as a tool to express opinions and make a change. Paraphrasing various Interviewees, people overall participate when life falls apart but become complacent political actors when life feels like smooth sailing. Many Respondents conveyed concerns about the future since they considered some Ecuadorians as indifferent toward politics. Various Respondents also spoke about change, even in nondemocracy, for example in contemporary Venezuela,

> Venezuela definitely needs a political change, it needs a change of government, and it has to be done through elections. It's simply a step that has to be taken because I'm sure that the desire for change and the willingness for change is [embodied] within the great majority of Venezuelans. But we must endorse the change in *a free, fair, transparent election*, independently, in which even [those from] Chavismo or Madurismo can participate… and whatever [ideological] leaning within the opposition who also want to openly participate. But if such a change will happen, it will happen the moment that we have the chance to express it and do it freely… *through voting*. (VE2, emphasis added)

Overall, being invested to contributing to a flourishing future is a distinct reason to vote because it was a primary motive in these interviews for individual-level migrant turnout. To avoid using this as a catch-all reason for migrant voter turnout, I have identified two parts of this reason: a better future

[67] Fornos and colleagues' (2004) institutional model's main variables are nationally competitive districts, electoral disproportionality, multipartyism, unicameralism, compulsory voting laws (coupled with sanctions for noncompliance) and concurrent elections; for the socioeconomic model, they use urbanization, literacy, and per capita Gross Domestic Product (scaled up from the significant variables for individual-level turnout of wealth, literacy, and education); and the political process model includes the quality of democracy and political freedom, founding elections (the first democratic election after transition), and electoral competition.

means a stronger democracy (with more extensive participation, representation, and 'better' political outputs), a brighter economic outlook, or both. Some Interviewees believed the political and economic aspects converge, not necessarily in a positive light, for example when an incumbent government is strong-handed or overly interventionist, weakening the chances of a flourishing future. Migrants—especially who have lived through political violence, corruption, and food shortages—conveyed that people should vote during 'bad times' to ameliorate the situation as well as during 'good times' to avoid falling into poor political or economic circumstances.

3.3.3 Formal recognition as a voter

Some Interviewees cited formal recognition, or the outcome of a state legally including new voters in the demos, as a motivation to vote. For emigrants, this means the origin country offering external voting for nonresident nationals; for immigrants, it is the country of residence granting denizen suffrage rights. The largest origin-country group that stated this as a reason to vote was Chileans since Chile was relatively late in granting external voting rights, compared to the rest of South America (Escobar 2015; see Chapter 2).

Of the 14 Chilean Interviewees, ranging from 34 to 66 years old, 12 reported a future intention to vote in origin-country elections (1 was unsure and 1 intends to abstain)—even though about a third of the Interviewees never had the chance to vote as a resident national of Chile before emigrating, primarily because they left when "there weren't elections because there was a military government" (CL13) under Pinochet in the 1970s and 1980s. At the time of the interviews, only one election had occurred in which emigrants could vote from abroad (in 2017; see Chapter 2), in which 8 of the 14 Chilean Respondents registered and voted. Regarding the first experience of voting from abroad, an Interviewee comments,

> For me, that was exciting, I mean we almost got there [to vote] crying from the excitement because, for the first time, *they considered us as Chileans*. It was always said that those of us who live abroad aren't part of Chile; there are a lot of people who think that. So, *they recognized us as Chileans*… I'm Chilean and I am going to be Chilean my whole life, so the fact that they let us vote while living abroad gives me *recognition*. (CL10, emphasis added)

At first glimpse 'recognition' seems to be the same as the concept as 'belonging;' however, they are distinct because external recognition can solidify feelings of belonging. For example, saying that

"I'm Chilean and I am going to be Chilean my whole life" (CL10) encompasses a feeling of belonging, whereas enfranchisement in Chile meant formal recognition of the emotional connection to the origin country, which motivated her to vote. Recognition can also instigate feelings of belonging: "I felt like I was part of Ecuador, I felt I was part of here… *when they took me into account for something so important*, something that's dear to the country. So, I felt amazing" (PE2, emphasis added). Another Respondent agreed, "When they take [you] into account for something so important like voting, *it's unavoidable to not feel like you're a part of Ecuador*" (PE3, emphasis added). Formal recognition made these Respondents feel included and contributed to a sense of belonging, but for them, the recognition itself was the principal motive to vote.

3.3.4 Bureaucratic reasons for migrant voting

Other Interviewees mentioned two bureaucratic reasons that motivate them to vote: avoiding fines and obtaining a voting certificate. Contrary to a sense of obligation toward the origin country, Peruvians have a legal obligation to vote from abroad and some Interviewees expressed irritation at voting: "I go to Peruvian elections by obligation" (PE6) and "…it isn't a motive. It's perhaps for [avoiding] the fine that would be sent to me" (PE9). Nonetheless, Respondents differ on their understanding of how effective the origin country is at delivering fines to those abroad. Based on the 14 Peruvian interviews, the general understanding is that if they do not *travel* to Peru, they will not receive a fine. Thus, some Respondents vote while others abstain in origin-country elections.

Voters who participate in some Latin American countries' elections receive a voting certificate as evidence of having participated. Some emigrants report that the origin country gives them tangible benefits from participating in external voting. One Interviewee explained that "I did it for a document that I needed, but not because I'm interested in voting" (CO15), explaining that it will help obtain another document since the Colombian Consulate offers discounts on some consular services when nationals show their voting certificate.

Voters in Ecuador similarly receive a voting certificate proving that they participated in the election. The Ecuadorian voting certificate is required (or at least commonly asked) for other bureaucratic tasks, such as when completing legal paperwork and accessing bank services (e.g., opening an account). Although the vote is facultative for foreign residents, many Interviewees reported that other people are unaware of this fact, believing it mandatory for everyone, since it is compulsory for Ecuadorians in Ecuador. Having it makes life easier, as one Respondent attested to:

> Voting provides you with a document for doing [bureaucratic] paperwork. Personal paperwork, banking procedures, and everything else—so to not have that document, later it's going to make it impossible to do that paperwork, or you can go get it, go and pay some amount to get it, even though the amount isn't so much, but the thing is, you waste time in going to get it afterwards. So, people feel pressured to do it [vote]. (PE4)

The confusion of facultative voting is problematic for foreign residents who wish to abstain, because they are then repeatedly asked to show their voting certificate throughout the year. To avoid problems and the hassle of explaining facultative voting to others who are less informed, some immigrants who want to abstain end up going to vote, just to obtain the certificate.

3.4 Migrants' Enduring Authoritarian Imprints in Two Countries

Political learning that occurs during socialization endures, but will it determine whether migrants vote or abstain? The concept behind this question is an "authoritarian imprint," what Antoine Bilodeau (2014, p. 362) explains as migrants having "an imprint of their political socialization under an authoritarian regime [that] marks their general outlook on politics." Several analyses of immigrants who socialized under authoritarian rule show that they then resocialized in, and adapted to, the democratic destination countries of Australia and Canada (Bilodeau and Nevitte 2003, Bilodeau 2004, 2014, Bilodeau, McAllister, *et al.* 2010). At the same time, as Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen (2020) point out, not all migrants relocate from a less to more democratic country. I apply this question of authoritarian imprints to Latin America since the region involves high intraregional migration (with low linguistic barriers for adaptation) and extensive experience of shifting political regimes.

As Table 3.4 shows, countries in the region have moved between liberal democracy and closed autocracy over the 19th and 20th centuries, sometimes fluctuating more than once, and experiencing democratic breakdown, transition, and setbacks in quality (Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005, Levine and Molina 2007, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013, Acosta 2018). For intraregional migrants, the fluctuations in political regimes and democratic quality mean many Latin Americans have had a variety of nondemocratic and democratic experiences. Interviewees described in detail their (re)socialization experiences while living under various regimes in the origin and residence countries.

Table 3.4 Political Regimes and Leaders in Origin and Residence Countries, 1979–2020

Regime Classifications:

No de-facto multiparty, or free and fair elections: Closed Autocracy (C.A.) or Electoral Autocracy (E.A.)

De-facto multiparty, free and fair elections: Electoral Democracy (E.D.) or Liberal Democracy (L.D.)

Origin Countries	1979 → 1990 → 2000 → 2010 → 2020					
Chile	**C.A.** (1979–88) Augusto Pinochet	**E.A.** ('89)	**Liberal Democracy** (1990–present) Patricio Aylwin, Eduardo Frei, Ricardo Lagos, Michelle Bachelet, Sebastián Piñera, Michelle Bachelet (2nd term), Sebastián Piñera (2nd term)			
Colombia	**Electoral Autocracy** (1979–90) Julio César Turbay, Belisario Betancur, Virgilio Barco	**Electoral Democracy** (1991–present) César Augusto Gaviria, Ernesto Samper, Andrés Pastrana, Álvaro Uribe (2 terms), Juan Manuel Santos (2 terms), Iván Duque				
Cuba	**Closed Autocracy** (1979–present) Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro, Miguel Díaz-Canel					
Peru	**C.A.** ('79)	**E.A.** ('80)	**E.D.** (1981–91)	**C.A.** ('92–94)	**E.D.+** (1995–2000) Alberto Fujimori (2nd–3rd term)	**Electoral Democracy** (2001–present) Alejandro Toledo, Alan García (2nd term), Ollanta Moisés Humala, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, Martín Alberto Vizcarra
			Fernando Belaúnde, Alan García, Alberto Fujimori (1st–2nd terms)			
Venezuela	**Electoral Democracy** (1979–2002) Luis Herrera, Jaime Lusinchi, Carlos Andrés Pérez, Ramón José Velázquez, Rafael Caldera, Hugo Chávez (2 terms)	**Electoral Autocracy** (2003–present) Hugo Chávez (3rd–5th terms), Nicolás Maduro (1st–3rd terms*), Juan Guaidó*				
Residence Country						
Ecuador	**E.A.** ('79)	**Electoral Democracy+** (1980–Present) Jaime Roldós, Osvaldo Hurtado, León Febres-Cordero, Rodrigo Borja, Sixto Durán-Ballén, Jamil Mahuad, Gustavo Noboa, Alfredo Palacio, Rafael Correa (3 terms), Lenín Moreno				

Source: Compilation from Regimes of the World (RoW) operationalized using Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data (Lührmann *et al.* 2018).

Notes: Table 3.4 excludes acting presidents. *Maduro's 3rd term and Guaidó are both only partially recognized as legitimate; ⁺Presidents serving less than two years are excluded; for the complete list, see Appendix 3.7. Initial changes toward an E.A. in Venezuela began during Chávez's second term. Contrasting the RoW classification of Ecuador, in the mid-1980s under Febres-Cordero, the country did not meet the full requirements of an E.D. and has been considered as competitive authoritarianism under Correa (see Mejía Acosta 2002, Basabe-Serrando and Martínez 2014).

To understand the effect of authoritarian imprints in Latin America, I follow Acemoglu and Robinson's (2006, p. 18) distinction between (non)democratic political systems: "In democracy, everybody has a vote, and at least potentially, can participate in one way or the other in the political process. In nondemocracy, an elite, a junta, an oligarchy, or in the extreme case just one person, the dictator, is making the decisions." Table 3.4 shows the chronological fluctuations in political regimes in both the selected origin countries and in Ecuador. The classifications help to better gauge which intraregional migrants moved from democracy to nondemocracy or vice versa, in order to then understand the effects on migrant voting.

Table 3.4 relies on the Regimes of the World (RoW) typology proposed by Lührmann, Tannenberg, and Lindberg (2018, pp. 3–4), which includes two types of autocracies and two democracies: 1) in a *closed autocracy*, there are no elections for the executive and legislature or there is no competition for those positions of power (e.g., one-party regimes); 2) in an *electoral autocracy*, the executive depends on an elected legislature but electoral accountability is absent since the institutions are de-facto undermined; 3) in an *electoral democracy*, there are multiparty and free and fair elections, providing a basis of accountability to voters; 4) in a *liberal democracy*, which is less common than electoral democracies, in addition to multiparty and free and fair elections, people (e.g., minorities) have more rights and there are more measures in place to limit the government and avoid "tyranny of the majority" (for further details on operationalizing RoW, see Appendix 3.8).

Given the variety of government types throughout the region over the selected decades of interest, relocating to Ecuador may mean moving from a less to more democratic country (e.g., from Cuba to Ecuador; from Chile to Ecuador in the 1980s), or vice versa (from Venezuela to Ecuador in the 1980s; from Chile to Ecuador in the 2000s). As Sánchez (2008) argues, Ecuador has not necessarily consolidated its democracy, aligning with the RoW classification as an electoral democracy rather than a liberal democracy.

3.4.1 Authoritarian imprints and typical trajectories

To evaluate the effects of authoritarian imprints in this group of Interviewees, I analyzed their responses about political socialization and resocialization and the current effect on views on democracy and on voting behavior. When asked if political experiences growing up in the origin country currently affects how they interact with politics, one Interviewee said,

> Yes… for Venezuela's very distinct situation and experiences going through political turbulence with coups… it was an interesting lesson to learn. We also forcibly learned a lot of things, we lived through the negative [part] of that, and *obviously that leaves its mark on you, and opens your eyes to these types of systems or governments or political parties; it's political learning.* (VE2, emphasis added)

For migrants who moved from a less or nondemocratic country to a more democratic country, there are two intuitive yet contrasting views on whether to vote or not. One view is that these migrants will not vote because they are unfamiliar or uncomfortable with using democratic voice and practices. But, as extensive literature has shown, while migrants transfer some previous knowledge with them to the residence country, they can still politically learn throughout their adult life (Almond 1960, Bender 1967, Searing *et al.* 1973, Niemi and Sobieszek 1977, Niemi and Hepburn 1995, White *et al.* 2008). So, adult migrants can familiarize themselves with democratic institutions and practices. Moreover, among this group of Interviewees, their selected origin countries share the same language as the residence country, making it easier for them to stay politically informed.

From the other perspective, one could view early political learning in a different context as the opposite of a barrier to voter turnout; in other words, some migrants will vote *because of* previous experiences with nondemocratic regimes. While distrust or disillusionment with origin country institutions and politics can lower emigrant voting from abroad, having such experiences with political corruption may inspire migrant voting later in democracy. Despite negative experiences with dysfunctional democracies or nondemocracies, Bilodeau (2014) finds that migrants still participate in the democratic destination country.

Negative experiences under nondemocratic regimes (e.g., restricted civil liberties, mistreatment of minorities) affect the political learning process (Hyman 1959). Studies of immigrants in Australia and Canada have found that authoritarian imprints eventually dissipate after living in democracy (Bilodeau, McAllister, *et al.* 2010, Bilodeau 2014). Some Interviewees noted that political socialization

experiences (as part of the national citizen-state relation) left a "mark" on them that could have affected their current voting behavior. The impression was enduring but did not exclusively determine migrant voter turnout.

Instead, Respondents' voting behaviors were influenced by both positive and negative experiences. For instance, many Interviewees enjoyed social and familial time while voting together, then sharing a meal, followed by watching electoral results in a group. While Interviewees reported that the collectiveness did not affect their vote choice, it built a habit and positive notions around the idea of electoral participation. Most Interviewees reported having discussed politics with family at the dinner table (Peruvians to a lesser extent), especially close to elections. Furthermore, most Respondents, even those living with families with divided ideologies, reported it having no effect on vote choice since their parents and relatives believed in the freedom to choose whichever candidate each person thought was best.

However, some Respondents admitted that politics was a grave topic of discussion that was avoided to maintain family unity and peace. The avoidance of discussing politics followed many migrants into the residence country, who claimed that they actively avoid talking about politics with friends, colleagues, and acquaintances. Nevertheless, almost every Respondent who reported avoiding talking about politics still displayed knowledge of past and present policies, election outcomes, which leader had done what, and various political parties' campaign information in both countries. In other words, the inclination to lean away from *discussing* politics was unrelated to their interest in politics and electoral participation.

Typical narratives around certain regimes and leaders emerged when the 71 Interviewees explained their migrant trajectories—which are soaked in politics. Interpreting these common patterns sheds light on dynamic (re)socialization processes that affect migrant voting outcomes. For the Interviewees, most negative marks, or authoritarian imprints, came from experiencing political violence, rampant corruption, and the breakdown of democracy (also see Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero 2021). Those free from these experiences (e.g., earlier immigrant waves of Venezuelans and recent waves of Chileans) have partial marks since their immediate family members passed down their stories to them. Those with first-hand experiences had more vivid memories: Chileans who left nondemocracy in the 1970s have lived in Ecuador the longest, but recall the violence, torture, terror, and disappearances as if they had just occurred. While Pinochet is a well-known dictator, the country was also in a desperate state prior to his regime, under Allende's administration. As Doña-Reveco (2020) details with Chilean exiles during that period, memory relates not only to the past but also to

the present since it shapes how emigrants construct their identities and citizenship with the origin country. One Chilean Respondent in the interviews asserted, "I don't believe that there could be a Chilean who lived through that period who could have forgotten anything [about it]; yea, *it really leaves its mark*" (CL7, emphasis added).

The mark similarly runs deep in the lives of Interviewees who described leaving Castro's Cuba and moving to democracy was like moving into the unknown. Peruvian Interviewees spoke often about corruption and how it resulted in a complete loss of trust in politics and politicians, which was often framed around Fujimori and his lasting effect on the country. Colombian Interviewees were influenced by decades of violence, fear, and narco-politics, as well as its ongoing repercussions in everyday life; they strongly voiced either approval or disapproval of political peace pacts with guerillas. Venezuelan Interviewees either recently fled persecution or spoke of family left-behind and their collapse of quality of life in the current authoritarian state, openly discussing the country both pre- and post-Chávez.

3.4.2 Democracy close at hand? Violence, corruption, and narco-politics

Compared to Cubans and other nationalities within the group of Interviewees, Peruvian Interviewees spoke less at length about living in nondemocracy. Fewer Peruvian Interviewees discussed politics at mealtime with family while growing up, posing politics as separate from their daily events, although most Interviewees were well informed about past and present politics in both Peru and Ecuador. An exception was a 22-year-old Respondent (PE1), who spoke about how her parents are "very against the left" after having recounted corruption, narcotrafficking, missing people, and curfews under the left. She was referring to the left-wing dictatorship 1968–1975 led by Juan Velasco. She remembered, "you grow up with that idea that, that you always have to vote for the right" (PE1). In this Respondent's case, the mark is generational and impacts her vote choice, without ever having lived under authoritarianism in Peru.

Older Peruvian Interviewees remember growing up with limited food supply and choices: a 62-year-old commented that "they sold us meat only twice a week [and] we could buy only one or two kilos, no more… I would hear my mom say that no, for how much longer, I don't know how much longer, that we're in a bad situation and we want to get back to democracy" (PE2). Yet this same person feels represented in Ecuador by Correa and identifies as left-leaning, reporting herself as a 3 on the left-right 10-point scale. Another Interviewee recalled terrorism, curfews, the APRA (*la Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* [American Popular Revolutionary Alliance], now a social-democratic

political party), food shortages of flour, rice, and meat, as well as a lack of freedom of the press, particularly "manipulated news" in Peru during the 1980s (PE5).

Many Peruvian Interviewees' (unprompted) main talking point was contemporary Peru being undemocratic and its facilitation of past and present corruption. Four Respondents (PE1, 6, 11, and 12) noted the amount of corruption in Peru. Another Interviewee (PE10) linked corruption in Peru as a major contributor to her low trust of the electoral process in the Peruvian Consulate in Ecuador. Other evidence of prior nondemocratic practices brought up during interviews included the prevalence of Fujimorismo as a political ideology, the abundance of narcos and guerrillas, and Fujimori's dissolution of Congress. Some Interviewees conceded that traces of democracy always existed in Peru—even under the regimes of Toledo, García, and Fujimori—but it is "all the same, at the end, they all ended up disappointing us" (PE13). Such views have carried over until today, evaluating contemporary Peru: PE12 says that Peru is a façade of a democracy and that the last two governments were dictatorships, despite their democratic appearance, because they failed to have separate branches of government or civil servants. Thus, contrary to the classification in Table 3.4, some Interviewees would not agree that Peru is a democracy, as they understand it.

In contrast, coming from a country with deep-rooted violence, corruption, and narco-politics, Colombians moving to Ecuador have generally seen an improvement in democracy. Responses from interviewed Colombians displayed an enduring mark from violence, corruption, kidnappings, issues around peace pacts, and restricted freedom. They intertwined these experiences with perceptions related to the link between narco-traffickers and politics, stemming mostly from events in the 1980s and 1990s. One Interviewee recalled how Pablo Escobar "bought the people in the towns; he gave them money, he gave them housing, he gave them things and they hid them, he gave them jobs" (CO3) and recounted that it was an extremely violent time in Colombia. During the same period, another Interviewee expressed feeling disconnected with politics because, "[Luis Carlos] Galán was the only, only, only presidential candidate that, in my whole life, we knew that he would change the country, but Pablo Escobar got him killed because the political group he was managing, and that he was funding, had to win. That's how things are done, and that's why I prefer not to talk politics" (CO16).

Even decades later, a liberal democracy in Colombia seemed far off to the Respondents. In the early 2000s, "Álvaro Uribe got all that: there were the guerillas, there was the FARC, there was the ELN, which were supposedly political organizations, but they're narco-political, rather during that time, we hadn't even wrapped our minds around what narco-politics was, and the M-19 was also right

behind" (CO3).[68] These events have had a significant impact on Colombian Interviewees' views about democracy; for one Interviewee, even though there are "ups and downs" in politics, "democracy in Colombia has been unstable, really subjective, very cold, and very calculated. That's the 'democracy' in Colombia" (CO7). Other Respondents agreed and saw no real change in democracy in Colombia because it is "similar to how it's always been: the same parties asking for the same thing" (CO18). Certain Colombian Respondents professed having no trust in candidates running: "the majority of Colombians in my generation, and I think the younger ones [too], don't really trust politicians anymore" (CO15). One Respondent opposed the current political situation in Colombia because "we're in the hands of many guerillas," who she stands strongly against because,

> … they kidnapped some relatives of mine… they even paid extortion [money], that was something very sad, really ugly there, it was a monthly [payment] that you had to pay there so that they wouldn't get you, so that they wouldn't kidnap you. So no, honestly, I don't agree with what our past president did… the peace with guerillas. No, because in Colombia there's no peace, right now there's no peace… no, it didn't work, it honestly didn't work. (CO9)[69]

Nonetheless, experiences with violence, corruption, and narco-politics do not by default deter migrant voting. The previously quoted Interviewee (CO9) is a dual transnational voter and conveyed that she really loves Ecuador, where she has made a home and family. Other Interviewees were similarly undeterred from voting by prior experiences with corruption: "I thought I could change the world… it's difficult, it's difficult while so much corruption exists. It's not only Ecuador, but it's Colombia, it's Brazil, it's Argentina, it's Chile, it's the US, it's Russia. It's the whole world. We live in a very corrupt world" (CO3). Although this Interviewee's comments have a pessimistic ring to it, they reflect a critical eye and realistic views of someone who actively follows politics in both countries and is a dual transnational voter.

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[68] The FARC (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*) is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the most well-known guerilla movement in Colombia; the ELN (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*) is the National Liberation Army, an armed leftwing group; and the M-19 (*Movimiento 19 de abril*) is the 19th of April Movement, a previous guerilla organization, turned political party (see, e.g., Benítez 2006).

[69] The Interviewee was referring to 2016 when President Juan Manuel Santos came to an agreement with the FARC for a ceasefire.

3.4.3 Voting 'here' in democracy and 'there' in nondemocratic elections

Venezuelan Interviewees repeatedly drew a definitive line between Venezuela pre- and post-Chávez. Pre-Chávez Venezuela had an open, free, flourishing society with great salaries and jobs, and high immigration—these were times in which "we were happy, and we didn't even know it" (VE3, VE6). Post-Chávez Venezuela was referred to as a nondemocracy, dictatorship, and a constitutionally disguised dictatorship. "We all thought that when Chávez died, everything would end" (VE12) one Respondent recalled, but knew that the country "was no longer democracy, but a dictatorship" once he saw the electoral body's trucks burning, destroying the ballots in the process. At that time, he decided to emigrate since "you already knew what was coming, a total dictatorship." In the Interviewees' own words, the post-Chávez world has been a closed, corrupted, manipulated, heartbreaking place to live, dominated with fear, deprivation, lines for basic food and supplies—a nation deprived of colors, laughter, and life:

> Our Caracas doesn't exist anymore, it doesn't exist. It's done for. And it's a shame, because young people today can't even imagine how beautiful it was; they can't imagine the Venezuelan colors. Today Venezuela is grey, it's ocher. Before Venezuela was joyful, it was a yellow, blue, and red that shined along the highways, everywhere that you would go, but now that doesn't exist anymore… Before it was optimistic, it smiled at you. Now it cries, now it mourns, now it suffers. (VE7)

The starkest takeaway is that Respondents who had negative experiences during political socialization developed unique and insightful perspectives toward democracy, which fostered electoral participation. Of the 14 Venezuelan Interviewees, eight have already participated in dual transnational voting, two in immigrant voting (only in Ecuador), two in emigrant voting (casting a ballot from Ecuador for Venezuelan elections), and two have not participated in migrant voting. More than the other Interviewees, the Venezuelans interviewed most often agreed with the statement "democracy is the best type of government." The difference in responses may suggest that experiences with recent or current authoritarian regimes cause migrants to feel more strongly about staying politically informed, opposing corruption, and contributing to positive change, which I interpret to mean expansion of democracy and individual freedoms.

Comparing Interviewees who emigrated from an earlier, democratic Venezuela to those emigrating from a later, nondemocratic 'post-Chávez' Venezuela (in Table 3.4) reveal various

connections between politics and the economy. Those who left a prosperous democratic country decades ago came to what they derided as a dilapidated and underdeveloped country. One Respondent recalled, "Ecuador wasn't democracy; it was a dictatorship… and Guayaquil was a disaster… there were mountains of trash all over the city, it reeked, Guayaquil was disgusting" (VE7). These early arrivals marveled at the progress the city has made since.

In contrast, newer Venezuelan emigrants who moved from a failed democratic state in ruins consider Ecuador's political processes, especially its voting procedures, to be more organized. Venezuelan Respondents described prior voting in Venezuela as extremely time-consuming, caused by waiting in lines up to 12 or 14 hours, machines breaking down, or power outages (relevant since voting is electronic). Most Respondents interpreted these issues as government tactics to discourage people from voting. Most Peruvian Interviewees also describe Ecuadorian elections and the voting process as being "really organized… there weren't that many people either" (PE2), as compared to Peru. These responses are additional examples of how a negative authoritarian mark can positively affect views and electoral participation in the country of residence.

Although the recent Venezuelan cohort was marked by nondemocracy, they adapted to Ecuador and the mark left by their experience with authoritarianism dissipated quickly (also see Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2020). Unsurprisingly, all Venezuelan Interviewees report overwhelmingly negative perceptions of the origin country due to a low quality of life, fraudulent elections, political corruption, and lack of personal security as well as personal and civic freedoms. Of the 14 Venezuelan Interviewees, 13 reported highly distrusting the president, the Armed Forces, the Judiciary branch, and the electoral body in Venezuela.

Some Venezuelan Respondents yearned to participate as an emigrant voter, if and when Venezuela holds free and fair elections: "I would be willing to participate in the next Venezuelan elections, always and [only] when we have another electoral body, because obviously when you have a biased referee for an electoral body, you can't trust it" (VE3). Despite the negative mark—from a regime still in power—this Respondent nonetheless remains open to political participation and trusts other governments. Case in point, 5 of the 14 Venezuelan Interviewees reported trusting Ecuador's office of president, 6 the electoral body, 9 the immigration department, and 12 the Armed Forces in Ecuador. Venezuelan Respondents vote in two countries for different reasons: in Venezuela, "voting can be an act of rebellion. In Ecuador, it's a sign of trust" (VE1). As a sign of "rebellion," migrant voters cast ballots since it is the only remaining option to express formal demands to a state, even to a state that will not listen. Others refuse to vote until elections are free and fair in which all can

participate: "There's no democracy in Venezuela. Contributing a vote, going to vote, is like giving a regime more room to put up its smokescreen of democracy—and I'm not willing to do that, it's as simple as that" (VE7).

Incredulously, most Venezuelan Respondents remain optimistic about the political situation in their origin country. They clamor for change and are motivated to engage in politics in the residence country—specifically to avoid repeating recent negative experiences with living in Venezuela in Ecuador. One Respondent exercised his right to vote since he considered it "the only weapon we have," despite believing that a democratic end to the current regime was next to impossible: "I've definitely never seen any dictatorship in any country the in world that ended through democratic means. Unfortunately, that's how it is… dictators always end through other means" (VE11).

One may argue that it is possible for Venezuelan migrants to stay positive since, not that long ago, Venezuela was a thriving democracy, so they can easily recall the benefits and economic prosperity. Some Respondents view the current political regime as a break rather than the end of the country's democracy. This begs the question: is it possible for other migrants to be as involved and pro-democracy without ever having experienced it first-hand? Enter Cuba.

3.4.4 From no voting to democratic voting

While Cuban Respondents cannot be emigrant voters (for Cuba)—and thus cannot fit into the four types of migrant voting—they are immigrant voters in Ecuador who have unique migrant voter trajectories. Given the revolutionary process that began in 1959, coupled with regimes led by Fidel then Raúl Castro, the resulting consequences were a focus on political and economic order, including withholding the right to choose one's own job or progress in it, and high religious intolerance (see, e.g., Aja Díaz *et al.* 2017).

Cuba's volatile political situation and conflict since 1959 has led to forced emigration of individuals and families (see, e.g., Rubio 2016). Varieties of Democracy ranks democracy and in 2019, Cuba placed a pithy 163 of 179 countries (Coppedge *et al.* 2019). Given the origin country's history, many were unwilling to engage in a survey and interview about politics and voting. After reading the Informed Consent Information, more than half of the Cubans who initially agreed to meet chose not to participate in the interview, despite anonymity and being used for academic ends.

Despite their authoritarian imprint, several Cuban Interviewees identified as migrant voters. While Cubans cannot participate in emigrant voting by law, Cuban Respondents nonetheless answered all electoral participation questions and discussed their future intention to vote. Of the 9 Cuban

Respondents, 5 had voted at least once in Ecuador as a foreign resident, 4 intended on voting as immigrants (in Ecuador) in the future and 2 expressed interest in becoming dual transnational voters, hinging on the hope that Cuba will hold democratic elections within their lifetimes.

Many Cuban Interviewees commented extensively about the communist doctrine that was embedded throughout the socialization process—first in the school system and then over their working life. After emigrating they recognized that, although imperfect, democracy allows freedoms that they had never known were possible,

> The Ecuadorian has grown up in freedom—with limits, restrictions, some weaker parts—but [nonetheless] in a free city and *he knows that everything is possible*; and he himself says what he wants to achieve and what he doesn't want, and he sets his [own] goals. There *in Cuba we didn't even know that something else existed*. We thought that the world was we had on the island, and nothing more. (CU2, emphasis added)

For this Respondent, the quality-of-life difference between origin and residence countries was obvious and it did not take long or much effort to politically resocialize and appreciate the benefits of democracy—even if she had never experienced it prior to emigrating to Ecuador. Of the 9 Cuban Interviewees, 6 agreed with the statement, "Democracy is the best type of government," whereas 1 preferred not to answer and 2 neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. Compared to the other Interviewees of other nationalities, 49 of 62 agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, suggesting they have enjoyed the benefits of democracy, especially participating in free and fair elections. As Bilodeau (2014, p. 361) finds, migrants from nondemocracy recognize that democratic states guarantee rights and freedoms, which comprise some of the "tangible benefits" of moving to a democracy. The tangible benefit of exercising suffrage rights makes it easier to politically participate in democracy.

Given the one-party elections in Cuba, there is no public debate or electoral options, which restrict any possibility of Dahl's (1971) other dimension of polyarchy: opposition. Despite not having emigrant voting rights, the Cuban Interviewees commented on prior voting while they still lived in the origin country, describing it as a despised and manipulated process: "in Cuba, first off, it's not my vote; it's obligatory. It's not spontaneous or voluntary… there *they don't let me form an opinion*, I have to choose what's specified, [it's] indirectly specified what you should pick" (CU2, emphasis added). The Respondent added, "it tenses me up and it traps me because *I'm not free to vote*, I'm not *choosing*; having the vote is a manifestation of a choice that you make, a choice you make voluntarily and consciously."

Voters' demands and preferences are not represented in authoritarian regimes, as Hartmann (2015) points out for Cameroon and Rwanda, as well as in other African countries without electoral registration lists even for resident nationals. Regardless, some Respondents still vote: "I'm motived to vote in Venezuela, in Ecuador, here and anywhere else, because it's the only way to give your opinion, to express yourself, and as such, you get the right to complain or the right to express your demands to the elected leader" (VE5). Of course, the difference between a democratic state and an authoritarian regime is that the regime can ignore complaints and claims. Authoritarian regimes do not reflect voters' preferences because *there are no choices* that represent real preferences or because, in the case of opposition, the incumbent government conducts fraudulent electoral procedures. Voting in undemocratic elections, however, is worth it for some Respondents because even in fixed elections, "at least the government knows that there are people against them" (VE1).

In sum, Chileans and Peruvian Interviewees from older emigrant waves to Ecuador, Venezuelans from the emergent wave, and Colombians and Cubans from both waves, emigrated from a less or nondemocratic country to a more democratic one (see Table 3.4). Using Bilodeau's term, their 'authoritarian imprints' are enduring but not determinative of migrant voter turnout. The responses show that having lived under heavy restrictions on personal liberties does not discourage migrant voting. Based on the Interviewees' responses, prior negative experiences with restricted rights cause migrants to value freedom and democracy. Migrants are then motivated to be active immigrant voters in the residence country and take steps to 'voluntarily and consciously' make a choice by researching candidates and getting informed before elections.

3.5 Conclusion

Certain factors—such as age, education, civic duty, residence, intention to stay, and mobilization efforts—increase or decrease the probability of migrant voting (see Introduction and Chapter 1). But it takes more than these to understand the phenomenon of migrant voting. When asked why they vote or abstain, migrants give *reasons* to explain their electoral behavior. I claim that while resources and ties create a necessary condition for voting (see Figure 1.2), resources and a motive establish a sufficient condition for migrant voting. To find migrant voters for interviews, I looked to Ecuador since the country enshrined voting rights for foreign residents in 2008, then regulated and applied them in 2009. Given most of these immigrants also hold emigrant voting rights, it is possible to find people who can vote in national-level elections in two countries. Adding their reasons to the

established factors better specifies the initial theoretical argument to state that migrants with resources plus a *motive* will vote.

Based on an analysis of 71 Interviewees, most migrants say they vote at the national level because of family ties, territorial ties, and because they are invested in contributing to a flourishing future. The reasons hold true for emigrants voting in origin-country elections as well as for immigrants in residence-country elections. For emigrants, ties to a territory relate to civic duty, practicing citizenship as nationality, and a sense of belonging despite the physical distance to the origin country (e.g., "I'm Venezuelan," "it's still my country"). For immigrants, territorial ties relate more to current residence, belonging as a foreign resident, and trust in the destination country's voting process (e.g., "I live and work here," "my life is here," "casting a ballot is fast and efficient"). While the ties are geographically bound to a country, the same broad variables affect the chances of being a dual transnational voter. Combining ties in the two countries—having multiterritorial ties—translates to dual transnational voting, as I will further explore in Chapter 4.

It is qualitatively difficult to untangle the relation between belonging and ties. I categorized belonging into territorial ties as a reason for migrant voting; however, some migrants report belonging but abstain. As McIlwaine and Bermudez (2015) find, some Colombians abroad report identity or belonging with a place or community, but it does not translate into emigrant voting. One explanation is migrants' understandings of citizenship. As Pedroza and Palop-García (2017b) and Pedroza (2019) outline, citizenship no longer refers to only nationality, but also includes membership and identity. Different understandings of citizenship, as an idea and in practice, can shape identities (Pedroza 2019, p. 6). While 'feeling Colombian' creates an identity and a tie to the territory through nationality, the same person may separate her belonging from external voting and decide to abstain in Colombian elections. These Interviewees lead me to an informed inclination that territorial ties based on belonging may increase voting ("I vote because it's still my country"), while belonging based on ties (e.g., being or feeling a certain nationality translates to an identity) does not necessarily result in migrant voting in the country.

Ties and notions of citizenship (as nationality) become more complex under political regimes that shift between democracy and nondemocracy. Despite civic duty or attachment to a country, an autocratic regime can squash individuals' willingness to vote. Most of the 71 Interviewees moved from a less to more democratic country. Moving to democracy brings *tangible* benefits, as Bilodeau (2014, p. 361) outlines, such as guaranteeing rights and freedoms, as well as *symbolic* ones like "the hope for a better life." My analysis of the interviews strongly supports and expands Bilodeau's findings. Migrants

appreciate the freedom to participate in free and fair elections, to voluntarily participate and to be able to choose who they consider the best candidate. They maintain connections and duty to the origin country, and many vote from abroad, even in electoral autocracies. The symbolic benefits of a better life in the residence country stretch beyond initial emigration, given migrants' commitment to a flourishing future (a stronger democracy and economy) solidifies into a main reason for migrant voting.

In closing, considering the 71 Interviewees, political learning motivates these migrant voters to participate in elections to improve democratic quality and transparency moving forward, in both the origin and residence countries. A general knowledge of democracy, as well as sharing the same language, facilitate political participation. Migrants who have lived under tyrannical or violent nondemocracy showed that they quickly learned about the residence country's political system and value democracy, but are hesitant to trust politicians, political parties, and the electoral system. In Orwell's *1984*, Winston lived the dangers of doublethink and learned firsthand what really happens in the Ministry of Love; similarly, migrants who have lived in nondemocracy have experienced the worst of it decide to vote to avoid anyone else having to live through such political mayhem.

Chapter 4

Migrant (Non-)Voting, Resocialization, and the Roots Routes

In the previous two empirical chapters, I explained the enfranchisement process in two countries and used the migrant voting typology to categorize migrants who vote and abstain, and where. I also detailed the reasons migrants give to explain their turnout decisions in national-level elections, in either or both the origin and residence countries. Now I will explore answers as to why migrants vote, or do not vote, in two countries.

To cast a ballot, voters need suffrage rights, to be registered (i.e., enroll or be automatically enrolled), and be able to reach a polling station—but migrant voters face additional procedures and required documents. Even after enfranchisement, migrant-state relations comprise more layers compared to national citizen-state relations. Immigrant voters must be 'documented' by having established a formal migrant status, whereas emigrant voters must get informed about where and how to register, then cast their ballots from abroad. Maintaining a legal status and registering as a migrant voter requires extra documents—meaning more time and know-how. Falling short can result in non-voting. I discuss which opportunities and barriers to participate make migrants political insiders and outsiders. Moving beyond the boundaries of the demos and crossing international borders, I analyze how migration steps can foster or deter migrants' turnout in two countries.

The typology's four migrant voting categories have transformed the research question from why migrants vote to: why do some migrants vote only in the origin or destination country? Why do other migrant voters participate in both countries, or in neither? There remains a longing for explanation of migrant voting—one that I have hinted at throughout this dissertation. The aim of this Chapter is to use existent studies and the present empirical work to take a step toward theory building to form answers to why migrants vote and change voting behavior. Conceptualizing four types of voting, especially dual transnational voters and their multiterritorial ties, comprise the most novel part of this framework. But where do multiterritorial ties come from? Some migrants keep ties forever, others cut them off. Some migrants can easily form new ones and many migrants maintain ties in two places at once. Digging into how such roots form and change sheds light on why migrants not only vote or abstain but also why they change voting behavior over time.

I argue that international migration causes an individual-level shock that ends migrants' initial political socialization and starts their political resocialization process, which continues throughout their voting lives. As I will expand upon in this Chapter, both are cognitive learning processes that

involve interacting with other people and institutions. Such experiences shape how individuals interpret the political world and their role within it. In turn, the processes affect behavioral outcomes. Whereas political socialization affects individuals' electoral decisions in only one country, migrants' resocialization can remarkably affect electoral decisions in *two* countries: in the origin country as an emigrant and in the residence country as an immigrant. While, again, the present analysis is a step toward theory building, the resocialization process is not the *only* explanation of why migrants vote. Nonetheless, the socialization and resocialization processes leading up to migrant (non)voting—which form and sustain migrant-state relations at the core of claims-making and exercising formal voice in democracies—represent critical pieces in answering why migrants vote.

Since political learning during (re)socialization affects voting behavior, unpacking individuals' personalized trajectories reveals insights into migrant voting. 'Trajectory' in this case refers to an individual's electoral path over time, observed by following their movement among the migrant voting typology's four quadrants: immigrant voting, emigrant voting, dual transnational voting, and abstention. The typology's first use is for distinguishing between these types, which reveals where a given migrant votes; the second use is for tracking a migrant voter's movement to see how behavior changes. Finding changes requires measuring at least two points in time, for which I use prior voting and intention to vote. While intention to vote is a future projection and may entail some misreporting (see Section 2.3.2), since it is hypothetical, it allows for all migrants to express their intention to vote, not just those who currently hold suffrage rights in two countries. I draw on the non-representative group from Chapter 3 of interviews with 71 migrants in Ecuador in 2019. I find that migrants change ties over time, adjusting political attitudes and values to adapt to the current context in each country.

I suggest that multiterritorial ties between emigrants and their origin countries and between immigrants and residence countries can grow, stagnate, or weaken. All possible combinations of adjusting ties form nine paths, what I label the *Roots Routes*, that emerge and change throughout the ongoing resocialization process; changing routes affects migrant voting behavior. As a final contribution of this dissertation, migrant resocialization and the Roots Routes can be used as a framework to analyze migrant participation at local or national levels over time in other contexts.

The following Section 1 covers migrants' political (re)socialization processes; I describe socialization as growing roots and resocialization as growing new roots. I then position individual-state relations as the core component of how to analyze political resocialization as related to migrant voting. In Section 2, I introduce the nine possible paths of Roots Routes that emerge during political resocialization and explain why these paths are more useful and efficient than existent resocialization

theories. Changing routes changes electoral behavior, seen as movement among the four migrant voting types. Then in Section 3, I differentiate between migrants as political insiders or outsiders, an influence gained not only via voting rights. I address assumptions about voting and focus on how opportunities to vote affect the notion of citizenship as nationality. I also present barriers immigrants face that are set by states and reinforced by broader structures. Finally, I explain non-voting, both abstention and prevention, in Section 4. Throughout the Chapter, I draw on qualitative data obtained from interviews conducted in Ecuador from which a surprising convergence toward dual transnational voting appears, suggesting that some migrants can form and maintain multiple country-specific political identities.

4.1 (Re)Socialization Processes and Multiterritorial Ties

To argue that the post-migration political resocialization process shapes migrants' attitudes, values, and behavior, I have examined migrants' ties—i.e., their connections or attachment—to a country or to the people who live there (see Section 1.2.1). But where do multiterritorial ties come from? Enter the political learning process. An individual's socialization is "his learning of social patterns corresponding to his societal positions as mediated through various agencies of society" (Hyman 1959, p. 25). The most relevant takeaway is that socialization is a type of learning. Individuals learn and internalize social and civic rules, norms, values, behavioral patterns, and habits from people—such as family, friends, neighbors, and acquaintances—around them in sociopolitical contexts (see e.g., Berger and Luckmann 1966, Putnam 1993, Morawska 2013, Paul 2013, Rolfe and Chan 2017, Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017). Unlike other voters, international migration causes an individual-level shock that ends migrants' political socialization and starts their political resocialization process, which continues throughout life. Whereas political socialization affects individuals' electoral decisions only in the origin country, resocialization has the potential to affect electoral decisions in both the origin country as an emigrant and in the residence country as an immigrant. Continued learning comes from interacting with individual and institutional agents during the political (re)socialization process.

4.1.1 Political socialization: Growing roots

Everyone interacts with politics and undergoes socialization: "there is no exit from the political world, no possibility of disengagement; human, political decisions permeate human life" (Eliasoph 1998, p.

6).[70] Involvement starts in childhood, as Hyman's (1959) seminal contribution on political socialization positions family, particularly parents, as influential actors who affect a child's political orientation in terms of attitude and behavior, party affiliation, and political participation. In the early years, the family's authority structure plays a major role in the individual's future political behavior and represents a "projective view" of the political system (Bender 1967: 403). People internalize aspects from those around them that become their own (e.g., attitudes, beliefs, cognitions, and values), further embedding these characteristics and roles in society (Berger and Luckmann 1966).[71] By early adolescence, individuals establish their compliance to social rules and authority, understanding of democracy's rules of the game, and "fundamental loyalties to nation" (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, p. 4).[72]

While children's early comprehension and political learning shape adult political orientations, it does not determine fixed views and political behavior. Early political socialization scholars had wrongly assumed two things: a) that what was learned in pre-adulthood would remain unchanged throughout life (the primary principle, or the persistence perspective); and b) early knowledge would have a *significant* influence on behavior later in life (Niemi and Hepburn 1995). The primary principle lost footing in academic studies (see e.g., Searing *et al.* 1976, Niemi and Sobieszek 1977, Sears 1983, Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017); it was replaced by the lifelong openness perspective, which explains that individuals can continue political learning over time and have new experiences with different agents (see Sigel 1989, Sears and Funk 1999, Sears and Brown 2013, Wasburn and Adkins

[70] Extensive literature outlines electoral participation and turnout, both individual and aggregate, that is unnecessary to include here; for a review, see Rolfe (2012). Instead, I use earlier works, especially from Political Sociology, and those focused on migrants to outline how migrants undergo political socialization like others but have unique resocialization experiences, differentiating them as voters in two countries.

[71] To define each term, I use the Oxford Online Dictionary: an *attitude* is a way of thinking or feeling about something; a *belief* is something one accepts as true; a firmly held opinion; *cognition* is the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses; and *values* are principles or standards of behavior.

[72] While authority and loyalty relate to moral values (Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009), other social values such as achievement, conformity, power, and tradition (see Schwartz 1994) correlate with political attitudes (Feldman 2013). Some individual characteristics persist over one's voting life, as political interest stays highly stable (Prior 2010). People tend to only have a small handful of values that are relatively stable but can still change over time. Leading scholars on values, such as Schwartz (1992), position beliefs as part of values; values can affect policy preferences and underpin attitudes toward social groups, politicians, and parties (Feldman 2013, pp. 602–604).

Covert 2017). The new consensus positioned political learning as "visible over almost the whole course of adult participation in the electorate" (Converse 1969, p. 142), although Hyman (1959) highlighted much earlier that while pre-adult political experiences matter, experiences later in life also matter.

Such early processes occur also for migrants, but who will later have additional interactions with agents in another political system and can gain simultaneous voting rights in two countries. Examining migrants, Paul (2013, p. 190) outlines that, "socialising experiences from different contexts can interact with one another to create new meanings as learning is synthesised across time and space." This suggests that electoral behavior organically emerges from the processes of fusing early and later learning in at least two places. Comparing Bolivian emigrants to their peers in the origin country (with the same characteristics and home region), Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez (2015, pp. 14, 21) suggest that their similar voting behavior is due to their similar early political socialization experiences.[73]

For adult migrants, an international move represents a discontinuity in their surroundings, requiring them to assume a new role that changes sociopolitical attitudes and behaviors (Sigel 1989). Migrants' life changes build what Paul (2013, p. 195) calls "layered learning experiences." Layered experiences in turn affect behavior, including the electoral decision to vote or abstain. I am interested in how political learning in a new political system, and its specific context, affect migrants' political behavior not only in one, but two, countries.

I exclude migrants who are children or young adolescents from my analysis because dependent minors who move with their family differ from independent migrants who move as adults; in turn, their migrant voting behavior will differ. The younger cohort, or the 1.5 generation (Rumbaut and Rumbaut 1976), is called so because they are in between the first generation of immigrants who are the voluntary adult movers and the second generation who are children born and raised in (their parents' destination) country, which is the children's native country. While we can expect first-generation immigrants to maintain more ties in, and perhaps characteristics of, the origin country, the second-generation will be comparatively more similar to their peers born and raised in the country of residence and less so than children in their parents' origin country, yet the 1.5 generation could be anywhere in between (see, e.g., Zhou 1997, 2004). The adult emigrant politically socialized in the origin country and the second generation in the destination country, who amongst themselves greatly differ

[73] The scholars highlight, however, that indigenous movements had influenced Bolivian voters' early political socialization, perhaps irrelevant in other settings.

in transnational practices and how they exercise citizenship (Luthra *et al.* 2018). In between lies the 1.5 generation, who could fluctuate between the two poles depending on their age, language skills, parents' characteristics, and political learning before and after migration. The peculiarities of the group merit a unique, separate analysis, so I focus solely on adult migrants.

Analyzing migrants' political (re)socialization processes comprise the four aspects present in lifetime learning studies: time span, agencies, change, and process (originally noted in Bender 1967). The time span for migrants' political learning continues into post-migration resocialization, relating to the lifetime openness perspective. Migrants are influenced by at least two sets of agencies, one in the origin country and one in the residence country. Regarding change for migrants, systemic political change occurs during their post-migration interactions with two states, rather than one, whereas intra-systemic change occurs when migrant-state roles evolve when immigrants modify their participation in the residence country, and when emigrants change their participation in the origin country from abroad over time.[74] Finally, unintentional latent political socialization naturally occurs through those around migrants; and manifest political socialization happens through intentional attempts to convey political attitudes, beliefs, and values, for example by state- or party-led mobilization or engagement efforts (see e.g., Bloemraad 2006, Burgess 2018, Burgess and Tyburski 2020, Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020). Unique to migrants also entails having lived in at least two political systems in two different countries. International migration marks a new event in life and living in another country changes one's connections to more than one country, making ties multiterritorial. Leaving the origin country marks the end of political socialization (Paul 2013) and the start of the political resocialization process, which continues throughout migrants' lives.

4.1.2 Political resocialization: Growing new roots

Moving from political socialization to post-migration resocialization is an integral piece of migrant voting: during this process, migrants grow new roots—both as an immigrant in the residence country and also as an emigrant for the origin country—which affect their electoral decisions to vote or abstain in two countries. As I have defined in other works, "political resocialization is a cognitive learning process during which individuals maintain or adjust political attitudes, values, and behavior based on

[74] Systemic political change occurs when there is a change in the distribution and exercise of authority; non- or intra-systemic change occurs when there are fluctuations in, for example, political participation patterns or party affiliation within an existent political system.

individual and institutional agents within a new context" (Finn 2020a, p. 733).[75] The definition builds on previous works on socialization, starting with early contributions breaking down the learning process throughout life (Hyman 1959, Almond 1960, Froman 1961, Bender 1967, Niemi 1973), later research on the learning process, membership, and agents (Rolfe and Chan 2017, Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, García-Castañon 2018), and analyses on resocialization stages specific to international migrants (White *et al.* 2008, Paul 2013). Ongoing political resocialization processes make migrants distinct as voters, which I further unpacked through targeted questions on early learning versus post-migration experiences in the interviews in Ecuador (see Chapter 3). I draw on migrants' responses during these interviews to form a systematic way to analyze how ties to a country, and the people within it, influence migrant voting outcomes.

As political socialization is a learning process that forms political attitudes, values, and behavior, so is resocialization, which can *change* political attitudes, values, and behavior. Paul (2013, pp. 188, 189) captures the change by suggesting that individuals "unlearn" attitudes and behaviors they had learned in socialization and then partially replacing them through post-migration interactions with new agents. The process goes: learn, unlearn, then learn in a new context. I suggest that migrants do not, however, "unlearn" post-migration, which stirs thoughts of 'forgive and forget'—instead, they change. Past experiences (e.g., from authoritarian or hybrid regimes, or in dysfunctional democracies) leave an "authoritarian imprint" that eventually wears off (Bilodeau 2014). Individuals still remember but move on from previous experiences: the context changes and people change.

At the time of migration, nationals become emigrants and carry previous learning, partisanship, and political practices with them across borders—again, which will influence their electoral turnout. The more similar the two political systems, the easier for migrants to transfer previous experiences and adapt political behavior (Black 1987, Bilodeau 2004, Bilodeau, McAllister, *et al.* 2010). A low learning curve allows for the individual to grow roots more quickly as an immigrant in the residence

[75] Three comments on the definition: first, I reposition 'cognitive' to include it as part of the social process rather the political outcome. People learn from those around them, so learning is more about acquiring knowledge through experiences than a result of the process. Second, political attitudes (a way of thinking or feeling about something) reflect how individuals understand the political world and their role within it—the way one thinks about political regimes, democracy, institutions, and how decision-making occurs, in addition to people's perceived roles in politics. Third, values are more general than attitudes and people tend to order values by relative importance (Schwartz 1992, Feldman 2013, p. 603). Values (principles or standards of behavior) influence voting behavior and vote choice: an individual chooses to vote for a candidate who aligns with their own priorities and outlook.

country. If the transferability theory is applied here, it would suggest that migrant voters who participated in the past will continue to vote in the origin country from abroad in the future and—after gaining suffrage rights and having enough resources (see Figure 1.2)—are more likely to vote in the residence country.

Three existent political resocialization theories—resistance, transferability, and exposure—from White and colleagues (2008) fall short in explaining migrants' political behavior. The resistance theory proposes that some impressions formed from the initial political socialization process endure, meaning impressions formed as per the primacy or persistence principle will affect future behavior (Searing *et al.* 1973, White *et al.* 2008, Sears and Brown 2013, Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017). The transferability theory posits that immigrants can draw on past experiences and transfer lessons learned from their old environment in the origin country and apply them in the new environment in the residence country. Finally, according to the exposure theory, the longer immigrants are exposed to the residence country's political system, the more they adapt to it. Yet, scholars have long realized that early political learning during socialization sets persistent predispositions (Sears and Valentino 1997, Sears and Funk 1999) but does not totally determine future behavior (Niemi and Hepburn 1995)—largely debunking the resistance theory. I argue that prior origin-country political learning influences, but does not determine, future political behavior in either the origin or residence country.

The transferability theory fails to consider residence country influences, making it seem as if the migrant indefinitely draws on knowledge formed through the national citizen-state relation from political socialization. In t_1 of Figure 4.1 the migrant has two sets of roots, one as an emigrant with the origin country and one as an immigrant with the residence country. Transferability can explain why individuals who are already interested in politics are more likely to become interested in politics in the residence country. It could also help explain why prior voting in the origin country increases the probability of emigrant voting from abroad, or prior abstention lowering the probability of emigrant voting. Yet it does not say much about immigrant or dual transnational voting. In contrast, White and colleagues' (2008) exposure theory incorporates destination country effects, explaining that migrants acclimate to the newness of surroundings and develop "attitudinal and behavioural adaptation mechanisms" (Paul 2013, p. 183). However, while it correctly indicates the possibility of changing political beliefs, values, and practices over time, it does not say much about emigrant or dual transnational voting.

The three theories overlap, so must be used together, and they require nuancing to relate to migrant's future political behavior. The theories fail to recognize that learning occurs in contexts

beyond two countries and that, through time, individuals wear three 'hats' in their state relations: the national citizen-state, the emigrant-origin state, and the immigrant-residence state. Each relation creates a set of ties to a country and the people within it. Political attitudes and values from each period are finite, contrary to the indefiniteness posed by the resistance theory. Post-migration learning draws on lessons learned pre-migration in the national citizen-state relation, as the transferability theory explains, but it is not the only source of learning. Exposure to the residence country foresees immigrants adapting to its setting and in the future vote similar to natives (Bilodeau 2014) yet has nothing to say about exposure's influence on emigrant engagement in origin-country elections. Migrants can transfer attitudes but also adapt to the new context through exposure (Blomkvist 2020), meaning the two theories must be used together.[76] Just as before, the same problem Chaudhary (2018) tried to solve emerges: will emigrants' engagement increase or decrease over time? The answer remains 'it depends.' It depends on past experiences, on learning in more than one place and space, on distance between countries, and on the ease of registration and voting. To make sense of a migrant's multiterritorial electoral decisions over time, I instead offer the Roots Routes.

4.2 The Roots Routes: Nine Paths to Explain Migrant Voting

I suggest a three-fold role of individual-state relations (national citizen-state, emigrant-origin country, and immigrant-residence country) and define four categories of migrant voting. The three distinct relations each play a role in understanding how migrants establish and then change political attitudes and values over time during political socialization and resocialization. Post-migration, national citizen-state relations convert to emigrant-origin country relations and individuals also gain a new immigrant-residence country relation. Each relation has its own set of roots, or connections, as depicted in Figure 4.1. Emigrants can deepen ties with the origin country, keep the ties they already have there, or lose ties with the origin country and the people there. Simultaneously, immigrants can create new ties with and in the residence country, keep the ties they have at the time of arrival, or cut ties with the residence country or the people there. The specific combinations affect migrant voting, encouraging migrants to land in one quadrant, rather than another, of the migrant voting typology.

[76] While Blomkvist's (2020) research is within a Bachelor thesis, it uses evidence from interviews that Tomas Hammar conducted in Sweden in 1975–1976 with 664 immigrants from former Yugoslavia, comparing their political attitudes, knowledge, and behavior with 558 Swedes.

Figure 4.1 The Roots Routes: Nine Paths of Migrant Political (Re)Socialization

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">Political socialization</th><th>Growing roots</th></tr>
<tr><td>t_0
pre-migration</td><td>Establishing political attitudes, values, and behavior, occurring:
✓ for all individuals
✓ with one country</td><td>National citizen-state roots</td></tr>
</table>

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2" rowspan="2">Migrant political resocialization</th><th colspan="2">Either set of new roots can grow (1), stagnate (2), or shrink (3)</th></tr>
<tr></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">t_1
post-migration</td><td rowspan="2">Maintaining or adjusting political attitudes, values, and behavior, occurring:
✓ for migrants
✓ with two countries</td><td>Emigrant-origin country roots
③
②
①</td><td>Immigrant-residence country roots
③
②
①</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Three possibilities for two sets of roots ($3^2 = 9$) make nine distinct Roots Routes</td></tr>
</table>

Three options (grow, stagnate, shrink) for each of the two sets starting at t_1 mean each set can increase, maintain, or reduce, creating nine distinct Roots Routes ($3^2=9$). The aim of the routes is to conceptualize migrants' political trajectories over time, which came about based on existent studies and migrant responses while analyzing in-depth interviews. Here political resocialization occurs for *adult* international migrants, excluding children and the so-called 1.5 generation. At migration, the national citizen-state relation converts to a new emigrant-origin state relation.

Table 4.1 Summary of the Nine Possible Roots Routes

1	grow E-O, grow I-R	4	maintain E-O, grow I-R	7	reduce E-O, grow I-R
2	grow E-O, maintain I-R	5	maintain E-O, maintain I-R	8	reduce E-O, maintain I-R
3	grow E-O, reduce I-R	6	maintain E-O, reduce I-R	9	reduce E-O, reduce I-R

Note: E-O reflects roots stemming from the emigrant-origin country relation whereas I-R abbreviates the immigrant-residence country roots.

With the shorthand terms E-O referring to emigrant-origin country roots and I-R to immigrant-residence country roots, Table 4.1 summarizes the nine possibilities. Migrants can change Root Routes over time, various times. Each route encourages migrants to land in one of the four quadrants in the migrant voting behavior. Changing routes can affect voting behavior, relocating the migrant into another quadrant. Growing roots encourages voting, maintaining roots parallels maintaining the status quo (i.e., a migrant keeps the same voting behavior), and shrinking roots discourages voter turnout. When emigrant-origin country roots deepen, emigrant voting rises, and by default, also dual transnational voting; similarly, when immigrant-residence country roots deepen, immigrant voting increases, and by default, dual transnational voting. The opposite holds true: weakening roots in a country, or with the people living there, decreases migrant voting in that country.

New ties (growing roots) are one of the possibilities of post-migration roots: they symbolize connections or attachments formed through new interactions. In the residence country, people become involved in their new communities by building a family, meeting neighbors, and working with new colleagues. Similar to how everyone experiences political socialization, Waldinger (2008, p. 24) recognizes that "roots get established in the country of arrival, whether wanted or not," meaning new immigrants in a destination country inevitably form at least some ties. Immigrants take interest in salient issues affecting the community and the country's future. Gaining voting rights after a residence period—for example after five years in both Chile and Ecuador—provides a formal channel to exercise political voice on issues that shape the country's future. Similarly, after migrating, emigrants interact with the origin country in new ways. They may join associations or networks in their new residence country that relate to the origin country (e.g., diaspora communities, sport teams, cultural clubs, food festivals). As citizens abroad, they face different rules and procedures for registration and voting. Suffrage rights connect emigrants to their origin countries; for example, many Chileans abroad

reconnected with Chile when they exercised the external vote for the first time in 2017 in a national election. Connections nurture migrants' post-migration roots with either or both the origin and residence countries.

Cut ties (shrinking roots) is the opposite of attachment and can be either abrupt or drawn out. The first type of detachment conveys the idea of emigrants 'cutting ties,' 'moving on,' and migration as a step of 'leaving it all behind.' The reason for emigration may relate to cutting ties, for example when individuals leave after a regime collapse, during or after an economic crisis, or to move away from a malfunctioning democracy. Cutting ties may mean the emigrant had to renounce citizenship: losing both residence and citizenship may be enough to cut ties and involvement with the origin country. For immigrants, cutting ties with the residence country may involve international relocation elsewhere. The second type envisions migrants reducing ties slowly: for emigrants, they may slowly lose touch with friends, family, and news in a country in which they no longer live or are unable to travel there. Waldinger (2008, p. 25) refers to this as a "gradual withering away of home country ties"; Waldinger and Soehl (2013, p. 1268) recognize that emigrants may continue social and familial ties but nonetheless become, "detached from the polity they left behind." For immigrants, they may be overwhelmed and excited in the destination country immediately after arrival but once the "honeymoon" period ends, they better evaluate political institutions' performance, even in highly democratic countries (Bilodeau and Nevitte 2003).

Whereas the transferability and exposure theories can explain growing ties (in the residence country), they fall short explaining the contrary situation of reducing ties in either or both countries. Therefore, I suggest *detachment theory* which proposes that some individuals decrease or sever ties to the origin or residence country, or both, during resocialization. Based on my fieldwork (see Chapter 2 and 3), some migrants indeed become detached, which can occur purposefully or unintentionally. McCann, Escobar, and Arana acknowledge, "It is entirely possible that expatriates grow *detached* from public affairs after settling abroad" (2019, p. 18, emphasis added); however, they relate detachment to assimilation theories of a zero-sum game of replacing political attitudes, beliefs, or values with new ones. This tit-for-tat replacement of political attitudes and values does not fit the social world because migrants do not scrap their knowledge, attitudes, and views—they adjust them over time.

Instead of replacing or "unlearning," detachment takes two forms: a) cutting ties, like renouncing nationality and b) reducing connections, or simply 'losing touch.' Detachment from a country lowers political engagement over time, including voting, in that country. For emigrants, detachment may involve negative reasons for leaving the origin country or an uninterest or loss of interest in politics

there, just as other voters become uninterested, avoid politics, or develop apathy toward political engagement (Eliasoph 1998). Emigrants can disconnect from social networks, 'leave it all behind', or relocate with the entire family unit (i.e., there are no left-behind family members in the origin country). Detachment from the origin country while abroad lowers the probability of emigrant voting, whereas detachment from the residence country lowers the probability of immigrant voting. By default, detachment from both countries would decrease the probability of dual transnational voting and increase the probability of abstention.

Keep ties (maintaining roots) means individuals maintain established connections or attachments. Despite living abroad, emigrants continue ties with the origin country, including a sense of duty or loyalty with civic or patriotic motives. These ties were evident in the survey data from Chile and in the interview data from Ecuador. The deeper the initial socialization roots had grown in terms of political identity and belonging, the longer I expect someone to consider the origin, rather than the destination, country as 'their' country. Another way emigrants keep ties with the origin country is through maintaining communication and connections with people there, such as family, friends, colleagues, and schoolmates with whom they used to interact with regularly. Having these conversations, which often include following the news, politics, and events happening in the community, suggest the migrant is still interested in and informed about current events. Maintaining close connections with the origin country make it more likely for emigrants to be politically active, even while abroad. Besides ties to the territory and people there, many emigrants also have financial connections that encourage them to maintain ties with the origin country such as owning goods or property. Interest in their assets would increase a migrants' probability to vote in national-level elections that would affect taxes. At first glance, maintaining ties may appear to reflect resistance theory. While some political orientations (e.g., being more left or rightwing) may endure—'resisting' the test of time—they are still flexible (see Chapter 3) thus differ from resistance theory.

Even at the time of migration, immigrants have at least superficial roots in the residence country due to previous interactions between the individual and state. For example, potential immigrants submit pre-migration bureaucratic documents when applying for a visa such as medical, financial standing, and proof of nationality records (Finn 2019). Thus, even when resocialization first begins, individuals already have some roots as an immigrant in the residence country (the far-right side of t_1 in Figure 4.1). Within the initial post-migration period, immigrants may maintain superficial roots; for example, a migrant who plans to live in the residence country only temporarily for work may not wish to strengthen other social or political ties—as Waldinger (2008, p. 5) puts it, "some are simply

sojourners, for whom the displacement is experienced as temporary and hence never put down roots," whereas others intend to settle. Having superficial roots affects the future propensity to vote, not because migrants necessarily feel 'attached' to the country but because they have verified an ability to gather bureaucratic information, interact with the government, and understand how laws and structural procedures function in the residence country (while also demonstrating skills in the country's language). Interacting with institutional actors builds skills facilitating posterior interactions with state procedures. Initial superficial roots do not determine migrants' political engagement per se but establishing roots create useable skills for future migrant voting.

Just as White et al.'s (2008) other theories, resistance theory fails to recognize that post-migration (t_1), there are two new sets of roots. The theory overly concerns itself with pre-migration learning, ignoring migrants' diverse roles over the migrant trajectory. At migration, the national citizen-state relation ends, and the emigrant-origin country relation begins, alongside the new immigrant-residence country relation. Previous learning affects both new sets. The two-dimensional resistance theory lacks complexity and does not consider that learning is multidimensional in its temporal and spatial aspects. To better incorporate this complexity, I sketch three sets of roots from pre- and post-migration to match the three unique individual-state roles. Previous learning does not evaporate; rather, individuals change political attitudes and values, depending on interactions with agents in and between the two countries, which can change political behavior in the origin and residence countries.

Similar to how Chaudhary (2018) finds evidence for both an increase and decrease in emigrant voting over time abroad, White et al. (2008, pp. 275–277) find evidence that validates both the transferability and exposure theories, but for different political outcomes: migrants transfer interest in politics between countries and exposure impacts (only) immigrant voter turnout.[77] As I highlighted before, the two theories are not mutually exclusive and are also difficult to combine to understand the outcome of migrant political participation. Chaudhary (2018, p. 20) concludes by stating that "pre-migration political socialization, coupled with a political resocialization in the receiving country, may generate a degree of complementarity in the political engagement of immigrants who have both the

[77] White et al. (2008, p. 276) position an interest in politics as the least demanding form of political engagement (since the only requirement is following politics in the media) so such an interest would be easier to transfer from one context to another. They find exposure has a "substantial impact on *immigrant* voter turnout" regardless of origin country and exposure to the destination country's politics seems to be a prerequisite for immigrant voting (White *et al.* 2008, pp. 275, 277, emphasis added); since earlier learning in a different context does not necessarily deter voter turnout, their findings contrast the resistance theory premise.

resources and motivations to vote 'here' and 'there'." While he was referring to certain post-colonial immigrants, he mentions that "a simultaneous political socialization in which their positions in multiple political fields expose them to different ideas about governance, citizenship, rights and responsibilities" (Chaudhary 2018, p. 20).

After analyzing two non-representative groups of potential migrant voters, through a survey and interviews, I find three major parallels with Chaudhary's (2018) important contribution to the study of migrant voting. First, migrants (not only those from post-colonial settings) are positioned in multiple political fields, which allow them to establish multiple political identities. Second, resources and motivation combined indeed make a sufficient condition for migrant voting (see Figure 1.2 and Section 3.3). Third, resocialization itself is not what generates complementarity between migrant voting in two countries, but rather the result of the resocialization process, during which migrants continually make, maintain, or weaken ties in both countries. Although political resocialization occurs while the migrant is physically in the residence country, the process unfolds in two places since the migrant has a simultaneous immigrant-residence country relation as well as an emigrant-origin country relation.

The findings address Hypothesis 5 from the dissertation's Introduction that potential migrant voters with greater connections with a country are more likely to vote in that country. While experiences during political resocialization in the residence country have the possibility to affect both emigrant and immigrant roots, based on the interviews, the direction of change seems primarily unilateral. Experiences in the residence country tend to change the migrant-origin country roots (except for civic duty) whereas emigrant roots cause little change in residence-country ties. Such distinctions convey that the Roots Routes overcome the issues that I identified with the political resocialization theories of resistance, transferability, and exposure from White et al. (2008). The nine Roots Routes have added a manageable amount of complexity to the process, are mutually exclusive paths (i.e., a migrant can only be on one at a time), and they help predict migrant voting patterns, as I discussed in this section. The routes capture the various individual-state relations necessary to understand how migrants grow, maintain, or reduce ties related to two countries. They offer terminology and a framework to use in future empirical analyses on how political resocialization can affect migrant political participation. Specific to migrant voting, scholars can couple the routes with the migrant voting typology, as I do in the following subsection.

4.2.1 Dual transnational voters: Trajectories through the migrant voting typology

As the phenomenon of voting in national-level elections in two countries has rarely been studied, I focus on dual transnational voters using empirical data reported by migrants in Ecuador. The first use of the migrant voting typology is to analyze the differences between migrant voters, separated into the four types in any given moment. The second use is to make the static typology become dynamic by following individual movements among the four quadrants. One way to visualize such movements is comparing two moments in time; to achieve this, I asked migrants about their past voting behavior and future intention to vote. I explain migrants changing ties with people and places over time is reflected in their movement between quadrants.

While exposure to various political systems pre- and post-migration affects migrants' electoral turnout outcomes, how the exposure affects electoral decisions depends on political learning. Migrant voters' movements among the quadrants parallel their experiences throughout their voting life, meaning it is possible to track their movements by following their political resocialization processes. Condensing the possibilities, three principal movements exist: (1) migrants abstain then vote (in one country to both), (2) they vote (in one country to both) then abstain, or (3) they move among the three active types of migrant voting: emigrant, immigrant, and dual transnational.

Based on the Interviewees who have migrant voting rights in two countries, Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of their electoral behavior in 2019, whereas Figure 4.3 captures the group of migrants' future intention to vote. Comparing the two figures shows (intended) movement, revealing a tendency of moving away from abstention and toward dual transnational voting. Given the three basic movements among migrant voting types, the Interviewees moved especially toward dual transnational voting and away from abstention. The classification again shows that the typology is exhaustive in its four categories and that tracking movement shows transitions as changes in migrant voting over time in both the origin and residence countries.

To explain such movement over time, I suggest migrants change relations with people and places and evaluate current affairs in both countries, which sets them on one of the nine Roots Routes. Migrant voters distinguish between country contexts (see Section 1.3; Figure 1.3) and relevant issues. In the interviews, Chileans commented, "You have to check out the context of what's happening in Chile and what's happening here" (CL10);[78] "you've got to study each case, each candidate, each

[78] As in Chapter 3, I reference the interviews using the ISO Alpha-2 country codes and number each interview (i.e., CL1 is Chilean Interviewee 1, CO for Colombia, CU Cuba, PE Peru, and VE Venezuela).

[political] regime… So, *one vote doesn't influence the other one*" (CL11, emphasis added). When asked directly if voting in Ecuador would affect future voting in Peru, an Interviewee replied, "I believe that it doesn't affect [it] because politics are really different here in Ecuador and in Peru" (PE11).

Figure 4.2 Prior Migrant Voting: 58 Interviewees in Ecuador[79]

		Votes in Origin Country: Yes	Votes in Origin Country: No
Votes in Residence Country	Yes	Dual transnational voting 26 Respondents	Immigrant voting 16 Respondents
	No	Emigrant voting 10 Respondents	Abstention 6 Respondents

Source: Application of Finn's (2020a) typology.

Figure 4.3 Intention for Future Migrant Voting: 56 Interviewees in Ecuador[80]

		Votes in Origin Country: Yes	Votes in Origin Country: No
Votes in Residence Country	Yes	Dual transnational voting 41 Respondents	Immigrant voting 10 Respondents
	No	Emigrant voting 5 Respondents	Abstention 0 Respondents

Source: Application of Finn's (2020a) typology.

[79] From the 71 Interviewees, I exclude those who unable to enter all four quadrants: 4 Venezuelans (who did not yet hold immigrant suffrage rights in Ecuador) and 9 Cubans (who did not have external voting rights).

[80] Of 71 interviews, 15 people preferred not to answer this question, leaving a sample of 56. The intention to vote is a hypothetical future scenario that shows interest in participating in elections, thus I include all Respondents, not only those who already had voting rights in both countries.

While migrant voting in one country may, or may not, affect voting in the other country, migrant voters seem to evaluate a given country's particular political arena, making electoral decisions geographically bounded and independent. No one responded, directly or indirectly, that voting in the residence country was because of a habit or previous voting in the origin country; vice versa, no one reported voting in the origin country simply because they vote in the residence country. This suggests that migrant electoral turnout depends on context-specific socialization and resocialization, which aligns with existent findings (e.g., Bilodeau, White, *et al.* 2010, Paul 2013, Bilodeau 2014, Escobar *et al.* 2014, Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015, McCann *et al.* 2019, Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2020).

4.2.2 Multiple political identities based on country-specific contexts

Part of what makes political resocialization unique for international migrants is that they can develop multiple identities that connect to each place, despite inherent characteristics and previous identity linked to the origin country. Such multiple political identities can be country-specific, which was common among Interviewees. Some had enduring left or rightwing political orientations, but others were somewhat flexible. Although this group is non-representative of a larger population—and further samples should be tested in other contexts—on the surface, it suggests that migrants can change political attitudes throughout the political resocialization process.

While psychological factors influence ideology and environmental and elite factors affect political attitudes and beliefs, "political ideology can change significantly in response to the broader political and social environment" (Feldman 2013, p. 602). As such, individual and institutional agents within a given context shape people's political attitudes and beliefs—an important part of socialization. Based on the interviews, the multiterritorial aspect of migrants' lives can result in adapting ideology in response to two simultaneous environments. In-depth, open-ended responses on ideology showed very few migrant voters always identify as right, left, or center. Many highlighted that they gauge the current environment and candidates, then adjust electoral decisions accordingly. The dual response to two political environments is what I refer to as developing more than one political identity, since forming and adjusting political identities to an environment affects migrant voting.

The finding suggests that political identity may be fluid, not fixed, across borders. Some migrants report evaluating candidates rather than parties or ideology, whereas others will support only candidates or parties from the right or left. Following Feldman (2013, p. 591), I understand ideology as "used to describe the ways in which people organize their political attitudes and beliefs." Some migrant voters identity with the right, center, left, or a spot in between in both countries, while others

separate their identity—for example, outright distinguishing between the two political communities by voting for the right in the destination country and in the center for the origin country (PE4). Throughout the survey and interview data, I find fluidity and changes in political identity or partisanship, even among older individuals.

About half of the Interviewees reported choosing the 'candidate' or 'person' rather than a political party, adjusting their political position in the process. While other voters may also do this, migrant voters differ in the sense that they follow and evaluate politics and candidates in two countries; this means their positions in one country may "follow" them abroad affecting immigrant voting or their new adaptations could affect future emigrant voting. As a Chilean said, "I relate to people, not to political parties" (CL11), and a Colombian reported, "I believe, independent of left or right, [I vote] for what they're offering" (CO2). "There are rightwing people who are really bad and there are leftwing people who are really bad," so this Interviewee identifies with the center and votes for "the best person at the present moment" (VE4). "The topic of ideology doesn't really weigh in when going to vote. People follow people: they vote for the person" (CL5). Five Peruvian Interviewees (1, 8, 11, 13, 14) also report such flexibility since their vote choice depends on the candidate, the proposals, and the country. "I don't have a political party, I'm not a party supporter, I try to vote for who more or less has the tools [to get the job done] and I don't vote by party; I try to vote with my head, not with my heart" (VE5). Given these four origin countries differ in their political systems and party structures, these interviews show initial evidence that migrants do not necessarily use shortcuts such as past partisanship when it comes to migrant voting.

While the final decision involves vote choice, migrants spend more time, compared to other voters, getting informed (e.g., following issues, considering candidates' campaigns, etc.) in two countries before deciding to vote or abstain in an election. "I try to choose someone who, based on my own criteria, is good… I think that, independently from political affiliation, it depends a lot on who they are as a human being, because they are the ones who are going to apply [the policies]" (CU2). Such choices are more complex for migrants since they evaluate candidates in two countries, in two systems, and rank issues differently in the two environments. Other migrant voters may identify with right or left based on experience but would nonetheless consider a candidate from the other side; while other voters may do this, they change their vote choice *over time* whereas migrants can vote for, e.g., center-left in one country while at the *same time* vote for center-right in the other country.

Auto-identifying as rightwing, a migrant voter said, "in all seriousness, when someone tells me he's a Socialist or [in] a Socialist party, I keep him at an arm's distance" (VE10); he nonetheless has

voted for left-leaning parties in Venezuela who are part of the opposition and, depending on the candidates, would be open to *either side* in Ecuador as an immigrant voter. Another Interviewee similarly remarked,

> In Colombia, I've always gone for the right because the left has done many things to them [the people]… if I first see a candidate who's doing well and I see that this person is honest and can do something—take the reins of the country or a certain place—and if he's from the right, I support him, and if he's from the left, I would think about it. (CO12)

Ideological fluidity has limits: Interviewees more commonly fluctuate between the left and left-center, or the right and right-center whereas very few reported being open to voting for the right and the left in the *same* country; however, whether this holds *between* countries is an avenue for future research. Based on the interviews, some migrants commented that they are not completely convinced by either side, so vote for the lesser evil. "We had to pick him because the other ones were worse" (CO16). The lesser evil can result in a fixed ideological position,

> [T]he leftwing candidates have shown us that they just talk and talk and talk, right? They talk in a different way, but they go and do the same [thing] that the right does, and worse. We've already lived through that in Venezuela, in Colombia, in Ecuador, everywhere where the left has governed, yea, so *I don't want to say that the right is doing it well, but the left is doing it worse*…. Now with the new generation… they've forgotten what the left has done to us in Colombia, that *they've murdered, robbed, violated all human rights*… these young people think that those of us who vote for the right are stupid… but we know that they're murderers. (CO4, emphasis added)

Just as for other voters, ideology can be fixed also for migrant voters who already established their values and reported that they will not evolve anymore, as one Interviewee commented, "if you have an ideological, political, solid standpoint, wherever it is that you are, *it'll be the same forever*" (CL4, emphasis added). Even being just 30 years old, "At this later stage I already have, really have, my viewpoints, my ideologies, already have [certain] criteria" (CO6); she was convinced that her criteria will not change again, nor her voting habits. "I lean more toward the right than toward the left; clearly I'm never going to vote for somebody from the left" (VE1). Such a fixed position based on previous political learning underlines prior trauma, as a Venezuelan commented, "when you learn and…

understand what happened in Venezuela, you're never ever going to want to support a socialist or communist [electoral] platform" (VE2). Peruvians had similar reactions when discussing Fujimori, whose nickname "Chinochet" was based on his similarities to Pinochet's rule (Meléndez 2018). One Interviewee reported that "he, yes, is [from] a leftwing party; in his government's time there were also quite a few disappearances of people, massive killings in neighborhoods" (PE1). Other fellow Peruvian Interviewees who reported living through times of corruption, narcotrafficking, disappearances, and curfews under leftwing governments said they will remain rightwing.

While each country context clearly shapes the details of the Respondents' standpoints, similar responses came from all five origin countries. This underlines two important differences between migrants and other voters: a) migrants may, or may not, take such political learning with them across borders and apply them in the residence country (e.g., they vote rightwing in the origin, so also vote right in the residence country); and b) migrants may display fixed or fluid viewpoints over time. A fixed position may remain only for the origin country, while they adopt a new one for the residence country; they could transfer the prior fixed position to both countries, or adapt stances towards both countries over time. Highlighting again the inherent duality in migration that make migrants different from other voters, separating their positions towards two countries indicates that international migrants can develop multiple political identities.

On fixed positions, the bluntest findings from the 71 interviews corresponded to rightwing ideology from the early wave of Chilean migrants. A 49-year-old man who moved to Ecuador in the early 2000s said, "Pinochet and the right brought order to the country, and he made it possible for working people *to be able to have a normal life*; they could save up for their family, and work, and everything" (CL12, emphasis added). The "order" came after economic and social collapse that had occurred before the coup under Allende and the left. This Interviewee grew up during the Pinochet era, so these understandings of the times had been interpreted through childhood and adolescence. He remembered himself and his family working hard during Allende times yet, "I couldn't get food, I couldn't get a lot of things, because you had to be with the leftwing party to be able to get them." He added, "I don't deny that there were human rights violations" under Pinochet, but in 2019, he conveyed that "there's a lot of really poor information around what happened during Pinochet's government; there's a lot of bad information and a lot of victimization from leftwing people" since he believed that those who disappeared during the regime were guilty. For him, the negative authoritarian mark proves worse, because he still recalled scarcity under a leftwing government, contrasted by

prosperity and a "normal life" during a military dictatorship, which solidified into a fixed ideological position.

Regarding fluid positions, a common reason for moving along the right-left ideological line for each election was a real or hypothetical situation in which the migrant voter felt that the country needs a "big change," captured in the motive of being invested in a flourishing future (see Section 3.3.2). Such migrants reported evaluating the country's current situation and candidates' proposals as more important than ideology, so reported being willing to vote for the other ideological pole. Instead of indecisiveness, such fluctuation reveals savvy political actors who gauge the current political, social, and economic environment to consider which candidate or party promises could be attainable and would improve the country, origin or residence. Rather than exaggerating the idea of migrants having multiple political identities, my aim is to highlight that while some migrant voters take fixed ideology across borders and apply it in elections, it is an oversimplified notion since other migrant voters show more fluidity in their positions over time towards both countries' politics.

Getting and staying informed about politics in two places also brought obstacles. Some Interviewees complained about a lack of information about candidates and parties, even when they searched for it. Others noted an unnecessary use of formal "elegant" language on ballots, instead of simple accessible phrasing (PE1). Other migrant voters showed interest in politics, attempted to follow and learn about candidates, but despite such efforts, they reported still feeling uninformed when going to vote. Getting and staying informed about country-specific politics is time-consuming and difficult when access to unbiased media may be restricted. The distance and time away that lowered the emigrant's ties to the country can also result in resorting to a single stream of political information, such as strictly from family members, rather than a variety of sources across the country to paint the larger political scene.

4.3 Migrant Political Insiders and Outsiders: Rights and (Non-)National Citizens

Considering such obstacles, not all migrants are able to get or stay involved in politics, even if they have voting rights in a country. Contrarily, many migrants never gain voting rights but are still able to participate in politics in other ways. Political participation is thus not bound by migrant status or voting rights. Given the important effects of shaping the political arena, in this subsection I discuss migrants as both political insiders and outsiders and how this affects the notion of citizenship. A political insider is an actor with the power to influence decisions within the political arena, whereas an outsider lacks such influence.

The porousness of borders (evidenced by clandestine migration) and the demos (evidenced by its morphing and re-morphing) highlight that neither international borders nor the boundary of the demos adequately indicates which migrants are political insiders or outsiders. Migrants who have voting rights may seem like political insiders, but if they feel like outsiders, they disengage and abstain in elections. Rolfe and Chan (2017, p. 372) posit "it may be that individuals who don't 'fit' with others within their immediate social context are less likely to engage in prosocial activities such as political participation." Moreover, migrant non-voters may be insiders or outsiders, migrant voting represents only one way of becoming a political insider.[81]

Nationality still plays a principal role in establishing voting requirements, varying between regions and countries (e.g., Groenendijk 2008, Arrighi and Bauböck 2017). Decades ago, Carens (1989) offered the parsimonious dimensions of birthplace and residence to determine who has which political rights. Paraphrasing Carens' argument, Beckman (2006, p. 157) states, "At the end of the day, the extent to which people have social ties or are affected by the social context is consequently less important for the extent of their political rights. All that matters is whether they are born in the country and, if not, for how long they have been living there." Sidestepping the importance of social ties and context for granting rights makes sense from the viewpoint of state-led decision-making over the boundaries of the demos. Yet, moving to post-enfranchisement, social ties and context are critical pieces in understanding why migrants participate (Ryan 2018). As I have reiterated, it is not enough to understand why states grant voting rights but also to know when, where, and why migrants exercise suffrage rights.

For migrant voting, neither nationality nor naturalization comprises the whole story of gaining or exercising voting rights. As Luthra, Waldinger, and Soehl (2018, p. 177) point out, "while the electorate is clearly bounded, the boundary between society and the polity is fuzzier, with many aspects of political life accessible to all." Some people without voting rights, such as undocumented immigrants, may seem like political outsiders on the surface, yet in the US they participate in the political realm and in certain cities have gained voting rights (Hayduk and Coll 2018, Besserer 2021). Using a

[81] My definition refers to both emigrants' and immigrants' political influence, gained through nationality or suffrage rights. Some countries, such as Mexico, restrict even naturalized individuals' political activity (Fitzgerald and Cook-Martín 2014). Other states reduce emigrants' direct influence by withholding suffrage rights when residing abroad. Regarding foreign residents, Kukathas (2021) positions all immigrants and potential immigrants as outsiders, whereas I consider that different people and groups at different times can be political outsiders or insiders.

representative sample of both documented (including naturalized) and undocumented Latino immigrants across the US, McCann and Jones-Correa (2020) measure individuals' fear in two ways: deportation and finances. The findings show that fear of the risk to the personal safety of loved ones motivates immigrants to increase their civic engagement. This underlines my finding in Chapter 3 that familial ties can be a main factor motivating migrant voting (see Table 3.2).

Participation in various aspects of society parallels sociological discussions involving acculturation, integration, and segmented assimilation for both the first and second generation of migrants (Portes and Zhou 1993, Portes 1995, e.g., Berry 1997, Zhou 1997, Waters *et al.* 2010, Hainmueller *et al.* 2017). Those who legally cross an international border, maintain their documents and legal status, speak the language (Chiswick and Miller 1996), and have formal job contracts seem more likely to 'integrate' and politically participate. Naturally, this means anyone who has left one or more of these pre- or post-migration steps incomplete faces lower chances to fully participate in a society (Finn 2019; see Figure 4.4). As Brettell (2015: 174) states, "the interaction between structure and agency accepts the fact that migrants shape and are shaped by the context (political, economic, social, and cultural) within which they operate, whether in the sending or in the receiving country".

Figure 4.4 Temporal Nonlinear Hurdles to Immigrants' Access to Formal Rights

Note: The terms pre- and post-migration bureaucracy come from Finn (2019).

In this sense, *agency* is a necessary component of being a political insider—and migrant voters must overcome more barriers than other voters to be able to participate. Such barriers mostly comprise non-organic steps, as depicted in Figure 4.4, which occur over time but are not necessarily linear, as migrants can skip steps and regress in, or lose, legal status various times along the way. Each column reflects a reduced potential immigrant population. Those with 'capabilities' and 'aspirations' will move but each step is embedded within human and economic development in both countries and relates to broader social and structural changes within the globalized world (Carling 2002, de Haas 2014, 2021), as are state decisions over migrant membership (Smith 2003), including voting rights.

Figure 4.4 captures wider influences as multilevel contextual factors surrounding (potential) immigrant populations' decision-making steps, what de Haas (2021) calls "sets of perceived geographical opportunity structures." The figure highlights that only a small elite population become eligible to gain additional rights as documented foreign residents (also see Spiro 2008). At the organizational level, a migration regime has spread, affecting migration governance at the global, regional, and national scales (Betts 2010, Geddes *et al.* 2019), including in South America (Domenech 2013, Acosta and Freier 2015, 2018, Finn and Doña-Reveco 2021). Migration governance has become more restrictive in South America (Brumat *et al.* 2018, Finn *et al.* 2019), including in Chile (Acosta *et al.* 2018, Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero 2020, Vásquez *et al.* 2021). Domenech (2018) reviews how the regime has emerged through forums and agreements, for instance, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and through international organizations' power and influence over creating 'best practices' for 'good governance' and 'migration management'. Such management can largely be grouped into national, international, and transnational modes of governing migration (Gamlen and Marsh 2011). These larger processes affect decision-making for states and migrants as active agents, in this case, voters. I am thus suggesting that all levels are relevant pieces in understanding who gains voting rights and which migrants vote. Migrants who *gain* certain legal statuses before or at the border crossing and those who *maintain* a legal status via ongoing post-migration bureaucracy, will be closer to gaining formal rights (Finn 2019), such as participating in migrant voting.

First come rights, then voting. Possessing political rights was traditionally the key defining factor of full citizenship (Marshall 1964) (see Section 1.1.2). GLOBALCIT (2020, p. 8) defines citizenship as "a legal status and relation between an individual and a state or other territorial polity that entails specific legal rights and duties," using it as a synonym for nationality (i.e., 'citizenship as nationality'). People face an uneven playing field for accessing such rights as well as to nationality in the first place,

for example, due to investor programs benefitting the wealthier (see Džankić 2019) and selection mechanisms targeting the 'highly skilled', a definition that varies across time and countries (see, e.g., Shachar and Hirschl 2014). Given my focus on national-level voting rights, citizenship indicates a person's bundle of rights defined through the individual-state relation. In most contemporary democracies, being an adult national citizen is usually sufficient to gain voting rights (Caramani and Grotz 2015), but citizenship as nationality does not define membership in the demos (Beckman 2006) since citizens include both nationals (those with a certain nationality, evidenced for example by holding a passport) as well as non-nationals in local, regional, and national elections (Pedroza 2013, 2019, Arrighi and Bauböck 2017, Piccoli 2021).

Citizenship practices can be multilevel (Maas 2013) and are located within transnational constellations of citizenship regimes (Bauböck 2010, Vink 2017). As Arrighi and Bauböck (2017, p. 16) conclude, "standard assumptions in theories and comparative studies of democratic citizenship need to be revised by paying symmetrical attention to emigration and immigration contexts and differentiating between national and local levels of citizenship." When states extend migrant voting rights (see Appendix 1.1), they eliminate the inequality of considering some individuals' preferences over others based on nationality or residence. Migrant voting disrupts prior nationality and residence links—at the local or national level, or both—since denizen and diaspora voters are also members whose preferences, as expressed through voting, have equal weight.

Sometimes states withhold emigrant suffrage rights (even though they are nationals), creating a kind of membership 'penalty' for those living abroad, compared to resident nationals. Granting external voting rights eliminates the penalty. Furthermore, while emigrant voting requires nationality, denizen voting often does not. Many countries allow foreign residents to vote in local elections without naturalizing (e.g., EU nationals residing in another EU country) and even in national elections (e.g., in Chile and Ecuador; see Chapter 2 and 3; Appendix 1.1). Immigrant voters indicate the discrepancy between full political rights is eliminated and an equal opportunity of political participation for all those living in the territory and who meet voting requirements is opened.

Since casting a vote from abroad and active denizen voting are other ways to be members, migrant voting has changed the concept of citizenship as nationality, given its three dimensions defined by Bauböck (2006): legal status, rights, and political participation. When immigrants, emigrants, or both groups have political rights and participate, these two dimensions are no longer exclusively reserved for national citizens, weakening the concept of citizenship as nationality. This leaves legal status as the remaining dimension, defined as the legal relation between the individual and the state and is embodied

in the most basic sense, as holding a visa versus nationality (e.g., through *ius soli*, *ius sanguinis*, *ius domicile*, naturalization, etc.).[82] While holding one or the other largely differs in practice, it conceptually means that the legal status of citizenship is the only dimension differentiating (non)migrant groups. The measurement would be if an individual holds citizenship as nationality as a binary measure (yes or no), obtained either by birth or naturalization. A stand-alone dimension is fragile, diminishing its conceptualization.

Although individuals may feel a sense of citizenship as nationality through active participation, citizenship is no longer the foundational aspect of nationality. A "sense of citizenship based on active participation" is high-intensity citizenship, while low-intensity citizenship is "a minimum set of rights linked to membership, without necessarily requiring agency" (Fox 2005, p. 193). Here, membership is not nationality. The citizenship-nationality distinction underlies why many South American states could enfranchise immigrants in the early to mid-1900s "without having to address issues of national identity and solidarity or the value of citizenship, as has been the case, for example, in the United States" (Escobar 2015, p. 929). As Bauböck (2002, p. 4) outlines, citizenship broadly means a "status of full and equal membership in a self-governing political community" but "citizenship boils down to 'nationality', i.e., a formal affiliation of persons to states." Moreover, "how migration changes citizenship depends to a large extent on how states and their citizens *perceive* migrants and on how they *construct* the meaning of citizenship" (Bauböck 2002, p. 2, emphasis in original). However, although the 'citizens' Bauböck refers to are nationals and the meaning of 'citizenship' here refers to nationality at its core, ultimately states and people (socially and legally) determine who can gain membership to become a political insider.

Migrant voting changes citizenship as a concept, exemplifying "citizenship beyond nationality" (Pedroza 2019). The same holds for Faist's (2001, p. 8) discussion of the broad dimensions of citizenship as a) "legal status of equal individual liberty" and b) "some affinity to a political community". Compared to nationals, a denizen voter has equal political rights, and an active migrant voter can also demonstrate affinity to the same political community. Therefore, when discussing voting rights and electoral participation, the terms 'citizen' and 'noncitizen' (including 'nonresident citizen' and 'noncitizen resident') should be replaced with 'nationals' and 'non-nationals.' Tension

[82] A person's bundle of rights does not only depend on holding a visa versus nationality, as rights can vary even within these categories. For example, nationals who were born with the nationality can have more secure long-term rights, as compared to people who naturalized, when residing abroad (for Latin America, see Pedroza *et al.* 2016).

exists between nationals and non-nationals in a democracy. Democracies give equal weight to individuals' preferences (Dahl 1971)[83] and nationality allocates people to states, dividing nationals from foreigners (Brubaker 1992, Acosta 2018) and signaling that its members have equal rights. But for immigrants, such a delineation denotes that not all individuals in the territory are equally represented since the democratic state would prioritize national citizens' preferences over that of foreign residents. A similar situation occurs for emigrants; when states withhold voting rights from those residing abroad, not all nationals are equally represented in the democratic origin state.

4.4 Reasons for Migrant Non-Voting: Abstention versus Prevention

Migrants who successfully pass through the numerous stages (of Figure 4.4) and then gain voting rights may then participate in immigrant, emigrant, or dual transnational voting, or abstain. Beyond these four migrant voting categories, another group exists since there is a difference between non-voting by choice (i.e., abstention) and involuntary non-voting (prevention). Based on the exploratory non-representative set of 71 interviews conducted in Ecuador, in this section, I group the reasons for migrant non-voting, which complements the motives for migrant voting (as listed in Table 3.3).

At the time of interviews (between August and October 2019), the 71 migrants were foreign residents in Ecuador (for details on the Interviewees and questionnaire, see Chapter 3 and Appendix 3.4–3.6). Before moving to Ecuador, they were born and raised in five Latin American origin countries: Chile (14 Interviewees), Colombia (20), Cuba (9), Peru (14), and Venezuela (14). Overall, the group of 71 migrant Interviewees are highly educated (with 48 reporting having a university degree), range in age from 21 to 76 years old, 55 of them reported having stable employment, and one in every five reported that they or someone in their household had experienced some form of discrimination within the last year in Ecuador (for more descriptive characteristics, see Table 3.1).

Interviewees who reported that they had not voted or did not plan to vote were asked a follow-up question asking *why* they did not vote or did not plan to vote. On one hand, abstention among these Interviewees is mostly because of a lack of ties or a distrust in politics, politicians, or voting

[83] While Mill (2006 [1861]) argues that everyone, regardless of sex and race, ought to have a political voice, he also argues against everyone having an *equal* voice since he favors weighted voting. During his era, living in England, there were drastic gaps between what Mill refers to as illiterate 'manual laborers' and those working in skilled professions. Conversely, mainstream ideals of democracies consider all votes evenly (e.g., Dahl 1971), whereas some contemporary non-mainstream proposals (e.g., Brennan 2017) still advance Mill's weighted political voice in voting systems.

procedures. While trust was mentioned as a necessary condition to vote, those who abstain report distrust as a sufficient condition to not participate. On the other hand, some migrants cannot vote due to reported obstacles deterring or blocking them, either on paper or in practice (also see Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2020). I thus separate migrant non-voting into two categories, abstention versus prevention, as detailed in the next two subsections.

4.4.1 Abstention: Migrants who abstain can still be political insiders

Migrants who voluntarily choose to not vote fall into the abstention category of the migrant voting typology. Table 4.2 lists Interviewees' responses explaining why they preferred, or still prefer, to abstain. 'Main reasons' in the table are the motives Interviewees most cited as principal reasons for abstaining, whereas the 'secondary reason' was less commonly cited.

Table 4.2 Reasons for Migrant Abstention

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Main reasons</td><td>Lack of ties
Emigrants: non-residents, lack of belonging to the nation
Immigrants: non-nationals, lack of belonging to the nation, future plans to leave</td></tr>
<tr><td>Distrust
Emigrants: democratic voting process, transparency
Immigrants: voting process, transparency, politics, politicians</td></tr>
<tr><td>Secondary reason</td><td>Lack of interest</td></tr>
<tr><td>(Case-specific) bureaucratic reason</td><td>Compulsory voting, once registered (only emigrants)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Past reasons</td><td>Lack of information (only immigrants)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Presidential turnover (only immigrants)</td></tr>
</table>

Source: Based on interviews with migrants in Ecuador in 2019.

Lack of ties, specifically non-residency for emigrants, was a main factor for abstention: "I don't live there… it's that I'm not interested in what is happening, not even with my country" (PE6). Interestingly, the Respondent still referred to Peru as "my country" (showing territorial connections) yet wanted no part of it—thus, in practice, cut territorial ties. While growing roots and strengthening

ties with people and a place can increase turnout, lowering ties to the origin country or the people there has the opposite effect: it leads to a lack of ties, and a higher probability of abstention.

However, it was surprising to discover non-residency as a reason for abstention even when emigrants still had family in the origin country. Some gave straightforward answers as to why: "I don't live there, so it wouldn't affect me like it does for the people who live there… that's why I don't participate in elections there" (CO11). But for others, the answer was more complex: "it's my country, but there's a difference; since I'm not living in Peru, I don't exactly know what, [or] who, is better for Peru as [the elected] leader" (PE2). While this Respondent gave non-residence as a reason to abstain, he still had ties there ("my country") but felt disconnected from politics to a point that he believed he lacked substantial details of the political environment to make an informed choice. In these cases, personal feelings toward the origin country do not seem to affect turnout decisions in the country of residence.

In other cases, ties to the origin country may affect electoral behavior in both countries. Some emigrants who expressed belonging to the origin country did not necessarily convert, or translate, this to turnout in the origin country from abroad. When interviewing Colombians in London and Madrid, McIlwaine and Bermudez (2015, p. 398) describe emigrant voting as just one way of "expressing citizenship" since many emigrants define belonging through nationality ("feeling Colombian") but belonging does not go hand-in-hand with emigrant voting from abroad. Similarly, within the present group of Respondents, when territorial connections increase because of a (concrete or imagined) return to the origin country, it increases emigrant voting and abstention in the residence country.

Independent of ties to the origin country, immigrants do not necessarily or 'naturally' grow roots in their country of residence. Some may have strong ties in the destination country and suffrage rights as a foreign resident but continue to view national-level voting as a right traditionally reserved for nationals. One Respondent believed that "I'm not Ecuadorian. I reckon that since I'm not Ecuadorian, representatives should be elected by actual Ecuadorians… Ecuador for Ecuadorians" (CL1).

Another main factor for abstention among both emigrants and immigrants is distrust in politics, politicians, or voting procedures. Those interviewed by McIlwaine and Bermudez (2015, p. 397) cite distrust of the Colombian party system and politicians as a reason for abstention in origin-country elections. When emigrants distrust the democratic voting process and transparency, it may be because of an undemocratic political regime controlling the origin country. One Venezuelan Respondent detailed, "In Venezuela, there's no democracy, there's no way to vote… Venezuela no longer exists, Venezuelan politics don't exist" (VE7). Immigrants who distrust the residence country's democratic

institutions tend to be suspicious of the voting process and transparency in the residence country's system and of politicians and politics overall.

Distrust in Ecuador's voting process and transparency mostly came from immigrants who comparatively considered their origin-country's procedures as smoother or more transparent. For example, one Respondent unfavorably compared Ecuador's processes to contemporary Chile: "I've had the experience of being an electoral overseer [in Ecuador]. Unfortunately, elections—especially presidential elections, [but] also the local ones—there's this problem with transparency in counting the votes, and it's a recurring problem" (CL5).

Respondents also described distrust in more general terms, such as becoming disillusioned after years of empty political promises and especially after corruption and scandals. For one Respondent, "Peru already takes the cake on that one because not a single president up until now has come out clean" (PE5), referring to executive leaders failing to leave office without a scandal. Past studies have found that migrants in Eastern European countries were similarly disaffected, for example by corruption ruining trust in politics and institutions (Kostadinova 2003, Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020). Many Peruvian Interviewees reported viewing all politics and politicians as the same; they abstained when they felt their vote would not make a difference one way or another because it results in "the same economic situation, the same problems; with politicians it's always the same situation, day after day" (PE9). Despite feeling disillusioned, this Respondent was undocumented in Ecuador and travels back to Peru for every election to avoid the fine—but said he has always casted blank ballots. For others, overall disillusionment—"the truth is, politics are horrendous" (PE6)—can affect voting behavior in both the origin and residence countries.

A secondary factor for migrant abstention was a reported lack of interest. Various Colombians (CO5, 8, 15) explained that "it has never been my priority, not in my country, nor in another, to vote"; that "I don't really like politics, I'm a bit uninterested… I'm not really interested in seeing who's going to be my next president;" or "the truth is that I'm anti-political… I'm uninterested, so I don't worry about voting." Others were interested in electoral participation but reported a *momentary* disinterest because they found politicians and parties' offers unappealing. One Respondent preferred not to participate in immigrant voting, "because I'm not convinced by anybody [running]" (CL3); another admitted "the truth is that I don't identify with anyone [running]" (PE1). Similarly, many Cuban Interviewees emphasized that political parties in Ecuador have failed to propose an appealing political line or agenda, so individuals wanting to vote are left to choose the candidate who most closely—but yet, not quite—reflected their preferences. Even those who reported being uninterested or neutral

about politics were informed about current events, the economy, scandals, as well as past candidates' and current incumbents' names, political parties, and policies. Such extensive knowledge parallels McCann and colleagues' (2019) findings that Mexican and Colombian emigrants in the United States, even those who spent a long time living abroad, maintain similar political attentiveness as compared to those who never left the origin country.

One bureaucratic factor some Interviewees cited as a reason for abstention was avoiding certain types of compulsory voting. Some Respondents abstain because once they register as an emigrant voter, future voting is compulsory. These Respondents wanted to vote in some, but not all, origin-country elections—so in an all-or-nothing game, they chose abstention.

Lastly, a few Respondents mentioned past factors for abstention that have since become obsolete: lack of information and presidential turnover. Lack of information was mainly prevalent before widespread Internet access and migrants could not gain information on candidates and upcoming elections, even when they searched for it. Nonetheless, a couple Respondents still found it difficult to find specific or straightforward information regarding candidates in Ecuador. Presidential turnover was common in Ecuador over the decade between 1996 and 2006 during which the country had seven presidents (see Appendix 3.7). One Respondent recalled, "I heard a lot of news, and mostly around the topic of presidential instability because there were always a lot of them" (CO14). Many had little information about Ecuador's politics or daily life, but nonetheless emigrated then stayed. While presidential turnover represents a reason for abstention only in past decades, I include it because it shows migrants' ability to evaluate changing political environments.

4.4.2 Prevention: Rights on paper but not in practice

While the previous factors apply to migrants who chose to abstain, other migrants reported that their lack of participation was non-voluntary, blocked by legal or bureaucratic obstacles deterring them, what I refer to as 'prevention'. Despite enfranchisement and seemingly low legal barriers for registering and voting for most migrants interviewed, such obstacles remain for migrant voting. In short, some migrants with suffrage rights 'on paper' reported not fully having them in practice.

A widespread issue for many foreign residents across Ecuador, including some Interviewees, was that they believed they had been registered to vote in the 2019 multilevel elections in Ecuador but were not. They wanted and intended to vote but found their name missing on the electoral registry and thus could not cast a ballot. The National Electoral Council authorities argued that in prior elections, there had been an omission or misinterpretation of a clause in the Electoral Law (Código

de la Democracia [Code of Democracy] 2009), which requires foreign residents to enroll before each local, regional, and national election. The rationale behind this part of the legislation was that migrants were (believed to be) more likely change residences, as compared to other voters in Ecuador. Since many migrants had previously been able to vote by registering a new address (*cambio de domicilio*) with the National Electoral Council, the legal loop allowed them to continue voting up until the 2019 election, when the Council raised the issue. In other words, the step of voting registration had not been enforced since 2009 when denizens began voting in Ecuador (Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2020). Therefore, when the National Electoral Council eliminated the migrants' names to account for the legal discrepancy, they ended up preventing many foreign residents from voting in 2019.

Other Respondents lamented the distance between their homes and polling stations as a barrier to participation, although many nonetheless made the journey to vote. While distances generally increase when living outside urban areas, several Respondents reported lengthy travel because they had moved since the last election but failed to update their residential address. The extra task of changing their address prevented several Respondents from being able to vote at a nearby location. One emigrant Respondent thought that the very task of registering to vote was superfluous because "if somebody goes to the Embassy, they should already have at least a registry of people who have emigrated, and maybe we could even simply go [to the Embassy directly] to vote" (CO8).

Certain barriers to participation applied specifically to Venezuelan Interviewees. While many Respondents had originally emigrated for political reasons, the Venezuelan group differs because the political situation is contemporary and ongoing. Moreover, international accords recognizing refugee status are more prevalent and recognized in South American countries, as compared to prior migration waves. As Freier and Parent (2019) argue, using the definition of refugees in the Cartagena Declaration of 1984, the last wave of Venezuelan emigrants has faced generalized violence, immense violations of human rights, and other factors that have disturbed the public order, which are sufficient conditions to consider them refugees. Regardless, countries throughout the region have responded with a variety of policies and established visas for Venezuelan emigrants (Brumat 2021); the most inclusive policies in the region include Argentina and Uruguay's extension of the Mercosur Residence Agreement to Venezuelans and Brazil's implementation of a legal route in late 2019 for Venezuelans to claim refugee status (Acosta *et al.* 2019, Brumat 2019, Ramírez *et al.* 2019, Acosta and Madrid 2020). As of 2020, Nicolás Maduro still holds political power after his 'reelection' in 2018. Recent emigrants still have fresh ties to family and friends in Venezuela who continue living under Maduro's authoritarian regime, which resulted in very different open-ended responses from Venezuelan Respondents, as compared

to, for example, Chilean immigrants who lived under Allende's then Pinochet's regimes in the 1970s and 1980s. There were stark differences between Venezuelan migrants and migrants from other countries in their views of freedom and liberty in democracy and of using democratic voice as a tool to express opinions and instigate political change.

While Venezuelans abroad can vote in any Consulate, they continue to face two major problems. First is that Venezuelan law requires "legal residence" in the residence country to be able to register and vote at the Consulate. Many Venezuelans fled the country and remain unable to obtain all the documents necessary to establish a legal status in the residence country, particularly birth certificates and criminal background checks, which must be issued by the Venezuelan government (Freier and Parent 2018, Acosta *et al.* 2019, Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero 2020). Lacking such documents prevent some Venezuelan emigrants from participating in Venezuelan elections. Others with documents reported wanting to avoid all interactions with diplomatic personnel, given their connection to the incumbent government. As Buxton (2018) points out, Maduro relies heavily on the armed forces, with state administration comprising active and retired military. It is understandable that Venezuelans recognize or assume the military-Maduro connection in offices abroad and are consequently deterred from engaging with diplomatic personnel.

The second problem is that elections in Venezuela fail to meet free and fair democratic procedures. Since 2003 under Hugo Chávez then Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela has been an electoral autocracy (see Table 3.4). Electoral autocracies hold elections but without electoral accountability since the institutions responsible are de-facto undermined (Lührmann *et al.* 2018). Thus, very few Venezuelans turn out to vote among the already reduced number of Venezuelans abroad who are willing and able to register, given Venezuela's undemocratic elections. This issue prompted further exploration of migrants' past experiences in nondemocracy, their current views on democracy, and how these affect their current electoral behavior in two countries.

Some are understandably hesitant, afraid, or irritated by the notion of interacting with personnel in Venezuelan diplomatic offices. One Respondent remarked that going to the Consulate "frightens you" (VE1) and another Respondent admitted "one is even scared to go to the Embassy and give their name and sign up and the whole thing because they feel like all of that is controlled by the government" (VE3). Moreover, Venezuelan Respondents maintained that Embassy personnel assume emigrants are part of the opposition: "They know that we're here, [that] we reject the government there, and they're not interested in having a vote against [them]. They're uninterested in having a vote that wouldn't be in their favor" (VE6). The Respondent went on to say, "I believe that the Venezuelan

government is uninterested in any vote from abroad and it shouldn't be like that, because we're Venezuelans", suggesting that nationality should be sufficient to exercise suffrage rights.

Many feared a lack of anonymity with voting and distrusted the electoral system because, "in Venezuela, in 1998, there was an election and a famous list came out from Tascón, who was a congressman [and] in theory, this congressman had written and released a list [of names] who had voted against the [incumbent] government" (VE3). Others reported having tried to participate in emigrant voting, but diplomatic personnel blocked voter registration by using bureaucratic barriers to prevent emigrants from participating in origin-country elections; they were inflexible with appointments and voting dates or incorrectly recorded identification numbers or birthdates on official documents.

Bureaucracy, logistics, and infrastructure can all stifle voter registration. Hartmann (2015, p. 915) finds that such practices, common in the Sub-Saharan African countries that his research focuses on, depress turnout not only physically but also psychologically, as it introduces "doubts about the rationale behind participating in elections which may not be entirely free and fair", which discourages turnout. In the same vein, one Respondent explained the difficulty of obtaining documents from the Venezuelan government led to exclusion as an emigrant voter:

> The problem is that people who are now arriving to Ecuador, or those who arrived here between 2015 and 2018, are people who don't have resources and they came here without documents, without birth certificates, without passports, so they can't legalize their migratory status, and as a result, they don't have their chance to exercise voting rights. (VE11)

Post-migration, living abroad further exacerbates logistics and being able to overcome bureaucracy. A Respondent described it as: "In Venezuela, since everything is destroyed and the institutions don't really work to [be able to] get a birth certificate, it's hard. So you have to hire someone to do the paperwork for you and he charges you to get it, they send it to you here, and then you can get in [to register]…" (VE13). The Respondent dispelled the notion that the requirements for obtaining paperwork was easy because "in Venezuela, it's hard to get all that government paperwork." Only those who have or can get their documents can formalize their status, then register and exercise voice through formal political participation.

These obstacles that blockade voting have not always existed. Most of the 14 Venezuelan Interviewees were well-established in Ecuador and had voted from abroad, eight as dual transnational voters and two as emigrant voters. However, this participation largely occurred before

authoritarianism took hold in the origin country. Like other Interviewees, the reasons Venezuelan Interviewees gave for voting revolved around being invested in a flourishing future and territorial and familial ties (see Chapter 3). As I have argued before, the critical aspect of ties that differentiates migrants from other voters is the duality. Developing and maintaining multiterritorial ties with both the origin and residence states lies at the core of unpacking the four types of migrant voting.

4.5 Conclusion

Becoming a full member of a demos brings voting rights, no longer necessarily restricted by nationality and residence since voters can be foreign residents and nationals abroad. Migrant voting has changed the concept of citizenship as nationality since active denizen voting and casting a vote from abroad are alternative ways to be members. Citizenship is a person's bundle of rights defined through the individual-state relation. Considering migrant voting has led me to suggest that, when discussing voting rights and electoral participation, the terms 'citizen' and 'noncitizen' (and 'nonresident citizen' and 'noncitizen resident') should be replaced with nationals and non-nationals. Non-nationals can alternatively be called 'denizens' or 'foreign residents.'

I also argue that neither international borders nor the boundary of the demos distinguishes migrants as political insiders or outsiders. When enfranchisement boundaries are clearly defined, migrants outside the demos are electoral outsiders whereas active migrant voters are political insiders. Yet other migrants may have suffrage rights on paper but not in practice, making it possible for migrant non-voters to be insiders or outsiders. Before migrants can even attempt to vote, they encounter a series of barriers perpetuated by states, depicted in Figure 4.4, that serves to reduce the number of migrants eligible to vote. Combining a legal border crossing with completed pre- and post-migration bureaucracy creates a necessary and sufficient condition to maximize the ability to access full rights (Finn 2019). In short, many steps exist along the migratory trajectory, long before the 'normal' steps of registration and voting.

To address migrant non-voting, I separate abstention from prevention. Based on 71 interviews (with immigrants in Ecuador who were born and raised in Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, and Venezuela), the main reasons for choosing not to vote, despite having suffrage rights, were lack of ties to a country and distrust. Emigrants voting for origin-country elections reported distrust due to a lack of transparency and the voting process. Immigrants voting in the residence country also conveyed additional distrust of politics and politicians. The second most cited reason for abstention was a lack of interest, which for some meant overall apathy toward politics and the political process. Others

expressed interest in voting but explained a momentary disinterest because they found politicians and parties misaligned with their priorities or felt unrepresented by the current political movements, parties, and candidates.

Other migrants cannot vote due to reported obstacles deterring or blocking them, either on paper or in practice. Prevention means non-voting is involuntary on the individual's part and thus makes this group political outsiders in the political arena, even for those who have rights 'on paper'. For example, Venezuelans who moved before being able to gather all pre-migration documents lack a legal status in the residence country and thus cannot register to vote in either country. Some Venezuelan migrants who could register as an emigrant voter feared interacting with diplomatic officials, given their link to the incumbent government in Venezuela. Others who went to register reported diplomatic personnel issuing documents with incorrect information and waiting up to a year for documents. In this case, being undocumented brings a double punishment since they cannot register as an immigrant or emigrant voter. Others still reported being able to register then vote but did so despite knowing that recent elections were not free and fair—this group of migrant voters would seem to be political insiders, but their vote is not equally considered fairly, thus they have limited influence over future political decisions, despite voting.

What rights migrants have on paper and in practice, reflecting the migrant-state relation and perceptions, are critical pieces of information to better understanding migrant voting. I argue that by focusing on the emigrant-origin country relation and the immigrant-residence country relation (see Figure 4.1), the political resocialization process helps explain the outcome of individual-level migrant voter turnout. Analyzing 71 Interviewees provided an empirical sample to "see" the unobservable mechanism of resocialization in action, for both migrant voters and non-voters. Moreover, the process explains why a migrant is located within a specific migrant voting quadrant in the typology—as an immigrant voter, emigrant voter, dual transnational voter, or in abstention. Political (re)socialization processes are not the only individual-level explanations for migrant voting; contextual and institutional factors within each country, such as incentives, information, and issue salience in elections, also affect proclivities to vote or abstain. Nonetheless, the political resocialization process sheds light on why migrants vote or abstain as well as why migrants participate in only one country, both, or neither.

Throughout political resocialization—which continues over the voting life—migrants grow, maintain, or reduce ties with people and places over time, resulting in distinct Roots Routes. As compared to individual-level variables—such as tenure abroad and intention to stay (which are factors that affect voting but not reasons or mechanisms) or an interest in a politics (largely invariable)—

changing Roots Routes through adjusting ties to people and places better explains the outcome of migrant voting in two countries. Each route carries different probabilities of pertaining to only one (at a time) of the four types of migrant voting.

Analyzing political resocialization through the nine Roots Routes provides a systematic approach to nuance migrant voting farther from the simplistic dichotomy of voting 'here' or 'there', as I first discussed in Chapter 1. Moreover, my intention was to highlight that White and colleagues' (2008) resistance, transferability, and exposure theories fall short in explaining the outcomes stemming from migrants' political resocialization processes. They ignore that learning occurs in contexts beyond two countries and that, over time, individuals wear three 'hats' in their state relations: the national citizen-state, the emigrant-origin state, and the immigrant-residence state. Since a scholar must combine them to make sense of a migrant's multiterritorial electoral decisions over time, they fall short of explaining political behavior. Instead, changing Roots Routes can change electoral behavior—seen as movement among the four types of migrant voting. I have proposed detachment theory to entail when migrants: a) cut ties, for example, renounce nationality, or b) reduce connections, simply 'lose touch.' Detachment from a country lowers political engagement over time, including voting, in that country.

I also suggest that growing and maintaining multiterritorial roots in both the origin and residence countries increase the probability of being a dual transnational voter. But will they stay in this quadrant over the long term? This question requires diving deeper into how the independent variable of in-country tenure affects migrant voting in two countries. On one hand, dual transnational voters will not necessarily remain in the quadrant for the rest of their voting lives because movement between the typology's quadrants seems to be normal. Just because someone has participated in national-level immigrant and emigrant voting does not necessarily mean they are interested in voting in every election. On the other hand, voting in two countries may be mutually reinforcing (Tsuda 2012) to keep a migrant in the dual transnational voting quadrant. When asking migrants if they wanted to and planned to vote in the future, more reported wanting to vote in both countries, suggesting a convergence toward dual transnational voting. I did not find evidence of a trade-off between voting in the origin and residence country; changing ties in, or perceptions of, one country seemed to affect voting only in that country, not the other. This indicates independent (non-causal) voting decisions in the two countries.

Conclusion

Voting from abroad for nonresident nationals occurs for more than 120 territories and immigrant voting in almost 50 (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017, GLOBALCIT 2019). The expanding phenomenon of migrant enfranchisement unbundles rights from territory for emigrants, allowing them to take suffrage with them abroad; for immigrants, states grant rights based on residency, largely unbundling suffrage from nationality (Beckman 2006, Maas 2013, Caramani and Grotz 2015, Vink 2017). Migrant political participation affects democratic decision-making and electoral outcomes in two polities, reasons for which both migrant enfranchisement and migrant voting merit scholarly research.

Migrant voters are unique from other voters since they face additional factors that influence their electoral decisions and because they hold suffrage rights in two countries. Most studies on this topic have focused on either emigrants or immigrants, mostly in advanced democracies and primarily at the local level. I considered individuals as both emigrants for the origin country and immigrants in the residence country. My goal has been to unpack why migrants decide to vote or abstain in either the origin or residence country, in both, or in neither.

To collect data on migrant voters, I examined Chile and Ecuador because both countries grant immigrants multilevel voting rights after a five-year residence. Most are South Americans who also hold emigrant voting rights, making these two countries likely cases in which to find individuals who have dual transnational voting rights in national-level elections. The case studies shed light on the legal and normative origins of migrant enfranchisement, differences among the migrant voting variants, and how political (re)socialization processes help explain why migrants vote and change voting behavior over time.

Given I have focused on migrant rights, voting, and political resocialization, I review these in the next three sections. I highlight the similarities and differences from the case studies of Chile and Ecuador. Thereafter, I summarize my argument about the migrant resocialization process and how it applies to other contexts. I conclude by outlining how this dissertation opens future lines of research.

Migrant Suffrage Rights:
Comparing Enfranchisement in Chile and Ecuador

Since migrants must have suffrage rights before they can vote, I conducted historical analyses of migrant enfranchisement in both case studies of Chile (1925–2017) and Ecuador (1998–2008). Palop-García and Pedroza (2019) outline three steps to enfranchise emigrants: legislation must be 1) passed,

2) regulated, and 3) applied. I used the same steps not only for emigrant but also for immigrant enfranchisement. Countries can get caught in debate before enacting enfranchisement (Pedroza 2019), stagnate between steps (Finn 2020b, Umpierrez de Reguero unpublished), experience rights reversal (Brand 2006, 2010, Hayduk 2006, 2015), or fluctuate between granting, repealing, then again granting migrant suffrage (Wellman 2015, 2021).[84] Beginning the process does not guarantee that immigrants or emigrants will eventually exercise suffrage rights in local, national, or multilevel elections—or that they will continue to vote in the given country. Both Chile and Ecuador have completed all three migrant enfranchisement steps.

Both Chile and Ecuador grant foreign residents multilevel suffrage after a five-year residence, regardless of naturalization decisions or origin-country nationality (after meeting basic requirements such as age). Along with Malawi, New Zealand, and Uruguay, this ranks Chile and Ecuador among the most inclusive polities, at least on paper, for immigrant suffrage worldwide (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017). Dozens of other countries offer select immigrant groups the right to vote but typically restrict it based on nationality, especially throughout the Commonwealth and in the European Union; the latter also typically restricts denizen voting to local-level elections.

Immigrants in both Chile and Ecuador comprise primarily South Americans with a low or no language barrier for becoming or staying informed about politics. Moreover, most immigrants had been impacted by the effects of nondemocracy, either through first-hand experiences or indirectly from parents and relatives living under such regimes. Such political learning enriched the migrants' in-depth responses regarding their (re)socialization processes, incorporating comparative views of political leaders, institutions, and the role of government.

Aside from such commonalities, Chile and Ecuador differ in important ways, making them two separate case studies. They granted suffrage rights at different times and for different reasons (see Table 2.1 and 3.1 for legal milestones in each country). Chile first granted rights to immigrants; the steps occurred in 1925 (enacted), 1934 (regulated), and 1935 (applied) for local-level elections and respectively in 1980, 1988, and 1988 at the national level (Courtis 2017, Finn 2020b). These earlier

[84] To understand why states grant migrant suffrage rights, see the theoretical and normative studies of, e.g., López-Guerra (2005), Bauböck (2007, 2015), Beckman (2007), and Owen (2012), as well as Bender (2021) arguing for refugee suffrage. There are also many analyses on migrant enfranchisement drivers, patterns, and timing (e.g., Calderón Chelius 2003, 2019, Earnest 2008, 2015a, Rodriguez 2010, Stuhldreher 2012, Escobar 2015, Lafleur 2015, McMillan 2015, Turcu and Urbatsch 2015, Koopmans and Michalowski 2016, Mosler and Pedroza 2016, Erlingsson and Tuman 2017, Belton 2019).

dates make the country a world pioneer of immigrant suffrage rights, alongside other countries such as New Zealand (in 1853). After various failed attempts, Chile completed the three steps for emigrant enfranchisement in 2014, 2016, and 2017 (Toro and Walker 2007, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 2015, 2016). Ecuador first enfranchised emigrants by completing the three steps in 1998, 2000/2002, and 2006, then immigrants in 2008, 2009, and 2009 (Palop-García and Pedroza 2019, Ramírez and Umpierrez de Reguero 2019, Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2020). Since 2008, Ecuador also reserves legislative seats in the National Assembly to represent emigrants in their own overseas district, as the country's Fifth Region (Boccagni and Ramírez 2013, Collyer 2014a, Palop-García 2017, 2018, Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2017). Chile thus experienced a long 92-year road whereas Ecuador had a relatively short 11-year road to migrant enfranchisement.

The reasons behind Ecuador's migrant enfranchisement corresponded with democracy, migrants' human rights, and inclusion. In contrast, immigrant enfranchisement in Chile had little to do with civic engagement in democratic processes in the 1920s and was extended in the 1980s regardless of the minute immigrant population size. It instead reflected a longer path dependence, dating back at least a century of normative views shaping migrant-related legislation. Early accounts outline that nineteenth-century migration legislation aimed at attracting white skilled Europeans as part of Chile's legal nation-building project (Lara Escalona 2014, Durán Migliardi and Thayer 2017, Acosta 2018), then including some foreigners into legal definitions of who is considered 'Chilean' as early as the 1822 Constitution (Courtis 2017).

I present the path dependence finding while considering, and agreeing with, Vink (2017, p. 229) that "understanding citizenship regimes requires a context-sensitive approach." This insight does not make path dependency arguments irrelevant but rather highlights that previous citizenship rights, including political inclusion, can change in the future since the target group of these rights change over time, given the "contested and changing reality" (Vink 2017, p. 230). When the Commission was reviewing the 1833 Constitution to draft the 1925 Constitution, political elites' normative viewpoints about nationals versus foreigners' rights and obligations to the state set enduring norms (Finn 2020b), including understandings of which migrants belong to the demos. Yet notions slowly change over time, for instance when Chile included emigrants in 2014–2017 and contrarily, could eliminate long-standing immigrant suffrage in the future.

The Four Types of Migrant Voting

Facing the choice to vote or abstain in origin-country elections as an emigrant (nonresident national), and the same choice in residence-country elections as an immigrant (foreign resident), creates four options. I capture these in a collectively exhaustive migrant voting typology (Finn 2020a): 1) immigrant voting, or foreign residents or naturalized persons participating only in the residence country; 2) emigrant voting, or nonresident nationals participating only in the origin country from abroad; 3) dual transnational voting, or migrant voters participating in both countries; and 4) abstention, or migrants choosing not to vote in either country despite having suffrage rights (see Figure 1 in the Introduction).

The typology has advanced conceptualizing noncitizenship and citizenship. As Tonkiss and Bloom (2015) argue, noncitizenship represents its own independent analytical category that does not require citizenship as a starting point. As a bundle of rights, citizenship can correspond to both nationals (those with a certain nationality, evidenced, for example, by holding a passport) as well as non-nationals. Foreign residents exercising voting rights in a growing number of countries creates (or expands) the notion of non-national citizens. While emigrant voting requires the nationality of the origin country, denizen voting does not when non-naturalized foreign residents can vote in residence-country elections. Changing the rights individuals hold affects their citizenship, without changing their nationality. Since nationality alone does not define membership in the demos (Beckman 2006), citizenship as nationality cannot comprise the core of analyses of membership or rights, or of exercising those rights.

Building from Pedroza's (2019) analysis of 'citizenship beyond nationality' that examines debates on denizen enfranchisement, and recognizes that citizenship also includes membership and identity, I highlight that not just gaining rights but *exercising* suffrage rights matters for conceptualizing citizenship. I emphasize citizenship as a bundle of rights because voters may be a (non-)national of a certain country; having and using political rights means migrant voters are citizens. In contemporary times, foreigners can more often gain membership either through naturalizing or residence (Pedroza 2013, Huddleston and Vink 2015) (see Table 2.2). Migrant voting has further deconstructed part of the concept of citizenship as nationality since casting a vote from abroad and active denizen voting are valid alternative ways to be active members of the demos.

The typology also has two empirical uses, both of which I exploit in this analysis. With two different goals, I chose two methods, both using migrant voting as the dependent variable. First, I applied the migrant voting typology to examine differences among migrant voters. Using original

survey data from Chile, I evaluated the independent variables of knowledge of voting rights in the residence country, linguistic communication, interest in politics, intention to stay, and in-country tenure (see Appendix 2.10 and 2.11). The online survey—designed in Qualtrics and advertised through Facebook—was available for five days in both November and December 2017, aligning with Chile's two rounds of the presidential election (see Appendix 2.6–2.8). Chileans living abroad voted for the first time in national-level elections in 2017, which drew attention to the phenomenon of migrant voting, even though immigrants had been voting in Chile for over eighty years. Survey Respondents qualified by meeting the voting age and being foreign-born but currently residing in Chile, resulting in 1,482 completed surveys. Of those, 680 migrants had voting rights in national-level elections in two countries (see Appendix 2.10). To analyze the group in Chapter 2, I drew on the typology's first use of showing a snapshot in time. Classifying migrants in only one quadrant for any election demonstrates *which* migrants vote or abstain and where.

The cognitive learning process and linguistic communication related to immigrants' understanding and involvement in the political world shed more light on migrant voting than language fluency. As native speakers in a region of linguistic variation within Spanish, the survey responses revealed informal linguistic barriers to interacting with formal political channels. The survey asked about migrants' self-reported ability "to communicate clearly and coherently" in Spanish in Chile. While low communication created informal barriers to politics with Chileans and in Chilean spaces of political debate, it did not blockade electoral participation for the group. The larger takeaway would be that while fluency creates a formal barrier to immigrants' electoral participation, I find that linguistic communication presents an informal barrier to becoming embedded into residence-country politics. As language and linguistic particularities are woven into a country's cultural 'code,' fluency represents a poor measure of (political) belonging or integration. Instead, the resocialization learning process better explains how immigrants embed themselves in the residence country, interact with 'locals', and participate in formal channels.

Second, I attempt to explain how and why factors affect individual migrant decisions to vote in one, both, or neither country. I analyzed in-depth interviews, occurring between June and October 2019 with 71 foreign residents in Ecuador, to unpack the reasons migrants give for voting and their political (re)socialization processes. Interviewees qualified if they were of voting age and currently living in Ecuador but grew up in Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, or Venezuela. Variation in democracy, hybrid regimes, and authoritarianism attempted to capture migrants' political learning experiences from, and effects of, (non)democracy over time and across borders. To analyze the group, I classified

migrants into the four migrant voting types and outlined their *motives* to vote in one, both, or neither country in Chapter 3. Thereafter, in Chapter 4, I drew on the typology's second use of tracking movements between quadrants throughout a migrant's voting life over political resocialization. I separately discussed migrants' authoritarian imprints which seemed to endure but not determine migrant voter turnout decisions.

Combined with the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 1, these analyses shed light on migrant rights, voting, and political resocialization. The migrant voting typology itself entails the primary contribution, due to its conceptual implications and usefulness for empirical applications.[85] I then started to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for migrant voting. Resources and ties—i.e., connections to a territory or nation-state as well as to people within it—form a necessary condition for migrant voting and moreover, determine which of the four migrant voting types a migrant belongs, at any given moment (see Figure 1.2). Holding enough ties in the origin country results in emigrant voting, whereas ties in the destination country can lead to immigrant voting. Ties in both relates to dual transnational voting. I further elaborate on this argument in Chapter 3 by outlining the reasons that migrants provide when asked why they vote or abstain (see Table 3.3; Section 3.3). I claim that resources and a motive form a sufficient condition for migrant voting. I draw these conclusions based on my findings of the overlaps and differences between the case studies.

Migrant Voting:
Comparing Individual-Level Turnout and Ties in the Case Studies

Acknowledging that more international migrants face a choice of voting or abstaining in two countries—and that voting in *both* places matter for democracy—means recognizing the four distinct types of migrant voting behavior. The most novel quadrant is dual transnational voting. In both Chile and Ecuador, dual transnational voting occurred more frequently than expected, although the data were non-representative. Examining the survey data from Chile and interview data from Ecuador using the migrant typology yielded the following results:

[85] Migrant political engagement literature has grown over the last two decades (as noted throughout this dissertation, e.g., Guarnizo *et al.* 2003, 2019, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Hayduk 2006, Tsuda 2012, Bilgili 2014, Escobar *et al.* 2015, Gamlen 2015, McIlwaine and Bermudez 2015, McMillan 2015, Waldinger 2015, Paarlberg 2017, Chaudhary 2018, Peltoniemi 2018b, McCann *et al.* 2019, Mügge *et al.* 2019, Ramírez and Umpierrez de Reguero 2019, Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020, Finn 2020a, McCann and Jones-Correa 2020; Besserer 2021; Fliess 2021; Jakobson *et al.* 2021; Szulecki *et al.* 2021). It seems that the trend will continue, presenting ample opportunities to apply the migrant voting typology.

- **Chile survey data**: Out of 658 potential migrant voter Respondents, most were classified as emigrant voters, with 332 reporting having voted only in origin-country elections. 201 were dual transnational voters who had participated in both countries, followed by 93 who abstained and 32 immigrant voters who reported having voted only in Chile (the residence country) (see Figure 2.2).
- **Ecuador interview data**: Out of 58 Interviewees with voting rights in two countries, the largest group were dual transnational voters (26 Respondents), followed by 16 immigrant voters, 10 emigrant voters, and 6 in abstention. Projecting into the future, all planned to be active voters, especially dual transnational voters, corresponding to 41 Respondents (see Figure 4.2 and 4.3).

The inherent duality of international migration signals that political engagement is more costly for migrant voters than for other (non-migrant) voters. One factor of voting behavior is having resources, and allocating some toward voting, such as money spent for transportation to a voting location and time spent on becoming and staying politically informed. For migrants, such resources again must exist in not only one but two countries. This information can be difficult to obtain and understand for origin-country voting procedures when living abroad (since emigrant voting differs from their previous in-country voting as resident nationals) as well as in the residence country for immigrant voting since the entire system and institutions are new. Trade-offs for voting are the forgone resources used to register, stay informed, and vote that would have been spent on other activities. Gaining knowledge of new systems and in two places simultaneously means migrant voting requires even more resources. Over time, more established immigrants have more time and resources to get involved and participate in origin-country politics (Escobar *et al.* 2014, McCann *et al.* 2019).

Following politics in two countries is time-consuming in practice and, moreover, interest may not lead to participation in both countries (Jakobson and Kalev 2013, Waldinger and Soehl 2013, McIlwaine and Bermudez 2015). While dual transnational voting implies that migrants stay involved in both countries simultaneously, forming and maintaining dual identities, duties, and ties to people and places requires effort. To ease the burden, states, organizations, and political parties attempt to connect with migrants, especially emigrants, being strategic in targeting larger populations in popular destination countries (e.g., Tintori 2011, van Haute and Kernalegenn 2020, Yener-Roderburg 2020). State-led diaspora politics and institutions abroad can convey information and strengthen transnational connections (Fauser 2013, Délano and Gamlen 2014, Adamson 2016, Burgess 2018) or attempt to control them (see, e.g., Brand 2006, Liu 2020, Tsourapas 2020). Institutional changes such as granting voting rights, special emigrant representation, and easing registration increases migrant

voting (Lafleur 2013, Collyer 2014a, Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019, Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020). Party-led outreach such as electoral campaigning abroad can stir higher emigrant turnout (Burgess 2018, Paarlberg 2019, Burgess and Tyburski 2020); such evidence points to new dynamics of party politics abroad (Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020), expanding well beyond national bounded territories. Using Rosenblatt's (2018) notion of 'vibrant parties', political parties are targeting emigrant voters, many striving to become vibrant parties abroad. In response, migrants act within these political opportunity structures and exercise agency within legal and institutional bounds, deciding to vote or abstain in each election.

Based on the literature and my fieldwork, I posit resources combined with ties to people or places in one or both countries might constitute a necessary condition (see Figure 1.2) and having resources and a motive to vote might be conceived as a sufficient condition for migrant voting (as outlined in Chapter 3). When asked why they vote or abstain, migrants give reasons to explain their electoral behavior. Drawing on the open-ended interview questions, three reasons stand out as the strongest for accounting for migrants' decision to vote (see Table 3.3): 1) migrants have ties to people, mostly family, living in the country; 2) migrants have deeply rooted ties to a territory through ideas of citizenship, nationality, and the nation, as well as civic duty; and 3) migrants are invested in creating a flourishing future for the country—both a stronger democracy and stable economy. A secondary reason is a reaction to formal recognition, meaning migrants feel inclusion or belonging shortly after enfranchisement, motivating them to participate. Bureaucratic reasons include concerns about avoiding fines (whether or not the fine would logistically reach them) and voting only to obtain a voting certificate. The voting certificate in Ecuador is commonly requested when completing other bureaucratic tasks, like opening a bank account. Although foreign residents have optional voting, migrants reported that other people are unaware of this fact, believing it mandatory for everyone. While these were mostly specific to country contexts and electoral rules—or misunderstandings of those rules—the reasons could also be prevalent elsewhere with similar settings.

Within territorial ties, there are variation and overlaps between immigrant and emigrant voting. Immigrants' ties correspond with residence and belonging as a foreign resident whereas emigrants' ties relate more to nationality and belonging, despite living abroad. Immigrants spoke more frequently about trust in the voting process and compared the origin and residence countries' institutional and legal frameworks and transparency. Emigrants focused more on obligations or responsibilities to the origin country, often framing it still as "their" country. Responses were divided yet often came from the same individuals, highlighting the duality of migrants' lives and the separation of voting in two

countries. It also signals scholars to keep studying the four types of migrant voting and understand the possibility of dual transnational voting, rather than only analyzing immigrant or emigrant voting. A significant overlap in motivating factors among emigrant and immigrant voters was a sense of civic duty to continue voting over time, not only in the origin but also in the residence country. The rights-responsibilities balance between the migrant and a state can emanate from both the emigrant-origin country and the immigrant-residence country relation.

The Interviewees' multiterritorial ties to the territory and to people within it seem to be 'mutually reinforcing' within a country (using terminology from Tsuda 2012)—migrant voters who establish social belonging (e.g., through forming a family) in the destination country may then develop a sense of belonging to the nation-state. However, ties alone do not necessarily instigate voter turnout. McIlwaine and Bermudez (2015), after interviewing Colombians living in London and Madrid, propose that emigrant voting is just one way of "expressing citizenship" since migrants convey belonging to the origin country through nationality ("feeling Colombian") but still abstain. In my group of Interviewees, I find that when territorial connections increase because of a real or imagined return to the origin country, it increases emigrant voting and abstention in the residence country, indicating that belonging is not a sufficient condition for emigrant voting.

Ties and notions of nationality, as linked with citizenship practices, become more complex under shifting (non)democratic political regimes. Regardless of their sense of civic duty or attachment to a country (which does not necessarily entail the state or government), individuals can lose their willingness to politically participate under nondemocratic regimes. Moving to democracy brings *tangible* benefits, as Bilodeau (2014, p. 361) outlines, such as guaranteeing rights and freedoms, and *symbolic* benefits like "the hope for a better life." Most of the 71 Interviewees moved from a less or nondemocratic country to a more democratic country (see Table 3.4) and their responses support Bilodeau's results. Despite a possible social desirability bias, many Interviewees seemed to appreciate the freedom to voluntarily participate in free and fair elections and the ability to choose who they consider the best candidate. They maintain connections and duty to the origin country and some vote from abroad, even in electoral autocracies (e.g., some Venezuelan Interviewees). Within my data, the symbolic benefits of a better life in the residence country live on; migrants reported strong commitments to a flourishing future (in terms of a stronger democracy and economy) that solidified as a main reason for migrant voting.

Multiterritorial voting was previously downplayed in migration and electoral studies, but the category of dual transnational voting is essential in demonstrating that migrant voting in one country

can be independent from electoral decisions in another country, even though it is the same individual voting in both places. While a trade-off between voting in two places may occur—especially since getting and staying involved in politics in two places requires more resources and time for migrants—I suggest that for individual-level migrant turnout, a trade-off between voting in the origin and residence countries does *not* organically emerge over time. In my interview data, migrants separated their motives for voting; for example, they distinguished between ties based on civic duty and belonging to a place based on their role as an emigrant or immigrant (see Table 3.3). I find that one membership, belonging, or sense of duty does not replace previous ones, but rather they can co-exist (also see Tsuda 2012, Bilgili 2014, Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2020).

Over time, rather than a trade-off or replacement, migrants changed their positioning and motives to vote in one country or both countries. I show this (in Figure 4.2 and 4.3) by using the migrant voting typology as a framework to track changes in migrant voting over time in two countries and compare prior migrant voting to future intention to vote. I attempt to understand individual-level decisions to vote or abstain in the country or countries of choice by asking why a migrant would land in one quadrant and not another in the typology. Three principal movements through the migrant voting typology exist: 1) migrants abstain then vote (in one country to both), 2) they vote (in one country to both) then abstain, or 3) they move among the three active types of migrant voting: emigrant, immigrant, and dual transnational.

For emigrants, some studies show that transmigrant activities and engagement across borders are practiced only by a small exclusive group (as mentioned, Guarnizo *et al.* 2003, Waldinger 2008). Chaudhary (2018) combines the contrasting research outcomes stemming from assimilationist versus complementary views but reports evidence for both, leaving the debate unresolved. Moreover, Chaudhary (2018) uses citizenship (as nationality) acquisition and associational membership to measure political and civic engagement in Europe, which limits explaining migrant voting outcomes elsewhere. This line of research also continues an unbalanced focus on 'integration' in the residence country, as Erdal (2020) highlights. Instead, following Finn (2020a) and Umpierrez de Reguero and colleagues (2020), equalizing the origin and residence countries allows for analysis of individuals' turnout as an immigrant and emigrant voter. Combining both immigrant and emigrant voting for Interviewees (a group interested in politics and with high prior voting), asking about their future intention to vote revealed a strong convergence toward dual transnational voting.

Overall, it seems that migrants evaluate current country-specific politics when deciding to vote, making their electoral decisions geographically bounded and independent. No Interviewees reported

voting in the origin country simply because they vote in the residence country, or vice versa. Very few Interviewees reported abstention in both countries because of an uninterest in politics (granted, the social desirability bias could have affected their reported positions); those self-identified as apolitical showed a general uninterest, not an aversion or dislike of politics that arose in one country and then filtered to the other. Similarly, the underlying reasons for voting among those reporting a high interest in politics were familial ties, territorial ties, and strong beliefs in using formal voice to participate in democracy. However, this finding should be further tested elsewhere and with other data, as both groups reported high education, an interest in politics, and almost all of them faced a low or no language barrier to gain political knowledge. In other words, these migrants could have been more pre-disposed to vote in both places.

My analyses strongly align with work emphasizing the *simultaneity* of dual engagement in the origin and residence countries (e.g., Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, Tsuda 2012, Bilgili 2014, Erdal 2020). Simultaneity is a key component differentiating migrants from other voters, in turn nuancing studies on migrant voting processes and outcomes. Political involvement also stretches into and across spaces that international migration and migrants create and sustain *between* countries, as depicted in Figure 1.3 (Faist 1998, 2000, Smith 2003, Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, Waldinger 2008, 2015, Erdal and Oeppen 2013, Fauser 2013, Jakobson and Kalev 2013, Paul 2013). Migrants' unique positions within these spaces have "familial, socio-cultural, economic and political" aspects (Faist *et al.* 2013, p. 54)—including following politics and voting on both sides of the border.

The liminality of the two places (the origin and residence countries) forms the concepts of transmigrants and transnationalism; immigrants, emigrants, and transmigrants live in and between places. Building from this literature, I suggest four learning places and spaces for international migrants (Figure 1.3) that include the two countries, the transnational space between them, and the intersecting and independent migratory system (the last stemming from Paul 2013). The duality of being involved in more than one place and space complicates the phenomenon of migrant voting, which is reflected in the migrant voting typology.

Another contribution of this dissertation is detailing not only the reasons for migrant voting but also reasons for migrant non-voting (see Section 4.4). Non-voting cannot be ignored in a study about voting since it may be voluntary abstention or a result of legal or bureaucratic obstacles preventing a group of voters from participating. While abstention is part of the dependent variable (since it is part of the four migrant voting types), involuntary non-voting is not. I nonetheless argue in Section 4.4.1

that migrants who abstain can still be political insiders and affect the political sphere, as McCann and Jones-Correa (2020) show.

Abstention occurred mainly due to a lack of ties in both countries, distrust in one or both countries' voting processes (e.g., through a lack of transparency or information), or lack of interest (see Table 4.2). For example, Chile automatically registers foreign residents into the electorate, while in Ecuador they must register to join the electorate. Automatic registration has led to some individuals being uninformed or misinformed about having voting rights as an immigrant in Chile (also see Doña-Reveco and Sotomayor 2017, Pujols 2020).

Within the group of migrant Interviewees, those who answered they have either not voted or do not plan to vote, were then asked an open-ended question of 'why'. For them, non-voting occurred for three main reasons: the origin country did not grant emigrant voting rights (e.g., Cuba), the individual had not yet reached the residence requirement to gain immigrant voting rights (i.e., had lived less than five years in Chile or Ecuador), or because migrants were prevented from voting. Despite some migrants falling into the first category of non-voting, I nonetheless included many of these migrants in my analyses because they can shed light on how a lack of rights in one country may affect their voting behavior in the other country. Moreover, Cubans also expressed hope for voting from abroad within their lifetimes in Cuba—surprisingly, many reported an intention to vote as emigrants in the future, if Cuba holds democratic elections and allows emigrants to vote.

I took the second scenario of not yet reaching the residence requirement into consideration by asking these migrants about their prior voting pre-migration, their emigrant voting post-migration, and intended future voting. Of 1,482 Respondents, most intended to stay long term in Chile since more than half reported plans to stay six years or more—of these, 322 reported intending to stay more than 10 years or "forever." 658 Respondents had already met the five-year requirement and gained voting rights; of these, 301 had already resided in Chile between 6 and 10 years, whereas 357 reported their arrival year was 11 to more than 20 years ago. Based on these results, all survey Respondents and Interviewees could answer *as if* they had voting rights, since intention is hypothetical.

Regarding the third non-voting scenario, voting prevention refers to legal or bureaucratic obstacles that deter or block migrants from voting (see Section 4.4.2). Some migrants with suffrage rights 'on paper' reported not fully having them in practice in the origin or residence country, or both. Examples of such barriers included non-cooperative consulate staff, fear of a lack of anonymity with voting (e.g., cited by Venezuelans), and long distances between migrants' homes and polling stations

(either because, for instance, they failed to change their residential address, or a lack of polling stations well distributed across the residence country for emigrants).

Latin American countries' experiences with democratic breakdown, transition, and nondemocracy added complexity to migrant (non-)voting. Most migrant Interviewees had lived in nondemocracy and reported political and social experiences with corruption, government turnover, torture, and narcotrafficking, to name a few. These aspects affected their economic wellbeing through unemployment, scarcity, inflation, waiting in line for basic needs like food and medicine, and in several cases triggered their initial decision to emigrate. Despite even traumatic or brutal political experiences, identity (especially through nationality) and civic duty for the origin country remain strong for some and keeps emigrants voting even decades later. This was particularly true for Chilean Interviewees who were able to vote as emigrants for the first time in 2017, almost thirty years after the country returned to democracy.

Migrant Political Resocialization:
Theory Building to Why Migrants Vote Where and When

After exploring self-reported reasons for (not) voting and rationales for why migrants vote—two pending questions remain: how do these reasons form and why do these motives affect migrant voting? To start answering this, in Chapter 4, I suggest that international migration is a shock that starts the political resocialization process, during which a person (as an immigrant and emigrant) maintains or adjusts political attitudes, values, and behavior over time. Cumulative political experiences with two distinct political systems and various regimes affect how ties are formed, in turn also influencing self-reported motives about where and when migrants vote or abstain. Alongside being invested in a country's future, multiterritorial ties to places and people ebb and flow, affecting migrants' choices to vote or abstain in two countries.

My claim is that political resocialization helps to explain individual-level migrant voter turnout. Both socialization and resocialization processes comprise complex, temporal, and accumulated learning experiences. During political resocialization in a new context, international adult migrants maintain or adjust political attitudes and values that in turn affect voting behavior in two countries. As I argue, especially in Chapter 4, all individuals interact with the state pre-migration, a process I refer to as "growing roots" through their national citizen-state relation (see Figure 4.1). Post-migration, individuals replace national citizen-state relations with emigrant-origin country relations and gain immigrant-residence country relations. Each person manages two country relations after

migrating, each with its own set of roots representing the ties a migrant has with that country. I further suggest that migrants grow, keep, or cut their ties to each country and the people who live within these territories (summarized in Table 4.1). This conceptualization results in three possibilities for two sets of roots, making nine different Roots Routes.

Growing roots, or making ties, mean that immigrants immerse themselves in their new surroundings in the residence country by building a family, meeting neighbors, working with new colleagues, or getting involved in salient community issues. Similar to how political socialization occurs for everyone, "roots get established in the country of arrival" for migrants "whether wanted or not" (Waldinger 2008, p. 24), meaning immigrants unavoidably form at least some ties. While emigrants have past experiences with the origin country, they interact with the country and people there in new ways after emigrating. They may join associations or networks in the new country that relate to the origin country (e.g., hometown associations). As nationals abroad, emigrants face different rules and procedures for registration and voting compared to their peers in the origin country.

Keeping ties, or maintaining their roots, means individuals maintain established connections or attachments. Emigrants can continue ties with the origin country, including a sense of loyalty, duty, or civicness. The deeper the initial socialization roots in terms of political identity and belonging, the longer one will consider the origin country as 'their' country. Emigrants also maintain communication and connections with family, friends, colleagues, and schoolmates with whom they used to interact with regularly. Moreover, emigrants may continue to own goods or property in the origin country that encourage them to maintain ties through financial connections. Immigrants have at least superficial roots in the residence country even at the time of migration due to previous individual-state interactions. For example, potential immigrants submit pre-migration bureaucratic documents when applying for a visa such as medical, financial standing, and identification records (Finn 2019). Since individuals already have some roots as an immigrant in the residence country when political resocialization begins (see Figure 4.1), they either maintain superficial roots (e.g., perhaps those who have moved temporarily for work may be uninterested in strengthening other social or political ties) or adjust roots by growing them further or cutting them post-migration.

Cutting ties, or shrinking their roots, can occur abruptly or slowly. On one hand, some emigrants cut ties when 'moving on' or emigrating as a way of 'leaving it all behind.' Abruptness may relate to the reason for emigration, for instance, when individuals leave after a regime collapse or a malfunctioning democracy, or because of economic crisis, they may more quickly cut ties. Moreover, forced migration or renouncing nationality can eliminate formal legal connections with the origin

country. While I did not directly inquire about the reason for initial emigration, migrant Interviewees revealed their relations with the origin country at the time of migration via explaining their political socialization and their relations thereafter during the political resocialization process. It seems that the graver the situation for leaving the origin country, the greater the shock at the time of migration and more likely that the migrant will cut their ties to the origin country, although not to the people there. On the other hand, emigrants could also slowly experience a "gradual withering away of home country ties" (Waldinger 2008, p. 25). This includes not only lowering emigrant-origin country ties (e.g., facing travel restrictions or commitments that prevent them from visiting to keep their ties strong) but also losing touch with family. This scenario seems likely for migrants who relocate with their immediate family thus everyone lives in the residence country. Immigrants may shrink their roots if they do not intend to stay in the residence country, possibly after having negative experiences after migrating, or may break them off when relocating to a third country.

Throughout their voting lives, migrants change Roots Routes as their ties to places and people change. The Roots Routes and the migrant voting typology fit together because each of the nine routes carry different chances of pertaining to only one (at a time) of the four types of migrant voting: immigrant, emigrant, dual transnational, and abstention. Understanding how such roots form and change—in other words, understanding the (re)socialization processes—sheds light not only on why migrants vote or abstain but also why they change voting behavior over time. My contributions build from and add to the theories and literature related to political (re)socialization. I particularly focus on the resistance, transferability, and exposure theories from White and colleagues (2008). Although they separately hold validity, the theories lack complexity and must be used together to explain individuals' political attitudes, beliefs, and values over time (see Section 4.1.2). To overcome the shortcomings of previous resocialization theories, I offer three solutions.

First, I propose detachment theory, which explains that some individuals decrease or sever ties to the origin or residence country, or both, during resocialization. As McCann, Escobar, and Arana note, "it is entirely possible that expatriates grow *detached* from public affairs after settling abroad" (2019, p. 18, emphasis added). Detachment does not follow classic assimilation theories that convey a zero-sum game of replacing political attitudes, beliefs, or values with new ones. Migrants do not scrap their knowledge, attitudes, and views but rather adjust them over time. Detachment from the origin country while abroad would lower emigrant voting, whereas detachment from the residence country would lower immigrant voting. By default, detachment from both countries would decrease dual transnational voting and increase abstention.

Second, to better incorporate complexity, I sketch three sets of roots from pre- and post-migration to match the three unique individual-state roles: national citizen-country, the emigrant-origin country, and the immigrant-residence country relations (see Table 1.1; Figure 4.1). Similar to how early political learning during socialization sets persistent predispositions but does not determine future behavior (Niemi and Hepburn 1995), I suggest that earlier political learning during migrants' origin-country socialization partly influences current political behavior in the origin and residence countries, as both Bilodeau (2014) and Chaudhary (2018) also suggest in their migrant voting studies.

Third, I try to add multidimensional aspects of where migrants' political learning occurs through incorporating temporality, agents, and context into conceptualizing migrant voting and political resocialization (see Section 1.3). The transnational space in between the origin and destination countries—which have been called "social fields" (Glick Schiller *et al.* 1992, p. 1) or comprise a "social space" (Faist 1998, 2000)—and the migratory system as a learning space (Paul 2013; see Figure 1.3) are particularly relevant. Like Erdal's (2020) 'multiscalar approach' to migrant transnationalism and integration, continued political learning is multidimensional in its temporal and spatial aspects. Since migrants' political resocialization affects both sets of roots, it can affect multiterritorial voter turnout.

While migrants are influenced by individual and institutional agencies throughout political resocialization, they themselves are active agents. Migrants are the final decision makers on when and where to vote or abstain and must contend with the barriers to participation on paper and in practice (see Section 4.4.2). Migrants draw on information from various countries—not only past personal experiences but also general knowledge of democracy and politics—to evaluate current issues and the feasibility of political parties or candidates' campaign promises. Unpacking migrants' political (re)socialization processes from my data, part of this evaluative filter (and critical eye) among South American migrants comes from experiences with repression and crises under both left and rightwing governments and in nondemocracy. Negative prior experiences made some immigrants attentive and cautious when evaluating political discourse and candidates' promises in the residence country, whereas others became disillusioned and disengaged with politics. But overall, negative past experiences prompted emigrants and immigrants to evaluate and compare politics in both countries, adapt political attitudes to fit the current political context, and update their positions in both the origin and residence countries over time.

Experiences with shifting regimes and nondemocracy in the origin country leave a mark—what Bilodeau (2014) calls an "authoritarian imprint"—but I find they are not determinative of migrant voter turnout or vote choice in the residence country (see Section 3.4). Chilean emigrants who lived

in dictatorship under an extreme right Pinochet may still vote for a right or center-right candidate in the origin or residence country. Venezuelans who experienced food shortages and hyperinflation under a left government may still vote for a left or center-left candidate in the residence country when they believe the candidate would bring progress. I also found traces of *indirect* imprints in younger migrants who had 'inherited' them from parents or family who live or had lived in nondemocracy. The 'heirs' to memory about government and ideology were prevalent with young Chilean and Colombian Interviewees whereas indirect experience was currently unfolding with Venezuelans with friends and family under the nondemocratic regime at the time of interviews. In short, despite direct or second-hand negative prior political experiences, adult migrants still vote and update their stances, not just based on long-term prior experiences but also in reaction to more recent ones.

Moving Migrant Voting Research Forward: Future Agenda for Comparison and Causality

The typology and its applications have paved the way forward for future studies on migrant voting and political engagement in origin and residence countries. Migrant political participation can incredulously affect democratic decision-making and electoral outcomes in two countries—an unfathomable phenomenon in previous decades that is now growing worldwide. It is beyond the time that all studies should recognize how the past and present roles of both countries, and the people who live in both, affect migrants' political behavior.

While migrant political participation analyses may focus more on one side as part of their research objectives (e.g., immigrants' integration in the residence country or emigrants' involvement in homeland politics), the temporal influences from the other country are relevant and cannot be ignored. Moreover, the present and future outcomes of political behavior—migrant voting or other types of (non)conventional political participation—can affect politics in both countries. The four exhaustive migrant voting types deliver the conceptual terminology and framework to recognize the potential political involvement that occurs in what I have called the four spaces and places of political learning. Scholars can apply this framework to extend comparability and establish causality.

Future studies should incorporate new cases and perspectives. Cross-country or cross-region studies would shed light on more institutional, historical, or contextual differences that affect migrants' voting behaviors and patterns. Moreover, given circular and stepwise migration, engagement can also be surveyed in more than two countries. In the four places and spaces of political learning (Figure 1.3), the origin and residence countries constitute the two places, yet many migrants have lived, or will

live, in additional countries (see e.g., Constant 2020); their political experiences from additional countries may affect their political views, activism, and participation in different ways, opening further avenues of research to incorporate these additional countries.

Instead of covering national-level elections, researchers could alternatively focus on local or multilevel voting when migrants hold suffrage rights in two countries. They could also nuance the application to those holding local-level immigrant voting and national-level emigrant voting, as is common throughout the European Union for EU migrants. Quantitative tools such as econometric models would be inappropriate since the independent variables that influence individual-level voter turnout can differ for local versus national elections. More fitting and fruitful, from my perspective, would be qualitative research that could distinguish between variables and further delve into the motives migrants give for voting, and how these reasons differ between levels and elections. Even more possibilities for further comparison include extending analyses over time with the same migrants by using panel data, for example. Scholars could also apply the typology to other migrants such as dependent movers (e.g., children and the 1.5 generation) or migrants' descendants who hold political rights in a country in which they have never lived.

Based on the data analyzed in this dissertation, migrant belonging and ties are difficult to untangle. While I nestle belonging territorial ties as a reason for migrant voting, some migrants reported belonging yet still abstain in elections. Similarly, McIlwaine and Bermudez (2015) find that some Colombian emigrants report identity or belonging with a place or community but abstain in origin-country elections. Waldinger and Soehl (2013) also show Mexicans abroad keep close social ties but show minimal political participation in Mexican elections (also see Smith and Bakker 2008, Finn and Besserer 2021). One explanation for belonging not translating into emigrant voting is migrants' different understandings of citizenship and its practices that shape migrants' identities (Pedroza and Palop-García 2017b, Pedroza 2019). While 'feeling Colombian' uses nationality to spur an identity and instigate ties to the origin country, attachment is not necessarily expressed through electoral participation. Perhaps territorial ties based on belonging increases voting ("I vote because it's still my country") more so than belonging from ties (e.g., being or feeling a certain nationality translates to an identity). Future studies can further unpack migrant belonging and ties, as related to participation.

One topic that may be of particular interest would be the convergence of movement in the typology toward dual transnational voting (see Section 4.2.1). What causes a migrant to move from abstention to voting, or from immigrant or emigrant voting to dual transnational voting? Institutions, political parties, media (traditional and digital), issue salience, or the electoral legal system in one or

both countries may influence migrant voting more than individual-level characteristics or life events. How do residence-country actors and institutions instigate immigrant voting? When could immigrant voting in the residence country instigate emigrant or dual transnational voting in the origin country? Once in the dual transnational voting quadrant, what keeps migrants motivated to continue voting in two countries? What obstacles do they face and overcome over time?

I suggest that having resources and ties increases the probability of being a migrant voter, that combining resources and a motive creates a sufficient condition for migrant voting, and that establishing multiterritorial roots increases the probability of being a dual transnational voter. However, none of these hypotheses directly explain a change in voting behavior. The political resocialization process can help to explain how migrants' relations with people and places change over time, which in turn, changes migrants' political behavior in two countries. During (re)socialization, both social and political agencies, as institutions and actors, play roles and affect migrants' attitudes, values, and behavior. Breaking down the political resocialization process, how and when do migrants start developing their new identity, belonging, and a sense of civic duty? When and how do state or political party-led campaigns connecting with migrants instigate, advance, or deter the process? How do interactions at religious gatherings, community groups, diaspora activities, and with migrant organizations affect connections?

The present findings also reveal the possibility that migrants develop and maintain multiple country-specific political identities. Migrants show extensive ability to separately analyze each country's political scene, candidates, and context; in parallel, such separation positioned their turnout in the origin and residence countries as independent non-causal decisions. Yet, I initially found that multiterritorial roots with people and places in two countries seem to relate to dual transnational voting. Developing multiple political identities, including self-identification of political ideology in both countries, and how they relate to migrant voting should be extended to other settings and examined with migrants from a variety of backgrounds.

The process of instigating migrant voting does not have to occur through active mobilization or targeted campaigns, but rather can emerge from the overall political ambience and from individual-level factors. Since political resocialization links conditions with outcomes, scholars can dissect the process to find causal mechanisms not only for migrant voting but for other types of migrant political engagement. Original panel data in the United States in McCann and Jones-Correa (2020) show that between 2016 and 2020 (during Trump's administration), both fear and anger toward the political arena positively relates to *higher* migrant civic engagement in protest and traditional routes of political

participation—these results hold across states, nationalities, and legal status, including undocumented immigrants. Given this high civic engagement by migrants without suffrage rights in national elections, combined with the significant number of naturalized individuals who can vote, indicates that many migrants and their children are active political insiders. The political scene affects their behavior, and their behavior affects politics and electoral outcomes. Moving forward—as exemplified by McCann and Jones-Correa's (2020) work—it is critical to understand motives not only for voting but also for nonconventional engagement and under what conditions migrants participate. It is also imperative to investigate the same immigrants' participation in the origin country, as emigrants.

It cannot be stated enough that migrant voters are unique from other voters due to the inherent duality of international migration and the spread of individuals being able to exercise political rights in more than one country. Rather than favoring origin or residence country engagement, moving forward, scholars must include both countries on par. The overarching goal of this work has been to guide intellectual discussion toward this nuanced and novel conceptualization, so that future scholars exploring migrant enfranchisement, voting, and political resocialization may continue the research advanced throughout these pages.

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Appendix

APPENDIX CHAPTER 1

Appendix 1.1 Migrant Voting Rights in Select Countries Worldwide, 2020

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="9">Non-Resident Citizen Suffrage Rights</td><td colspan="7">Foreign Resident Suffrage Rights</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td rowspan="2">None</td><td colspan="2">Only Local Level</td><td colspan="2">Multilevel</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" rowspan="2">None</td><td>Restricted</td><td>Universal</td><td>Restricted</td><td>Universal</td></tr>
<tr><td>Guatemala
Nicaragua
Suriname</td><td>Cyprus
Greece
Israel+
Malta</td><td>-</td><td>Barbados+
Belize
Guyana
Ireland*
St. Lucia
St. Vincent & Grenadines
Trinidad and Tobago</td><td>Ireland*
Malawi^
Uruguay^</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Only National Level</td><td>Restricted</td><td>Canada</td><td>Germany</td><td>Denmark
Iceland
Sweden</td><td>United Kingdom</td><td>-</td></tr>
<tr><td>Universal</td><td>Costa Rica
El Salvador
Honduras
Mexico
Panama
Switzerland
United States</td><td>Austria
Bolivia
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Italy
Latvia
Poland
Romania
Spain</td><td>Argentina
Belgium
Colombia
Estonia
Finland
Hungary
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Paraguay
Peru
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Korea
Venezuela</td><td>Australia
Brazil
Portugal</td><td>Chile
Ecuador
New Zealand</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Multi-level</td><td>Restricted</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>Norway</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr>
<tr><td>Universal</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td></td></tr>
</table>

Sources: Modified version based on Arrighi and Bauböck (2017: 24, Table 1), Earnest (2008), IDEA (2018), and national migration legislations.

Notes: Restricted means that suffrage is available only, e.g., to select migrants or in some locations abroad. *Ireland restricts foreign resident suffrage in national elections but is universal at the local level (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017: 24). The dissertation's two case studies are in bold. +In Barbados and Israel, only certain groups of citizens (e.g., public officials) can vote from abroad. ^In Malawi and Uruguay, citizens who reside abroad can vote, but only if they return to the origin country to do so.

APPENDIX CHAPTER 2

Appendix 2.1 Democracy Index Scores, Chile 1900–2015



Source: V-DEM (2020)

Appendix 2.2 Newspaper Search of 1924 and 1925, Chile

Interested in public discussion or announcements prior to Chile enfranchising foreign residents in the 1925 Constitution, I looked to Chile's National Digital Library (*Biblioteca Nacional Digital de Chile*, http://www.bibliotecanacionaldigital.gob.cl/bnd/633/w3-propertyname-661.html). In the 1924 and 1925 sections, many of the included newspapers are from later years (thus incorrectly placed in these years). From 1924 and 1925 the library offers the following five newspapers:

1. El Esfuerzo órgano oficial de la Federación Obrera Local
2. La Opinión de Peñaflor
3. Alborada
4. El Rayo Convención Bautista de Chile
5. Horizontes

From which a keyword search was done for four words:

1. extranjeros ('foreigners')
2. 'extrangeros' (how 'foreigners' was spelled until around the end of the 19th century)
3. emigrantes (emigrants)
4. ciudadanía (citizenship)

None of these keywords brought fruitful results. Only in Alborada on June 30, 1926, was there mention of a law on workers' insurance for both nationals and foreigners (Seguro Obrero Obligatorio, Ley 4.054). Another newspaper in print in the period of interest was the Mercurio, which began in 1822. However, since it is still in print as of July 2020, the archives are held within the newspaper's office. Due to Covid-19, unfortunately in-person archival fieldwork to review enfranchisement topics in these original prints was not possible.[86]

[86] I thank Germán Campos Herrera for his help on this digital archival work.

Appendix 2.3 Total Population and Foreign-Born, Chile Select Years 1907–1940



Sources: Based on INE (1907, 1920, 1930, 1940) and Gutiérrez Roldán (1975).

Appendix 2.4 Number of Foreign-Born by Sex, Chile Select Years 1907–1940



Sources: Based on INE (1907, 1920, 1930, 1940) and Gutiérrez Roldán (1975).

Appendix 2.5 Population of Foreign Residents as Voters, Chile Select Years 1907–2019

Census Year	Total Population	Number of Foreign-born	Percentage of Foreign-born in Total Population	Number of Foreign Residents Eligible to Vote	Legal Milestones in Suffrage Rights
1907	3,231,022	134,524	4.2%	0	National literate men 21 years old and older
1920	3,720,235	120,436	3.2%	0	
1930	4,287,445	105,513	2.5%	Unavailable	Foreign resident (literate men 21 years old+ with 5-year residence) added for municipal elections (1925)
1940	5,023,539	107,273	2.1%	Unavailable	Foreign residents and women (literate 21 years old+) added for municipal elections (1934)
1952	5,932,995	96,511	1.6%	Unavailable	Women added for national elections (1949)
1960	7,374,115	104,853	1.4%	Unavailable	
1970	8,884,768	90,441	1.0%	Unavailable	Voting age lowered to 18 (1969)
1982	1,1329,736	84,365	0.7%	Unavailable	Foreigners added for national elections (1980)
1992	13,348,401	105,070	0.8%	19,548*	
2002	15,116,435	187,008	1.2%	15,172*	Foreign residents automatically registered to vote after 5-year residence
2017	17,150,383	746,465	4.4%	267,116	

Sources: INE (1907; 1920; 1930; 1960; 1970; 1982; 1992; 2002; 2017); INE-DEM (2019); UN DESA (2019); Servel (1993; 2005; 2017); Chile Constitution 1833; Chile Constitution 1925,

Article 104; Law 5.357 of 1934; Law 9.292 of 1949; Law 17.284 of 1969; Chile Constitution 1980, Article 12; Law 20.568 Article 6 of 2012.

Notes: In 1930, the foreign population was recorded by sex and while Chile was home to 68,163 boys and men, I cannot say how many would have been eligible to vote (i.e., were literate men 21 years old and older with a 5-year residence). In 1940 and 1952, since women had been granted suffrage in municipal elections in 1934, foreign resident voters were counted with women voters, and I could not find a disaggregated data source. *Servel's historical data on registered foreign voters in the electorate (https://www.servel.cl/resumen-historico/) begins with the 1988 plebiscite, so the numbers reported here are for registered foreign voters in the 1993 then 2005 presidential elections. While Chile conducted a census in 2012, it was later considered invalid and its data unreliable, thus I exclude it.

Appendix 2.6 Advertisement Designed to Find Immigrant Respondents, Chile 2017

Notes: The image was advertised in color and reads "Immigrant in Chile? Your voice counts! A brief survey."

Appendix 2.7 Informed Consent Information and Form, (original in Spanish, followed by English)

Estimada/Estimado:

Muchas gracias por tomarse el tiempo de revisar este formulario en línea. Esta encuesta forma parte de una investigación científica cuyo objetivo es analizar el voto de los inmigrantes en Chile. En el siguiente enlace se adjunta el Consentimiento informado del Estudio, que ha sido revisado y aprobado por el Comité de Ética de Investigación de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales e Historia de la Universidad Diego Portales. En este documento se detalla el procedimiento de la investigación. Además, se detalla la confidencialidad de la encuesta. Es importante que usted sepa que su participación en esta investigación es completamente voluntaria. Además, su participación en la encuesta en línea será anónima y sus datos personales o lo que usted responda no serán conocidos por nadie; sus respuestas no quedan asociadas a su nombre. En el documento se encuentra también la información de contacto de la investigadora responsable, Victoria Finn. La encuesta tiene una duración aproximada de 7 minutos.

Título Proyecto: Participación electoral de los inmigrantes
Investigador Responsable: Victoria Finn
Unidad: Escuela de Ciencia Política de la Universidad Diego Portales

PRESENTACIÓN DEL ESTUDIO Y CONSENTIMIENTO

El propósito de esta información es ayudarle a tomar la decisión de participar o no en una **encuesta en línea** que forma parte de una investigación científica cuyo objetivo es analizar el voto de los inmigrantes en Chile, su interés en la política, sus vínculos sociales, y su conocimiento sobre el derecho a voto en Chile.

Procedimientos de la investigación: Su participación consiste en responder de manera individual un cuestionario en línea, actividad que implicará destinar aproximadamente unos siete minutos. El cuestionario trata temas relativos a vínculos sociales, al voto en elecciones nacionales y a su conocimiento sobre el derecho a voto; sus ideas respecto al voto de los inmigrantes, interés en política y su experiencia como inmigrante en Chile.

Beneficios: Usted no obtendrá beneficios personales por participar en esta investigación. Sin embargo, la información que usted nos entregue será de gran valor para conocer más sobre el interés

en política y el voto de los inmigrantes en Chile, lo que podría ayudar a otras personas como usted en relación a los vínculos sociales y políticos de inmigrantes y sus grupos con chilenos.

Riesgos: No anticipamos riesgos asociados a su participación en este estudio; en el caso de que alguna de las preguntas le produzca incomodidad, no dude en contactar al investigador responsable quien le orientará hacia la o las personas que podrían aconsejarla. Usted puede dejar de responder el cuestionario en cualquier momento.

Confidencialidad de la información: Es importante que usted sepa que su participación en la encuesta en línea será anónima y sus datos personales o lo que usted responda no serán conocidos por nadie; sus respuestas no quedan asociadas a su nombre. Toda la información que usted entregue será usada para propósitos exclusivamente académicos y conocida sólo por los miembros del equipo de investigadores. Los resultados obtenidos serán publicados en revistas académicas o libros y podrían ser presentados en conferencias, sin embargo, la identidad de las personas entrevistadas no será revelada. Los datos obtenidos de su participación y de la de otras personas que contesten este cuestionario, serán almacenados por cinco años en las dependencias de la Escuela de Ciencia Política de la Universidad Diego Portales, ubicada en Avenida Ejército Libertador 333, Santiago, Chile.

Voluntariedad: Su participación en esta investigación es completamente voluntaria. Usted tiene derecho a no aceptar participar o a retirar su consentimiento de participación en el momento que así lo decida, sin mediar explicación y sin consecuencia para usted.

Preguntas: Si tiene preguntas acerca de esta investigación, puede contactar a la investigadora responsable; Victoria Finn, Teléfono +56950015845; correo electrónico: victoria.finn@mail.udp.cl. Esta investigación ha sido revisada y aprobada por el Comité de Ética en Investigación de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales e Historia de la Universidad Diego Portales. Si usted tiene alguna duda, pregunta o reclamo, o si considera que sus derechos no han sido respetados, puede contactar al Comité de Ética de la Ciencia Política de la Universidad Diego Portales (comitedeetica@mail.udp.cl) dirección: Manuel Rodríguez Sur 415. Teléfono: 26762197.

Informed Consent, Translated to English

Thank you very much for taking the time to review this online consent form. This survey is part of a scientific research project with an objective is to analyze immigrant voting in Chile. In the following link you will find the study's Informed Consent, which has been reviewed and approved by

the Research Ethics Committee at the Faculty of Social Sciences and History at the Diego Portales University. This document details the research project. In addition, it also explained the confidentiality for survey respondents. It is important for you to know that your participation in this research is completely voluntary. Moreover, your participation in the online survey will be anonymous and your personal information and answers will not be made known to anyone; your answers will not be associated with your name. The document also contains the contact information of the responsible researcher, Victoria Finn. The survey takes approximately 7 minutes to complete.

THE RESEARCH PROJECT AND CONSENT

The purpose of the following information is to help you decide to participate or not in an online survey, which is part of a scientific research project with an objective to analyze immigrant voting in Chile, immigrants' interest in politics, social ties, and knowledge about the right to vote in Chile.

Research project procedures: Your participation consists of individually answering an online questionnaire, an activity requiring approximately seven minutes. The questionnaire addresses issues related to social ties, voting in national elections, and your knowledge about the right to vote, as well as your views on immigrant voting, interest in politics, and experience as an immigrant in Chile.

Benefits: You will not receive personal benefits from participating in this research. However, the information you provide will be of great value in learning more about immigrant political interest and voting in Chile, which may help others such as yourself regarding the social and political ties of immigrants and their group relations with Chileans.

Risks: We do not anticipate any risks associated with your participation in this study; in the event that you are uncomfortable answering any of the questions, please do not hesitate to contact the responsible researcher who will direct you to the person(s) who can assist you. You may stop answering the questionnaire at any time.

Confidentiality: It is important for you to know that your participation in the online survey will be anonymous and your personal data and answers will not be known to anyone, since your answers are not associated with your name. All information you provide will be used exclusively for academic purposes and known only to the members of the research team. The results obtained will be published in academic journals or books and may be presented at conferences; however, the identity of the persons interviewed will not be revealed. The data obtained from your participation and that of others

who answer this questionnaire will be stored for five years on the premises of the School of Political Science of the Diego Portales University, located at Avenida Ejército Libertador 333, Santiago, Chile.

Voluntary: Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You have the right to not accept to participate or withdraw your consent to participate any time you want, without explanation or facing consequences.

Questions: If you have questions about this research, you may contact the researcher in charge of the research project, Victoria Finn: by phone +56950015845 or by email: victoria.finn@mail.udp.cl. This research has been reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics Committee at the Faculty of Social Sciences and History at the Diego Portales University. If you have any questions or complaints, or if you consider that your rights have not been respected in any way, you may contact the Political Science Ethics Committee at the Diego Portales University (comitedeetica@mail.udp.cl), at the following address: Manuel Rodríguez Sur 415, or by telephone: 26762197.

Appendix 2.8 Online Survey Questionnaire, Conducted November and December 2017 in Chile (original in Spanish, followed by English)

Original Survey Questions

Pre-Pregunta1 ¿Acepta participar en este estudio bajo las condiciones previamente indicadas?

- Sí
- No

Pre-P2 Cuando este estudio termine, ¿desea recibir un resumen ejecutivo de sus resultados y/o una copia de la eventual publicación que se realice?

- No
- Sí. Indique su dirección de correo electrónico: ______________________________

P1 ¿Cuántos años tiene usted? ____________

P2 ¿En qué año llegó usted a Chile? ____________

P3 ¿Cuál es su género?

- Femenino
- Masculino
- Otro

- Prefiero no responder.

P4 ¿En qué país nació usted?

- Argentina
- Bolivia
- Brasil
- Chile
- China
- Colombia
- Ecuador
- España
- Estados Unidos
- Haití
- Perú
- Venezuela
- Otro

P4a Por favor, indique su país de origen. _____________

P5 ¿Por cuantos años más cree usted que vivirá en Chile?

- Menos de un año
- 1–4 años
- 5–10 años
- Por siempre.
- No sé.
- No vivo en Chile.

P6 En Chile durante los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha sido usted o alguien de su hogar tratado injustamente o discriminado/a, por una persona chilena, debido a: ...?

	Nunca	1–2 veces	3–5 veces	Muchas veces
Nivel socioeconómico	○	○	○	○
Su ropa	○	○	○	○
Su color de piel	○	○	○	○
Ser inmigrante o extranjero/a	○	○	○	○
Sus creencias o religión	○	○	○	○
Su manera de hablar	○	○	○	○

P7 Pensando en sus ingresos y en los de su grupo familiar, ¿cuál de las siguientes alternativas describe mejor su situación actual?

- No alcanzamos a cubrir nuestras necesidades.
- Cubrimos nuestras necesidades básicas y nada más.
- Nos permite darnos pequeños gustos.
- Nos permite vivir cómodamente.

P8 Cuando usted conversa *en español* (castellano) en Chile, ¿puede comunicarse de forma clara y coherente?

- Siempre
- Frecuentemente
- Algunas veces
- Rara vez
- Nunca
- No sé.

P9 ¿Cómo están compuestos los siguientes grupos en los que usted participa activamente?

	No estoy en dicho grupo	En su mayoría son chilenos	En su mayoría son de mi país de origen	En su mayoría son de otros países
Colegas y compañeros de trabajo	○	○	○	○
Vecinos del barrio	○	○	○	○
Amigos	○	○	○	○
Familia	○	○	○	○
Centro de padres y apoderados	○	○	○	○
En mi iglesia u organización religiosa	○	○	○	○
Club deportivo o recreativo	○	○	○	○
Grupo de comunidad (juntas de vecinos, comité de aguas, comité de allegados, otros)	○	○	○	○
Agrupaciones artísticas o culturales (grupo folclórico, de teatro, de música, de baile, de danza, otros)	○	○	○	○
Grupo político o ideológico (partido político, movimiento político, otros)	○	○	○	○

P10 Mi nivel más alto de educación completado es (seleccione uno):

- o Nunca asistió a la escuela
- o Básica/Primaria
- o Media
- o Colegio/Superior
- o Formación técnica, comercial, industrial
- o Estudios en una institución profesional

- Pregrado
- Posgrado
- Doctorado

P11 Actualmente, ¿cuál es su principal actividad económica?

- Tengo un trabajo estable.
- Tengo un trabajo esporádico (temporero).
- Estoy cesante y buscando trabajo.
- Estoy cesante, pero no busco trabajo.
- Estudio y trabajo.
- Solo estudio.
- Soy jubilado/a o pensionado/a.
- Ni trabajo, ni estudio.

P11a ¿Qué tipo de contrato de trabajo tiene usted?

- Temporario
- Permanente
- No tengo un contrato formal.
- No recibo un sueldo pagado.
- No lo sé.
- Otro tipo

P12 ¿Cuál de los siguientes medios de comunicación consume normalmente usted—y de dónde? (seleccione *todos* los relevantes)

	No consumo dicho medio	Chilenos	De mi país de origen
Diarios/periódicos (incluso en la red/online/digital)	☐	☐	☐
Noticieros de television	☐	☐	☐
Programas de radio	☐	☐	☐
Media social (por ejemplo, en Twitter o Facebook)	☐	☐	☐

P13 ¿Cuál de los siguientes medios de comunicación *políticos* consume normalmente usted—y de dónde? (seleccione *todos* los relevantes)

	No consumo dicho medio	Chilenos	De mi país de origen
Diarios/periódicos (incluso en la red/online/digital)	☐	☐	☐
Noticieros de television	☐	☐	☐
Programas de radio	☐	☐	☐
Media social (por ejemplo, en Twitter o Facebook)	☐	☐	☐

P14 ¿Cuán interesado/a está usted en política?

- o Muy interesado/a
- o Poco interesado/a
- o Desinteresado/a
- o Complemente desinteresado/a

P15 ¿Usted tiene el derecho a voto en las próximas elecciones presidenciales en Chile?

- o Sí
- o No
- o No lo sé.

P16 En el pasado, ¿ha votado usted en por lo menos una elección presidencial *en su país de origen*?

- o Sí
- o No

P17 Mientras usted viva en Chile, ¿votará desde aquí en la próxima elección presidencial *en su país de origen*?

- o Sí
- o No

P17a ¿Por qué no votará desde aquí en la próxima elección presidencial en su país de origen?

___

P18 En el pasado, ¿ha votado usted en por lo menos una elección presidencial *en Chile*?

- o Sí

- No

P19 ¿Votará en la próxima elección presidencial *en Chile*?

- Sí
- No

P19a ¿Por qué no votará en la próxima elección presidencial en Chile?

P20 grupo 1 En Chile, los inmigrantes tienen el derecho a voto después de haber vivido legalmente 5 años en el país. El gobierno chileno da dicho derecho porque está muy interesado en escuchar voces como la suya. Supongamos que usted ya tiene el derecho a voto, ¿votaría usted en la elección presidencial del 19 de noviembre de 2017 en Chile?

- Sí
- No

P20a ¿Por qué no votaría?

P20b ¿Por quién votará usted en la próxima elección presidencial en Chile?

- José Antonio Kast
- Alejandro Guillier Álvarez
- José Antonio Kast
- Alejandro Navarro Brain
- Carolina Goic Boroevic
- Marco Enríquez-Ominami
- Beatriz Sánchez Muñoz
- Sebastián Piñera Echenique

P20 grupo 2 En Chile, los inmigrantes tienen el derecho a voto después de haber vivido legalmente 5 años en el país. El gobierno chileno da dicho derecho porque está muy interesado en escuchar voces, como la suya. Imagine que ya varias personas en su grupo de comunidad—como sus amigos, vecinos, colegas o familia—han conversado frecuentemente con usted sobre la importancia de votar para representar los inmigrantes/no-chilenos en la democracia chilena. Supongamos que usted ya tiene el derecho a voto, ¿votaría usted en la elección presidencial del 19 de noviembre de 2017 en Chile?

- Sí
- No

P20c ¿Por qué no votaría?

____

P20d ¿Por quién votará usted en la próxima elección presidencial en Chile?

- José Antonio Kast
- Alejandro Guillier Álvarez
- José Antonio Kast
- Alejandro Navarro Brain
- Carolina Goic Boroevic
- Marco Enríquez-Ominami
- Beatriz Sánchez Muñoz
- Sebastián Piñera Echenique

Survey Questions, translated to English

Pre-Question1 Do you accept participating in this study under the previously listed conditions?

- Yes
- No

Pre-Q2 When this study is finished, would you like a summary of the survey results and/or the eventual publication?[87]

- No
- Yes. Note your email address: ____________________________________

Q1 How old are you? ______________[88]

Q2 In which year did you arrive in Chile? ______________

Q3 What is your gender?

- Female
- Male
- Other

[87] As stated here, on February 6, 2018, I emailed a summary of the survey results to all 1,043 Respondents who had left their email address (of which 41 were returned to me as incorrect or unfound email addresses). The Executive Summary was a three-page document thanking them for their participation and presenting the demographic and electoral participation results.

[88] Such a line indicates an open-ended response hence Respondents could write in their answers.

- I prefer not to answer.

Q4 In which country were you born?

- Argentina
- Bolivia
- Brazil
- Chile
- China
- Colombia
- Ecuador
- Haiti
- Perú
- Spain
- United States
- Venezuela
- Other

Q4a In the case of 'Other', please write your origin country. _____________

Q5 For how many more years do you plan on living in Chile?

- Less than a year
- 1–4 years
- 5–10 years
- Forever.
- I don't know.
- I don't live in Chile.[89]

[89] If the Respondent selected "I don't live in Chile," the survey closed.

Q6 Over the last 12 months in Chile, have you or someone in your household been treated unfairly or discriminated against by a Chilean, for:

	Never	1–2 times	3–5 times	Many times
Socioeconomic standing	○	○	○	○
Your clothing	○	○	○	○
Your skin color	○	○	○	○
Being an immigrant or foreigner	○	○	○	○
Your beliefs or religion	○	○	○	○
Your way of speaking	○	○	○	○

Q7 Considering your household income, which of the following best describe your current financial situation?

- o We don't cover our basic needs.
- o We cover our basic needs but nothing more.
- o Our income allows for a treat now and again.
- o Our income allows us to live comfortably.

Q8 When you speak Spanish in Chile, how often are you able to communicate clearly and coherently?

- o Always
- o Frequently
- o Sometimes
- o Rarely
- o Never
- o I don't know.

Q9 Of the following groups, in which do you participate and how would you best describe your fellow members?

	I'm not in this group	Mostly Chileans	Mostly from my origin country	Mostly from other countries
Colleagues	○	○	○	○
Neighbors	○	○	○	○
Friends	○	○	○	○
Family	○	○	○	○
School board or parents' school groups	○	○	○	○
In my church or religious group	○	○	○	○
Sports or recreational clubs	○	○	○	○
Community groups (for example, neighborhood groups)	○	○	○	○
Cultural or artistic groups (folklore, theater, music, dance, others)	○	○	○	○
Political or ideological group (political party, movement, others)	○	○	○	○

Q10 My highest completed level of education is (choose one):

- o I never went to school.
- o Primary school
- o Middle school
- o High school
- o Technical training in trade or industrial
- o Professional training

- Undergraduate degree
- Postgraduate degree
- Doctoral degree

Q11 What is your main current economic activity right now?

- I have a steady job.
- I have a temporary or sporadic job.
- I'm unemployed and looking for work.
- I'm unemployed but not looking for work.
- I study and work.
- I only study.
- I'm retired.
- I'm not working or studying.

Q11a What type of employment contract do you have?

- Temporary
- Permanent
- I don't have a formal contract.
- I am not paid for my work.
- I don't know.
- I have another type of contract.

Q12 Which of the following media outlets do you normally use? (Select all that apply)

	I don't use this	Chilean	From my origin country
Newspapers (including online/digital versions)	☐	☐	☐
Television news	☐	☐	☐
Radio programs	☐	☐	☐
Social media (for example, Twitter or Facebook)	☐	☐	☐

Q13 Which of the following *political* media outlets do you normally use? (Select all that apply)

	I don't use this	Chilean	From my origin country
Newspapers (including online/digital versions)	☐	☐	☐
Television news	☐	☐	☐
Radio programs	☐	☐	☐
Social media (for example, Twitter or Facebook)	☐	☐	☐

Q14 How interested are you in politics?

- o Very interested
- o Somewhat interested
- o Uninterested
- o Very uninterested

Q15 Do you have the right to vote in the upcoming presidential elections in Chile?

- o Yes
- o No
- o I don't know.

Q16 In the past, have you voted at least once in a presidential election in your *origin country*?

- o Yes
- o No

Q17 While living in Chile, will you vote from here in the next presidential election in your *origin country*?

- o Yes
- o No

Q17a Why will you not vote from here in the next presidential election in your origin country?

____

Q18 In the past, have you voted at least once in a presidential election *in Chile*?

- o Yes
- o No

Q19 Will you vote in the upcoming presidential election *in Chile*?

- Yes
- No

Q19a Why will you not vote in the upcoming presidential election in Chile?

Q20 group 1 In Chile, immigrants have the right to vote after legally living in the country for five years. The Chilean government gives this right because it is interested in hearing voices, such as yours. Suppose that you already had the right to vote; would you vote in the presidential election on November 19, 2017 in Chile?

- Yes
- No

Q20a Why would you not vote?

Q20b For whom will you vote in the upcoming presidential election in Chile?[90]

- José Antonio Kast
- Alejandro Guillier Álvarez
- José Antonio Kast
- Alejandro Navarro Brain
- Carolina Goic Boroevic
- Marco Enríquez-Ominami
- Beatriz Sánchez Muñoz
- Sebastián Piñera Echenique

Q20 group 2[91] In Chile, immigrants have the right to vote after legally living in the country for five years. The Chilean government gives this right because it is interested in hearing voices, such as yours. Imagine that numerous people in your community—such as friends, neighbors, colleagues, or family—had frequently spoken to you about how important it is to vote in order to represent

[90] Note that I used the Qualtrics feature to randomize the order of the candidate list (eight in the first round, two in the second round.)

[91] This question includes the treatment, which is the extra phrase about social network influence on the individual decision to exercise suffrage.

immigrants/non-Chileans en the Chilean democracy. Suppose that you already had the right to vote; would you vote in the presidential election on November 19, 2017 in Chile?

- Yes
- No

Q20c Why would you not vote?

Q20d For whom will you vote in the upcoming presidential election in Chile?[92]

- José Antonio Kast
- Alejandro Guillier Álvarez
- José Antonio Kast
- Alejandro Navarro Brain
- Carolina Goic Boroevic
- Marco Enríquez-Ominami
- Beatriz Sánchez Muñoz
- Sebastián Piñera Echenique

92 Again, the candidate list was randomized.

Appendix 2.9 Immigrants in Chile: Nationality, Age, and Region, 2017

Number and Nationality of Immigrants in Chile, 2017		
Country of Birth (from most to least represented)	Number	Percentage within Total Immigrant Population
Peru	187,756	25.2%
Colombia	105,445	14.1%
Venezuela	83,045	11.1%
Bolivia	73,796	9.9%
Argentina	66,491	8.9%
Haiti	62,683	8.4%
Ecuador	27,692	3.7%
Spain	16,675	2.2%
Brazil	14,227	1.9%
United States	12,323	1.7%
Dominican Republic	11,926	1.6%
China	9,213	1.2%
Cuba	6,718	0.9%
Mexico	5,806	0.8%
Germany	5,736	0.8%
France	5,447	0.7%
Uruguay	5,172	0.7%
Paraguay	4,492	0.6%
Italy	4,097	0.5%
Other country	34,243	4.6%
No country reported	3,482	0.5%
Total	746,465	100%

Age Groups of Immigrants Versus Total Residents in Chile, 2017				
Age Groups	Number of Total Population	Number of Foreign-Born Residents	Foreign-Born Residents, per Age Group (Percentage of Total Population)	Foreign-Born Residents, per Age Group (Percentage of Total Foreigners)
0–14 years old	3,402,123	78,839	2.3%	10.6%
15–64 years old	11,792,868	640,925	5.4%	85.8%
65+ years old	1,955,392	26,701	1.3%	3.6%
Total	17,150,383	746,465	4.3%	100%

Number, Sex, and Percentage of Immigrants in Total Population in Chile, 2017					
Region of Residence	Total Population	Total Number of Immigrants	Number of Immigrant Men	Number of Immigrant Women	Percentage of Immigrants of Total Population, per Region
Arica and Parinacota	220,254	18,015	8,117	9,898	8.2%
Tarapacá	319,289	43,646	20,360	23,286	13.7%
Antofagasta	571,446	62,663	28,604	34,059	11.0%
Atacama	282,268	8,798	4,226	4,572	3.1%
Coquimbo	739,977	14,741	7,381	7,360	2.0%
Valparaíso	1,765,261	40,166	20,586	19,580	2.3%
Santiago Metropolitan	6,962,102	486,568	243,502	243,066	7.0%
O'Higgins	893,155	13,242	6,962	6,280	1.5%
Maule	1,020,162	10,780	5,773	5,007	1.1%
Ñuble	469,542	3,736	1,987	1,749	0.8%
Biobío	1,531,365	12,144	6,094	6,050	0.8%
Araucanía	929,307	10,674	5,298	5,376	1.1%
Los Ríos	371,518	3,768	1,926	1,842	1.0%
Los Lagos	807,046	10,034	4,898	5,136	1.2%
Aysén	98,427	2,083	932	1,151	2.1%
Magallanes and the Chilean Antarctica	160,220	4,714	2,103	2,611	2.9%
Total	17,141,339	745,772	368,749	377,023	4.4% (average)

Source: INE (2018).

Appendix 2.10 Descriptive Characteristics of Survey Respondents, Chile, N=650

Variables	Responses	Number of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Knowledge of voting rights in the residence country	Yes	377	57.3%
	No	176	26.7%
	I don't know	105	16.0%
Linguistic communication	High	409	62.2%
	Low	249	37.8%
Interest in politics	Uninterested	70	10.6%
	Somewhat interested	254	38.6%
	Very interested	334	50.8%
Intention to stay	Short, 0–5 years	49	7.4%
	Medium, 6–10 years	79	12.0%
	Long, >10–forever	322	48.9%
	I don't know	208	31.6%
Tenure in the residence country	Medium, 6–10 years	301	45.7%
	Long, 11–>20 years	357	54.3%
Age	16–24	32	4.9%
	25–33	118	17.9%
	34–42	214	32.5%
	43–50	138	21.0%
	> 50	156	23.7%
Education	High school or less	211	32.1%
	Professional training	222	33.7%
	University	225	34.2%
Sex	Woman	414	62.9%
	Man	244	37.1%
Socioeconomic status	Low	214	32.5%
	Medium	249	37.8%
	High	191	29.0%
Top origin countries	Colombia	145	22.0%
	Peru	187	28.4%

	Venezuela	38	5.8%
External voting rights	No	46	7.0%
	Yes	612	93.0%
Subsample	November	336	51.1%
	December	322	48.9%
Total		650	100%

Source: Adapted from Finn (2020a).

Notes: Short tenure (0–5 years) is excluded because these individuals would not have gained immigrant voting rights yet in Chile.

Appendix 2.11 Multinomial Logistic Regression Results by Migrant Voting Types, Prior Voting N=658

Variables	**Responses**	**Abstention**	**Immigrant Voting**	**Dual Transnational Voting**
Knowledge of voting rights in the residence country	Yes	0.46 (0.27)	4.41*** (1.06)	4.98*** (0.50)
	No/I don't know (base category)	.	.	.
Linguistic communication	High (base category)	.	.	.
	Low	0.40 (0.27)	0.06 (0.47)	-0.26 (0.26)
Interest in politics	Uninterested	0.49 (0.40)	-0.58 (0.89)	-1.61** (0.49)
	Somewhat interested	0.55* (0.28)	0.17 (0.47)	-0.57* (0.27)
	Very interested (base category)	.	.	.
Intention to stay	Short, 0–5 years	0.49 (0.44)	-0.98 (1.15)	0.19 (0.49)
	Medium, 6–10 years (base category)	.	.	.
	Long, >10–forever	0.35 (0.38)	-0.37 (0.73)	0.04 (0.43)

	I don't know	-0.05 (0.29)	-0.50 (0.52)	0.00 (0.28)
Tenure in the residence country	Medium, 6–10 years	-0.79** (0.29)	-1.37** (0.51)	-0.92*** (0.28)
	Long, 11–>20 years (base category)	.	.	.
Age	16–24	1.84*** (0.47)	0.67 (1.21)	-0.15 (0.76)
	25–33	0.17 (0.36)	0.59 (0.63)	-0.18 (0.39)
	34–42 (base category)	.	.	.
	43–50	-0.15 (0.37)	-0.07 (0.59)	0.52 (0.34)
	> 50	-0.29 (0.38)	-0.78 (0.62)	0.38 (0.34)
Education	High school or less	-0.05 (0.32)	-0.98 (0.59)	-0.03 (0.32)
	Professional training	-0.04 (0.33)	0.11 (0.50)	0.32 (0.30)
	University (base category)	.	.	.
Sex	Woman	0.10 (0.26)	-0.59 (0.45)	0.07 (0.26)
	Man (base category)	.	.	.
Have emigrant voting rights	Yes (base category)	.	.	.
	No	-1.02 (0.53)	-1.34 (0.67)	0.28 (0.55)
Top origin countries	Colombia	0.18 (0.32)	-0.72 (0.59)	-0.53 (0.35)
	Peru	-0.82* (0.34)	-1.63* (0.65)	-0.34 (0.31)
	Venezuela	-1.13	-16.55	-0.72

		(0.79)	(2154.1)	(0.57)
Subsample	November	0.07 (0.28)	-0.11 (0.46)	-1.03*** (0.27)
	December (base category)	.	.	.
Intercept		-0.71 (0.61)	-2.41 (1.30)	-3.18*** (0.77)
	Log-likelihood	-521.6		
	Chi-square	460.96		
	McFadden Test	0.31		
	N	*650*		

Source: Adapted from Finn (2020a).

Notes: Significance level: *<0.05, ** <0.01, *** <0.001; standard errors are in parentheses. Emigrant voting is the reference category since this is the most populated quadrant in the respondent group; all other base categories for answers are marked with a period (.); the reference categories were chosen because they were the most selected response, except for sex, using man as the base category. Short tenure (0–5 years) is excluded altogether because these individuals would not have gained immigrant voting rights yet in Chile. As a non-probabilistic sample, the results apply only to this group of 658 Respondents.

APPENDIX CHAPTER 3

Appendix 3.1 Percentage of Select Foreign Residents in Total Immigrants, Ecuador, 1997–2018



Sources: Based on data from the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses, Ecuador (INEC 2020).

Notes: The selected origin countries are listed in order of size of immigrant population in Ecuador, with Colombians being the largest group and Cubans the smallest.

Appendix 3.2 Percentage of Foreign Residents in Total Population, Ecuador, select years 1960–2015



Source: World Bank.

Notes: The top three stocks by nationality in Ecuador come from Colombia, the United States, and followed by Peru. The graph further depicts percentage stocks of Chile, Venezuela, and Cuba since these are the selected origin countries in the present study.

Appendix 3.3 Interviewed Migrants' Year of Arrival to Ecuador, Traditional Versus Emergent Waves, 1979–2019, N=71



Notes: More Respondents arrived during the traditional wave, given its longer time span and its relative importance for the present study of socialization in nondemocracy. I separate the most emergent wave since these foreign residents have not yet reached the five-year residence requirement to gain suffrage rights in Ecuador, thus cannot partake in immigrant voting.

Appendix 3.4 Selection Requirements for Choosing Interviewees, (original in Spanish, followed by English)

1. Requisitos mínimos (obligatorios)
   - Individuos de 18 años o más.
   - Residentes o ciudadanos con doble ciudadanía en Ecuador, pero que hayan nacido en el extranjero, con padre y/o madre no-ecuatoriano/a.
   - Individuos que lleven al menos cinco años con residencia ininterrumpida en Ecuador (*con la excepción de la última ola de llegada de venezolanos).

- Extranjeros residentes pertenecientes a las siguientes diásporas: colombiano/a, cubano/a, chileno/a, español/a, peruano/a, venezolano/a.

2. Requisitos secundarios (facultativos)
   - Individuos que migraron a Ecuador desde su respectivo país de origen (i.e. Chile, Colombia, Cuba, España, Perú o Venezuela) entre 1979 a 2014.
   - Individuos que hayan votado, por lo menos, una vez en el pasado en elecciones ecuatorianas a nivel nacional (sea presidenciales, legislativas o para la elección de los miembros del CPCCS).

3. Características a considerar dentro para la muestra
   - La muestra tiene que reflejar una proporción equitativa entre hombres y mujeres a la población estimada de la diáspora en Ecuador.
   - La muestra tiene que estar compuesta proporcionalmente por las dos olas de migración: emergente (2008–2018) y tradicional (1979–2007).
   - En la muestra tiene que haber un balance en relación a la edad. No es admisible que la muestra se concentre en un rango determinado de edad, sino idealmente que haya un equilibrio entre el número y los rangos de edad.
   - La muestra debe estar compuesta de residentes de distintas ciudades de Ecuador. En consecuencia, no pueden ser (casi) todos elegidos en la misma ciudad. Las áreas rurales también cuentan como diversidad geográfica.
   - La muestra no puede estar compuesta por individuos con lazos familiares directos (hermanos, padres, hijos o primos de primer grado de consanguineidad). En otras palabras, los participantes (entrevistados) no deben estar emparentados o ser miembros de la misma familia.
   - La doble nacionalidad no cuenta, si el entrevistado nació en Ecuador.
   - Tener cuidado especial con los refugiados, ya que la mayoría de ellos tienen otro estatus legal y por ende, otros derechos políticos-electorales, tanto en su país de origen como en su país de destino.

Requirements, translated to English

1. Minimum Requirements (mandatory)
   - Individuals 18 years old and older.

- Residents or citizens with dual citizenship in Ecuador, but who were born abroad, to a non-Ecuadorian father or mother.
- Individuals with at least five years of uninterrupted residence in Ecuador (*with the exception of the last arrival wave of Venezuelans).
- Foreign residents belonging to at least one of the following nationalities: Colombian, Cuban, Chilean, Spanish, Peruvian, or Venezuelan.

2. <u>Secondary requirements (optional)</u>

- Individuals who migrated to Ecuador from their respective countries of origin (i.e. Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Spain, Peru, or Venezuela) between 1979 and 2014.
- Individuals who have voted at least once in the past in Ecuadorian elections at the national level (either presidential, legislative, or to elect CPCCS members).

3. <u>Characteristics to consider within the selected group</u>

- The group should aim to reflect a balanced gender ratio within each target nationality population in Ecuador.
- The group should be relatively balanced between the two waves of immigration: emerging (2008–2018) and traditional (1979–2007).
- The group must be balanced regarding age. It is unacceptable to concentrate only on particular age ranges; ideally a balance should exist between the age and age ranges.
- The group should be composed of residents from different cities in Ecuador. Consequently, (almost) all should not be selected within the same city. Rural areas also count as geographical diversity.
- The group cannot contain individuals with direct family ties (siblings, parents, children, or first cousins). In other words, the Participants (Respondents) must not be related or be members of the same family.
- Dual nationality does not count if the Interviewee was born in Ecuador.
- Pay special attention to refugees since their legal status differs, therefore most have a different set of political-electoral rights, both in their origin country and the residence country.

Appendix 3.5 Informed Consent Information and Form, (original in Spanish, followed by English)

CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO

Estimado/a Sr./Sra./Srta.: ____

Usted ha sido invitado/a a participar en la investigación "Democracia, ideología y partidismo en perspectiva transnacional. Evidencia del voto migrante desde y en Ecuador (1979–2018)", dirigido por los investigadores de la Universidad Casa Grande (Ecuador), Sebastián Umpierrez de Reguero y Gabriela Baquerizo Neira, y apoyado por Victoria Finn de la Universidad Diego Portales (Chile) y la Universidad de Leiden (Holanda), como investigadora externa. El objetivo de esta investigación académica es contribuir al acervo bibliográfico del voto migrante, sobre todo porque Ecuador permite que sus extranjeros residentes puedan participar en elecciones nacionales. Por intermedio de este documento se le está solicitando que participe en esta investigación al ser un actor relevante en el tema de estudio. El propósito de esta investigación es identificar patrones sobre el voto migrante y la relación con la democracia, la ideología y la identificación partidaria de los posibles votantes chileno/as, colombiano/as, cubano/as, español/as, peruano/as y venezolano/as a través del tiempo. En resumen, los objetivos de la investigación y del proyecto son estrictamente académicos universitarios; no tenemos ninguna vinculación con el gobierno de ningún país.

Su participación es voluntaria, consistirá en responder a una entrevista de diseño semi-estructurado, que se podrá realizar entre agosto a octubre de 2019. Esta investigación tiene fines académicos, eso significa que se guardará el derecho de anonimato y confidencialidad de sus respuestas. Se codificará sus respuestas antes de publicar cualquier resultado derivado de las entrevistas con el propósito de que su nombre, carrera y reputación no sufra ningún tipo de efecto colateral por su colaboración en esta investigación (i.e. su nombre no aparecerá en ninguna publicación). Para ello, una vez transcrita de forma literal la entrevista, se va a revisar la información proporcionada entre el equipo de investigación y se crearán códigos numéricos para cada entrevista con la meta de guardar procesos de fidelidad. El almacenamiento de la codificación estará a cargo de los investigadores del proyecto. Usted, en caso de necesitarla, puede obtener una copia del documento transcrito. El participar en este estudio no tiene costos para usted ni recibirá ningún pago de parte nuestra por su participación. Usted puede negarse a participar en cualquier momento del estudio y también podrá elegir qué preguntas del cuestionario contestar y a cuáles abstenerse, lo que no perjudicará ni tendrá consecuencias para Usted.

La información obtenida se va a utilizar en producción científica (universitaria), respetando los criterios arriba indicados. En caso de existir publicaciones académicas, podrá solicitar una copia

electrónica o ejemplar del documento a los investigadores. Su colaboración en esta investigación es muy importante para nosotros. Si tiene dudas o consultas respecto de su participación en la investigación puede contactar a los investigadores responsables de este estudio, PhD. Gabriela Baquerizo Neira y PhD. (c) Sebastián Umpierrez de Reguero, que trabajan en la Universidad Casa Grande con dirección: Avda. Las Palmas # 304 y calle 4ta, ciudadela Miraflores, Guayaquil-Ecuador. Teléfono de contacto: 593-4-2202180.

Parte del procedimiento normal en este tipo de investigación es informar a los participantes y solicitar su autorización. Para ello le solicitamos contestar y devolver firmada la hoja adjunta (ACTA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO) a la brevedad.

Quedando claro los objetivos del estudio, las garantías de confidencialidad y la aclaración de la información, acepto voluntariamente participar de la investigación, firmando la siguiente autorización.

ACTA CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO

Yo……………………………………………………………, Número del Documento de Identidad/Pasaporte.………………………………….., acepto participar voluntaria y anónimamente en la investigación "Democracia, Ideología y Partidismo en Perspectiva Transnacional: Evidencia del Voto Migrante desde y en Ecuador (1979–2018)", dirigida por los docentes investigadores de la Universidad Casa Grande (Ecuador), PhD. Gabriela Baquerizo Neira y PhD (c). Sebastián Umpierrez de Reguero, en conjunto con PhD (c). Victoria Finn de la Universidad Diego Portales (Chile) y la Universidad de Leiden (Holanda).

Declaro haber sido informado/a de los objetivos y procedimientos del estudio y del tipo de participación que se me solicita. En relación a ello, acepto participar en una entrevista que se realizará durante el periodo entre agosto a octubre de 2019. Declaro saber que la información entregada será confidencial y anónima. La información que se obtenga será guardada y analizada por el equipo de investigación, resguardada en las dependencias de la Universidad Casa Grande y su utilización será para fines académicos y producción científica.

Nombre del/ de la Participante	Nombre de la Investigadora
Firma	Firma
Fecha	Fecha

Informed Consent Information and Form, translated to English

INFORMED CONSENT

Dear Mr./Mrs./Ms.: ____

You have been invited to participate in the research project, "Democracy, Ideology, and Partisanship from a Transnational Perspective: Evidence of migrant voting in and from Ecuador (1979–2018)," led by researchers from Casa Grande University (Ecuador), Sebastián Umpierrez de Reguero and Gabriela Baquerizo Neira, and supported by Victoria Finn from the Diego Portales University (Chile) and Leiden University (the Netherlands), as an external researcher. The objective of this academic research project is to contribute to the literature on migrant voting, especially because Ecuador allows its foreign residents to participate in national-level elections. Through this document, you are being asked to participate in this research project by being a relevant actor within the study area. The purpose of this research is to identify patterns of migrant voting and its relationship with democracy, ideology, and party identification of Chilean, Colombian, Cuban, Spanish, Peruvian and Venezuelan migrant voters over time. In sum, the objectives of the research project are strictly academic—we have no connections with a government of any country.

Your participation is voluntary; it will consist of responding to a semi-structured interview, which will be carried out between August and October 2019. This research has academic purposes, which means the right to anonymity and confidentiality for all your answers. Your answers will be coded before publication of any results derived from the interviews, so that your name, career, and reputation would not be affected in any way from collaborating in this research (i.e., your name will not appear

in any publication). As such, once the interview has been transcribed verbatim, the information provided will be reviewed by the research team and numerical codes will be created for each interview, with the goal of maintaining a strictly confidential process. The project researchers will be in charge of storage of the coding information. You can obtain a copy of the transcribed document if you need it. There is no cost to you to participate in this study, nor will you receive any payment for your participation. You may refuse to participate at any time during the study and you may also choose which questions on the questionnaire to answer, and which to abstain from, for which you will face no consequences.

The information obtained will be used in scientific (university) production, abiding to the criteria indicated above. In the case of academic publications, you may request an electronic copy or a copy of the document from the researchers. Your collaboration in this research is very important to us. If you have any questions or concerns regarding your participation in the research project, you can contact the researchers in charge of this study, PhD Gabriela Baquerizo Neira and PhD (C) Sebastián Umpierrez de Reguero at the Casa Grande University, located at the following address: Avenida Las Palmas # 304 and calle 4ta, ciudadela Miraflores, Guayaquil-Ecuador; their contact phone number is: 593-4-2202180.

Part of the normal procedure in this type of research is to inform the participants and request their authorization. For this purpose, we ask you to answer and return the attached sheet (INFORMED CONSENT FORM) as soon as possible.

As the research study's aims, guaranteed confidentiality, and the information are all clear, I voluntarily accept to participate in the research, by signing the following authorization.

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

I ……………………………………………………………, of the following identity card or passport number, ………………………………….., accept to participate voluntarily and anonymously in the research project, "Democracy, Ideology, and Partisanship from a Transnational Perspective: Evidence of migrant voting in and from Ecuador (1979–2018)," led by research professors at the Casa Grande University (Ecuador), PhD Gabriela Baquerizo Neira and PhD (C) Sebastián Umpierrez de Reguero, in conjunction with PhD (C) Victoria Finn from the Diego Portales University (Chile) and Leiden University (the Netherlands).

I declare that I have been informed about this study's objectives and procedures, as well as the type of participation requested of me. In turn, I agree to participate in an interview to be held during the

period between August and October 2019. I declare that I know the information provided will be confidential and anonymous. The information obtained will be stored and analyzed by the research team, protected within the premises of the Casa Grande University, and its use will be only for academic purposes and scientific production.

______________________	______________________
Name of Participant	Name of Researcher
______________________	______________________
Signature	Signature
______________________	______________________
Date	Date

Appendix 3.6 Interview Questionnaire, Conducted August through October 2019 in Ecuador, (original in Spanish, followed by English)

SECCIÓN A. IDENTIFICACIÓN GENERAL

(1) ¿Cuál es su edad?	(________) años.

(2) ¿Cuál es su género?					
1. Femenino		2. Masculino		3. Prefiero no decirlo	

(3) ¿En qué país nació Usted?					
1. Chile		2. Colombia		3. Cuba	
4. España		5. Perú		6. Venezuela	

(4) ¿Cuál es su último nivel terminado de educación?					
1. Enseñanza primaria no terminada		2. Enseñanza primaria		3. Enseñanza Secundaria (Bachillerato)	

4. Formación técnica		5. Pregrado (Título Universitario)		6. Postgrado (Maestría, Diplomado, Doctorado)	

(5) ¿En qué año llegó Usted al Ecuador?					
1. Entre 1979–1984		2. Entre 1985–1989		3. Entre 1990–1994	
4. Entre 1995–1999		5. Entre 2000–2004		6. Entre 2005–2009	
7. Entre 2010–2014		8. Entre 2015–2019		9. Antes de 1979	

(6) Antes de migrar al Ecuador, ¿Usted migró a otro país?					
0. No		1. Sí		En caso de que haya respondido sí, puede indicarnos ¿qué país(es) y por cuánto tiempo?:	(a) ________________ (____ años) (b) ________________ (____ años) (c) ________________ (____ años)

(7) ¿Cuántos años más cree que vivirá Usted en Ecuador?					
1. Menos de un año		2. Entre 1 y 4 años		3. Entre 5 y 10 años	
4. Por siempre		5. No lo sé		6. No quiero decirlo	

SECCIÓN B. PARTICIPACIÓN ELECTORAL

(8.1) Pensando en *Ecuador*: ¿Cuán interesado está usted en la política aquí?							
1. Muy interesado/a		2. Poco interesado/a		3. Desinteresado/a		4. Completamente desinteresado/a	
(8.2) Pensando en su *país de origen*: ¿Cuán interesado está usted en la política allá?							
1. Muy interesado/a		2. Poco interesado/a		3. Desinteresado/a		4. Completamente desinteresado/a	

(9) ¿Está Usted registrado para votar en elecciones ecuatorianas?					
0. No		1. Sí		2. No lo sé	

(10.1) ¿Ha votado Usted en al menos una elección en Ecuador?					
0. No		1. Sí		2. No me acuerdo	
(10.2.) En caso de haber respondido sí: ¿se acuerda Usted cuándo? (Puede marcar varias opciones)					
1. 2019 (seleccionales y CPCCS)		2. 2018 (Consulta popular)		3. 2017 (Presidenciales y Legislativas)	

4. 2014 (seleccionales)		5. 2013 (Presidenciales y legislativas)		6. 2011 (referéndum y consulta popular)	
7. 2009 (presidenciales, legislativas y seccionales)				8. Elecciones previas	

(11) ¿Votará Usted en la elección presidencial de Ecuador en 2021?					
0. No		1. Sí		2. No lo sé	

(12) ¿Está Usted registrado para votar en elecciones de su país de origen?					
0. No		1. Sí		2. No lo sé	

(13) En el pasado, mientras Usted vivía todavía en su país de origen (antes de migrar), ¿votó en al menos una elección presidencial o parlamentaria *de allá*?					
0. No		1. Sí		2. No me acuerdo	

(14) En el pasado, mientras Usted residía en Ecuador (o sea, después de migrar), ¿votó en al menos una elección presidencial o parlamentaria de su país de origen, *desde aquí*?					
0. No		1. Sí		2. No me acuerdo	

(15) En el futuro, si Usted sigue residiendo en Ecuador, ¿votará *desde aquí* en la próxima elección de su país de origen?					
0. No		1. Sí		2. No lo sé	

(16) En la siguiente escala: ¿cómo se auto-identifica Usted en la política? (Por favor solo marque un número).												
Izquierda →	1	2	3	4	5	← Centro →	6	7	8	9	10	← Derecha

(17) ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está Usted con la siguiente afirmación: "La democracia es el mejor tipo de gobierno"?					
1. Totalmente de acuerdo		2. De Acuerdo		3. Ni en acuerdo ni en desacuerdo	
4. En desacuerdo		5. Totalmente en desacuerdo		6. Prefiero no opinar al respecto	

SECCIÓN C. PREGUNTAS ABIERTAS [ESTILO CONVERSACIÓN]

Sobre participación electoral:

- Por favor hábleme sobre una de sus experiencias electorales, sea en Ecuador o en su país de origen (nota: es relevante saber cuándo y dónde ocurrió la experiencia, en qué tipo de elección votó [por ejemplo: las presidenciales] y su contexto sociopolítico).
- En su opinión, ¿cuál es el principal obstáculo o limitante para votar en Ecuador? Así mismo, ¿cuál es el principal obstáculo o limitante para votar en su país de origen desde el exterior?
- Por el contrario, ¿qué lo motiva a Usted a votar en Ecuador? ¿Qué lo motiva a votar en su país de origen? ¿Cuáles son las razones más importantes para estas decisiones?
    a. *Solo para quienes NO votan en Ecuador y/o en su país de origen,* ¿cuáles son las razones para abstenerse de ejercer su voto, sea en Ecuador, en su país de origen o ambos?
- ¿Cree Usted que su voto impacta o genera un cambio en su país de origen? De igual manera, ¿cree que su voto impacta o genera un cambio en Ecuador? Sí es así, ¿cómo y de qué forma? [Por favor haga la diferencia entre los dos países].

Sobre cultura política y la socialización política:

- ¿Recuerda si su familia hablaba de política en la mesa o cuándo se reunía, mientras Usted era pequeño/a o en la adolescencia? ¿Su familia, por ejemplo, iba en grupo a votar o cada uno iba por su cuenta?
- ¿Se acuerda Usted de la primera vez que votó? ¿Su experiencia fue en Ecuador o en su país de origen? ¿En qué elecciones participó, eran ecuatorianas o de su país de origen? Por favor no dude en explayarse.
- ¿Siente que votar en un país (sea Ecuador o su país de origen) afecta sus decisiones o preferencias electorales futuras? Sí es así, ¿por qué y de qué manera? Por favor haga la diferencia entre los dos países.

Sobre democracia y la (re-)socialización política:

- ¿Cuál es o ha sido su percepción de la democracia *en su país de origen*, tanto cuándo decidió migrar al Ecuador, como en la actualidad mientras reside en el Ecuador? En la misma línea, ¿cuál es o ha sido su percepción de la democracia *ecuatoriana* antes de migrar y ahora que reside aquí?

- ¿Cree Usted que sus experiencias con la política de su país de origen cuando era pequeño/a, adolescente o antes de migrar al Ecuador, afectan actualmente cómo Usted interactúa o se relaciona con otras personas sobre política? Sí es así, ¿por qué y de qué manera?

Sobre identificación partidaria:

- ¿Su identificación partidaria es igual en los dos países? Es decir, ¿vota normalmente por partidos de izquierda o partidos de derecha en los dos países? Si no es así, ¿cuál sería la diferencia?
- ¿Cómo definiría su relación con los partidos y movimientos políticos ecuatorianos? ¿Se siente representado/a? ¿Podría hacer una breve comparación con su país de origen?
- En este sentido, ¿siente Usted que la perspectiva que tenía hacia los partidos políticos en su país de origen *viaja* a la perspectiva que tiene sobre los partidos ecuatorianos, o son casos diferentes?
- ¿Siente que su manera de votar cambió después de vivir en Ecuador? En particular, ¿siente que su relación con conceptos como la derecha o la izquierda, la democracia o los partidos políticos, cambió después de vivir en Ecuador?

SECCIÓN D. PERFIL MIGRANTE

(18.1) Actualmente, ¿cuál es su estatus legal en Ecuador?					
1. No tengo visa actualmente, o nunca la tuve		2. Estoy renovando mi visa		3. Tengo visa temporal (incluida Visa MERCOSUR)	
4. Tengo visa permanente		5. Tengo doble ciudadanía/nacionalidad		6. Hoy en día, soy solo ecuatoriano/a	
7. Estoy en trámite de asilo o soy asilado		8. Tengo estatus de refugiado		9. Prefiero no decirlo	
(18.2) *Solo para quienes NO son actualmente ecuatorianos*: ¿ha considerado Usted solicitar la nacionalidad ecuatoriana en el futuro?					
1. Sí, estoy tramitando la nacionalidad		2. Sí, muy probablemente		3. Quizás algún día lo considere	
4. No, no lo creo		5. Nunca lo haría		6. Prefiero no decirlo	
(18.3) *Solo para quienes tienen doble ciudadanía/nacionalidad*: ¿cuáles son sus dos ciudadanías/nacionalidades?					
(a) ____.					
(b) ____.					

(19) En Ecuador durante los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha sido Usted o alguien de su hogar discriminado/a o tratado injustamente, por una persona ecuatoriana, debido a ...? (Puede marcar varias opciones)					
1. Su nivel socioeconómico		2. Su ropa		3. Sus creencias o religión	
4. Ser inmigrante o extranjero/a		5. Su color de piel		6. Su manera de hablar	
7. No me he sentido discriminado/a		8. Otras formas de discriminación:		a) ____________________________. b) ____________________________.	

(20) Actualmente, ¿cuál es su principal actividad económica?					
1. Trabajo estable		2. Trabajo esporádico (temporal)		3. Cesante y buscando trabajo	
4. Cesante, pero no busco trabajo		5. Estudio y trabajo		6. Solo estudio	
7. No trabajo ni estudio		8. Jubilado/a o pensionado/a			

(21) Pensando en sus ingresos y en los de su grupo familiar, ¿cuál de las siguientes alternativas describe mejor su situación actual?			
1. No alcanzamos a cubrir nuestras necesidades		3. Nos permite darnos pequeños gustos	
2. Cubrimos nuestras necesidades básicas y nada más		4. Nos permite vivir cómodamente	

(22) ¿Qué tan frecuente viaja Usted a su país de origen?			
1. Nunca (ni una vez al menos en estos últimos cinco años)		2. Rara vez (una o dos veces en los últimos 5 años)	
3. Ocasionalmente (cada año o año por medio)		4. Frecuentemente (una hasta tres veces al año)	

(23.1) ¿Qué tan frecuente envía remesas a su país de origen al año?					
1. Nunca envío remesas		2. Solo en una emergencia		3. Entre 1 y 3 envíos por año	
4. Entre 4 y 6 envíos por año		5. Entre 7 y 10 envíos por año		6. Más de 10 envíos por año	
(23.2) Si envía remesas a su país de origen, ¿cuál es el monto promedio que manda por envío?					
1. Menos de $100		2. Entre $101 y $250		3. Entre $251 y $500	
4. Entre $501 y $1000		5. Superior a $1000		6. No quiero decirlo	

(24.1) En Ecuador: ¿Usted es un miembro activo de…? (Puede marcar varias opciones)							
1. Partido político ecuatoriano		2. Asociación civil de migrantes		3. ONG ecuatoriana		4. Ninguna de las opciones	
(24.2) Pensando en su país de origen ¿Usted actualmente es un miembro activo de…?							
1. Partido político del país de origen		2. Servicio diplomático		3. ONG de su país de origen		4. Ninguna de las opciones	

(25.1) Por favor, califique de 1 a 5 (siendo 1 nada y 5 mucho) su nivel de confianza hoy en día en relación a las instituciones *de su país de origen*:											
1. Partidos políticos	1	2	3	4	5	2. Presidencia	1	2	3	4	5
3. Policía	1	2	3	4	5	4. Fuerzas Armadas	1	2	3	4	5
5. Sistema Judicial	1	2	3	4	5	6. Sistema Legislativo	1	2	3	4	5
7. Entidad Electoral	1	2	3	4	5	8. Embajada/consulado	1	2	3	4	5

(25.2) Por favor, califique de 1 a 5 (siendo 1 nada y 5 mucho) su nivel de confianza hoy en día en relación a las siguientes instituciones *ecuatorianas*:											
1. Partidos políticos	1	2	3	4	5	2. Presidencia	1	2	3	4	5
3. Policía Nacional	1	2	3	4	5	4. Fuerzas Armadas	1	2	3	4	5
5. Sistema Judicial	1	2	3	4	5	6. Asamblea Nacional	1	2	3	4	5
7. CNE	1	2	3	4	5	8. Extranjería	1	2	3	4	5

¡Muchas gracias por haber participado de esta entrevista!

Interview Questionnaire, translated to English

SECTION A. GENERAL IDENTIFICATION

(1) How old are you?	(_______) years old.

(2) What is your gender?					
1. Feminine		2. Masculine		3. I prefer not to say.	

(3) In which country were you born?					
1. Chile		2. Colombia		3. Cuba	
4. Spain		5. Peru		6. Venezuela	

(4) What is your highest completed level of education?					
1. Unfinished basic education (primary/ middle school)		2. Basic education (primary/middle school)		3. High school	
4. Technical training		5. Undergraduate (university degree)		6. Postgraduate (master's, diploma, doctoral degree)	

(5) Which year did you move to Ecuador?					
1. Between 1979–1984		2. Between 1985–1989		3. Between 1990–1994	
4. Between 1995–1999		5. Between 2000–2004		6. Between 2005–2009	
7. Between 2010–2014		8. Between 2015–2019		9. Before 1979	

(6) Before moving to Ecuador, did you first migrate to another country?					
0. No		1. Yes		If you responded "yes," could you answer, which country (or countries) did you live in, and for how long?	(a) ________________ (____ years) (b) ________________ (____ years) (c) ________________ (____ years)

(7) How many more years do you plan to live in Ecuador?					
1. Less than a year		2. Between 1 and 4 years		3. Between 5 and 10 years	
4. Forever		5. I don't know.		6. I'd rather not say.	

SECTION B. ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION

(8.1) Thinking about *Ecuador*: How interested are you in politics here?							
1. Very interested		2. Somewhat interested		3. Uninterested		4. Completely uninterested	
(8.2) Thinking about your *origin country*: How interested are you in politics there?							
1. Very interested		2. Somewhat interested		3. Uninterested		4. Completely uninterested	

(9) Are you registered to vote in Ecuadorian elections?					
0. No		1. Yes		2. I don't know.	

(10.1) Have you voted in at least one election in Ecuador?					
0. No		1. Yes		2. I don't remember.	
(10.2.) If you responded "yes": Do you remember when you voted? (Select all that apply)					

1. 2019 (local/regional elections and CPCCS[93])		2. 2018 (referendum)		3. 2017 (presidential, legislative elections)	
4. 2014 (local/regional elections)		5. 2013 (presidential, legislative elections)		6. 2011 (referendums)	
7. 2009 (presidential, legislative, local/regional elections)				8. Prior elections	

(11) Will you vote in the 2021 presidential election in Ecuador?					
0. No		1. Yes		2. I don't know.	

(12) Are you registered to vote in elections in your origin country?					
0. No		1. Yes		2. I don't know.	

(13) In the past, while you still lived in your origin country (before emigrating), did you vote in at least one presidential or parliamentary election *there*?					
0. No		1. Yes		2. I don't remember.	

(14) In the past, while you were already living in Ecuador (after immigrating), have you voted in at least one presidential or parliamentary election for your origin country, voting *from here*?					
0. No		1. Yes		2. I don't remember.	

(15) In the future, if you continue living in Ecuador, will you vote *from here* in the next election in your origin country?					
0. No		1. Yes		2. I don't know.	

(16) In the following scale, where would you self-identity regarding politics? (Please select only one number)												
Left →	1	2	3	4	5	← Center →	6	7	8	9	10	← Right

(17) To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "Democracy is the best type of government"?					
1. Completely agree		2. Agree		3. Neither agree nor disagree	
4. Disagree		5. Completely disagree		6. I prefer not to offer an opinion.	

[93] CPCCS (*Consejo de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social*, or the Council for Citizen Participation and Social Control) was a one-time election to choose a group of members to serve on the council.

SECTION C. OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS [CONVERSATION STYLE]

Regarding electoral participation:

- Please tell me about an electoral experience you have had, either in Ecuador or in your origin country [Note: it is relevant to know when and where the experience occurred, in what type of election you voted, for example, presidential elections, and the sociopolitical context].
- In your opinion, what is the main obstacle or limitation for voting in Ecuador? Also, what is the main obstacle or limitation for voting in your origin country from abroad?
- Contrarily, what motivates you to vote in Ecuador? What motivates you to vote in your origin country? What are the most important reasons for you to make these decisions?
    a. *Only for those who do NOT vote in Ecuador and/or in their origin country*, what are the reasons to abstain from voting in Ecuador, the origin country, or both?
- Do you think your vote impacts, or generates a change, in your origin country? Similarly, do you think your vote impacts or generates a change in Ecuador? If so, how, and in what way? Please differentiate between the two countries.

Regarding political culture and political socialization:

- Do you remember if your family talked about politics at the dinner table or when they met, when you were young, or in your teenage years? Did your family, for example, go as a group to vote, or did they each go out on their own?
- Do you remember the first time you voted? Was your experience in Ecuador, or in your origin country? Which elections did you participate in—were they Ecuadorian or for your origin country? Please feel free to elaborate on the memory.
- Do you feel that voting in one country (either Ecuador or your origin country) affects your future electoral decisions or preferences? If so, why, and how? Please distinguish between the two countries.

Regarding democracy and political (re)socialization:

- What is, or has been, your perception of democracy in your origin country—both before moving to Ecuador and since living here? Along the same lines, what is or has been your perception of Ecuadorian democracy, both before migrating and now residing here?

- Do you think that your experiences with politics in your origin country—when you were a child, teenager, and before migrating to Ecuador—affect how you interact with or relate to others about politics today? If so, why, and how?

Regarding party identification:

- Is your political party identification the same in both countries? That is, do you normally vote for left-leaning or right-leaning parties in both countries? If not, what is the difference for you?
- How would you define your relationship with Ecuadorian political parties and movements? Do you feel represented? Could you make a brief comparison with those in your origin country?
- Along the same lines, do you feel that the perspective you had towards political parties in your origin country 'travels' to your views on Ecuadorian political parties, or are they different cases for you?
- Do you feel that your way of voting has changed since living in Ecuador? Specifically, do you feel that your relationship with concepts such as right- or left-leaning, democracy, or political parties, has changed since living in Ecuador?

SECTION D. MIGRANT PROFILE

(18.1) What is your current legal status in Ecuador?					
1. I don't currently have a visa, or I never had one.		2. I'm currently renewing my visa.		3. I have a temporary visa (including the Mercosur visa)	
4. I have a permanent visa.		5. I have dual citizenship/nationality.		6. I'm only Ecuadorian.	
7. I'm in the process of asking for asylum.		8. I have refugee status.		9. I prefer not to say.	
(18.2) *Only for those who are NOT currently Ecuadorian*: Have you considered applying for the Ecuadorian nationality sometime in the future?					
1. Yes, I'm currently in the processes of applying.		2. Yes, it's very likely.		3. Maybe someday I would consider it.	
4. No, I don't think so.		5. I would never apply.		6. I prefer not to say.	
(18.3) *Only for those who have dual citizenship/nationality*: What are your two citizenships/nationalities?					
(a) ____.					
(b) ____.					

(19) In Ecuador over the last 12 months, have you or someone in your household been treated unfairly or discriminated against by an Ecuadorian, for…? (Check all that apply)					
1. Your socioeconomic standing.		2. Your clothing		3. Your beliefs or religion	
4. Being an immigrant or foreigner		5. Your skin color		6. Your way of speaking	
7. I haven't felt discriminated against.		8. Another form of discrimination:	a) ________________________. b) ________________________.		

(20) What is your main current economic activity right now?					
1. I have a steady job.		2. I have a temporary or sporadic job.		3. I'm unemployed and looking for work.	
4. I'm unemployed but not looking for work.		5. I study and work.		6. I only study.	
7. I'm not working or studying.		8. I'm retired.			

(21) Considering your household income, which of the following best describe your current financial situation?			
1. We don't cover our basic needs.		3. Our income allows for a treat now and again.	
2. We cover our basic needs but nothing more.		4. Our income allows us to live comfortably.	

(22) How often do you travel to your origin country?			
1. Never (not even once in the last five years)		2. Rarely (once or twice in the last five years)	
3. Occasionally (once a year or every year and a half)		4. Frequently (even sometimes three times a year)	

(23.1) How often do you send remittances to your origin country every year?					
1. I never send remittances.		2. Only in emergencies		3. Between 1 and 3 times a year	
4. Between 4 and 6 times a year		5. Between 7 and 10 times a year		6. More than 10 times a year	
(23.2) If you send remittances to the origin country, on average, how much do you send each time?[94]					

[94] Remittances were asked in USD because Ecuador uses the US Dollar.

1. Less than $100		2. Between $101 and $250		3. Between $251 and $500	
4. Between $501 and $1000		5. More than $1000		6. I prefer not to say.	

(24.1) In Ecuador, are you an active member of…? (Check all that apply)							
1. Ecuadorian political party		2. Migrant civil association		3. Ecuadorian NGO		4. None of these	
(24.2) Thinking about your origin country, are you an active member of…? (Check all that apply)							
1. Political party in the origin country		2. Diplomatic service		3. NGO in the origin country		4. None of these	

(25.1) Please mark your confidence level from 1 to 5 (1 being very low and 5 being very high) in each of the following institutions *in your origin country*:											
1. Political parties	1	2	3	4	5	2. Office of President	1	2	3	4	5
3. Police	1	2	3	4	5	4. Armed forces	1	2	3	4	5
5. Judicial system	1	2	3	4	5	6. Legislative system	1	2	3	4	5
7. Electoral body	1	2	3	4	5	8. Embassy/Consulate	1	2	3	4	5

(25.2) Please mark your confidence level from 1 to 5 (1 being very low and 5 being very high) in each of the following institutions *in Ecuador*:											
1. Political parties	1	2	3	4	5	2. Office of President	1	2	3	4	5
3. National Police	1	2	3	4	5	4. Armed forces	1	2	3	4	5
5. Judicial system	1	2	3	4	5	6. Legislative system	1	2	3	4	5
7. CNE	1	2	3	4	5	8. Office of Foreign Affairs	1	2	3	4	5

Thank you for participating in this interview!

Appendix 3.7 Leaders in Selected Origin and Residence Countries, First Year of Regime and Full Name, 1979–2020 (Excluding Acting Presidents)

Chile

1973 (coup of Salvador Allende) Augusto José Ramón Pinochet Ugarte

1989 Patricio Aylwin Azócar

1994 Eduardo Alfredo Juan Bernardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle

2000 Ricardo Froilán Lagos Escobar

2006 Verónica Michelle Bachelet Jeria (1st term)

2010 Miguel Juan Sebastián Piñera Echenique (1st term)

2014 Verónica Michelle Bachelet Jeria (2nd term)

2018 Miguel Juan Sebastián Piñera Echenique (2nd term)

Source : www.memoriachilena.gob.cl/602/w3-article-3573.html#cronologia

Colombia

1978 Julio César Turbay Ayala

1982 Belisario Antonio Betancur Cuartas

1986 Virgilio Barco Vargas

1990 César Augusto Gaviria Trujillo

1994 Ernesto Samper Pizano

1998 Andrés Pastrana Arango

2002 Álvaro Uribe Vélez (1st term)

2006 Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2nd term)

2010 Juan Manuel Santos Calderón

2014 Juan Manuel Santos Calderón

2018 Iván Duque Márquez

Source : www.colombia.com/colombia-info/historia-de-colombia/presidentes-de-colombia/

Cuba

1959 Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz

2008 Raúl Modesto Castro Ruz (acting President in 2006; officially President in 2008)

2018 Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez

Source : www.ecured.cu/Presidente_de_Cuba

Ecuador

1979 Jaime Roldós Aguilera

1981 Luis Osvaldo Hurtado Larrea

1984 León Esteban Francisco Febres-Cordero Ribadeneyra

1988 Rodrigo Borja Cevallos

1992 Sixto Durán-Ballén Cordovez

1996 Abdalá Jaime Bucaram Ortíz

1997 Lupe Rosalía Arteaga Serrano

1997 Fabián Ernesto Alarcón Rivera

1998 Jorge Jamil Mahuad Witt

2000 Gustavo José Joaquín Noboa Bejarano

2003 Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez Borbúa

2005 Luis Alfredo Palacio González

2007 Rafael Vicente Correa Delgado (1st term)

2009 Rafael Vicente Correa Delgado (2nd term)

2013 Rafael Vicente Correa Delgado (3rd term)

2017 Lenín Boltaire Moreno Garcés

Sources : Mejía Acosta (2002); http://cne.gob.ec/es/component/tags/tag/atlas-electoral-del-ecuador

Peru

1975 Francisco Morales-Bermúdez Cerruti

1980 Fernando Belaúnde Terry

1985 Alan García Pérez (1st term)

1990 Alberto Fujimori (1st term)

1995 Alberto Fujimori (2nd term)

2000 Alberto Fujimori (3rd term)

2000 Valentín Paniagua Corazao

2001 Alejandro Toledo Manrique

2006 Alan Gabriel Ludwig García Pérez (2nd term)

2011 Ollanta Moisés Humala Tasso

2016 Pedro Pablo Kuczynski Godard

2018 Martín Alberto Vizcarra Cornejo

Sources : www.congreso.gob.pe/biblioteca/presidentes/2000-2021;
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-16097439

Venezuela

1979 Luis Antonio Herrera Campíns

1984 Jaime Ramón Lusinchi

1989 Carlos Andrés Pérez Rodríguez

1993 Ramón José Velázquez Mújica

1994 Rafael Antonio Caldera Rodríguez

1999 Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (1st term)

2000 Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (2nd term)

2002 Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (3rd term)

2007 Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (4th term)

2013 Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (5th term)

2013 Nicolás Maduro Moros (1st term)

2013 Nicolás Maduro Moros (2nd term)

2019 Nicolás Maduro Moros (3rd term; only partially recognized)

2019 Juan Gerardo Antonio Guaidó Márquez (only partially recognized)

Sources : https://www.venezuelatuya.com/historia/presidentes_de_venezuela.htm; www.cne.gob.ve

Appendix 3.8 Regimes of the World (RoW) Definitions and Operationalization

I used the following typology to classify regimes (in Table 3.4); after which I include the definition of each of the four types as well as a brief overview of operationalization.

Closed Autocracy	**Electoral Autocracy**	**Electoral Democracy**	**Liberal Democracy**
No *de-facto* multiparty, or free and fair elections, or Dahl's institutional prerequisites not minimally fulfilled		*De-facto* multiparty, free and fair elections, and Dahl's institutional prerequisites minimally fulfilled	
No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature	*De-jure* multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature	The rule of law, or liberal principles not satisfied	The rule of law, and liberal principles satisfied

Source: Recreated from Lührmann, Tannenberg, and Lindberg's (2018) Table 1.

According to the researchers' justification (Lührmann *et al.* 2018, pp. 3–4), de-jure multiparty elections are insufficient to make a regime a democracy because there is a lack of accountability between voters being able to reward or punish incumbents (or 'rulers') at the ballot—which is why they argue that democracy "requires not only free and fair elections but also the freedoms that make them meaningful." The main difference between the two types of autocracies is about direct or indirect elections for the executive and national legislature.

Regime Definitions

These definitions are from Lührmann and colleagues' (2018) RoW work.

1) Closed autocracy: "the chief executive and the legislature are either not subject to elections, or there is no de-facto competition in elections such as in one-party regimes. Regimes with elections that do not affect who is the chief executive (even if somewhat competitive) also fall into this category."

2) Electoral autocracy: "the chief executive is dependent on a legislature that is itself elected in de-jure multiparty elections (in parliamentary systems), directly elected alongside a separately elected legislature (in presidential systems), or a combination of both (in semi-presidential systems). In an

electoral autocracy, these institutions are de-facto undermined such that electoral accountability is evaded."

3) Electoral democracy: this regime achieves the basic criteria of "*de-facto* multiparty and free and fair elections" since this dimension is a "necessary, qualitative criteria for labelling a regime as a democracy."

4) Liberal democracy: "In addition to fulfilling the criteria for electoral democracy, liberal democracies are characterized by an additional set of individual and minority rights beyond the electoral sphere, which protect against the 'tyranny of the majority', thus having limits on government is intrinsic to democracy itself."

Operationalization Overview

The RoW regime typology is operationalized with data from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). Lührmann, Tannenberg, and Lindberg (2018: 5) explain the overall operationalization as follows: two main variables, which mirror V-DEM indicators, distinguish between autocracy and democracy: a) multiparty elections and b) free and fair elections. Only democracies have a sufficient score of each and meet the Electoral Democracy Index cut-off. Lacking one or the other indicators, or not meeting the cut-off, results in autocracy. On one hand, within autocracy, two variables distinguish between closed and electoral autocracies: a) multiparty elections executive and b) multiparty elections legislature. Insufficient scores on either one results in a closed autocracy. On the other hand, within democracy, not sufficiently meeting two variables, a) access to justice men/women and b) transparent law enforcement, results in electoral democracy. Meeting these two, plus being higher than the Liberal Component Index cut-off, results in liberal democracy. (For exact score cut-offs and their relation to V-Dem data, consult Lührmann, Tannenberg, and Lindberg 2018).

Accordingly, I code the selected origin and residence countries starting in 1979 when Ecuador returned to democracy, up until present, 2020, as:

Regimes of the World classification for selected origin countries and residence country:
0=closed autocracy; 1= electoral autocracy; 2=electoral democracy; 3=liberal democracy

Chile		**Colombia**		**Cuba**		**Ecuador**		**Peru**		**Venezuela**	
1979–1988	0	1979–1990	1	1979–Pres.	0	1979	1	1979	0	1979–2002	2
1989	1	1991–Pres.	2			1980–Pres.	2	1980	1	2003–Pres.	1
1990–1995	2							1981–1991	2		
1996–Pres.	3							1992–1994	0		
								1995–2000	1		
								2001–Pres.	2		

Source: Lührmann, A., Tannenberg, M., & Lindberg, S. I. (n.d.). Regimes of the World - the RoW measure (www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/).
Notes: 'Pres.' means present, as of 2020.

Curriculum Vitae

Victoria Finn was born on March 18, 1986, in Pittsfield, MA, in the United States. In 2007, she earned a Bachelor of Arts in Spanish and minor in Business Administration from the University of Central Florida and then attained a Master of Arts in International Affairs from the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University in 2013. She has worked in research centers, policy institutes, and international organizations in seven countries. She was a resident Visiting Doctoral Fellow in 2021 at Tallinn University, Estonia, and since 2018 has been an Affiliated Researcher at the Instituto de Investigación en Ciencias Sociales at the Universidad Diego Portales, Chile. She serves as an elected Co-Convener for the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Standing Group on Migration and Ethnicity and elected Executive Council Officer for the American Political Science Association (APSA) Migration and Citizenship Section. She researches migrant political participation, (non)citizenship, and South American migration governance. Her publications appear in *Citizenship Studies, International Political Science Review,* and *Latin American Policy*, among others. In late 2021, she began her post-doctoral position within the Global Citizenship research area at the European University Institute, Italy, as a Max Weber Fellow.